Developing the developed world?
The European Union Counter-Radicalisation discourse through the lens of critical development theories.

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Abstract

This thesis focuses on the governance strategy informing the Radicalisation Awareness Network discourse. It proposes an analysis that employs as categories of analysis concepts drawn from Critical Development Studies. This thesis aims to provide an answer to the following research question: to what extent is the EU radicalisation discourse, embodied in the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) policy recommendations, mobilizing a “liberal peace” governance project? It is argued that that the RAN has brought the focus towards the local level and communities, linking vulnerability and community membership, insisting in favour of tailor-made strategies that require responsible communities, and framing grievances linked to radicalisation as perceptions, in which, again, communities become the primary responsible of their management. It is also asserted that “key individuals” and “first-line practitioners” facilitate the implementation of a system of indirect rule. This thesis, hence, concludes that the RAN, like the “liberal peace” governance strategy, aims towards the empowerment of communities to turn them into stable entities that no longer pose a threat. In a way, the RAN strives towards “developing” communities inside the “developed” world.
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Introduction

In the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attack, the siege of a kosher supermarket\(^1\) in Paris, the antiterror raids\(^2\) in Belgium and the shootings in Copenhagen\(^3\) in the opening months of 2015, Europe was forced to re-think its counter-radicalisation strategies. The fact that the gunmen were born and raised in France, Belgium, and Denmark respectively raised the questions: What is the European Union (EU) doing to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism? Are the existing counter-radicalisation strategies effective?

The notions of radicalisation and counter-radicalisation are not new to Europe. They have been part of the political debate for years, particularly after the bombings in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005. Over the last 10 years, discussions have focused on “home-grown terrorism”, the factors that contribute to terrorism i.e. root causes, understanding “the process by which a terrorist is made”, and prevention (Coolsaet, 2010; Githens-Mazer & Lambert, 2010; Kundnani, 2015). As a result of these discussions the EU established a counter-terrorism strategy\(^4\) structured by four “pillars” in 2005. These pillars Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Respond. The European Council simultaneously adopted “The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to terrorism”, updated in 2008 and again in 2014\(^5\). Furthermore, in November 2010, the European

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Commission presented “The EU Internal Security Strategy (ISS)”\(^6\). Most recently in January 2014, the Commission presented the Communication: “Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU’s Response”\(^7\).

The EU considers fighting terrorism a national competence i.e. a responsibility of each of its Member States. The primary role of the EU hence, is to support national initiatives by creating legal framework for cooperation, providing funding for internal security, and developing common abilities (European Commission, 2015). As part of the support strategies in 2011 the European Commission launched the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) as an “umbrella network” to pool expertise, knowledge, and good practices with the collaboration of civil society members (including victims), local authorities, academics, and field experts. The RAN is an aiding body for Member States that provides input for national policies as well as “fostering dialogue and cooperation with civil society” (European Commission, 2015).

The RAN policy recommendations were considered in the drafting of the 2014 “Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism” and the 2014 Commission’s Communication “Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU’s Response”. These documents focus on “home-grown terrorism” and insist that strategies should go beyond traditional law enforcement techniques. The documents require the involvement of a wide array of actors including, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), experts, front-line practitioners, as well as civil society and communities. Furthermore, these documents call on the need to provide training for those acting “on the ground” and who are closer to the communities, promote the empowerment of communities, and encourage close cooperation between Member States.

The novelty of these documents rests on the fact that such policies had previously not commonly been applied within the EU. The delineated strategies, new to the internal affairs of the EU, are in fact very similar to the policies the EU has long supported overseas primarily under the development discourse. The development discourse, for instance has, in


broad terms, also asserted the need to engage communities for their own development and employs a wide array of actors to that end; yet it has rarely focused its efforts on the EU territories, hence making it even more interesting to find that present counter-radicalisation policies present a similar approach. In light of this, I would like to explore whether both discourses share more aspects and, if possible, whether the existing knowledge about development could potentially be applied to counter-radicalisation studies. The discourse of development has been extensively discussed in academia and has evolved and changed distinctly over the last 50 years, hence for comparison purposes it is more practical to start with the annual United Nations Human Development Report (UNHDR) that marks the milestones of worldwide development and provides a sharp overview of the present policies and strategies. Therefore, in order to further explore the similarity between the development discourse and the counter-radicalisation discourse of the EU, it is useful to contrast four key elements of the EU’s discourse with the 2014 UNHDR.

The first element refers to “shared responsibilities” of the state and society. The discourse of the EU asserts that fighting terrorism is a national responsibility that should be shared with local communities, civil society, the private sector, and NGOs. The focus of the EU is on joint efforts to “enhance trust and transparency”; this “will help make individuals more resilient to terrorist ideology and less vulnerable to radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism” (Council of the European Union, 2014, p. 10). Similarly, the UNHDR asserts that, “collective action is needed” there is a need to “bring together states, international organizations, civil society and the private sector in common support of building more-resilient global systems” (2014, p. 8) The EU counter-radicalisation discourse and the development discourse hence aim to promote stronger communities through widespread engagement and shared responsibilities in the face of threats, be this terrorism, natural disaster, or a financial crisis.

The second element concerns the differentiation between groups of individuals. The discourse of the EU differentiates between non-violent majorities and the “others” i.e. those that are more prone to be radicalized. This is particularly visible through the appeals of the EU discourse to “emphasize the voice of the majority which favours moderation and rejects recourse to violence” (Council of the European Union, 2014, p. 7). Correspondingly, the development discourse has been traditionally organized on a dichotomy i.e.
developed/underdeveloped states\(^8\) (see Cowen & Shenton, 1996; Sörensen, 2010). The 2014 UNHCR addresses a slightly different categorization of individuals and refers to vulnerable populations and those “less vulnerable” or more capable to overcome adverse conditions. The use of the “vulnerability” category by the UN aims to address the fact that vulnerability is not necessarily limited to a certain group of individuals *per se*. It is in fact a risk all individuals face, but some are better equipped to face this risk than others. The discourse of the EU has built its categorization on a similar assumption. Both discourses stand on a dichotomous differentiation of individuals in which one group is more “at risk” than the other.

The third element refers to the “underlying factors” of vulnerability and radicalisation. The discourse of the EU identifies as “factors that may be conducive to radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism” the “perceptions of diverse nature, among them inequality, marginalization, social exclusion, and a difficult access to quality education” (Council of the European Union, 2014, p. 6). Likewise, the development discourse has identified such factors, among others, as leading to underdevelopment. The UNHCR particularly emphasizes as “important underlying factors of vulnerability [...] exclusion and discrimination” (2014, p. 17). It is clear that there is an almost identical definition of underlying factors for both radicalisation and vulnerability.

The fourth element concerns strategies and policies. Both discourses share the view for the need for a wide engagement of actors and shared responsibilities between the state, civil society, and the private sector. The EU works towards,

promoting inter-cultural dialogue, strengthening education to enable opportunities and critical thinking, and promoting tolerance and mutual respect, exchanging viewpoints and communicating to civil society the success in these areas. (Council of the European Union, 2014).

Likewise, the UNHCR sets forth a strategy focused at “enabling the disadvantaged and excluded to realize their rights, to express their concerns openly, to be heard and to become active agents in shaping their destiny” (2014, p. 5). These discourses hence stress the need to employ similar strategies to address radicalisation and vulnerability that could be summarized as partnership, engagement, dialogue, and empowerment.

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\(^8\) President Harry S. Truman inaugural speech in 1949 is considered the pivotal moment for the establishment of the dichotomy. Truman called “for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas” (Cowen & Shenton, 1996, p. 6; Sörensen, 2010, p. 4). This “speech act” re-defined a number states as underdeveloped and legitimate subjects of intervention.
There is one final similarity between the EU counter-radicalisation discourse and the development discourse. Both discourses delineate strategies that act between security concerns and a social/developmental agenda of sorts. It is unnecessary to elaborate on the grounds for this affirmation concerning the counter-radicalisation discourse; it follows from the brief overview of the EU strategy on counter-radicalisation that traditional military and police strategies have lost pre-eminence to more comprehensive approaches e.g. emphasizing community cohesion and participation. As with the development discourse, it is important to consider the “development-security nexus⁹” as the process by which “the issues of security and development have come to be merged” (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010, p. 123). According to Critical Development Theories, in particular the work of Mark Duffield, there has been a process of radicalisation of development which implies a “shift in aid policy towards conflict resolution and societal reconstruction” (2001a, p. 2). In other words, development policies have increasingly shifted towards a more comprehensive approach including security concerns. Therefore, it can be argued that both the development discourse and the counter-radicalisation discourse act between security concerns and a social/developmental agenda.

To summarize, there is a clear similarity between the discourse of the EU and the development discourse. Both share a dichotomous differentiation of individuals, identify a similar range of underlying factors, frame strategies through a wide engagement of actors and shared responsibilities, and support policies pertaining partnership, engagement, dialogue, and empowerment. Lastly they can both be placed midway between social engagement and security concerns.

Building on these similarities, this thesis focuses on exploring the governance rationality underpinning the EU counter-radicalisation discourse embodied in the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) policy documents. As a starting point it refers to the similarities between the governance rationality of the development discourse, defined

⁹The development-security nexus refers to the connection between development policy and security concerns. The first link between development and security took place with the outset of the Cold War. Development was used as an instrument to “prevent areas [states] from falling into communism” (Sörensen, 2010, p. 5). Around the 1980’s the new concern about underdevelopment was that “unstable areas risked producing refugees and developing illiberal or shadow economies [...]” (Duffield, 2001, p. 27; Sörensen, 2010, p. 5). Underdevelopment was thus construed as a threat to the developed world (Duffield & Hewitt, 2009; Duffield, 2001a; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010; Sörensen, 2010). The reprioritisation of underdevelopment was also connected to neoliberal paradigm, which prompted a decline on the importance of the state and an incorporation of individuals as main actors in the development agenda.
by Mark Duffield (2001a), as a political project that aims not only to solve certain deficiencies of underdeveloped societies but also to transform them into stable entities that no longer pose a threat to the developed world, and the works of Charlotte Heath-Kelly (2013), Lasse Lindekilde (2012), and Francesco Ragazzi (2015a, 2015b) regarding the governance strategies of counter-radicalisation policies. These authors assert that these policies are building on a neo-liberal governance strategy, that promotes liberal values, the empowerment of individuals, and community engagement. Hence, the following is the research question for this thesis; *to what extent is the EU radicalisation discourse, embodied in the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) policy recommendations, mobilizing a “liberal peace” governance project?*

The RAN discourse is analysed through a sociological discourse analysis method. Chapters 2 and 3 explore the validity of the following hypothesis, introduced in chapter 1: *the EU counter-radicalisation discourse emerging from the RAN justifies (1) a shift of responsibilities from the state towards the communities by promoting empowerment and partnership strategies and (2) by insisting on the importance of key individuals and first-line practitioners legitimizes de facto, a system of indirect rule.* Each segment of the hypothesis is analysed in a different chapter.

The second chapter traces 1) how the RAN has brought the focus towards the local level and communities, linking vulnerability and community membership and 2) how the RAN has argued in favour of tailor-made strategies that require responsible communities; and 3) how the RAN has framed grievances linked to radicalisation as perceptions and as such has shifted the responsibility of their management to the community. These three processes engage communities and somewhat disengage the state. In brief, this chapter asserts that in the RAN discourse the state is no longer a visible actor, whereas communities are in turn expected to become active, responsive, and responsible i.e. self-reliant.

The third chapter outlines the similarities between "key individuals", "first-line practitioners", and “native administrators”. The overall conclusion of these comparisons is that both first-line practitioners and key individuals facilitate the implementation of a governance strategy of indirect rule concerning radicalisation.

The final chapter presents an overview of the findings and asserts that the RAN effectively mobilizes a "liberal peace" governance project. It does this by supporting key individuals and first-line practitioners as indirect administrators and insisting on empowering and rendering vulnerable communities self-reliant. In summary this final
chapter asserts that the EU counter-radicalisation discourse aims to transform communities into stable entities that no longer pose a threat. Furthermore, this chapter addresses the broader political implications of the EU discourse and asserts that through these policies, the state manages to acquire greater control of communities by embedding the counter-radicalisation discourse into the narratives of key individuals and first line practitioners. This has the effect of limiting the political dialogue inside communities as well as limiting the political engagement of the state with communities since possible alternative narratives are silenced.
Chapter 1: Setting the scene: counter-radicalisation and development

Having introduced the similarities of the counter-radicalisation discourse and the development discourse in the last section, this chapter aims to “set the scene” for the research that will be conducted in this thesis. Firstly, it presents an overview of the existing literature that has grappled with the governance strategy of counter-radicalisation policies. Secondly, it is shown that the neo-liberal governance strategy as explained in the existing literature, while not widely researched in radicalisation scholarship, has been already extensively addressed in the works of critical development theories, namely that of Mark Duffield. Therefore, it seems adequate to employ this literature as a source of categories of analysis to comprehend the EU counter-radicalisation discourse. The next section of this chapter introduces the categories of “liberal peace”, “self-reliance”, and “indirect ruling”. Next, the documents from the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) are presented as the object of study of this thesis. With this, the following hypothesis is introduced, “the EU counter-radicalisation discourse emerging from the RAN (1) justifies a shift of responsibilities from the state towards the communities by promoting self-reliance, and (2) by insisting on the importance of key individuals and, first-line practitioners legitimizes de facto a system of indirect rule.” Lastly, an overview of the research design of this thesis is presented.

Counter-radicalisation policies: is there a governance strategy?

Radicalisation has gained salience over the last 10 years both in the public policy realm and in academia. The concept of radicalisation was supposed to open doors for coherent and objective research on how terrorism comes to being and help set forth possible preventive measures (Kundnani, 2015, p. 15). However, the discourse of radicalisation has been “circumscribed by the demands of counter-terrorist policy-makers” (Kundnani, 2015, p. 15). As such, much of the scholarship that aimed to present a reflection on the causes for terrorism has been restricted by very particular and limiting conceptions that could be summarized in the following question: “why do some individual Muslims support an extremist interpretation of Islam that leads to violence?” (Kundnani, 2015, p. 16) Consequently, most of the existent literature has been unfortunately created to fulfil the needs of governments and policy makers rather than to actually research the subject of radicalisation.

Authors working towards fulfilling policy-makers requirements have focused on an account of root causes of radicalisation that can be summarized as “individual psychological
or theological journeys, largely removed from social and political circumstances” (Kundnani, 2015, p. 16). These accounts of ‘root causes’ have encouraged the establishment of policies based on the idea that it is possible to “pre-empt future terrorist attacks through intensive surveillance of the spiritual and mental lives of Muslims” (Kundnani, 2015, p. 30). These policies have mostly aimed towards prevention of radicalisation and established a particular governance system of communities.

In this context, and with Muslim communities at the heart of counter-radicalisation, a considerable amount of researchers have focused on the effects of these policies. Moreover, a limited amount of scholars have focused on analysing not only the effects of the policies on Muslim communities but also the underpinning rationality of the policies i.e. the governance strategy enacted. Most of the scholarship addressing, albeit not always directly, the governance strategy of counter-radicalisation policies can be divided into two groups. The first group of authors focus on the idea that counter-radicalisation policies produce “suspect communities” and concomitant alienation. Authors of this group have focused mostly on the effects of counter-radicalisation policies on Muslim communities. Authors like Arun Kundnani (2009, 2012, 2015), Lella Nouri and Andrew Whiting (2015), and Christina Pantazis and Simon Pemberton (2009) refer mostly to the idea that counter-radicalisation policies are producing “suspect communities” and the alienation of those communities. For instance, Pantazis and Pemberton, who define a suspect community as “a sub-group of the population that is singled out for state attention as being problematic” (2009, p. 649), argue that Muslim Communities, in particular Salafists and Islamists, have been construed as posing a threat, and as such have become a “suspect community”. Pantazis and Pemberton further stress that “suspicion” in these policies is not directly linked to a possible wrongdoing but to being a member of a particular community, and that those communities are now at the center of security concerns and policies. Similarly, Arun Kundnani, analysing the United Kingdom (UK) Prevent policy, argues that this policy “constructs the Muslim population as a ‘suspect community’ [and] fosters social divisions among Muslims themselves and between Muslims and others”(2009, p. 8). Moreover, Nouri and Whiting (2015) also focus on the UK Prevent strategy and argue that it further “compounds the construction of suspect communities through a discourse of vulnerable people that disproportionately focuses on young British Muslims” (2015, p. 175). Likewise, Sophie Body-Gendrot (2008) while not employing the category “suspect community” analyses the negative effects for Muslims of being categorized as a community “at risk”. Overall, these
The authors’ main assertion is that the most important effect of the counter-radicalisation policies is that as “at risk” or as “suspect” communities these populations become alienated, and the centre of security concerns. However, these authors, while asserting that this communities are being managed, do not deal directly with the governance strategy underpinning the counter-radicalisation polices, nor do they address the fact that these governance strategies can have contrasting effects on different members of a single community.

The second group of authors, namely Lasse Lindekilde (2012), Charlotte Heath-Kelly (2013) and Francesco Ragazzi (2015a, 2015b), addresses these shortcomings and takes into consideration both the possible contrasting effects of counter-radicalisation policies on different individuals inside a same community and the governance strategy underpinning counter-radicalisation policies. This thesis draws upon the work from these authors. Lasse Lindekilde (2012) and Charlotte Heath-Kelly (2013) focus mostly on the governance rationality underpinning counter-radicalisation policies and assert that these policies enact neoliberal governance strategies aiming towards transforming radicals into liberal individuals. Francesco Ragazzi (2015a, 2015b) also concentrates on the underpinning governance strategy of counter-radicalisation policies, but is more focused on the contrasting effects of the policies on different members of the same community. Lindekilde (2012) asserts that counter-radicalisation policies in Denmark are enacting a neo-liberal governance strategy aiming at “transforming, shaping, and disciplining illiberal and violence-prone “radicals” into active, liberal citizens” (Lindekilde, 2012, p. 110). Similarly, Heath-Kelly (2013) asserts that within the UK Prevent strategy communities became both the object and the subject of security practices. That is to say, communities become the battleground on which radicalisation is to be fought, and at the same time they become protagonists in counter-radicalisation strategies (Heath-Kelly, 2013, p. 402). As protagonists, communities and individuals are expected to develop self-management capabilities, i.e. become responsible. Heath-Kelly and Lindekilde hence identify a neoliberal form of governance, focused on empowering individuals and promoting liberal values as the underpinning rationality of counter-radicalisation policies. Francesco Ragazzi (2015a) draws similar conclusions as regards the governance rationality of counter-radicalisation policies, namely identifying empowerment strategies and also bringing to the forefront the issue of the contrasting effects of counter-radicalisation policies on different members of a same community (2015b). According to Ragazzi, this means that there is differentiation in
the communities albeit with fragile and shifting borders; there are cases in which individuals can be alienated as the “suspect community” scholars maintain, however there are other cases in which individuals can also establish themselves in key positions to interact with the government, and as such not be necessarily alienated (2015b).

To summarize, Lasse Lindekilde (2012), Charlotte Heath-Kelly (2013) and Francesco Ragazzi (2015a, 2015b) identify a neo-liberal form of governance enacted by counter-radicalisation policies. This governance strategy organizes the way in which communities are engaged and also the way in which communities can, in turn, engage the state. Additionally, it presupposes the promotion of liberal values, empowerment of individuals and communities, and partnership strategies. To a certain extent these authors agree with Kundnani (2009, 2012, 2015), Nouri and Whiting (2015), and Pantazis and Pemberton (2009) that counter-radicalisation policies produce “suspect communities”. These authors and particularly Ragazzi, further emphasize the need to account for the fact that some members of the communities are able to engage the state or be engaged by the state and are not alienated. Other community members however do become alienated. Consequently, this literature provides a good starting ground to develop research on the governance strategy of the counter-radicalisation discourse of the EU.

Yet, while conclusions of these aforementioned authors’ represent an innovative approach to counter-radicalisation policies, this particular governance strategy is not an entirely new phenomenon. In fact, similar conclusions as regards the governance rationality of the development discourse have been drawn by the existing critical development literature. Mark Duffield (2001a, 2001b, 2005, 2006, 2009) for instance, has asserted that the development discourse has a governance rationality that promotes strategies of community engagement, empowerment of individuals, the advancement of liberal values, as well as having a differentiated effect on communities in which some members are engaged while others are alienated. Therefore, since the literature on critical development is more extensive, it seems wise to employ the concepts developed by Mark Duffield as categories of analysis.

The Development-Security Nexus: A “liberal peace” governance project

Following the overview of the existing literature on the governance rationality of counter-radicalisation policies, and having asserted that there are similarities between the conclusions of this literature and research on the governance strategy of the development discourse, this section introduces the categories of analysis that will be employed in this
thesis. These categories of analysis are namely the "liberal peace" category and the concepts of "self-reliance" and "indirect ruling".

Mark Duffield (2001a, 2001b, 2005, 2006, 2009) has focused both on the security-development nexus and the governance rationality in the development discourse. He introduces the category of liberal peace as the “consensus that conflict [...] is best approached through a number of connected, ameliorative, harmonizing and, especially, transformational measures” (2001a, p. 11). Duffield’s main argument is that the radicalisation of development i.e. the “shift in aid policy towards conflict resolution and societal reconstruction” (2001a, p. 2) entails the emergence of a global liberal governance project. A “network of global governance” comprises this governance project where governments, NGOs, the private sector, and military establishments converge. In addition, the project aims at social transformation. For Duffield, liberal peace is the underlying rationality organizing the development discourse. Liberal peace aims to change “hearts and minds” which, according to Duffield, refers to the way that “people in the South are no longer ordered what to do – they are now expected to do it willingly themselves. [...] Partnership and participation imply the mutual acceptance of shared normative standards and frameworks” (2001a, p. 34). Liberal peace, hence, represents the combination of liberal values with security concerns. It is not a strategy, but a political project, a rationality organizing the development discourse. It aims not only to “solve” certain deficiencies of underdeveloped societies but also to change them as a whole. The transformation requires direct action and will only be possible through a network of global governance. The strategies that are employed are expected to solve conflict and transform societies into stable entities that no longer pose a threat to the developed world.

The governance rationality of liberal peace is more clearly understood through the concepts of “self-reliance” and “indirect ruling” (Duffield, 2005). Self-reliance presupposes an individual (or community) that is capable dictating and altering one’s own future. Individuals are “valued in terms of their ability to embrace risk and effectively manage life’s risks and contingencies” (Duffield, 2005, p. 152). This is directly linked to the notions of interest, participation, and “active citizenship” which render individuals or even communities as stakeholders (Harrison, 2004, p. 103). Self-reliance is the capability of an individual or a community to survive within their means. This implies that survival is not directly linked to actions or structural changes from the government or any administrative institution. In fact, with the particular shift of the focus of development towards individuals,
effective changes of material aspects are no longer a priority. As Vanessa Pupavac posits “development becomes a form of therapeutic governance focused on enhancing people's capacities, motivation and sense of well-being within their existing material circumstances” (2005, p. 173). Self-reliance then explains the process through which structural changes, e.g. eliminating poverty, are diluted and replaced with capacity-building strategies and individual focus. In short, communities are changing, yet their structural challenges, i.e. inequality and poverty, are not.

These self-reliant communities are managed and secured through a process of “indirect ruling”. Indirect ruling, in the development discourse, is related to the notion of fragile state. In the words of Duffield a fragile state is a “more or less sovereign void and, in relation to legitimate rule, an ungoverned space” (Duffield, 2009, p. 117); a fragile state thus represents a threat that requires intervention; it needs to be managed and contained. Yet, management, within the framework of self-reliant individuals and communities, cannot be structured through direct intervention. Consequently, the concept of native administration is set forth. Native administration presupposes the existence of an interlocutor capable of building alliances, between those who are ruling at a distance and the communities (Duffield, 2005, p. 144). Indirect ruling hence strengthens the administrative capacities of the community, while at the same time establishing a system of strict control over it.

To summarize, the categories of analysis this thesis will employ are “liberal peace”, “self-reliance”, and “indirect ruling”. These categories of analysis represent a two-level analysis. Firstly, “liberal peace” presents an overarching governance strategy focused on individuals, working towards the connection of networks, and with the aim of long-standing conflict resolution. The goal of “liberal peace” is social change, which should put an end to the threat of underdeveloped populations. Liberal peace employs global governance networks, which are the place of convergence of state and non-state actors communicating and coordinating actions and strategies (Duffield, 2001a, p. 73). “Self-reliance” refers to the way in which changes are achieved within communities. Through a complex set of strategies that are concentrated in creating empowered individuals and communities, social transformation should be possible. This also entails a shift from structural changes and responsibilities, for example addressing poverty, to social and internal changes, e.g. creating individuals able to succeed within their own lives and means. Lastly, “indirect ruling” represents the way in which the governance strategy is executed. With self-reliant individuals the state looses pre-eminence. The management of these communities takes
place through governance networks and through the same individuals that have been empowered (Duffield, 2005, p. 144).

Object of study and hypothesis

Once the categories of analysis have been determined the object of study, which is EU counter-radicalisation discourse embodied in the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) policy documents, will be outlined. In order to fully comprehend the EU’s discourse, it is important to keep in mind that the EU position on fighting terrorism is that it is a national responsibility. The EU aims to “support Member States’ efforts” (European Commission, 2014, p. 3). Hence the states remain responsible for implementing and designing their own policies or strategies. Therefore, policy documents such as the Communication from the Commission about “Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU’s Response”, and the “Revised Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism” are guidelines presented to help states devise their own strategies. Each state’s strategies will differ in light of their own needs and any EU document will not necessarily comprise all of the member states positions, but will possibly present a middle ground between the different views.

Considering the abovementioned caveat, grasping the scope of the EU discourse or at least a considerable amount of it requires access to a set of documents that take into consideration the different state’s views, and still put forward a unified position on counter-radicalisation. An effective approach is to consider the documents emanating from the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN). This network was created to define “alternatives to terrorist narratives” (European Commission, 2010, p. 8) with the collaboration of civil society members (including victims), local authorities, academics, and field experts by sharing good practices and creating a pool of experiences and knowledge. It is considered “an umbrella network connecting people involved in preventing radicalisation and violent extremism throughout Europe” (European Commission, 2013). This network is organized into eight thematic groups\(^\text{10}\). It can be characterized as a “knowledge hub”, a place where

\(^{10}\text{RAN POL: the possible role of local and community police in preventing radicalisation leading to violent extremism and/or to terrorism. RAN the use of Voices of Victims of Terrorism in fighting radicalisation leading to violent extremism and/or to terrorism. RAN @ Internet as a counter-messaging vector. RAN early interventions with individuals and groups most vulnerable to radicalisation leading to violent extremism and/or to terrorism. RAN getting out of radicalisation leading to violent extremism and/or to terrorism. RAN P&P the possible role of prison administration and other actors working in prisons and during probation in the fight against radicalisation leading to violent extremism and/or to terrorism. RAN HEALTH awareness raising in the health sector. RAN INT/EXT from radicalisation to foreign fighters / what role can the diaspora play in the fight}
information is gathered, processed, and translated into policy recommendations. Therefore, to comprehend the RAN as a “knowledge hub” that produces a unified and legitimate discourse makes it possible to apprehend, if not in its entirety, an extensive part of the EU counter-radicalisation discourse. More precisely, the EU’s discourse becomes analysable by addressing the documents emanating from the RAN.

Consequently, having presented the category of “liberal peace” as category of analysis as well as having explained why the policy documents from the RAN contain what could be considered a sufficiently accurate part of the EU counter-radicalisation discourse, the following can be posited as a hypothesis:

_The EU counter-radicalisation discourse emerging from the RAN (1) justifies a shift of responsibilities from the state towards the communities by promoting self-reliance, and (2) by insisting on the importance of key individuals, first-line practitioners and their networks, legitimizes de facto a system of indirect rule._

**Research Design:**

**Method of data generation and sources:**

This research will be performed using an interpretive research design. Data will be generated through documentary collection methods for primary sources. I will refer to the existing and public documents from the RAN. These include the RAN Charter (2011); the RAN “Best Practices Collection” (2014); the “Discussion Papers” of the 2013 and 2014 High Level Conferences; the “Policy Recommendations” from the eight working groups drafted for the 2013 High Level Conference; all of the “RAN Update” documents; the 2014 “Cities Conference Paper on Foreign Fighters”; and the 2015 “Manifesto for Education: Empowering Educators and Schools”.

**Method of analysis:**

The data will be analysed through a sociological discourse analysis method. Three levels of discourse analysis will be employed: textual analysis, contextual analysis and sociological analysis. The overarching assumption is that these levels of analysis interact constantly – are

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interconnected – and as such should be considered together. While the analysis will be circular or bi-directional between levels, I will explain each of the methods separately.

The basic assumption of textual analysis is that the text of the discourse is conveying meaning and can be treated as an object of study in itself. Textual analysis aims to characterize the discourse i.e. to determine its composition and structure. In order to do so, I will employ content and thematic analysis hence breaking down the text into units and topics, accounting for their order of appearance, and interconnection with the other topics. However, thematic analysis is based on the assumption that there is a widespread shared meaning of the discourse, which is not necessarily the case for, as Ruiz Ruiz asserts, “discourses use language (shared meanings) as a means of expression, but in doing so they also modify or renew it” (Ruiz Ruiz, 2009). Consequently it is necessary to problematize that meaning. To do so, a the level of textual analysis, I will employ formal semiotic analysis, that focuses on the effects of meaning at the enunciation level of forms of speech.

The second level, the contextual level of analysis assumes that a discourse is the product of certain subjects immersed in a particular reality and time and as such it acquires a particular meaning. However, this type of analysis focuses too much on the meaning agents give to it. Therefore, it is also necessary to resort to the third level of analysis.

The sociological analysis, and third level of analysis is instrumental for the formulation of the interpretation of the discourse. This process “involves making connections between the discourses analysed and the social space in which they have emerged” (Ruiz Ruiz, 2009). I will focus on an ideological form of analysis (van Dijk, 1999) in which “discourse is [...] understood to mirror mechanisms of ideological domination” (Ruiz Ruiz, 2009). The final product of the overall analysis will be possible by employing abductive logic in the combined readings of the three levels of analysis. The analysis will follow a chronological order of the RAN's documents, starting with the RAN Charter to the last RAN Update, which announces the transformation of the RAN into the “RAN Centre of Excellence”11 by October 2015 (Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), 2015).

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Scope and Limits:

The proposed analysis of the EU counter-radicalisation discourse in this thesis will focus only on one set of information. This is the information produced by the RAN. Consequently, the research will not necessarily cover all of the existing discourses (e.g. individual national discourses), nor will it be able to provide information about the variations or changes within these discourses or the different views from each Member State. However, in as much the RAN is presented as a “knowledge hub” for the EU, meaning it aims to convey the existing positions about radicalisation in order to create a unified, legitimate discourse, this analysis will therefore be able to present some generalizable conclusions about the overall radicalisation discourse in the EU.
Chapter 2: “Self-reliant” communities and the shift in responsibilities

In order to delineate the governance rationality organizing the EU counter-radicalisation discourse embodied in the RAN documents, the following hypothesis was introduced: the EU counter-radicalisation discourse emerging from the RAN (1) justifies a shift of responsibilities from the state towards the communities by promoting self-reliance and (2) by insisting on the importance of key individuals, first-line practitioners, and their networks legitimizes de facto a system of indirect rule. This chapter will focus on the shift of responsibilities from the state towards the communities via the promotion of self-reliance i.e. part 1 of the hypothesis.

The argument of this chapter is twofold. First it is argued that the RAN has legitimized a shift of responsibilities from the state towards communities by 1) promoting a refocus of the counter-radicalisation discourse towards the local level and communities; 2) emphasising the existence of a link between an individual’s vulnerability and his/her membership to a particular community; 3) defining radicalisation as a local issue that requires local solutions, active communities, and asserting that it can be contained inside those communities; 4) stressing the need for ‘tailor made’ strategies that speak to each community in culturally specific ways, which comprises the inclusion of local actors and communities as responsible subjects and implementers of counter-radicalisation strategies; and 5) framing grievances as feelings or perceptions that can be directly addressed by communities. Secondly it is argued that these 5 elements of the RAN discourse promote the construction of “vulnerable” communities into self-reliant communities. This implies that these communities are expected to manage their own destiny and be self-sufficient within their own means. This implies a disengagement of the state from its responsibilities. In summary, it is argued that the RAN defends a management of vulnerable communities similar to that employed in the development discourse; that is by turning vulnerable communities into self-reliant communities it is promoting a shift of responsibilities and state’s disengagement.

Bringing communities to the forefront.

The RAN documents re-focus the discourse towards a 'local level' and the communities asserting that the work of the network is primarily directed towards these. This is visible throughout the RAN’s documents, particularly in the introductory section of its Charter. The Charter asserts that the network is
aimed at promoting actions to empowering communities and key groups engaged in the prevention of violent radicalisation and recruitment (Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), 2011).

This clearly conveys that the primary focus of the network is to work with communities. The Charter also states albeit secondarily that the RAN also plays a role to “support the policy process at the EU and Member States level” (Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), 2011). Correspondingly, in the first RAN Update (2012a) the commitment of the RAN towards the local level and local actors is mentioned firstly and the support to Member States’ policy processes is mentioned later on in the text. Similar text constructions can be found throughout the RAN Updates up to 2015, as well as in the policy recommendations of the eight RAN Working Groups. Conversely, the EU Commission generally presents its commitment towards each Member State effort in fighting terrorism firstly, and only refers to communities in the strategies section (See: Council of the European Union, 2014; European Commission, 2014). The RAN, hence, refocuses the discourse on communities, i.e. the local level, and hereby differs from the traditional EU approach

This focus on communities and the local level is further stressed by the RAN discourse through the assertion that there is a connection between vulnerability to radicalisation and being part of a specific community. According to the RAN the focus towards local level –communities and key groups– is,

based on the belief that terrorist radicalisation can be best contained at a level closest to the most susceptible individuals in the most affected communities. It requires close cooperation with local authorities and civil society and to empower key groups in vulnerable communities. (Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), 2011)

This paragraph presents three important aspects of the RAN discourse. Firstly that there is a vulnerability to radicalisation that needs to be accounted for in light of the connection between an individual and a particular community. Secondly that radicalisation can be contained, which means that the RAN is indirectly stating that there are certain limits to which containment is possible, i.e. inside a community. Thirdly that actions of containment should include local actors such as local authorities, civil society, and key groups. It follows that the RAN has refocused the discourse towards local levels and most importantly this focus makes communities not only objects of the policies but subjects and active parties. The RAN also makes a connection between community membership and vulnerability as is illustrated in the following text from the 2013 High Level Conference,
Every strata of society can be affected by radicalisation towards violent extremism. Nevertheless, it appears that certain Diasporas and overseas communities are more specifically targeted for radicalisation towards international terrorism. (Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), 2013a)

This paragraph refers specifically to the connection between Diasporas and vulnerability; in fact the RAN goes as far as to connect international terrorism, i.e. foreign fighters, to these communities. The RAN defines as foreign fighters “people who voluntarily leave their homes [in Europe] and join foreign conflicts” (Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), 2014a). The RAN also connects the problem of foreign fighters with communities and families rather than to national states. In a more broad sense, the RAN identifies an individual’s connection to a community as a source of conflict that needs to be taken into consideration when prevention strategies are deployed. A case in point is the following text, when it comes to prevention, attention needs to be paid to the sources of continuous conflict (trauma’s, grievances, vulnerable societies etc.) and how these are passed on through generations. (Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), 2014a)

The RAN thus focuses the discourse at a local level by connecting an individual’s vulnerability to his/her specific community, and goes as far as defining this link as a “source of continuous conflict”. Additionally, the RAN stresses the importance of the connection between communities and vulnerability asserting that radicalisation can be contained in a community, at a local level, and that it can be achieved by local actors.

In summary, the RAN brings the focus of the discourse towards communities linking community membership and vulnerability and also defining radicalisation as a local issue that requires local actions and local solutions. For instance, on the previously analysed introductory paragraph of the RAN Charter, the suggestion that containment needs to take place at the “level closest to the most susceptible individuals”, could be reformulated to “containment is possible within a susceptible individual’s community”. This implies that the focus is now centred on communities and also that the range of actions is somewhat limited to those communities. A case in point is the RAN PREVENT working group assertion that considers actions from local actors fundamental,

‘Local issues is a local problem and needs local solutions’ [...] The [RAN PREVENT] working group discussed issues of inclusion and participation and highlighted the need for local actors to be involved in delivering or at least supporting and collaborating with the interventions. (RAN PREVENT - Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2012)
This argument builds on the notion that “earlier and closer interventions” are best, and asserts that interventions are only possible through local actions and the involvement, participation, and support of local actors. It is key to focus on the word “closer” for it is not only defining physical proximity but also refers to cultural and even emotional proximity. In other words, the RAN insists on community specific actions that are pertinent to a community specific issue, radicalisation. It is clear therefore how the RAN has promoted the counter-radicalisation discourse to focus on a local level, by connecting vulnerability and membership to specific communities, and also connecting the capability to contain and/or deter radicalisation to those specific communities, i.e. at the level closest to those that are more vulnerable.

This emphasis on the local level and the involvement of community boundaries implied by the idea of ‘containment’ at the level closest to those who are vulnerable, brings to the forefront the notion of targeted and culturally specific actions or “tailor made” strategies. These ‘community specific actions’ are another argument the RAN employs to focus on communities and the local level as well as a way of including communities in the strategies as actors and not only as objects of the policies. The RAN discourse emphasizes the need for targeted actions through the inclusion for example of Diasporas, as well as stressing the importance of culturally specific interventions. A case in point is the 2013 High Level Conference discussion paper of the RAN, which states that members of the diaspora would know best how to build resilience within their own community. (Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), 2013a)

This text clearly illustrates the idea of specific targeted actions, particularly via the reference of the connection between diaspora and their ‘own’ communities. This text further clarifies that a local approach is not necessarily linked to a specific state, but to a cultural identity that will dictate on the specificity of the interventions. In other words, interventions should be community specific. As regards this, the RAN VVT working group introduces the following criteria in one of the first RAN updates,

Different kind of testimonies should be used depending on the goal, context and audience. (Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), 2012b).

Moreover, the working group follows suit in a policy recommendation stating,

Testimonies of all types of victims should be used, but especially the ones from victims culturally close to the extremists targeted. We work hand in hand with victims from diasporas and overseas communities and should go on this way to show that on the opposite of the extremists, no distinction or segregation is done, and that our work is inclusive, not
exclusive. (RAN VOICES OF VICTIMS OF TERRORISM - Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2012)

The working group clearly calls for culturally specific interventions. This paragraph however presents a contradiction. It firstly states the need to employ testimonies ‘culturally close’ to the extremists targeted, but it later affirms that no segregation is carried out. It is undeniable that, to a certain extent, the work of gathering testimonies is an inclusive endeavour in as much all groups are considered and all testimonies are supposed to be considered too. Nevertheless this is the limit of inclusiveness of the strategy. After gathering sources, the next step is to differentiate and supply only pertinent testimonies to each community. In this way, there is a process of differentiation and segregation of narratives after they are gathered, for these should be “tailor made” for each community. Therefore, it is possible to consider this paragraph as also supporting the focus of the discourse in communities, as well as insisting on the need to have actions specific to each community, and stressing the need to differentiate among strategies. Additionally, concerning the need for "tailor made" strategies, the RAN asserts,

> the message will come across more strongly when delivered by someone culturally close to the audience. (Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), 2013a)

Hence it is important to

> use facilitators/key figures that speak the language (literally and metaphorically) for outreach purposes. (Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), 2013b)

These two RAN Update texts insist on the need for tailor-made strategies because a group will more easily accept them. In other words, the RAN asserts culturally-identifiable strategies which will have better outcomes than neutral or non-differentiated messages. Consequently, it is logical to argue that the notion of ‘tailor-made’ strategies also contributes to bringing the focus towards the local level and locally specific issues, by being presented as an effective way to reach communities. Furthermore, these type of strategies move the responsibility of the actions somewhat from the state towards each community because those delivering the interventions need to be ‘culturally close’ and ‘speak the language’ of each community. This implies that they should be members of the particular community, i.e. local actors and civil society.

To summarize, this section focuses on how the RAN discourse has focused on the local level and communities. The RAN brings communities to the forefront by stressing the link between community membership and vulnerability. Furthermore, the RAN stresses that in light of this link, actions need to be taken at the level closest to the vulnerable
individuals, and that radicalisation can be contained at this same level, i.e. within the community boundaries. Subsequently the RAN emphasizes communities as both sources of vulnerability, but also as sources of possible actors, and the units based on which strategies will be devised. In other words, the RAN asserts that strategies need to take into consideration the particularities of each community and devise strategies culturally pertinent, i.e. “tailor made” strategies. These tailor made strategies require the inclusion of local actors, which implies the engagement of each community as a responsible entity for the containment of radicalisation, and not only as an object of the counter-radicalisation policies.

**Community management of grievances**

This previous section brought to the forefront the fact that communities have become the centre of counter-radicalisation policies as well as part of the policies as acting agents. This direct inclusion of communities and their members suggests that communities are becoming increasingly invested with the responsibility for managing and containing radicalisation. Indeed, the RAN discourse aims towards making communities responsible of their own future with the concomitant step back from the state. That is to say, the RAN is hereby justifies a shift of the responsibilities of the state towards the community.

This section will focus on how the RAN further justifies this shift of responsibilities by stressing that the grievances considered as root causes of radicalisation are not necessarily factual but only perceived or felt by communities. This framing is key, because felt or perceived grievances can be managed by communities, whereas factual grievances require at least, some action from the state.

The strategy of the RAN is to address the grievances that have been put forward by communities and catalogued as possible ‘root causes’ for radicalisation by framing them as felt or perceived. For instance the ‘RAN Update 2’ refers to risk factors of radicalisation and identifies,

> [...] among other factors, isolation, development disorder, feeling of exclusion and deprivation.(Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), 2012b)

In this section the RAN relativizes the ‘exclusion’ an individual could be victim of by asserting that it is only a ‘feeling of exclusion’ and not necessarily a fact. This, to a certain extent, puts in doubt whether there is an effective exclusion or marginalization of individuals, and frames grievances as only perceptions. Additionally, the RAN INT/EXT
working group continues with the ‘grievances as perceptions’ approach in the following text,

> While this [radicalisation] process is triggered by different motivational factors in different circumstances it is generally propelled through socialization, framing of injustice and perceptions of collective exclusion in political or other terms [...] It is important to deal with cultural sensitivities when dealing with insular communities and show understanding of their background and (perceived) grievances. (RAN INT/EXT - Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2012)

This text shows how the RAN discourse disregards the factuality of grievances. This is done firstly by referring to “perceptions of collective exclusion” thus indirectly negating the existence of a factual exclusion, and secondly by including the adjective ‘perceived’, even though it is included in brackets. The inclusion of this adjective in both cases problematizes the factuality of the grievances and moves them to the realm of perceptions. Consequently, it is safe to argue that the RAN frames grievances, which are considered as root causes of radicalisation, as feelings and not necessarily factual. Moreover, this indirectly relieves the state from having responsibility for the grievances. When grievances are moved to the realm of perceptions, the state can claim to have no accountability for the feelings of a group or an individual.

To further support the shift from factuality to perception of grievances, and indirectly free the state from responsibility, the RAN aims to guide the strategies of counterradicalisation towards a feelings and emotions realm. The RAN thus proposes strategies that avoid any factual or cognitive engagement. For instance the RAN asserts that

> Emotions are more important than evidence [...] success is not achieved in counter-narrative terms through evidence, which can always be refuted and countered. Instead, they need to appeal to human emotions. (RAN @ - Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2012)

This account of the RAN clearly supports the move of strategies towards emotions. More importantly, it dissuades any use of facts in counter-narratives. The argument presented by the RAN is interesting because it acknowledges that success will not be achieved if grievances are discussed through evidence, hence indirectly acknowledging that grievances may be in fact ‘real’. Nevertheless, the RAN maintains its argument, and further stresses the need to only employ an ‘emotions approach’. Likewise, the RAN DERAD working group provides another illustration of this in the following text,

> The methodological emphasis is put on emotional learning and emotional intelligence rather than cognitive learning and debate skills. [...] Furthermore, the emphasis on emotional
development includes work with experiences of embarrassment/shame, insecurity, fear, aggression, hatred and violence (since these affects play a major role in acts of violent extremism/hate crime). Hence, *good-practice interventions don't overstress educational 'topics' or 'historical issues' as such but instead look for the subjective investments placed on them by each participating individual* [emphasis added]. (RAN DERAD - Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2012)

This text summarizes the RAN position on grievances, for it states that they should be framed as perceptions or ‘subjective investments’ and not addressed as ‘historical issues’. Additionally this text supports strategies of ‘emotional learning and emotional intelligence’ and the importance of addressing ‘the subjective investments’ placed on the issues. Therefore, it is possible to argue that the RAN argument as regards the need to employ an ‘emotions approach’ towards grievances, further supports the idea of a state that is released from responsibility for the grievances while at the same time making individuals and communities are made responsible

Furthermore, the RAN not only works towards making communities responsible for their feelings and perceptions, but as was argued on the previous section, the RAN works towards making communities responsible for the containment of radicalisation, and in this case, responsible of addressing their own (perceived) grievances to prevent radicalisation. The RAN PREVENT working group makes a case for this and asserts,

> Some of the key drivers for radicalisation are the lack of identity, belonging, role models and a sense of participation for the individual at risk and therefore *a consistent, local actor can be key in providing for some of those needs and filling those gaps* [emphasis added]. (RAN PREVENT - Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2012)

According to the working group a perceived grievance can be “filled” by a community’s actions, for instance providing role models and a sense of belonging and participation. The RAN asserts that communities should be able to provide and ‘fill’ the ‘gaps’ that have caused radicalisation themselves by further prompting a disengagement of the state. Consequently, it can be argued that the RAN discourse promotes a shift of responsibilities towards communities by framing grievances as matters that can be addressed by the community.

**Conclusion: Self-reliant communities**

The previous two sections have traced how the RAN has brought the focus towards the local level and communities, linking vulnerability and community membership, and how the RAN has argued in favour of tailor-made strategies that require responsible communities; furthermore it was also stressed how the RAN has framed grievances linked to
radicalisation as perceptions and as such has shifted the responsibility of their management to the community. These three processes engage communities and disengage the state. In the RAN discourse the state is no longer a visible actor, whereas communities are in turn expected to become active, responsive, and responsible. Communities are thus expected to become self-reliant.

The concept of self-reliance was introduced in the first chapter of this thesis as presupposing an individual (or community) that is capable to dictate and alter its own future. The development discourse promotes the self-reliance of underdeveloped populations through the establishment of a “form of therapeutic governance focused on enhancing people’s capacities, motivation and sense of well-being within their existing material circumstances” (Pupavac, 2005, p. 173). According to Mark Duffield self-reliant communities can be defined “in terms of their ability to embrace risk and effectively manage life’s risks and contingencies” (Duffield, 2005, p. 152). The formation of self-reliant communities implies a state that is no longer responsible for structural changes but that is nevertheless providing capacity-building skills to communities to ensure their survival within their existing means. Consequently, it is possible to draw a parallel between the concept of self-reliance in the development discourse, and the type of communities the RAN discourse aims to promote. More specifically, three similarities can be drawn:

Firstly, the bringing of communities to the forefront. In the case of development, what is called “radicalisation of development” (Duffield, 2001) brought communities to the forefront and made them not only the centre of development policies, but also agents of development. Similarly, the RAN is bringing communities to the forefront. This has not only meant that the discourse is focused on the local level but also that the work is for and with the communities.

Secondly, communities are empowered towards self-management. The development discourse promotes the self-management of communities and individuals and also insists on enhancing their ability to overcome risk. Likewise, the RAN promotes the formation of engaged and active communities by including them in the formulation and implementation of strategies to contain radicalisation. This is illustrated by 1) the assertions of the RAN regarding counter-radicalisation narratives, stressing that they will have a better outcome when delivered by someone culturally close to those who are vulnerable (Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), 2013a); and 2) the RAN PREVENT
working group policy recommendations calling for local actors to ‘fill’ in the gaps caused by grievances (RAN PREVENT - Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2012).

Thirdly, there is a shift of responsibilities from the state towards the communities. According to the development discourse, self-reliance entails two changes, a shift of responsibilities from the state towards communities and that the communities become able to manage risks within their existing material circumstances, hence assuming and managing those responsibilities. It is also possible to identify both of these changes in the RAN discourse. The RAN is justifying a shift in responsibilities by framing grievances as perceived and not factual, thus rendering them manageable for communities and disengaging the state from responsibility for them. Furthermore, the RAN is promoting communities to become responsible of the containment of radicalisation, and providing skills and strategies to make the new responsibilities of the communities manageable by simultaneously 1) promoting “tailor-made strategies” that require the active engagement of communities and local actors and 2) framing grievances as perceived and asserting that they can be better filled by locals.

It is clear thus that parallels can be drawn between the RAN counter-radicalization discourse and the development discourse. It is possible hence to argue that the RAN is justifying a shift of responsibilities from the state towards the communities by promoting self-reliance i.e. empowering communities into becoming able to manage their own risk. However, two important aspects of the RAN discourse still need to be addressed, 1) who are these local actors, i.e. key individuals, engaged to help define the “tailor made” strategies and fill the gaps left by grievances; and 2) how is the state engaging communities after responsibilities have shifted. It would be remiss to assume that because responsibilities have shifted toward communities the state is no longer involved in governing these communities or that they have been completely left to their own devices. These topics will be addressed in the next chapter.
Chapter 3: Governing at a distance: key individuals and first-line practitioners

The previous chapter focused on the process by which states shift responsibilities concerning radicalisation towards communities and delineating how communities are expected to become self-reliant. However, the role individuals play on this process remains to be addressed. It was previously introduced how key individuals, local actors, and civil society were involved and how these individuals provide input to counter-radicalisation policies with the objective of tailoring them to each community. However, the way in which the state engages communities, and the actual individuals involved in this task needs further explanation. Consequently, this chapter will focus on these key individuals, (members of the communities) and first-line practitioners working towards the containment of radicalisation. This chapter will hence explore the validity of the second segment of the hypothesis: through insisting on the importance of key individuals and first-line practitioners, the EU counter-radicalisation discourse emerging from the RAN legitimizes de facto a system of indirect rule.

The main argument of this chapter is that there is a similarity between: key individuals, first-line practitioners, and “native administrators”. This similarity resides in the fact that both key individuals and first line practitioners have direct access to the vulnerable communities and as such are able to develop a certain degree of legitimacy and credibility within communities while at the same time being considered legitimate interlocutors by the state. This double legitimacy makes it possible for these groups to feed communities with the official discourse of the state without the direct presence of the latter. It is argued that in as much as the RAN stresses the importance of key individuals and first-line practitioners it legitimizes the facto a system of indirect rule. However, a caveat is necessary, the state, while “ruling at a distance” is more able to control the lives of communities than with a direct strategy of governance.

Key individuals as “native administrators”

As shown in the previous chapter, the RAN has shifted the focus of the counter-radicalisation discourse towards communities and the local level. However, this focus has not been equally divided among all members of communities. In fact, the RAN differentiates between members of communities, defining some as “key individuals” or “key groups” while others are defined only as members of communities, or even as vulnerable individuals. The RAN discourse has outlined this differentiation since its launch in 2011. A case in point can
be seen from the text of the RAN Charter, which states that the network was created with the aim of

empowering communities and key groups engaged in the prevention of violent radicalisation and recruitment. (Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), 2011)

This means that, even from the very beginning, the RAN has made a differentiation between entire vulnerable communities and some of its members. Moreover, this differentiation is further stressed in reference to the containment of radicalisation, which according to the Charter

requires close cooperation with local authorities and civil society and to empower key groups in vulnerable communities. (Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), 2011)

This text illustrates how there are a number of individuals within communities that will be treated differently in the process of implementing counter-radicalisation policies. Some individuals will be objects of the policies, while others, the key groups, will be empowered. This differentiation brings to the forefront the issue of the role of these individuals as regards counter-radicalisation policies.

To understand this role, it is useful to first reintroduce a key element of the “indirect rule” concept discussed in the first chapter, i.e. the notion of “native administrators”. These are individuals who are part of the community or considered as such and that are able to help bridge the connection between the greater society and the self-reliant community. These individuals have legitimacy within the community, but also have the legitimacy provided by the state as an auxiliary in the administration of the community (Duffield, 2009, p. 124). In this section I will argue that key individuals resemble these “native administrators” and that as such, key individuals are a primary component of both the constitution of self-reliant communities as well as the implementation of an “indirect rule” form of governance.

The first characteristic of a “native administrator” is that it is an individual from the community who has been engaged in the implementation of state policies as well as in the definition of specific policies for each community. This can be easily linked to the objective of the RAN to develop “tailor-made” strategies to counter-radicalisation for each specific community. Indeed, the RAN PREVENT working group insists on this when it explains the importance of engaging key individuals:

Local actors have an in depth understanding and knowledge of the issues facing their community – including who the ‘excluded’ are. (RAN PREVENT - Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2012)
Similarly, the RAN INT/EXT working group stresses the importance of key individuals in the definition of counter-radicalisation strategies;

knowledgeable local actors can reconstruct identity and provide a more humanistic point of view to counter the individual or group mentality of the radicalised extremist. (RAN INT/EXT - Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2012)

It is clear how the RAN frames key individuals in light of the need to develop culturally specific strategies to contain radicalisation, for which input from the key individuals is crucial. It is easy, hence, to compare the “native administrator” concept and the “key individuals” concept whereby the latter are seen as members of communities and providers of knowledge and information for culturally specific policies, or “tailor-made strategies” to contain radicalisation.

The second characteristic of a “native administrator” relates to his/her legitimacy and relates to two sources, 1) the recognition the “native administrator” obtains from the community; and 2) the recognition of the state or the developing agency that has engaged him/her. In the case of key individuals, the RAN is not clear about the basis upon which community legitimacy and credibility are assessed. The RAN INT/EXT working group, for instance, is the only working group that provides a specific definition of this basis. For example, the working group asserts the following in reference of its duty as regards local actors,

Identify and engage [...] actors (including spiritual leaders and mass organisations such as the Nahdlatul Ulama) that have the legitimacy, credibility and expertise necessary to: a) marginalise and discredit the narratives associated with violent extremism; and b) generate a positive paradigm, which facilitates social harmony and cohesion within EU Member States and abroad. (RAN INT/EXT - Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2012)

In general, however, the RAN remains rather vague in reference to community legitimacy. A case in point is illustrated in the following text from the RAN PREVENT working group,

often the best interventions take place where there are local actors involved who know the individuals/groups that are vulnerable and who are aware of the wider issues in communities that are increasing levels of disaffection and frustration.(RAN PREVENT - Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2012)

This text only outlines the credibility, legitimacy, and access key individuals are expected to have inside their own communities in order to be considered as key individuals. More specifically, the text refers to the involvement of actors “who are aware of the wider issues in communities” which suggests that it is not only membership but legitimacy and to a
certain extent a privileged position inside communities that turn a regular member of the community into a key individual. Yet, the exact sources of that legitimacy, or how the RAN estimates this legitimacy are not clear. As regards the legitimacy from the RAN (indirectly from the state), the network is more specific as follows,

Local professionals and communities, in addition to better understanding, and acceptance that the phenomenon [radicalisation] exists, must also gain sufficient confidence in the police or security services. (RAN POL - Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2012)

This text clearly illustrates that the legitimacy is based on the willingness of these individuals to work with the state and that it is dependent of the acquiescence of the official discourse about radicalisation. In this way key individuals need to accept the existence of radicalisation as a process. Sharing the views of the state is thus a pre-condition to be considered a key individual.

In conclusion, it can be asserted that key individuals are equivalent to the “native administrators” from the development discourse. According to the description, key individuals resemble translators whose work is presented as that of builders of bridges between the communities and the state in the effort to contain radicalisation. As the RAN POL working group asserts,

engagement is necessary to identify appropriate credible voices from within Diaspora communities to facilitate communication but more importantly to help mainstream counter-radicalisation efforts from within the community itself. (RAN POL - Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2012)

This text further illustrates the role of key individuals in the management of communities and the containment of radicalisation. Key individuals like the “native administrators”, help towards the self-reliance of communities and allow the state to have an indirect presence. In this way key individuals facilitate a system of “indirect rule”.

**First-line practitioners as the acting hands of the state**

The system of “indirect rule” involving key individuals also depends on others. So-called first-line practitioners also aid in the implementation of counter-radicalisation policies. First-line practitioners can be defined as the counterparts of key individuals, and as such it can be argued that they also support the formation of self-reliant communities and promote the implementation of a system of indirect rule. This section will explore the similarities between these two groups of individuals and will focus on how first-line practitioners are also an intrinsic element of a system of indirect rule.
First-line practitioners work inside communities and are also essential for the formulation of “tailor-made” strategies. The RAN PREVENT working group asserts that, first-line practitioners like key individuals are
the ones who are best positioned [they] are practitioners and volunteers that work ‘on the ground’ and who are able to connect to vulnerable youth (RAN PREVENT - Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2012).
This text clearly illustrates the similarities of first-line practitioners and key individuals concerning their connection to the community. However, it is important to pay attention to the choice of words of the RAN. The “on the ground” reference is part of the differentiation the RAN makes between being part of the community and being “outside”. This differentiation illustrates the deep and clear division the RAN is making between communities that are deemed vulnerable and others. Additionally, these individuals “on the ground”, similarly to key individuals, are expected to have privileged knowledge about the communities and thus help elaborate the strategies for "changing hearts and minds" and containing radicalisation. The RAN in the following text stresses these previous points:

Local practitioners can make a difference, as they know their citizens and communities best and thus have the opportunity to detect worrying signs and act upon them. They can also develop tailor-made de-radicalisation or re-socialization programmes [...] We identified relevant practitioners from the following different sectors: legal and law enforcement (community/local police officers), local governments, youth work, the educational sector, (mental) health care and NGO’s. [...] In short, a multi-agency approach, in which practitioners work in close cooperation with each other, is key. (Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), 2014b)

This particular text clearly makes a case for the importance of the knowledge that first-line practitioners can provide to the drafting and implementing of counter-radicalisation policies. Furthermore, this text offers an important account of the occupational status of first-line practitioners. It is important to note that they are all people that work closely with the communities. Furthermore they all repeat the official state discourse.

Similarly, like key individuals, first-line practitioners, when not members of the government, are required to accept and stick to the official discourse For instance, the RAN PREVENT working group asserts that, in communities where there are numerous initiatives, the centrality and the importance of the state needs to be recognized. (RAN PREVENT - Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2012)
To be more precise just as with key individuals, the discourse needs to be unified and standardized. As the RAN DERAD working group outlines,

The deradicalisation intervention delivered by outside non-governmental practitioners need to be securely embedded in the governmental institution and supported through the informed assistance of the institution’s statutory employees. Since good-practice deradicalisation is systemic by nature [...] the intervention needs to be systemically grounded in and complemented by the everyday procedures of the institution. (RAN DERAD - Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2012)

Consequently, it can be argued that first-line practitioners again like key individuals are directly controlled by the state to present a unified and standardized discourse. In fact, it could even be asserted that first-line practitioners are the ones making sure that key individuals carry the same discourse dictated by the state and translated by first-line practitioners to the communities. Furthermore, this text from the RAN DERAD working group is also important since it establishes a “two level” approach through which counter-radicalisation policies are delivered. This means that there is a differentiation between first-liners and governmental institutions. The latter are clearly not directly engaging with communities but employing first-liners to carry out their policies.

This differentiation or “two level” approach helps comprehend how first-line practitioners aid in the implementation of the “indirect rule” system of governance. Interestingly, the RAN argues the importance of a “two levels” approach. The RAN presents two arguments. Firstly that it would be counter-productive to introduce an “expert” with no rapport or engagement into communities. The RAN refers to “parachuting” an expert into communities and insists on its negative effects (See: RAN PREVENT - Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2012). The reference to “parachuting” has the same effect as the “on the ground” mention previously addressed. It is employed to differentiate the actual public spaces of the communities and the state. It is possible to assert hence that experts on radicalisation not engaged to communities are taking a step backwards, for, as it was argued, it is counter-productive to “parachute” them into a community. In addition to this, the RAN also argues that a direct state presence might limit trust and rapport from communities towards practitioners. A case in point is the following text,

People feeling marginalized and sometimes alienated by state structures will rather accept to work with non-governmental practitioners than with authorities (Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), 2013a).
Secondly that direct state intervention may complicate matters because of bureaucratic constraints. The following text illustrates this,

Too much statutory control and regulation [...] leads to the inhibition of creativity and responsiveness of those specialist non-statutory organisations [...] In addition, these organisations [civil society organisations and NGOs] are often specifically set up to deliver ‘this’ [build trust, delivering intervention and prevention] work. They are therefore able to be flexible and responsive in their approach whereas larger, more bureaucratic organisations may face greater challenges due to the ‘broader’ nature of their function/ role e.g. social workers whose remit it is to safeguard – not to provide counter narrative. (RAN PREVENT - Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2012).

Clearly the RAN presents arguments to disengage the state of direct action. However total disengagement does not occur, for, as it was argued previously, those executing policies will have to accept the official discourse and reproduce it. Consequently, it is possible to assert that by promoting first-line practitioners the RAN legitimizes the state taking a step back and implementing a system of governance of “indirect rule”.

**Conclusions: a system of indirect rule**

This chapter has focused on exploring the validity of the second segment of the hypothesis introduced in the first chapter which reads: the EU counter-radicalisation discourse emerging from the RAN by insisting on the importance of key individuals and first-line practitioners legitimizes de facto a system of indirect rule. Indirect rule is a governance strategy employed by the development discourse to manage underdeveloped populations. This form of governance requires the implementation of a “native administration” which is comprised by interlocutors capable of building alliances between the community that is being managed and the development agency –or state– that is intervening in the underdeveloped population.

This chapter outlined the similarities between “key individuals”, “first-line practitioners”, and “native administrators”. The overall conclusion of these comparisons was that both first-line practitioners and key individuals facilitate the implementation of a governance strategy of indirect rule in what refers to radicalisation. Key individuals therefore play an important role in the constitution of self-reliant communities that are able or expected to be able to manage their own risk and contain radicalisation. Similarly, first-line practitioners play a role in the constitution of self-reliant communities managing their own risk and containing radicalisation. Consequently, it can be argued that since the RAN
insists on the importance of key individuals and first line practitioners, it legitimizes de facto a system of indirect rule.

However this governance strategy does not implies that the government is not involved. Indeed the state is directly involved and effects the lives of the communities particularly by silencing alternative narratives. Furthermore the state dictates which members of communities are engaged. The most important component of this decision is, that these individuals both key individuals and first-line practitioners accept the official discourse about radicalisation. Consequently, via this strategy, the state silences alternative voices and narratives, and promotes the reproduction of one standardized discourse dictated by the state but disseminated by individuals who are not openly working for the state. Consequently, it is possible to assert that the RAN effectively legitimizes de facto a system of indirect rule
Conclusions: Counter-radicalisation as a “liberal peace” governance strategy

The tragic terrorist attacks that hit Europe in the opening months of 2015 brought to the spotlight the EU counter-radicalisation policies and raised many questions regarding their effectiveness. The primary questions posed were, how does the EU counter radicalisation? And, are preventive strategies effective?

Any answer to these questions requires a thorough comprehension of the strategies, including the governance rationalities that underlie such strategies. Therefore, in an effort to fully comprehend the possible impact of the counter-radicalisation discourse, I have focused on delineating the governance rationality underpinning the counter-radicalisation discourse of the EU embodied in the RAN policy recommendations. My research has employed as categories of analysis concepts of the Critical Development Studies, namely “liberal peace”, “self-reliance”, and “indirect rule”, in an effort to provide an answer to this research question: to what extent is the EU radicalisation discourse, embodied in the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) policy recommendations, mobilizing a “liberal peace” governance project?

Chapters 2 and 3 explored the validity of the proposed hypothesis. It was argued that the RAN has brought the focus towards the local level and communities, linking vulnerability and community membership, insisting in favour of tailor-made strategies that require responsible communities, and framing grievances linked to radicalisation as perceptions, in which, again, communities become the primary responsible of their management. It was asserted that via these processes the RAN aims to make communities active, responsive, and responsible, in brief self-reliant. It was also asserted that the intervention of “key individuals” and “first-line practitioners” is instrumental. These two groups of individuals were defined as similar to the “native administrators” from the development discourse. First-line practitioners and key individuals, it was asserted, facilitate the implementation of indirect rule. Additionally, it is possible to assert three major political implications of these processes, 1) More control from the government, albeit indirect. These strategies promote the implementation of a system of control via proxies that is even more comprehensive than a straight forward military and police strategy. 2) Silencing of minorities and alternative narratives. The pre-requisite set by the state to acquiesce with the official discourse makes all those defending alternative narratives to become even more limited on their effective access to the state. For instance, in the case of minorities within larger communities, what certainty is there that the key individuals
engaged will also represent the minorities; additionally, this could also be considered from the other side of the coin, what certainty is there that a key individual is not in fact only representing a limited amount of interests inside communities. Furthermore, it could also be possible for communities to model themselves into appealing groups for the official discourse, stressing their risks in order to get official attention as is asserted by Bigo et al (2014, p. 28) in a report for the EU LIBE Committee concerning communities “tweaking” their community programs to fit counter-radicalisation policies. 3) De-politization of communities and limited possibilities of dialogue. Since the official discourse is intermingled with local discourses, via key individuals, schools, and non-governmental organizations, the subject to which communities can bring their complaints has become diffused. Thus, how can change be achieved? To whom, for instance, should communities bring their difficulties, or the possibility of a new narrative or approach to tackle radicalisation? Moreover, once grievances are out of the dialogue and only addressed tangentially through locals as perceptions, how can structural changes be promoted or even requested? Who will bring these claims to the political debate? A possible answer could be civil society, but this brings us back to the fact that this governance strategy is comprehensive and as such is already engaging members of the community with the pre-requisite of acquiescing to the official discourse, meaning that, from the very beginning, they have been made into a voice that repeats the discourse of the state and not so much a voice that will challenge it.

However, as was argued in the first chapter, the three proposed categories of analysis represent a two level analysis, and so far only one has been addressed. Consequently, it is necessary to further consider the findings of chapters 2 and 3 in light of the category of liberal peace.

“Liberal peace” as asserted by Mark Duffield (2001a) is a governance project. It presupposes a “consensus that conflict […] is best approached through a number of connected, ameliorative, harmonizing and, especially, transformational measures” (Duffield, 2001a, p. 11). Furthermore, it comprises a governance project where governments, NGOs, the private sector, and military establishments converge. This project aims towards social transformation, which means not only to “solve” certain deficiencies of the underdeveloped populations, but also to change them as a whole. This transformation is expected to solve conflict and transform societies into stable entities that no longer pose a threat to the developed world.
It is clear that there are important similarities between the underlying rationality of the RAN discourse and the category of “liberal peace”. The first convergence is that the overall logic of the counter-radicalisation strategies that the RAN supports have been framed under the idea that “changing hearts and minds” is more effective than "shock and awe". Hence the RAN aims towards community cohesion, engagement, and empowerment of individuals rather than implementing military and policing strategies. Similarly, the “liberal peace” project operates under the assumption that conflict and underdevelopment are better approached through partnership, empowerment, and dialogue, i.e. via conflict resolution (Duffield, 2001, p. 75). Secondly, the RAN stresses the need to have a “multi agency approach” (Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), 2014) that includes a wide array of actors including local authorities, social workers, school teachers, (mental) health practitioners, and also key individuals and (community) police members. Correspondingly, “liberal peace” presupposes the convergence of several actors including the state, civil society, non-governmental organizations and the military. Most importantly, and this is the third convergence, the RAN, like the “liberal peace” governance strategy, aims towards the empowerment of communities to turn them into stable entities that no longer pose a threat. It is possible hence to assert that, in a way, the RAN strives towards “developing” communities inside the “developed” world. The EU counter-radicalisation discourse embodied in the RAN policy recommendations appears to be more of a political project, that a simple set of strategies, which aims to change societies as a whole.

To conclude, it is possible to assert that, just as “liberal peace blurred traditional distinctions between people, army and government and, at the same time, forged new ways of projecting power through non-territorial, public–private networks and systems” (Duffield, 2001a, p. 16), the EU counter-radicalisation discourse embodied in the policy recommendations of the RAN has done the same. As Baker-Beall et al (2015) argue “it does not matter whether people experience a process of radicalisation or not, because the discursive apparatus of academia, media and state have already decided that radicalisation always precedes violence”. The RAN is embedding the counter-radicalisation discourse into a multi-agency network of practitioners acting “on the ground” and limiting the political capabilities of communities to engage the state and propose alternative narratives. In sum, this discourse is aiming to transform communities into stable entities that no longer pose a threat. It is developing the developed world.
Bibliography


