THE ROLE OF SMALL STATES IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AMERICAN NATIONS (UNASUR): THE CASES OF ECUADOR AND URUGUAY

By

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Abstract

The last decades have been of significant importance for small state studies as new small states have been created and many of them have become members of an existing or a newly created regional organisation. This investigation introduces an innovative model for studying the role of small states in regional organisations. It conceptualises small states into region-engaging, region-constraining and region-adapting actors, according to their particular type of engagement in regional politics. This thesis defines Ecuador and Uruguay as region-engaging small states, and argues that elements of a shared collective identity were a major factor of influence on the region-engaging character of Ecuador and Uruguay in the recent process of constructing the South American Union of Nations (UNASUR). Theoretically, the study employs a constructivist approach to exploring the reasons why Ecuador and Uruguay have supported the creation and consolidation of UNASUR. It takes a cross case-oriented approach based on the analysis of documents, political speeches and semi-structured interviews of members of the political elite, whilst also considering various historical events during the period from 2000 to 2012. Each case study delves into various historical events to provide specific foci on elements of a shared collective identity, left-oriented ideology, the failure of economic integration projects, the overpowering influence of exterior agents, the need for national and regional peace, as well as the prospect of leading roles and a new type of political cooperation within UNASUR. A significant component of the research concerns the shared factors of a South American identity, whereby the use of illustrations facilitates the comparison and the understanding of the aspects of identity influencing the behaviour of Ecuador and Uruguay in the consolidation of UNASUR.

Keywords: small states, UNASUR, Ecuador, Uruguay, regionalism, international cooperation
Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to those people who instilled in me the value of education, particularly to my parents whose positive vision about my future accompanies me along this journey, to my daughter Feline and to those to come.
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List of Abbreviations

ALADI  Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (Latin American Integration Association)
ALALC  Asociación Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio (Latin American Free Trade Association)
ALBA  Alternativa Bolivariana para las Américas (Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas)
CAF  Corporación Andina de Fomento (Andean Corporation Fund)
CAN  Comunidad Andina de Naciones (Andean Community)
CARICOM  Comunidad del Caribe (Caribbean Community)
CEPAL  Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean)
COSECTI  Consejo Suramericano de Educación, Cultura, Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación (Council for Education, Culture, Science, Technology and Innovation)
COSIPLAN  Consejo Suramericano de Infraestructura y Planeamiento (Council for Infrastructure and Planning)
CSN  Comunidad Suramericana de Naciones (South American Community of Nations)
CSD  Consejo Suramericano de Defensa (South American Council for Defence)
CSS  Consejo Suramericano de Salud (South American Council for Health)
IIRSA  Iniciativa para la Integración de la Infraestructura Regional Suramericana (Initiative for Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America)
IMF  International Monetary Fund
NAFTA  North American Free Trade Area
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
MERCOSUR  Mercado Común del Sur (Common Market of the South)
OAS  Organisation of American States
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
ORAS  Organismo Andino de Salud (Andean Health Organisation)
OTCA  Organización del Tratado de Cooperación Amazónica (Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organisation)
SAFTA  South American Free Trade Area
SELAC  Sistema Económico Latinoamericano y del Caribe (Latin American and Caribbean Economic System)
TIAR  Tratado Inter-Americano de Asistencia Recíproca (American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance)
UNASUR  Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (Union of South American Nations)
WTO  World Trade Organisation
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Introduction

Many Eastern-European small states continue to adapt their economic and political systems in order to become full members of the European Union, despite the fact that Southern European small states such as Greece and Cyprus have questioned the appropriateness of European integration following Europe's financial crisis. It is well known that such phenomena involve and affect small states to a disproportionate extent.

The cyclical political or economic crisis in one region triggers the interest of academics in explaining and understanding such political and economic events, and politicians seek practical examples in other regions with the expectation of finding political alternatives either in historical explanations, or practical measures implemented by other governments in order to resolve similar issues.

While such events have become a challenge to some small states within the European Union, which since its origins has had economic integration as its motor, the six South American small states, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Surinam and Uruguay have joined the six relatively larger states, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela in an integration project that prioritises political union as a new type of integration. Hence, it has relied primarily on the political will of their governments, that in the name of the twelve South American peoples, have decided to, ‘...construct a South American identity and citizenship, and develop an integrated regional space in the infrastructural area
with regard to political, economic, social, cultural, environmental, energy and communicational issues, in order to contribute to the strengthening of the unity of Latin America and the Caribbean’ (UNASUR, 2008: Preamble)¹.

In the process of the construction and consolidation of this newly created South American international organisation, some states have played a more prominent role than others. Researches have mainly focused on the role of relatively bigger states, in order to explain the role and the possible ambitions of regional and rising powers in the international context of the twenty-first century (Bernabé, 2012; Caballero, 2011; Gardini, 2011a; Poggio, 2011; Malamud, 2011; Sanahuja, 2010; Seabra, 2010; Freitas, 2007; Burges, 2007).

However, very few studies have analysed the role of small states and their reasons behind their engagement, despite the fact that the South American small states have also been involved in this South American regional integration project throughout the whole process.

This investigation therefore analyses the region-engaging character of Ecuador and Uruguay in the context of the process of creating and consolidating the South American Union of Nations (UNASUR). It develops an innovative model to look at the role of small states in international organisations and provides the answers to the question, why have Ecuador and Uruguay supported the creation and consolidation of UNASUR?

¹ The provided translation of direct citations are only those stemming from primary sources. These translations have been made by the author of this investigation and the original cited texts are collated in Appendix 4.
The UNASUR is the main political pillar of the South American region, whose period of creation can be traced back to the first meeting of South American heads of state and government in Brasilia in September 2000 (Sanahuja, 2010). Hence, this study includes the analysis of historical events from the period of the appearance and expansion of the Initiative for the Regional Integration of South America (IIRSA) in 2000, and the foundation of the South American Community of Nations (CSN) in 2004, as predecessors of UNASUR.

The period of formal consolidation of UNASUR spreads from 2008, the year of the signature of its treaty, to 2012, when sanctions were imposed for the first time by UNASUR on a member state, Paraguay. This measure taken by UNASUR acts as a minimum indicator of the degree of its consolidation as a further influential actor of regional politics.

The study was initially inspired by the fact that these two South American small states, Ecuador and Uruguay made substantial contributions to the consolidation of this South American regional international organisation while the investigation was being planned.

On the one hand, Ecuador, as President Pro Tempore of UNASUR 2009-2010, and as depositary of the instruments for the legal international recognition of UNASUR as a norm-binding organisation of states, campaigned for, and obtained, the ratification of six member states until the end of its period in November 2010.
On the other hand, the ratification of the UNASUR treaty by Uruguay made it possible for this organisation to begin to consolidate in December 2010. The Uruguayan decision to submit the ratification of the treaty fulfilled the required ninth instrument for legal international recognition of UNASUR, and legally bound all South American states in a political union during a regional crisis that provoked scepticism about UNASUR’s consolidation. This fundamental step showed that South America was consolidating as a socio-politically organised region.

The second motivation for this study was the transformation of the behaviour of small states in the context of international cooperation, owing to the fact that most states supported economic international cooperation as a mechanism of integration, and all of them were involved in the negotiations for the creation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) which were driven by the USA from the beginning of the 1990s. However, this project failed after the withdrawal of support by most South American states, including Ecuador and Uruguay, during the negotiations for the creation of UNASUR.

The first contacts with documents of the regular meetings of the South American presidents within the framework of the IIRSA, CSN and the UNASUR treaty enabled the identification of theoretical links to the social constructivist perspective for the study of international relations, which conceives international relations as a socially constructed reality, and became the general theoretical guide to understand these political events as further clarified in chapter two.
The insights gained through feedback of data and theory also enabled the formulation of the following specific question: has identity influenced the decision-making process of these small states in the process of creating and strengthening UNASUR?

The dominant approaches in the study of the behaviour of small states in the context of region construction suggest that there is a causal relationship between being a small state and lacking power, if power is considered as the material capability of small states. In that case, supporting processes of integration as region construction would endow small states with sources of power and elements of influence on international politics (Geurts, 1998; Hänggi, 1998; Wivel, 2005; Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006; Steinmetz and Wivel, 2010; Bizzozero, 2008, 2010). For that reason, these studies also consider small states as individualists, free riders, competitors and internationally material-oriented political actors.

According to the approaches supporting these views Ecuador and Uruguay would have been likely to benefit from supporting the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) project, driven by the United States of America (USA), as this would have meant more possibilities for competition, and for example, that Ecuador and Uruguay would by this means have had assured access to the strongest market on the continent, and perhaps to security through a partnership with the leading world power, the USA. Similarly, they would have been able to freely trade with middle powers such as Mexico and Argentina, or with emerging powers such as Brazil.
Instead, the South American small states supported the creation of UNASUR, a regional political organisation that supports cooperation and coordination between national public policies and the consolidation of South American citizenship and identity, pushing commercial integration into the background.

This suggested, at the beginning of this study, that theoretical perspectives that explain this process of integration on the basis of commercial cooperation and power relationships were not the most appropriate theoretical tools to use as a guide for understanding the role of small states in the process of the creation of the South American region.

Therefore, this study has also borrowed constructivist theoretical ideas to explain emerging regions in the form of security communities, as developed by Adler and Barnett (1998), in order to understand the complexity of the rise of South America as a region through the creation of UNASUR and the engagement of small states in this process.

In this context, the South American small states have played an international role that demanded clarification. Constructivist views of role theory developed by Nabers (2011) have been used as further elements to construct a conceptual framework as a guide for the understanding the role of Ecuador and Uruguay in the process of consolidating UNASUR.
The Importance of Studying South American Small States in the Construction of the South American Region

International Relations (IR)\(^2\), as a discipline that subsumes small state studies, has not produced sufficient literature compared with the increasing number of small states and their important political value in international relations both regionally and globally. The reasons for the underproduction of investigations in this field vary, from the supremacy given to realist approaches and therefore to research on great powers (Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006), and to the disagreement about a ‘common research agenda’ regarding small state studies (Steinmetz and Wivel, 2010: 8).

With that in mind, this study aims to contribute to the enrichment and development of the literature in the area of small state studies by introducing new insights regarding the actions of small states of the South American region in its process of integration.

Moreover, studies of small states within the discipline of International Relations have been conducted employing mainly (neo) realist- and (neo) liberal- theoretical frameworks, which due to their nature tend to underestimate the role of small states in international politics, converting the study and theorisation of small states within the discipline of International Relations to an under-valued field of research. Katzenstein (2003) points out that the leading authorities in the study of

\(^2\) This investigation refers to International Relations (IR) as the discipline of study and international relations as the relations of a state with other states. Moreover, the terms small nation, small state, small country or small power are used to mean the nation-state as the primary unit of international relations.
international relations once tended to share the view that ‘since nobody cares about small states why waste so much time writing about them?’ (p.10). Probably, this has also contributed to undermine the importance of studying South American small states in the international context.

In fact, small state studies as a sub-field of the discipline of International Relations is not well represented and adopted across regions. Small state studies is underrepresented within the European academic environment and limited within the South American region. Tickner’s (2009) study of the situation of the discipline of International Relations in Latin America demonstrates that from 1012 academic articles published in six prominent journals of International Relations of Latin America, the theme ‘small state’ does not appear at all as a subfield of International Relations or as a research theme in the South American region.

In the light of that, this study also aims to strengthen the field of small state studies by presenting new insights into the role of small states from a non-European region. This presentation of new insights into the role of small states in the formation of a regional international organisation in the South American region, and to the development of its political institutions, will contribute to the further development of the field and open its theoretical debates to a wider geographical area.

South American small states have traditionally been involved in the construction and transformation of the region. At the sub-regional level Ecuador and Bolivia are founder member states of the Andean Community (CAN), and Uruguay and
Paraguay have been involved in the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) since its creation.

These states have also been members of the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) throughout its history, as well as members of the Organisation of American States (OAS). In addition, their membership of global international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) offers them the possibility of influencing the shape of international policies by supporting each other in the debates about international matters and decision-making processes in order to put forward their projects and interests (Waltz, 2001; Wivel, 2005).

Their recent commitment to the South American Community of Nations (CSN) and their support for its transformation into UNASUR, and UNASUR’s subsequent consolidation affirms these South American states as inspiring case studies that can help to understand the importance of small states in emerging regions.

This is particularly important as most South American small states are older political unities than many European small states. The main global conflicts of the twentieth century such as the two world wars and the Cold War did not impact in the same way on the societies of the American continent, or on its political map, as they did on Europe.

In South America, only two states, Guyana and Surinam, were created in the twentieth century, and the old small states, notably Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay, have maintained their sovereign status since their creation in the
1820s and 1830s. Hence, South American small states seem to have developed a local approach, both to their role in international organisations, and to regionalism, whose study with the old theoretical tools developed within the European academic environment could be inappropriate (Dabène, 2009).

The rise of constructivist approaches has made a significant impact on most of the subfields of IR and can be a useful tool to analyse the international events driven by small states. For that reason, this study expects also to contribute to the theoretical debates of International Relations by probing the wider applicability of the explanatory character of theoretical approaches informed by social constructivism in the sub-field of small state studies.

Finally, academic studies in English about small states from non-European regions, in particular about South American small states, are still underrepresented within the discipline of International Relations. There are only a few examples of studies concerning small states from non-European regions, compared with the large quantity of academic articles and books about larger states.

By presenting new, important case studies about small states from the South American region, this study aims to facilitate the task of scholars and students with new data and information gathered and distilled here, contributing to the construction of a more accurate notion of the international political role of small states worldwide.
Structure of this Study

The study is organised into five major chapters and a short conclusion chapter. The first chapter analyses the secondary literature on small states and seeks to identify the roles and patterns of behaviour of small states as international actors in international politics generally, and more specifically in the construction of regions. This chapter also reviews the literature about the development of small state studies as an area of study, and indicates the approaches to studying small states in regional integration processes in Europe and South America.

The second chapter further clarifies the concepts that form the basis for the development of this investigation and presents an emerging conceptual framework that guides the two case studies, Ecuador and Uruguay, in the formation and consolidation of UNASUR. It employs an inductive approach to construct this framework on the basis of insights obtained from the data, relating them to social constructivist principles to study international relations, rising regions as security communities and role theory, as mentioned above. The final part of this chapter also describes the case study methodology as well as the methods employed for gathering and analysing the qualitative data that form the basis for this study.

The third chapter presents the insights obtained through the empirical case study of Ecuador as an international political actor in the construction of UNASUR. It focuses on six factors identified as significant influences for the Ecuadorian support for the creation and consolidation of UNASUR. These include the
domestic political situation, the influence of the major external agents such as the USA, Colombia and Peru; the disenchantment of Ecuador with the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), the influence of ideology of the governing powers, the links of national with regional identity, and the enactment of international roles within UNASUR.

The fourth chapter outlines the main insights into the region-engaging character of Uruguay obtained through the empirical case study of this small South American state. It uses similar approaches to the study of Ecuador, taking into account the Uruguayan particularities. It focuses on the domestic political situation, the influence of the major external agents such as the USA, Brazil and Argentina, the Uruguayan discontentment with MERCOSUR and ALADI, the influence of the ideology of the governing powers, the links between national with regional identity, and the enactment of international roles within the UNASUR.

The fifth chapter contrasts and discusses the outcomes of the two empirical case studies, as suggested by the cross-case analysis method in Miles and Huberman (1994). It illustrates the main similarities and differences between the two case studies, focusing on four main themes: the national situation of these small states, the idea of a new type of cooperation, the factors of identity as the study's explanatory guide, and the importance of the enactment of international roles for small states, focusing on the role of member and on the significance of playing the role of President Pro Tempore.
The conclusion chapter summarises the main insights obtained throughout this study, and evaluates the conceptual framework and the methodology in order to propose suggestions for further studies.
Chapter 1: Small States, Followers or Constructors of Regions? A Literature Review

1.1 Introduction

The role played by small states in the formation of regions is related to their motivations and the reasons for their given support to projects of region construction. Exploring the literature on small states and understanding the explanations given by scholars about such factors are of importance for this study, since this can help identify possible answers to the question as to why small states would support the formation of regions.

This chapter’s first aim is to highlight the theoretical development of the study of small states as a sub-field of International Relations, on the basis of the question: are small states ‘followers’ or ‘constructors of regions’? It aims to identify the theoretical approaches that in general terms have driven the study of small states within IR.

Secondly, it looks at various positions of the literature regarding the engagement of small states in the construction of regions. Here, the aim is to single out theoretical frameworks or concepts that can inform an analysis of the part played by Ecuador and Uruguay in the construction of UNASUR, despite the fact that the literature studied is predominantly European and North American IR publications. Thirdly, it studies some literature on small states in Latin and South America. This aims to understand the academic situation of small state studies as a sub-field of IR in South America, as well as the South American perspective about small
states as international actors in the construction of regions. Finally, I summarise the chapter’s conclusions and suggest further insights regarding the engagement of small states in the construction of regions.

1.2 Small State Studies within International Relations

In the first years of the development of ‘realist’ thinking in the study of international relations, the conventional analysis portrayed the small state as an insignificant element of the international system within an overall classification of states as world powers, middle powers and small powers.

States were then considered ‘small’, if they lacked real military power. It was assumed that without military power a small state was in constant danger of disappearing and its destiny was outside its control, contingent upon the strategic interest of big powers (Wolfers, 1945; Morgenthau, 1948).

However, a study conducted by Baker (1959) demonstrated that some small states develop alternative approaches in order to survive as a political unit and to manage pressure imposed on them by stronger, external forces. Baker (1959) was intrigued by the ways in which Sweden, Spain, Turkey, Switzerland, Eire and Portugal managed to avoid being directly involved in the Second World War. Hence, she wanted to find out the methods used by small states to resist pressure imposed by bigger powers in the extreme case of war, and she found unexpectedly that small states’ diplomacy could sometimes outweigh the strength of bigger powers (ibid).
Baker’s (1959) work has consequently triggered important academic debates within IR such as the need to formulate a theory which designates the small state as a unit of analysis, and create a corresponding methodology to define the small state. Within the realist school the main concept under debate, when analytically classifying and defining small states, has been the concept of smallness with reference to the states’ material capabilities and its power (Vital, 1967; Handel, 1990; Väyrynen, 1983, 1997; Steinmetz & Wivel, 2010).

Scholars have further developed the idea of an area of studies within IR that concentrates mainly on the study of small states in the context of international relations by employing arguments particular to small states, suggesting that such states are confronted with different issues, may have different interests, and might be equipped with different resources than their fellow larger states (ibid).

The growth of further approaches to the study of international relations in the 1950s and 1960s, such as liberalism, economic structuralism and transactionalism that challenged classical realism, appear to have confused the original idea of developing a general theory that helps explain the actions and inactions of the small state internationally.

Instead, most research in the area has focused on the study of small states on the basis of the main theoretical perspectives of IR. Consequently, small state studies have developed into a jumbled puzzle of theoretical ideas and empirical studies from various origins lacking a convincing argument that holds it all together.
For instance, Vital (1967, 1971a, 1971b) develops an explanation for the survival of the small state as an isolated independent state that cannot integrate or merge voluntarily with another in order to withstand war, and consequently withstand external stress and preserve national unity, because hostilities prevent this.

He exemplified Israel, Cambodia and Finland, and argues that small states which are at war would fall into the prescribed category of a politically independent nation. In the last analysis, a greater power may use its superiority to force the weaker states to submit. He concludes that when studying small states, it is preferable to define a small state more loosely, and suggests criteria in his study.

Väyrynen (1983) summarised the following definitions of the small state identified by authors within the security concept of ‘balance of power’ as either:

- An ally of a big power or of a plurality of rival states
- A protectorate of a big power
- An unattractive/hiding/non-aligned state irrelevant to any big power’s strategic interest (p. 88).

Realist theories, the dominant explanatory tool of the behaviour of small states in security studies, adopted this conceptual order.

Furthermore, the fear of an imminent war positioned by the discourse of the Cold War very likely influenced the empirical study of small states until well beyond the Cold War’s end, and strengthened the proposition that small states lack hard
power, and that therefore their survival depends on a big world power or on a security community.

For instance, empirical studies about the economic, political and military vulnerability and concerns of 31 small states of the Commonwealth reported by the Commonwealth Secretariat (1997) suggest that analysis conducted since 1985 was based on the theoretical assumptions of the imminent presence of war due to the military offensive of Grenada by the USA in 1983.

Scholars from different areas of the study within IR used a combination of different disciplines in order to incorporate other factors and dimensions of the small state in their theoretical explanations (Rothstein, 1968; Keohane, 1969; Singer, 1972). For instance, Singer (1972) based his work on a combination of political science, economy, psychology, sociology and communication theory to explain the role of small states in the international environment dominated by big powers.

Here, Singer (1972) focuses in the first and fourth chapters of his study on the need to explain the importance of social elements such as the role of communication and language, the identity of groups, and the contribution of historical and ideological elements, among others, for his understanding of small states in their role in international politics. And he suggests that such factors should also be considered as elements of the power of states as they impact on the behaviour and relationships of others (ibid).
However, the fact that small states interact with various international actors such as governmental and non-governmental organisations, have human and natural resources, and have acquired new technology, including the possibility of developing nuclear weapons, has further diffused the ideas about the main factors that should be considered when classifying and studying small states.

Moreover, the quantitative dimension of power, the categorisation and definition of small states based on their size in relation to their hard power and material capabilities which dominated in the aforementioned approaches has been criticised by authors such as De Russett (1954), Vandebosch (1964), Wilcox (1967), Goetschel (1998), Hey (2003), and Rostoks (2010) throughout the development of this area of study.

They have questioned the reliability of such methodology, based as it is on the quantification of power. They point out that qualitative factors such as level of education, political culture, social cohesion, membership in international organisations, and the uncertainty of the international system could also be included as sources of power (ibid).

A further perspective regarding the study of small states in international politics has been developed by economic structuralists, institutionalist and neo-liberal thinkers. For instance, researchers such as Santos (1983), Katzenstein (1985) and Hey (1993, 1995a) analysed the small state from the perspective of the economic structuralist or globalist, and neo-liberalist approach. They take into account mainly the economic factors, and the capacity of small states to act either
relation to a big power (Hey, 1993, 1995, 1995a), within a constraining economic structure (Santos, 1983), or within a liberalised international market of democratic systems (Kantzenstein, 1985).

According to these scholars, small states are small in terms of their economic capability. Small states at the periphery are exposed to dominance and interference at all levels of the state by the core or economically stronger states. It follows that core states would support the imposition of economic liberal and neoliberal measures within small states, to weaken them and avoid the transformation of economic production worldwide (Santos, 1983).

On the other hand, Katzenstein (1985) has suggested that the economic dominance of stronger powers has also affected industrialised European small states. His study concentrates on the possible outcomes for Switzerland, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark by the application by these small states of corporate democratic measures as a mechanism to counter the pressure of competition with external economic forces driven by developments of the global economy.

His study suggests that democratic corporatism between those states has allowed them to resist the dominant contradictions of international market competition by accommodating each other’s needs and ‘including all significant actors in the decision-making process’ (ibid, p. 192).
From a different perspective, but still centred on the structural approach, Fernández (2012) based the study of his native small state Uruguay on the theoretical premises of the neo-realist Kenneth Waltz to analyse Uruguay's foreign policy from 2010 to 2012 within the framework of MERCOSUR. His emphasis on the behaviour of Uruguay as a small state within MERCOSUR shows the restriction imposed on small states by the system, since two bigger powers, Brazil and Argentina, dominate the system to maintain stability.

This perspective allows him to agree with neo-realist explanations regarding the domination by big powers within a structure. The small state is supposed to have minimal possibilities of influencing the politics and determining the changes within such a system, as it is argued that small states do not have sufficient power to do this. So, small states are trapped within the power of the structure, or that of the dominant powers, in a condition of dependency whereby the nation-state continues in its individualist fashion to seek strategies to ensure its own survival (Waltz, 1979).

However, Fernández’ (2012) thinking has its limitations. He couches his arguments in terms of the following: the international system, balance of power, Uruguay's political system, its developmental strategy, and its resources and national capabilities. In the first place, he avoids the acknowledgement that neo-realism theory failed to explain the end of the Cold War, the downfall of the Soviet Union into many small states, and the outbreak of war between the different ethnic groups of ex-Yugoslavia.
Secondly, there are other factors that may have influenced the behaviour of the country as a whole such as the ideological affinity between the governments of Kirchner, Lugo, and Mujica. In addition, all were Spanish speakers, were from a left-oriented government and from countries with a shared history and shared cultures. Hence, the abilities of small state’s population and the quality of their self-identification (ignored by most neo-realist theories but highlighted by constructivist approaches) are important elements which should be considered when studying a state in International Relations.

These social elements, dismissed by neo-realism, became important factors in the theorisation of the study of the behaviour of small states in the 1990s, which had the aim of understanding the foreign policies of European small states. Goetschel (1998) developed a theoretical proposal to explain the changing role of a small state caught in the security dilemma of ‘influence or autonomy’. Here, ‘influence’ means not only the ability to affect the direction of politics, but also to resist exterior pressure, and ‘autonomy’ means the aspiration to have more freedom from international regulations and commitments with a bilateral or multilateral basis (p. 17-19).

Goetschel (1998) starts highlighting many inaccuracies in the application of realist theoreticians’ outdated methodologies. For instance, military power and the size of the economy do not completely reflect the power of a state, since international war is not at the moment the major danger for the existence of the Western European small state. Instead, the identity of small states currently plays an
important role in making decisions regarding security (ibid). This is plausible also within the South American region in the twenty-first century.

As a consequence, he points out, the behaviour of small states in this new international environment should no longer be measured with the old tools, particularly, with those used by realist theoreticians, since old conceptions of ‘power’ are no longer applicable in the present international environment, given the changed rules and norms constraining the behaviour of most states, both small and large (ibid).

The challenge to the orthodox methodology of neo-realism in IR originated also in various theoretical perspectives within small state studies in the post-Cold War period. For instance, Elman (1995) based her theoretical framework on the theory of domestic politics and explains the formation of small states’ foreign policies through pressure exercised by societal groups internally and the social effects of the application of such policies by the state apparatus. Here, she uses historical institutionalism (ibid, p.180) to situate the design of small states’ foreign policy within the constraints of exogenous forces, which can also be influenced by domestic policies of the small state.

The rise of such theoretical developments and the influence of social constructivism on the study of international relations are likely to have transformed small state studies by offering new perspectives to studying political phenomena related to small states, which realist and liberalist approaches undermined.
For instance, Sheffer (1997) and Møller (1997) note the importance of constructivism to help define a small ethnic state and understand ethnicity in the formation of new nations within the anarchic environment of Eastern Europe that emerged as result of the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Sheffer’s (1997) investigation claims that some small states that throughout the history of the twentieth century have been created on the basis of ethnicity are the most vulnerable to external threats from hegemonic global or regional powers, as the small ethnic state has not consolidated its territorial and economic sovereignty or its autonomy in the making of national policies.

The ethnic identity of a state and a maximum population of 15 million are the conditions to define a small ethnic state, according to Sheffer’s (1997) study. This uses a three perspective framework; global ecological; regional circumstances and activities; and internal developments.

However, the references made are not only to small ethnic states as internationally recognised sovereign unitary nation-states, but include ethnic groups found within a federal-state within a nation-state. This would include Chiapas, in Mexico, or the position of Kurdish people within a central national state. By definition these do not have the degree of autonomy necessary for international influence independently of the central government’s agreement.

An important insight of this analysis is that small ethnic states are mainly exposed to internal threats. This raises the question of why such states based on ethnicities present this problem. Within the present study, the case of Ecuador
comprises a high number of ethnic groups and a high level of political instability, which may both be linked and therefore need both to be taken into consideration.

Hey (2003) avoids adhering to any particular theoretical perspective in order to assemble new ideas into her definition of small states. Her theoretical introduction develops a three-level analysis framework (individual, state and system) for a series of empirical single case studies of the foreign policy and global engagement of Paraguay, English-speaking Caribbean states, Panamá, Luxembourg, Austria, Gambia, Jordan, and Laos.

She proposes that a state can be considered as small ‘if a state’s people and institutions generally perceive themselves to be small, or if other states’ people and institutions perceive that state as small’ (p. 3). She concludes that there are three main factors restricting the actions of small states in international relations, these are: the influence of international structures which are stronger in less developed countries; the level of development of the society (the diplomacy of less developed countries tends to be less consistent and more influenced by individual governmental leaders); and that less developed small states are likely to have regime security as their foreign policy, being more dependent on credits from international financial institutions.

As a theoretical contribution, she concludes that most small states would pursue regional engagement in their foreign policy agenda and that governmental leaders would engage in foreign affairs ‘relatively unfettered by domestic groups’ (p. 194).
These two theses have been taken into account in the design of the present study. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, the central analytical focus is upon Ecuador and Uruguay, treating each as a discrete example of the small states, and using agents close to the central state as source of information for this study. Secondly, it aims to analyse the engagement of small states in the construction of UNASUR. This includes the context of international regionalism or integration that according to Hey (2003) appears to be one of the most relevant areas of engagement in the foreign affairs of small states.

In conclusion, this review of the literature has shown that first, there is neither a generally accepted definition of small state nor an agreement on the factors that would be the fundamentals of small state studies. There is a pressing need for an agreed set of variables to form the core theoretical elements of this area of study.

Secondly, the literature review has also shown that there are very few studies that refer to theoretical ideas originating in Latin or South America, although the majority of Latin American states and at least half of the South American states could be categorised as small states. This phenomenon might be related to the late introduction of International Relations in academic research in South America and the low availability of academic programmes within Latin American academia as shown by Tickner (2009).

Therefore, this area of study requires expansion and the positioning of itself internationally as an operational field of IR study within new regions, as in this way
small state studies can make a further contribution to the strengthening of IR internationally.

Finally, there are few theoretical frameworks using social constructivist theory to study international relations. This study also aims to strengthen constructivism in the study of small studies within IR by employing constructivist ideas in its analysis.

1.3 The Study of Small States as International Political Agents within Regions

Some regional international organisations or international systems can be considered as processes of integration whose objectives shape the type of organisation and direct the dynamics of international relations. The economic, the political as well as the military environment at the time of their creation have probably influenced their institutional setting, but the institutions have been exposed to transformations.

For instance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was studied by Deutsch (1957, 1968) as the path to integration and formation of security communities. Therefore, and in order to avoid confusion, this section does not limit itself to investigations that look at a particular region and or regional integration within a conceived geographical area. This section reviews some research that can help to develop an understanding of the engagement of small states in regions and international organisations worldwide.
One character of small states within regions highlighted by the majority of the surveyed studies is that small states tend to be region-engaging. This means that they tend to voluntarily sign and ratify regional multilateral agreements, organise and attend regionally related meetings, among others as suggested in chapter two.

Some researchers see the constant creation of new small states and their membership in an internationally regulated system as a favourable international development for their survival. For example, Goetschel (1998), Hey (2003), and Steinmetz and Wivel (2010) suggest that the membership of small states in regional or global organisations does not make them less vulnerable, but their existence appears to be more protected.

Other scholars propose that international organisations are important sources of influence on the international political development of small states. In this sense, there is an evident increase in the importance of international organisations as well as the role of small states in such organisations (Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006; Geurts, 1998; Hänggi, 1998).

For other scholars, such as Barston (1971), Jacquet (1971), and Hirsch (1983), international organisations and integration processes have historically been the principal international political environment within which small states have been able to express their national interests, and to portray their identity and influence in regional and global international politics. International organisations are small
states’ principal sources of international political influence (ibid). Hence, the likely motives for small states to engage in regional organisations are to ensure their survival, to enhance their international influential power and to internationally position their national identity.

Another view of the motives for action of small states in international organisations was voiced before the end of the Second World War. For instance, Marriot (1943) employs a historical approach to argue that the way to preserve the small state is in a federal system.

Here, he considers small states as a fundamental element of the world community, historically conceived among a variety of states as further members of the world community and contributors to the world culture. Diplomatic and historical cultural elements of small states were considered as important sources of world culture and co-makers of the civilisation and as a fundamental element of the world community (Fisher, 1914; Marriot, 1943).

The engagement of small states in international organisations is seen by these authors as for the purpose of contributing internationally instead of as merely self-interested acts. Hence, they could be considered as constructors rather than followers.

Following the Second World War and until the end of the Cold War, the main concerns of researchers of small states within regional international organisations appears to be the imposition of a dominant realist approach to defining power in
order to favour the arguments of big powers for a redistribution of political power within international organisations. For instance, Hirsch (1983) considers Luxembourg as his case study within the European Economic Community (EEC) applying the theory of dependence as his framework and suggests that ‘the right to invoke a national interest is increasingly denied to the small state, especially if such interests collide with those of more powerful countries’ (p.130).

Hence, small states tend to support and strengthen supranational organisations, since they might consider prioritising mechanisms which would represent the collective interest of the member states, rather than the interest of the stronger state (ibid).

However, international institutions as agents of integration processes are not always structured as a supra-national organisation, and they are exposed to changes according to circumstances and the international political environment. For instance, the number of European commissioners in the European Union has constantly changed according to the number of new member states. Hence, new forces for negotiation may reduce the possibility of influence of the single small state in an environment of competition and egoism.

Despite this, Geurts (1998) and Kuosmanen (1998) agree that such institutions are important sources of power and influence for European small states in the shaping of European policies. They apply an institutional framework to investigate the role of the European Commission (Geurts,1998) as an actor and ally of small
states, and the role of the Council of the EU (Kuosmanen, 1998) in the decision-making process.

In this context, the new concerns of small states in the twenty-first century appear to be related to the appropriate ways of working together within existing international institutions to influence their collective policies which allow them to tackle shared problems. For instance, Lee (2009) suggests that the new setting of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has allowed small states to collectively block multilateral agreements when these would solely reflect the interest of the dominant states.

The questions regarding this are: can we continue analysing new social and political international phenomena with the old theoretical tools? Could theorists still justify the self-oriented behaviour of the states? Or is this a particular characteristic of the small state? It is evident that the role of small states within international organisations has changed in the course of the last few decades and the academic response to these challenges has been widely discussed.

For example, for Lewis (2009) the present international situation has not completely eliminated the fears of domination of small states by bigger neighbouring powers, but this period of stability and peace for small states has favoured the integration between them and/or with larger entities. For him, there is instead a clear instability of international systems as they are constantly appearing and disappearing (ibid).
This suggests that an international system may not be static and the role of small states in international organisations and region formation could be changeable. International systems are exposed to change, which takes place in a process that could be either long or short. Therefore, Lewis (2009) suggests that the analysis of the role of small states within international systems or international processes requires the adaptation of theoretical tools to the type of international system and to the international environment of the small states being investigated.

This academic requirement can be understood by reviewing Erikson (2009), Cooper (2009), and Vlcek (2009). All three case studies involve small states in the Caribbean within different international systems such as the WTO, OECD and the OAS.

Therefore, each case is presented within a geographical international environment based on a similar geographical premise that the geopolitical location of the state is important. Although all three case studies refer to a small state’s problem within an international system, all of them differ on the theoretical fundamentals as they have been adapted according to the nature of the state, the theme of study and the international organisation concerned.

A further example of such flexibility and adaptation of various theoretical frameworks could be seen in Steinmetz and Wivel (2010). They illustrate the present challenges and opportunities that influence small states’ policy-making within the framework of the EU and at the same time contribute to the theoretical development of the field. The main focus of these studies is the projection of the
influence of small states on policy-making (ibid). However, these studies evade providing an answer to the following question: how would such policies affect the domestic politics of the small member state?

The transition of the old small states’ foreign policy of ‘hiding’ to the present foreign policy of ‘binding’ reveals the importance of the new role of European small states in the present international systems (Steinmetz & Wivel, 2010). On the one hand, the ‘hiding’ strategy that suggests the inaction and unnoticed behaviour of the small state implies neither a follower’s nor a constructor’s trait. On the other hand, the ‘binding’ strategy suggests an intentional action of small states in regions. Hence, it implies a constructors’ trait.

Moreover, the influential forces of bigger states which influence the behaviour of small states within the institutionalised set of norms, rules and procedures of EU policy-making may have not disappeared. In this sense, the unchallenged acceptance of regional policies directed by bigger states would show a tendency of small states towards becoming ‘followers’.

However, European small states in the EU do not depend on their ability to remain undiscovered, nor do they submissively accept the impositions of bigger states. On the contrary, Steinmetz and Wivel (2010), and Wivel (2010) indicate that European small states actively attempt to include larger states in their collective projects. In this sense they can be considered as constructors of regions.
A further relevant insight into the role of small states in regions is shown in Baillie’s (1998) study regarding Luxembourg. The actor-centred institutionalist framework suggested by Baillie (1998) uses three hypothetical principles that have a constructivist background. These are the historical context of the state of Luxembourg as a case study in relation to the formation of the institutions of the European Union; the institutional explanations which contain the collective norms, procedures of negotiation and rules shaping the behaviour of the states and determining the outcomes of international relations; and the actor-centred explanations which are based on various bargaining strategies (Baillie, 1998).

The geographical position and the variables of the international projection of a particular small state may make Baillie’s (1998) framework workable in the case of Luxembourg, but might be difficult to apply generally in the case of all small states.

Nevertheless, these ideas need to be taken into account in the cases of Ecuador and Uruguay, as both South American small states are geographically situated between larger states in a salient geopolitical and geostrategic position, as they both have direct access to the exterior through the ocean and to the interior through the main continental rivers.

Relevant further factors have been confirmed as the motivations of small candidate states to become members of an established international regional organisation. Šabič and Brglez (2000) and Nugent (2006) affirm that Slovenia’s and Cyprus’s drive to become a member of the EU were politically and
economically influenced, that is to say, politically to affect EU policies and economically to become part of a large market.

In Šabič and Brglez’s (2000) case study on Slovenia, the transformation of both the national identity and the political system in order to become a member of the EU as seen in the discourse of political actors is analysed. The authors problematise the formation and strengthening of the national Slovenian identity questioning its place in the construction of a European identity. Smallness becomes an independent variable to explain the identity formation of a small state.

Šabič and Brglez’s (2000) interest is to find out if smallness could be an influential factor in the formation of the Slovenian national identity as a contra-factual condition to the formation of the European identity by analysing the actors and institutions of the country. They consider that this can influence the perception of the national identities such as elites, media and public opinion.

Smallness as an independent variable for the formation of the national-identity was regarded as unconvincing in their results (ibid). The fact that national identities are shaped by strong symbolic, historical, linguistic and ethnic elements, among others, may be a reason for the perception of the low value of ‘smallness’ as an identity factor. But perhaps, smallness as part of the identity of a nation could be considered as one factor within many factors shaping national identity.
The studies of Ecuador and Uruguay are also based on similar ideas regarding identity formation. A regional feeling of South American identity might help explain the engagement of these small states in the construction of UNASUR.

Nevertheless, one evident phenomenon for the formation of national identity highlighted in Šabič and Brglez’s (2000) study is that the discourse of a small state as a candidate to become a member of a regional organisation and regional identity triggers debate and causes tension between the feeling of national-identity and those of regional identity.

On the other hand, Nugent (2006) highlights two fundamental characteristics that have been theorised and presented as shared elements of the behaviour and self-perception of small states as well as of other states’ behaviour towards them and perceptions of them in international relations and therefore within regional organisations.

Nugent’s (2006) work also assures us that in the case of Cyprus a third motivation or variable should be considered, notably the factor of security, as the Cypriot problem of national security has dominated the foreign policy of the country.

However, the factors presented as Cyprus’ reasons for adapting in order to become a member of the EU have been described as stemming from the lack of political, economic and security influence associated with quantitatively defined ‘smallness’ (ibid).
In conclusion, the review of the literature in this section has facilitated an identification of two important types of small states’ general behaviour in regions or regional international organisations. This can be characterised as ‘region-engaging’ (the constructor model) or ‘region-adapting’ (the ‘follower’ model), which both need to be further studied.

Secondly, most of the explanatory variables for the actions and adaptations of the small states are related to: economic interests; security in terms of the classical assumptions; and politics in terms of political influence in the formation of international regional policies.

Finally, most of these explanatory variables are related to European case studies. We have to consider the possibility that this could be due to the two following reasons: a) the limitations of academic contributions in this area of studies in some regions or b) the lack of access to academic resources produced locally. A review of the academic work produced in Latin and South America about small states could help to clarify this.

1.4 The Study of Small States in Integration Processes in Latin and South America

In contrast to the considerable amount of literature on small states carried out by European and North American academics, this study has found it challenging to identify academic investigations in this field produced in the Latin and South American region itself. This statement, it must be said, only represents the
perceptions within this study. The limited academic production within the main field of International Relations in Latin America as suggested by Tickner (2009), and the restricted technological access to resources from foreign research centres have further hindered the generation of a more accurate picture of the present situation of small state studies in Latin and South America.

The information collected during the field work and some relevant empirical and descriptive work conducted across the region identified in the visited academic centres in Ecuador and Uruguay are important guides for the identification of cues about the motivations of South American small states for the construction of regions.

Hence, this review will include some empirical and descriptive studies about Latin American small states and integration, particularly, from Uruguay and Ecuador that may not specifically underpin any theoretical explanation, but due to their significant descriptive character can be important for the development of this study.

When one regards the weight of the study of South American small states in relation to the formation and strengthening of international organisations and construction of regions, it can be observed that the focus taken by researchers avoids the categorisation of states.

Studies about the role of small states in such processes can be identified as implicit rather than explicit. For this reason, it seems that theoretical output
regarding the role of small states in international relations generally and specifically the contribution to the formation of small state studies is relatively low.

Secondly, most of the Latin and South American small states appear to have traditionally supported a discourse of international regional integration. Some small states such as Ecuador and Uruguay have a constitutional mandate towards supporting regional international integration and some small states have been historically engaged in such projects.

For instance, according to Salgado’s (1994) historical work regarding Ecuador’s part in the integration of Latin America, it was Ecuador itself which originally directed the meetings and discussions of the 1950s for the creation and institutionalisation of the Latin American Free Trade Association (ALALC).

Similarly, the publications of the Ministerio de Hacienda (1962) and of Magariños (2000) give a succinct description of the role of Uruguay in the Latin American integration process, in which Uruguay is portrayed as one of the most relevant region-engaging states of Latin America. Accordingly, these small states can be categorised as region-engaging or constructors of regions during the creation period of this regional organisation.

Thirdly, the literature shows that most South American small states have been geopolitically, militarily and economically engaged in continental integration projects as well as in international continental organisations such as the American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) and the Organisation of American States.
(OAS) since the preliminary meetings for their creation (Connell-Smith, 1966; Carrión, 1989; Villacres, 1989; Carranza, 2000; Vieira, 2008).

Therefore, in terms of integration, the South American small states have been involved in a regional integration process at four different levels: the continental level (TIAR, OAS, FTAA), the Latin American level (ALADI, SELAC), the South American level (SAFTA, UNASUR), and the sub-regional level (CAN, MERCOSUR).

Carranza (2000) exemplifies two levels of integration in the 20th century in America that involve most South American small states. He uses the globalisation approach to explain region formation. According to him, integration at a continental level carried out in the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) project was being directed by a declining hegemony of the USA. On the other hand, the ideas of a South American Free Trade Area (SAFTA) have been led by Brazil since the beginning of the 1990s (ibid).

On a sub-regional level, according to Salgado (1994) and Vieira (2008), Ecuador was one of the founders of the sub-regional international organisation, the Andean Pact, now called the Andean Community (CAN), which was originally created by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela in 1969. On the other hand, Uruguay is a founder state of the Latin American Integration Association (ALALC/ALADI) created in 1962 and MERCOSUR which was also created by Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay in 1991.
In general terms, Latin American academia has invested a large amount of energy in empirically investigating integration in South America. Despite it being a relatively new regional integration process, UNASUR has become a fundamental theme of academic interest at a South American level.

In this context, Peña (2010) and Fernández (2011) suggest that the South American small states support the tendency of integration within UNASUR. However, this is not only because UNASUR is the first South American regional organisation to include all twelve states, but also due to the fact that it offers small states suitable means to confront the challenges affecting internal democracy and stability in the twenty-first century.

Moreover, regional integration has been a constant factor in the foreign policy of most South American states as demonstrated by Cadena and Chavez (2011), and Ayuso (2010). Their research employs a historical approach to elucidate the political trend of South America and its projection internationally in the twenty-first century.

Ayuso (2010) proposes that this historical process of regional integration has paid more attention to the local ideological political and economic interests culminating in the formation of UNASUR, an organisation that is being constructed with principles that purport to reduce the asymmetries of the member states.
For Cienfuegos and Sanahuja (2010), regionalism, or integration, was driven by most of the South American states in a particular Latin American fashion during the 1990s and at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

This process of development has been theorised as the South American ‘open regionalism’, a liberalist framework that supports regional economic and political integration with a preferential system for certain products and countries with relatively low development within the region, but does not support the regularisation of a common external agenda of the members of the common regional market.

According to these authors, the regional and global political context of the twenty-first century has influenced the dynamics of local politics in the South American continent, and South America aims to enter a phase of post-liberal regionalism. The interests of societies have been expressed in the election of left-oriented governments.

Consequently, the transformation of right-wing liberalist oriented to leftist and integrationist governments in most of the South American states has strengthened the historical pro-integrationist ideals of the region.

As a response, states have developed new collective projects and integrationist strategies to project themselves internationally by focusing on social and political shared issues which distinguish UNASUR from previous regional integration projects (Cienfuegos & Sanahuja, 2010).
Such investigations look at the whole region as a system in order to describe the political transformation of South American from a historical perspective. They include a general view of the variables that have motivated the formation of UNASUR, avoiding an explanation of the behaviour of small states, but prioritising the role of larger states.

For instance, Sanahuja (2010) suggests that the South American Community of Nations (CSN) was created based on the following principles driven by Brazil: coordination and agreement on foreign policies; converging of the existing sub-regional economic integration processes CAN and MERCOSUR with the incorporation of Chile, Guyana and Surinam; and physical integration including transport, communication and energy.

In contrast to studies that aim to explain the emergence of the South American region as driven by bigger states, the present study will hopefully complement earlier studies by using a constructivist perspective to examine the role of small states in the strengthening of regional consciousness in South America and the creation of UNASUR.

In addition to this, by looking at the small states’ engagement in the process of regional construction, the influence of new ideological tendencies in South America can be clarified. Buono’s (2006) work concerning the views of academics and social civil groups regarding South American integration suggests that academics as well as civil society demand a transformation of the old economic-
oriented integration process into a more socialised and democratic regional integration. Hence, Cadena and Chavez (2011) and Sanahuja (2010) propose that instead of the ‘open regionalism’ framework of the 1990s and middle of the 2000s, the projection of integration of South America could be considered as ‘post-liberal regionalism’.

These different types of regionalism in which small states are involved in the present era challenge the understanding of the role of small states in regional integration processes. This also hinders the formation of an authentic theory of integration of Latin America and/or of South America due to the overlapping factors considered within the study of regionalism and integration.

A distinction can be made through the existence of over-governmental international institutions with certain legislative and executive powers that are characteristics of integration processes. Whereas regionalism can also be characterised through the presence of less legally binding international arrangements of governments, inter-relationship between societies and further international actors, which include an imaginary international geographical region. Hence, regionalism could subsume integration processes.

Dabène (2009) collates various theoretical attempts to explain the different theoretical perspectives of the Latin American integration processes, comparatively exploring the transition from typical economic integration to integration from below that involves the democratisation of the region.
According to Dabène (2009), the particularity of Latin American integration processes is difficult to explain and understand from the point of view of the normative European theoretical approaches to integration, as ‘each process has its own specificities and has to be evaluated according to its own standards’ (p. 24-25).

Moreover, as demonstrated by Vieira (2008), each project of international integration has its own character and has been adapted and renewed progressively according to the circumstances of local and international interests of the member states. Therefore, the application of established theoretical approaches to the study of South American integration requires a further adaptation to the context and time.

This review of the literature has also facilitated an understanding of the international environment of small states in the twenty-first century as it has focused on two political units, Ecuador and Uruguay within UNASUR as an international regional organisation. This includes the geographical area of South America with the exceptions of some islands and overseas European territories such as French Guiana.

Due to the fact that regional integration is referred to by authors from various areas of study and as part of the foreign policy of small states of Latin-and South American and sub-regional integration, it is, however, challenging to provide a clear analytical overview of the politics of regional integration solely of the small states within the whole region.
For instance within the area of foreign policy, Muñoz and Tulchin (1996) presented one of the first attempts to develop an analytical framework that could be applicable to many case studies favouring the comparative approach. Nevertheless, more flexibility was suggested (ibid) in the approach due to the different perspectives of analysing a variety of political actors and international systems.

Similarly, Mora and Hey (2003) assembled the most important aspects of the foreign policies of sixteen case studies including the cases of Ecuador and Uruguay. Their ‘three levels of analysis’ framework, focusing on the individuals, states and systems, allowed the authors to clearly picture the asymmetries between the different states. For example, while Ecuador’s main political approach to strengthening the CAN was by solving border problems with Peru, Uruguayan politics of integration focused on securing a favourable position in MERCOSUR (Hey, 2003; Bizzozero, 2003).

The difficulty of presenting a general overview of policies of small states in South America can be understood in Hey’s (1995) suggestion that Latin American states have not produced a definitive foreign policy agenda and that their policies respond to certain ideological cycles (ibid, 1995). In this context, Hey (1995) identified two ‘cyclical patterns’ of Latin American foreign policy behaviour: the shifting pattern from left to right or right to left, as a response to election results, and the ‘neoliberal trend’ where the tendency is to move towards a combination of neoliberalism in economic factors and pro-US foreign policy in political matters.
On the other hand, Fernández (2011) suggests that the volatile character of regional politics could be found in the institutional setting of the political system, whereby a stable national agenda of foreign policy and integration has been a challenge due to the interdependency of political power and decision-making within the presidency and the parliament.

In reference to such pragmatic factors within each state in Latin America, Gardini (2011) propose an ‘ideology and pragmatism’ analytical framework to study the foreign policy of Latin American states. This can be adaptable to a reality that varies from region to region and from small state to small state, as it is a framework developed around five fundamental concepts as tools of analysis: ends and purposes, means available, agency, process, and structure (ibid: 6-7).

Hence, the areas of small state studies and foreign policy analysis or international political economy are often considered to be intertwined. This shows that small state studies has not found solid ground within Latin and South American academia.

For instance, Bonilla (2008) employs the concept of ‘small state’ to address the challenges facing Ecuadorian foreign policy on entering an unknown era after the US international political reorientation of the twenty-first century. His concept of small states devolves from the principle of the capabilities of a state. Consequently, smallness as a defining characteristic of a state appears here as a quantitative concept (ibid).
However, the concept used in Bonilla’s study is not further defined. Yet within the study of Ecuadorian foreign policy, Bonilla (2002) provides wider insight into the perspectives and international projection of Ecuador in the twenty-first century within international organisations.

It is worth pointing out that the ten articles gathered in this publication tend to use a hybrid of theoretical frameworks within the same study. The common feature within these studies is the use of the concept ‘weak states’ to highlight the difficulties of Ecuador’s insertion into the international order (ibid).

Ecuadorian foreign policy within the most relevant international organisations such as the OAS, WTO, UN and the EU is considered in the studies collected in this volume (ibid). However, the theoretical principles of small state studies are limited, as they do not further develop the meaning of being a ‘weak’ as opposed to a ‘small’ state.

Integration studies and international political economy are also fields that touch on the principles of small state studies. Investigations in these fields are mostly gathered in collections about Ecuador, but they are limited to interpreting the nature of the state by means of a subjective concept of ‘small’, as well as by the specific nature of their field.

For example, Jaramillo (2010) records the positions of economic political actors regarding the transition of the Ecuadorian foreign policy from a bilateral to an
integrationist approach; but this study is conducted within the limits of the realm of international political economy.

In the Uruguayan academic environment, the situation of small state studies appears to be relatively similar. Bizzozero (2000) and Abreu (2000) introduced the term *estado pequeño* (meaning 'small state') to investigate Uruguay’s role in the integration process of MERCOSUR.

Bizzozero (2000) categorises small states according to material capabilities and uses a geopolitical framework to analyse the political position of Uruguay in the construction of the region. This means that the geographical position of a state plays an important role in the behaviour of small states within integration processes. Hence, geographical proximity appears here as a further factor that engages small states in integration processes.

The theoretical approach to the study of small states within integration processes is based on examples of the European Benelux states (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg). Therefore there is limited theoretical production of an authentic South American approach (ibid). A few years later, Bizzozero (2003) provided a clear summary of the historical development of the foreign policy of the Uruguayan state in the twentieth century. Here, his applied historical approach does not refer to the field of small state studies. This is an example of an inter-disciplinary study to focus on a case study such as Uruguay.
The case study developed by Abreu (2000) presents Uruguay as an active member state of MERCOSUR in a similar way to Bizzozero (2000). According to Abreu (2000), the Uruguayan policy of integration was oriented towards geopolitical and economic developments and was able to obtain some important concessions from Brazil and Argentina, such as the constitutional guarantee of the equality of states when bargaining over shared political and economic issues (ibid).

As mentioned above, the regional politics of South America have changed rapidly in the last decade from an ‘open regionalism’ to a ‘post-neoliberal regionalism’ and the developments of regional organisations such as UNASUR are likely to benefit from ongoing research.

Similarly, the role played by small states in the new projection of South American regionalism does not seem to be sufficiently analysed. In the case of Ecuador, its role in the construction of UNASUR is mainly analysed as part of its foreign policy, rather than specifically focusing on its role within UNASUR.

For instance, research conducted by Zepeda (2011), and Zepeda and Egas (2011) shows that, since the arrival of Rafael Correa to power, Ecuador has established a foundation plan for the development of its foreign policy, in which regional integration has occupied a strategic position within Ecuadorian foreign affairs.
Zepeda (2011) looks at four main themes of Ecuadorian foreign policy in recent years by employing a documentary study: regional integration; the bilateral relations with Colombia; the existing relations within old partnerships; and the search for new partnerships.

In further research, Zepeda and Egas (2011) highlight seven priorities of the new Ecuadorian government within the Revolución Ciudadana of President Rafael Correa: ‘defence of the national sovereignty, active multilateralism, Latin American regionalism, diversification of the international market and support of the cooperation South–South, protection of the environment, protection of Ecuadorian migrants abroad, and the free mobility of people and universal citizenship’ (p. 99).

However, according to Sánchez (2011) these changes mainly reflect the intentions of a new government, rather than those of the state. He employs the concept of ‘small state’ from the realist perspective and characterises Ecuador as a small state that has not been able to determine its own foreign policy agenda and instead has functioned in a reactionary manner to external factors. Nevertheless, this study suggests that the Ecuadorian foreign policy has changed following the peace agreement with Peru in Brasilia in 1998 (ibid).

In conclusion, the study of Ecuador and Uruguay and their motivations to engage in the construction of UNASUR is likely to benefit from further investigation. In the case of Uruguay, the literature has presented some insights into the probable motivations of the South American small state to support the construction of
UNASUR and thus the act of engaging in regional politics. The analysis of Bizzozero (2008, 2010) is based on a realist perspective. He perceives the small state within a regional environment in transition from open regionalism to continental regionalism.

He refers to the latter as ‘the new regional organisations’, in other words UNASUR and the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA). Bizzozero (2008) analyses the position of a small state in the formation of UNASUR employing a three level framework: global, regional and national perspectives. By means of this, his study highlights the following variables as motivations of small states, in particular Uruguay, to support the creation of UNASUR: the financial and economic crises of the region; the ‘bandwagoning’ effect that larger states can cause (in this case Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela); and the historical region-engaging character of Uruguay.

However, his study does not include the developments of UNASUR or the role of Uruguay in the years after 2008 which this present study aims to embrace. In order to complement Bizzozero’s research, this present study will include ideational factors such as the ideas of a collective or regional identity, and the interest in a regional and national peace, among others.

As a result, this study aims to look at the engagement of Ecuador and Uruguay in the construction and strengthening of UNASUR until 2012 from the constructivist perspective. Hence, small states are considered as social actors whose purpose is to identify issues affecting both the national and international community, look
for solutions that benefit the whole community and collectively resolve them within an amicable international environment whereby states’ actions are directed by the common interest and shared identity, as suggested by Wendt (1994, 1999), Finnemore (1996), and Adler (2002).

From the perspective of constructivism, small states do not need to be considered as weak, vulnerable, threatened, self-centred or in competition within the international arena as states enter into an interrelationship within a friendly environment. Small states as well as larger states have the same aims and are interested in finding a common position to make a communal effort to resolve common issues.

Small as well as larger states interact with each other within a ‘Kantian culture of anarchy’ (Wendt, 1999: 297). The construction of the meaning of smallness takes place within this harmonic interaction of international political actors. This also makes it possible for small states to be seen as potential ‘region-engaging’ actors from the point of initial contact, and the result of collective action is the product of a communal effort.

The history of the formation of UNASUR shows this fundamental principle, and looking at the Preamble of UNASUR’s Constitutive Treaty, the South American Integration contained in UNASUR envisages building a union amongst its peoples on the basis of a set of ideational factors, including the cultural, social, economic and political fields (UNASUR, 2008).
The primacy, as functionalists suggest, of economy and technology over politics, or the imposition by great powers of their own interests do not apply to this process of integration. On the contrary, this process is based on common principles: on the shared cultural heritage, shared history and interrelationship between societies, amongst others, which can be best understood as a process of regionalism within which small states can take leading international roles.

For these reasons, a constructivist framework may be the most appropriate approach with which to look for answers to the leading research question of this study, namely why Ecuador and Uruguay have supported the creation and the strengthening of UNASUR.

1.5 Conclusion

The survey of the literature suggests that authors categorise the small state in many different ways: namely as small ethnic states, industrialised small states, underdeveloped small states, and micro-states, among others.

The roles of small state in international relations and particularly the formation of regions referred to in the reviewed literature tend to respond to the theoretical perspective adopted by the investigation and the theoretical perspective and research questions seem to have influenced each study’s characterisation of small states.
As a result, small states can be characterised as followers which could also be considered as ‘region-adapting’ states, or as constructors which could be considered as ‘region-engaging’ states.

In summary, the major factors that appear to have greatest impact on a state’s interest and engagement in the process of construction and consolidation of regions seem to be their drive to maximise their relative power, their economic interest, their opportunity for political influence, their geographical proximity, their national interest in security, and their ‘small’-ness.

It is no coincidence that most of the theoretical approaches applied in these studies are grounded mainly in realist and neoliberal theoretical principles. Studies are planned and structured to identify what the researcher aims to explain or understand, and undertaken with the tools that they possess.

Another observation contained in this literature survey is that studies have mainly been conducted within the main sub-fields of IR such as the study of international security, international organisation and cooperation and of international political economy.

On the one hand, this facilitates access to studies underpinning various perspectives and theoretical views, as suggested above. On the other, the lack of agreement about a common agenda within small state studies has not allowed for the positioning of this field as a wider area of research in academic centres. So,
there is a low cumulative rate of research and limited progressive knowledge creation in this field in relation to other fields of International Relations.

This study has also shown that only a few investigations have analysed Latin American small states as agents in the construction of regions, and fewer studies have focussed on the role of identity in the behaviour of small states in the construction of regions.

This current state of small state studies in this region of the planet presents a promising opportunity to make a contribution to the field and to the discipline of International Relations. With that in mind, the next chapters of this study aim to look at the agency of Ecuador and Uruguay within international relations in order to further develop an understanding of small states’ motivation when they act in favour of, or against, the construction of regions.
Chapter 2. Understanding the Role of Small States in the Construction of Regions: A Conceptual Framework

2.1 Introduction

This chapter further develops the suggested concepts of small states as ‘region-engaging’ or ‘region-adapting’ that were identified in the previous chapter. It also clarifies the complementary concept of small states as ‘region-constraining’ as a first step to further construct a conceptual framework to analyse Ecuador and Uruguay as regional political agents in the construction of UNASUR.

In order to address this, the first part of this chapter clarifies the definition of small state and further single concepts as conceived in this study. This will help to avoid theoretical pitfalls and possible misunderstandings. The second part of the chapter develops concepts to characterise the engagement of small states in region-building processes. The terms ‘region-engaging’, ‘region-constraining’, and ‘region-adapting’ are considered here as fundamental characteristics of small states as international actors in possession of a role as ‘member’, ‘leader’, ‘defector’ or as ‘candidate’ in the construction of regions.

This set of concepts is based on the ‘conventional’ social constructivist ideas used to explain international relations (Fierke, 2010), elements of role theory in international relations developed by Nabers (2011) and Harnisch (2011), in combination with elements of Adler & Barnett’s (1998) conceptual framework to analyse the emergence and development of security communities.
The third part of this chapter presents and further clarifies the emerging framework to analyse the cases of Ecuador and Uruguay in the construction of UNASUR, and the final section explains the methodology employed in this study.

2.2 Clarifying Concepts that Underpin this Study: Small State, Region and Identity

The previous chapter showed that there is no single agreed meaning of the concept ‘small state’ and that the definitions proposed tend to be related to the theoretical perspective taken by the individual researcher. Whereas realist approaches view small states as international actors that respond to material and security needs, rationalist approaches consider them as free-riders, calculating actors that are driven by the results of a weighing up process of costs and benefits. On the other hand, this study sees small states as social actors of international politics driven by identity-like characteristics, values, norms and meanings that enable them to relate to further international actors, help them to clarify what they are and to define what their agency is.

The representatives of the small state in the international arena, including presidents, ministers, members of the military elite, diplomats and further special envoys of the state and government, are not only the carriers of a collective reality, but they are also the holders of their subjective reality. Consequently, norms, rules, language and context are important social factors that can influence the behaviour of
small states in international politics. These are some of the core fundamentals of social constructivism.

Hence, this study endorses the main constructivist assumptions that bind the various constructivist branches together, such as the view that international relations are the product of human action in the social world. Politics between national states is also ‘a world of our making’ (Onuf, 2002). Political international structures have been constructed through social action. The behaviour of political actors in the construction and in the modification of such structures can hardly be explained using the scientific tools of natural sciences. Therefore an interpretative approach to knowledge is considered here to be the most appropriate perspective to understand the social reality of small states in international relations.

In looking at the role of Ecuador and Uruguay in the South American process of region construction, this study also supports the view that small as well as bigger states are built of a politically organised social group that give meaning to further elements that form the state, and to the actions in international politics of their representatives. The ideas, history, culture, norms, values and further identity-like elements of the representatives of the small state are fundamentals for their action and for the shaping of the agency of the small state in international politics. What small states portrait as their agency is intertwined between both the collective ideas which shape the international politics of the small state as well as the subjective ideas of the international political actors.
However, the various constructivist views that have proliferated in the historical developmental path of constructivism could lead academics to prioritise or explicitly endorse certain nuances in the explanations and different understandings of the actions and behaviour of small states of international relations. These various views can direct the specific focus of the investigation about small states in IR.

For instance, by taking a ´modernist linguistic´ constructivist approach to study small states and disregarding the ´modernist´ and the ´radical´ constructivist views (Adler, 2002), academics may focus on the language and rules that enable them to explain the behaviour of small states, as well as the discourse of power and its employment in the construction of social reality (Adler, 2002). Fierke (2010) refers to this constructivist view as ´consistent constructivism´ whereas Adler´s ´modernist constructivism´ (2002) is referred to here as ´conventional constructivism´.

This study adheres to the conventional or modernist constructivism which has a ´cognitive interest in understanding and explaining social reality´ (Adler, 2002: 97-98). Hence, it firstly adheres to the assumption that there is a social reality that contains the social fact that a social international reality has been constructed at a certain time, place and historical circumstance. International Relations as a Social Science aims to explain and understand such reality. Secondly, ideas play a fundamental role not only in shaping the social reality of each small state, but also in the process of understanding such social reality.

For instance, it is plausible that South America contains various states, many of which can be considered as small states. The reality that such small states have
been historically created cannot be denied, and that they play certain roles in the processes of regionalism is evident from any theoretical perspective as suggested in the previous chapter. The historical South American as well as Latin American ideas are fundamental for the understanding of such a South American and Latin American reality as well as the role of South American small states in the context of international politics.

Here, the task is to clarify how such small states are defined from a constructivist perspective in order to understand their role in the formation of UNASUR. Firstly, small state is considered here as a corporate political actor that maintains relationships with other states or other political actors engaged across national borders. Despite the fact that there are more actors than the state itself that influence international relations, the South American states seem to have maintained their prevalence in the conduct of, and final decisions about, the relations between states.

So, this study focuses on the actions of the state as a unit of analysis, considering that the actions of the state include the political discourse, decisions, declarations, policies and agreements made by the main actors in the international relations of the South American small state: governments, diplomatic and military bodies.

In order to define the small state as a unit of analysis, this study departs from the assumption that the ‘state’, as a well established political concept, a sovereign political entity, is not open to further debate.
Hence, the controversial term within the whole concept is ‘smallness’ as an intrinsic characteristic of the identity of a state, and how it is understood and conceived from within by the unitary nation-state itself and from without by the international community.

In this sense, ‘smallness’ can be based on the inter-subjective understanding of the meaning of small shared within an international community and in a distinct context. This perspective is intrinsic to Hey’s (2003) definition of small state whereby she suggests that a state should be considered as small ‘if a state’s people and institutions generally perceive themselves to be small, or if other states’ people and institutions perceive that state as small’ (p. 3).

In the inter-subjective understanding of smallness from the point of view of people’s nation-state and its institutions, and of the people from other states and exterior institutions, as suggested by this study, material as well as ideational elements could be dimensions of the definition.

As suggested by Väyrynen (1971) in his ranking of typology, exterior and interior dimensions on one hand, and objective and subjective measurements on the other, can help to define the characteristic of small. Hence, it is the inter-subjective understanding of what will be taken into account for measurement that defines the character of smallness.

Singer (1972) attempts to avoid this subjective perception by introducing the term ‘weak’ to characterise small states, a term which also takes into account the socio-
economic, socio-political and socio-psychological patterns of the state’s formation and structure. Nevertheless, a certain level of subjectivity is hardly avoidable in defining a small state. Moreover, the kind of definition developed is ideologically based and context-specific.

In the light of such suggestions, this study presents a definition on the basis of Hey’s (2003) proposition that also needs to be set into a cognitive context. For example, in the context of the international religious community, the Vatican City could well be considered as a world leading state.

Hence, small state is considered in this study as the social construction of a sovereign political entity based on the shared understanding and collective recognition of the state category of small within the national and international community. It exhibits an identity, possesses agency, and as such presents an arena for the action of a group of representatives of the national population considered here as a cognitive community.

It is within this arena that the notion of small state is shaped on the basis of an inter-subjective idea of smallness. In this way, the perception of smallness becomes a distinctive characteristic of a particular state. Here, the context is a fundamental element of the understanding of smallness.

For the purpose of this study, smallness of the state is considered in the context of a South American cognitive community-region. According to Adler (2005) such ‘community-regions are regional systems of meanings (an interdependent group of
meanings among individuals or collectivities) and are not limited to a specific geographic place’ (p. 181). In this sense, the quality of smallness is based on a subjective perception and conceptualised inter-subjectively, whose characterisation could also be considered as an element of type identity.

Type identity is the second concept that is employed in this study and requires clarification due to its ubiquitous usage. The concept of identity employed in this study is based on Wendt’s (1999) definition of type identity. He describes this as the characteristics shared between many people within a social group in a national state as well as among an international community. In the case of small states, one of their shared characteristics is being ‘small’ as an element of their type identity.

According to this, the following six states can be considered small states within the South American socio-political context: Bolivia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Surinam and Uruguay. This would reflect the categorisation made by the Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean (CEPAL), which looking from a macro-economic perspective also characterises these states as small states (CEPAL, 2005).

These states have a variety of further elements of their national identity that link them with the other states of South America. For example, all were once European colonies and went through a process of political independence.

In this respect, they have a shared history. The symbiosis of various ethnicities in their national societies is a similar link. Moreover, all have maintained democratic
elected governments since the 1990s, and most have also been voluntarily involved in various projects of regional international integration.

It could easily be said that they share a set of norms and values. This claim, in conjunction with the (identitarian) elements of shared identification I have mentioned are the basis of a collective regional identity. This suggestion forms another concept I shall employ in this study.

A third concept to be clarified as a requirement before an understanding of the international political action or inaction of small states can be reached is the definition of a region as the international political arena of the small states. It is the context of small state study in this investigation.

The environment of the small state is at present inundated with a variety of sub-regional, regional, continental and global international organisations. This has obscured the limits and meaning of region; as ‘region’ and ‘regionalism’ are concepts used in many different ways in the study of regional integration, and form a variety of theoretical approaches (Riggirozzi, 2012; Rittberger and Zangl, 2006; Wiener and Diez, 2009).

Leaving aside for a moment the idea that UNASUR includes a region, not only in geographical terms but also in cognitive terms, since the whole of South America forms the international political environment of Ecuador and Uruguay, the requirement is here to define region.
Regions can be defined and understood as intergovernmental political, commercial or military arrangements that organise the relationship of states within a generally conceived geographical area (Hurrell, 1995).

According to Riggirozzi (2012), there are levels of region formation which demonstrate an inclination towards it becoming a global actor. A region could be said to comprise a geographical space progressively transformed into a ‘deeper institutionalised polity with a permanent structure of decision-making and stronger acting capability as a global actor’ (p. 425).

Adler and Barnett (1998) define regions as ‘a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change’ (p. 28). They maintain that the catalyst for its emergence as a region could be one of normative or material interest and could be motivated by the desire to coordinate relations, which may be caused by ‘exogenous and endogenous factors’ (p. 35).

According to the requirements for the presence of a security community as suggested by Adler and Barnett (1998), UNASUR cannot be categorised as a security community, due to various premises that will be clarified in the process of this study.

One reason for this incompleteness is the presence of military forces along some national borders whereas a security community demands the absence of troops along the interior borders of member states (ibid).
However, UNASUR shows its unique development in the process of cooperation. It demonstrates some characteristics that resemble a security community. For example, there is a collective regional discourse of collective defence. Moreover, some states may aim to go beyond mutual commercial and defence considerations towards harmonisation of its members’ social development and security policy. Greater cooperation and peaceful co-existence might then develop on the basis of shared culture and values.

Therefore, for the purpose of this study, the South American region contained by UNASUR can be considered as a pluralistic cooperative community: by that I mean an internationally organised region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain expectations of peaceful political change and human development through cooperation between the national states at various levels of their national and international politics.

International politics is considered here as the interaction of states, as corporate actors, through their national governments or representatives who shape and express their national interests across national borders. This can still be applied to the cases of states within the continent of South America, since the decision to participate, support or reject collective bilateral, or multilateral political actions is mainly influenced and defined by elites and by the government in power as mentioned above.
Furthermore, when studying security communities as defined by Adler and Barnett (1998), security goes beyond the traditional military concept of security, as it also includes elements of material and social welfare, human rights, reducing poverty and social inequality, and promoting ecological development, among others in a pluralistic cooperative community.

In 21st century South America, the meaning of security includes, in addition to its traditional meaning, ‘specific priorities of every state that contribute to the consolidation of peace, integral development and social justice based on democratic principles, solidarity and respect for national sovereignty’ (Serbin, 2010: 18), among others.

On the one hand, the understanding of security can be related to the interest of the national state in its role as protector of, and provider for, the whole nation. On the other, sovereignty can be considered as the aim of the South American states to retain their traditional international right to govern within a determined territory without exterior interference. However, how can a collective regional security be implemented without encouraging the mutual enforcement of internationally institutionalised norms in order to maintain peace at home and abroad?

It is worth noting that the emergence of UNASUR took place during a time of implementation of democratic political systems throughout South America with mainly left-oriented governments, and relative friendship between most of the South American national states.
In this context, the manifestation of cognitive communities such as the similar-minded political elites as suggested by Adler (2005), can play a relevant role in the formation of regions. This would concur with the view that within South America as a whole, international political decisions continue to be influenced [disproportionately] by a few individuals in each respective government.

As a result, the ideological concurrence of national leaders regarding both domestic government and regional integration may henceforward be seen as another contribution to explain small states engagement in the creation of regions.

The suggestion that intensive and extensive interactions between states can help to form a region has been further developed by Adler and Barnett’s (1998) concept of a pluralistic security community; this applies equally to the concept of a pluralistic cooperative community.

The original ideas of security communities can be traced back to Deutsch’s (1957) seminal theoretical approach to the study of their rise at that time. In concurrence with Adler and Barnett’s (1998) constructivist framework, the idea of an international cooperative community is best understood in terms of constructivist principles. As a result, a qualitative analysis of the interaction of states in the process of constructing a region becomes necessary.

But, it is important to be aware of pluralism as a factor here. This leads us in the direction of the principle of transactionalism referred to by Deutsch (1957) and improved theoretically by Adler and Barnett (1998).
For the purpose of this study, pluralism is instead conceived in terms of the variety of areas of international cooperation. By this I mean the acknowledgment of the complex interplay of ideas, cultures, identities and nations in the formation of a region, when the common aim is to incorporate the national states’ various policies and engage all small states in the consolidation of a union.

At the early stages of this community’s formation, the pluralism is contained in, and represented mainly by, an elite or a group of elites and experts that govern the different countries of the emergent cognitive community (Adler, 2005). This is so despite the presence of elements of an international collective identity among the region’s national populations. Nevertheless, it is within this interaction that the elements of shared or collective identity are identified.

So the role of charismatic international politicians can also be included as an important influence on the formation of collective identity, an identity which will be expressed in the national political constitution (in international treaties in the case of regional identity) and further political regulations, such as the national foreign policy of a state (collective/regional defence policies in the case of international communities). It could even motivate other community members to agree on shared issues within the region; though, of course, for some states that may not have the same relevance.

This is particularly important in politically unstable small states where foreign policy is formed as a reaction to external political developments, and where new political
regimes would constantly redefine the national interest according to the ideology of the governing political party as suggested by Gardini and Lambert (2011).

Another important concept that underpins the concept of cooperative international communities and needs clarification is the definition of international community. The definition of a community at an international level presents various difficulties due to the difference of meaning between an international organisation as an international community or as an international association.

The difference here is that the construction of an international community is based on an understanding of the political as an instrument for cooperation rather than as an approach that favours a power-related conceptualisation of the political in international relations.

Adler and Barnett (1998) distinguish between the forming of a group of self-interested member states and the forming of a group of non-self-interested member states which they refer to respectively as ‘an association’ and ‘a community’. To clarify this, they suggest that the ‘members of a community have shared identities, values and meaning’ (p. 29).

Important features of a community are the direct and many-sided relations; long-term common interests; the awareness of other community members; a sense of solidarity, self-responsibility and obligation; and particularly the fixed decision to avoid the use of violence to solve conflicts (ibid).
It can therefore follow that an international cooperative community might emerge within a friendly culture of anarchy, characterised by Wendt (1999) as the ‘Kantian’ culture of anarchy.

Within this Kantian culture of anarchy there is a possibility of evolving a collective interest in cooperation between like-minded states. This kind of cooperation can be considered as international communitarian cooperation which in other words is an expression of the voluntary will of states to identify common interests, complementary capabilities and shared issues in order to collectively solve them on the basis of solidarity and shared features, as manifested in the treaty of UNASUR.

These shared features of national South American states across the international regional community constitute the platform of a collective or regional identity. They can be mainly identified and strengthened through the interaction and inter-subjective understanding of meaning regarding the shared cultural aspects within a process of collective identity formation as suggested by (Wendt, 1994; 1999).

Hence, elements of a collective identity or regional identity can also help to explain the engagement of small states in the construction of regions. As suggested by Wendt (1999), collective identity is the identification of elements of the Self as being shared by the Other. ‘This identification, this sense of being a part of a group or “we”, is a social or collective identity that gives actors an interest in the preservation of their culture’ (ibid: 337).
According to this, a South American “we-ness” or South American identity can be defined here as the set of shared values and beliefs, shared identification features and institutionalised norms that enable a person, a group of people or a polity to consider itself as belonging to a South American community.

In conclusion, the international arena or environment of action of the small states, Ecuador and Uruguay, is framed in this study both by the process of creation, ratification and strengthening of UNASUR, and by the ideas of a shared South American identity based on shared values and beliefs.

The set of such shared South American values and beliefs may include the belief in individual freedom, a feeling of solidarity, religious beliefs based on the symbiosis of Christianity and Amerindian spirituality, the values of human rights, democracy and social justice, among others.

The set of shared identification features may embrace the symbiosis of Amerindian, Western European and African ethnicities and cultures, including the diversity of languages, architecture, music and film; a shared history and a unitary geographical space, among others.

The set of institutionalised shared norms could include the lack of requirement for a visa to travel across the region; the permission to drive across it with national driving licences; states' sovereignty and the self-determination of the people, and the trade of selected products across the region. These, and other norms, have been
regulated by the South American states through treaties, agreements and declarations.

2.3 The International Role and Small States as Region-engaging, Region-constraining, and Region-adapting

Small as well as relatively larger South American states have played dissimilar roles in the process of constructing UNASUR. Some small states such as Guyana, Surinam and Paraguay have been more reserved in positing a South American discourse, whereas others such as Bolivia and Ecuador have shown strong support for this project. Therefore, it is crucial to identify factors and actions that can fit the character of ‘region-engaging’, region-constraining’ or ‘region-constraining’ small states.

Moreover, it appears that the roles played by the different small states were changing throughout the process of creation and consolidation of UNASUR. Since this is so, it is necessary to clarify how this study defines the character of an international role for small states in the construction of regions.

There is a variety of national and international role definitions and approaches within International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis. Studies see states’ roles in international relations as functional (i.e. satellite) or as constitutive (i.e. member states) (Holsti, 1970; Walker, 1987, 2004, 2011; Harnisch, 2011; Harnisch et al., 2011; Breuning, 2011; Nabers, 2011).
Nabers (2011) identifies five theoretical approaches to the study of the role of states in international relations: structural, interactionist, functional, organisational and cognitive role theory. These theoretical approaches are linked to the main theoretical approaches to the study of international relations (ibid).

The description of small states' roles in international relations tends also to be influenced by the theoretical perspective taken in the studies of such states. In order to reduce such possible influences in this study, this section clarifies the approach taken here to understanding the role of Ecuador and Uruguay in the construction of UNASUR.

The particular role considered for the purposes of this study is that of UNASUR member and the engagement of small states in the process of constructing the region [figure 1], which concerns the action of signing, confirming and depositing treaties, declarations and conventions with regional international relevance.

Small states engage in the construction of regions when they participate, present and develop integration projects. They promote the creation of new institutions for cooperation within the process, and convert regional integration into national policy.

During this process of constructing a region as an international regional community, small states can play various roles -considered here as identity role or social role, and defined as a guiding cognitive representation for expected actions generally related to social behaviour within an organised social group (Nabers, 2011).
Inherently, such roles also form the identity of political international actors, such as states. Harnisch (2011) also suggests that, in the context of IR, roles can be considered as twofold. First, they are considered as constitutive to the group, in that the same expectations are set for those agents within a specific international environment. In the case of the construction of UNASUR as a pluralistic cooperative community, the role designed and assigned to all states is that of community member.

Secondly, a role could be considered as functionally specific. This means further expectations are assigned to the role and the same expectations are required in different international settings (ibid). For example, the expectations required of a ‘leader’ state within UNASUR could be the same within further international organisations. In the case of UNASUR, the role of President Pro Tempore gives member states the power to coordinate common projects, policies and meetings, among others, for one year.

In relation to a constructed or consolidated regional international community, three functional specific roles could be identified: ‘leader’, ‘defector’ and ‘candidate’. The roles of leader and defector are entwined with the constitutive role of community member, while the role of candidate is related to the expectations upon possible members of an international community.

However, these functionally specific roles are not necessarily present in the process of construction or in the emergence of a region within a ‘Kantian’ culture of anarchy, since the structures and their functions are themselves under construction.
Hence, roles are not necessarily defined. Therefore, in order to characterise small states according to their engagement in the construction and strengthening of international regions, small states can be categorised in the following types: small states as region-engaging, region-constraining, and region-adapting.

A set of conditions has also been developed in order to clarify these categories. This can help to understand the process of changing behaviour and the shift between the differing roles of small states, since states in international relations play various roles as well as possessing various identities (Nabers, 2011; Harnisch et al., 2011).

On the one hand, this categorisation can help to avoid the division into functional and constitutive roles for the determination of the character of small states in the construction of regions. On the other, the focus on the identity of small states and the elements of identity they share with other states of the region as well as with extra-regional political actors can help us to understand their behaviour in the region’s construction.

For this purpose, small states could be firstly characterised as ‘region-engaging’ when they voluntarily support the region-building process by signing, ratifying and officially depositing the majority of treaties, declarations, conventions and further instruments that support and enhance the cooperative community/region. In this way they assume the role of community member.
It is crucial to highlight that, just as in security communities, in cooperative communities an increasing number of interactions between states are required for the strengthening and maintenance of trust and the formation of institutions to coordinate state policies for material progress and peaceful change; even here conflict can occur, sometimes unpredictably (Adler & Barnett, 1998).

So we can see that the role of a state is being constructed at the same time as the cooperative community is coming into being, and once this community is established, states’ roles have simultaneously taken shape. In that way, the behaviour of the small state during this process can contribute to its ultimate character.

Moreover, small states actively and voluntarily engage in the process by presenting projects for the creation of institutions, their further development of them, and for the strengthening of the community. Furthermore, they call special meetings and organise events which enhance the cohesion of the region. Finally, region-engaging states are those states that have made regionalism a policy of national interest.

In such circumstances, such ‘region-engaging’ small states may also have similar patterns of commitment within other forms of region-building processes, as in the case of Ecuador and Uruguay within Latin American regionalism, and the sub-regional commitment to CAN and MERCOSUR, which themselves contain other identity roles.
Breuning (2011) suggests that in addition to the material imperatives that influence the role adopted by a state in international relations, both the national states’ ideational elements and international political ideas, such as democratic and liberal thought, can shape the identities and cultures which play an important part in a state’s behaviour and its development of a role. Moreover, both role diversity and the interaction with other groups could influence the state’s identity formation and its change of role.

During this process, a role conflict within an actor may arise causing the actor to weigh up its preferences and interests -and within a cooperative community, rivalry within the members can exist, but members tend to avoid the use of violence to settle their conflicts.

This, however, offers no assurance, due to intra-regional or extra-regional influences, actors will necessarily define their national interest by reference to the interest of the community despite the fact that harmonisation of national and regional collective interest is expected. So we can see that the roles and identities of small states are exposed to change.

Finnemore (1996) suggests that while national interests are being formed, states are assisted by norms and values in order to make such decisions. Hence, the role of states and changes in this role are influenced by the national state’s own norms and values and could also be influenced by regional and extra-regional values, norms and further forms of identity with which the state has interaction.
In conclusion, ‘region-engaging’ small states have a constitutive role to play as ‘community member’ within a regional project or consolidated region, and they can opt to play the functional role of ‘leader’. This is not static and the motivation for role change could be materially and ideationally driven.

On the contrary, and as an inference of the above, small states within a cooperative community could also be characterised as ‘region-constraining’ when they oppose the region-building process by ignoring, disapproving of and unsubscribing to treaties, declarations, conventions and further instruments that support and enhance the formation and development of regional cohesiveness. To do this requires that a state assumes the role of community member.

Region-constraining small states can engage in activities that oppose or weaken the process of region-building, such as breaking the norms and rules that regulate the interrelationship of states within the system, or forming alliances with extra-regional forces to oppose the norms and principles cultivated within the region. Finally, ‘region-constraining’ states could also be those that consider regionalism as opposition to their national interest.

As suggested by Adler and Barnett (1998), nascent security communities are exposed to many constraints, such as those posed by single national identities, by the processes of learning each other’s interests and conceptualisation of shared issues.
This phenomenon is similar in pluralistic cooperative communities. The development of a collective identity is progressive and reaches a more cohesive level at the mature stage of a cooperative community.

Within this process, opportunities for developing ‘region-constraining’ characteristics are present throughout the process of community consolidation and development, as some states may disregard some elements of common interest due to a lack of understanding of it.

Moreover, the ‘many-sided’ and ‘directed relations’ of the members of a community suggested by Adler & Barnett (1998) offer them a wide scope to shape and reshape their singular identity as well as to change their role within their community.

This could also be influenced by changes in the international regional or global political environment impacting on the role enactment and role change of community members. For example, after the creation of the Organization of American States (OAS), some small states openly opposed, refused or ignored important norms and principles cultivated within the regional system.

Since the revolution of the 1950s, Cuba has refused to transform its political system to return to the OAS from which it was suspended following a change of its political system which was highly influenced by the international expansion of communism.

Another example is Paraguay’s behaviour towards the region in 2012 while playing the role of President Pro Tempore of UNASUR. The Paraguayan parliament
impeached President Fernando Lugo and removed him from office whilst breaking democratic norms considered fundamental for the strengthening of democracy in South America. This could be understood as ‘region-constraining’ behaviour since the region found itself without a President *Pro Tempore* and with a weakened collective identity.

Finnemore (1996) suggests that institutionalised norms and values, as well as the interaction of social international life, are factors that assist states to define and redefine their national interest. However, this can also influence states to change their view of region-ness and we-ness influencing the shift of roles while the cooperative community is emerging or is in the process of strengthening itself. The following illustration [figure 1] summarises the indicators for the analysis:

**Figure 1. Indicators of role enactment and role change in region formation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role type and main characteristic of small state as actor</th>
<th>Indicators of actions and character of actors</th>
<th>Theoretical factors that impact on the engagement of small states</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Community member and region-engaging, toward ‘leader’   | - Signing, confirming and depositing treaties, declarations and conventions  
- Participation, presentation and development of integration projects (intensive transactions)  
- Creation of new institutions for cooperation within the process  
- Convert to integration as policy of national interest | - Normative, cultural and value driven  
- Identity or self-identification with the process, shared issues, common aims and interests |
| Community member and region-constraining, toward ‘defector’ | - Ignoring, disapproving, or unsubscribing to treaties, declarations and conventions  
- Breaking regional norms, rules, values  
- Forming alliances with extra-regional or intra-regional agents to damage the development of the international community | - Cultural, value and heuristically driven: within the region and in relation to extra-regional factors  
- Role and interest conflict, and identity change |
In conclusion, small states within an international cooperative community have a constitutive role of ‘community member’, but can adopt ‘region-constraining’ behaviour and become a ‘defector’, which should not be considered as a static stage. In addition, the motivation for change could be materially, ideationally or heuristically driven, or according to Harnisch et al. (2011) through role contention and identity change.

Finally, there is one further characteristic that a small state may show, whereby the state functions mainly as a receiver of norms and values regulated and institutionalised within the main mechanisms of regionalisation.

Such a state has the functional role of a ‘candidate’, oriented toward becoming a member of a cooperative community. In this case their role is exteriorly related to the international cooperative community and its main characteristic could be defined as ‘region-adapting’.

In a similar way to Adler and Barnett’s (1998) proposal regarding the emergence of a security community, a pluralistic international cooperative community could be built around strong powers and this can be attractive, predominantly to ‘weak’ states that
may become members in order to ‘enjoy economic, security and potentially other benefits’ (p. 37).

However, in the international political arena, this requires that region-adapting states formally apply to become a community member in which case they have to adapt themselves to signed treaties, conventions and resolutions in order to be integrated in a process of region-formation or in a consolidated regional organisation.

Sometimes states might have to adapt their own system in order to sign, ratify and be able to deposit the official requirements of community member. This also requires that region-adapting states learn and internalise the principles and norms of the community in such a way that ‘they do not only behave like us, but they learn to be one of us’ (Adler, 2005: 184), as in the case of becoming a member of NATO.

In conclusion, small states are exposed to a variety of motivational factors for role change and influential intra- and extra- regional actors that might impact on their behaviour within a process of constructing a cooperative community. States could play various roles which on one hand may make them multifunctional and adaptable to many environments (Nabers, 2011). On the other, their interaction and the enactment of many subordinate roles could motivate them to change their main role or even defect.

In view of this, Adler and Barnett (1998) emphasise the formation and strengthening of trust between members, defining trust as ‘a social phenomenon and dependent on the assessment that another actor will behave in ways that are consistent with
normative expectations’ (p. 44). However, conflicts, as a social phenomenon, do not disappear within a cooperative community due to unclear decoding of common interests, shared issues and identity conflicts.

2.4 An Emerging Conceptual Framework for the Study of Small States in the Construction of UNASUR

One problem with a theoretical framework created to study the role of small states in the construction of regions can be that the focus is mainly on small states as single units of analysis, and that it consequently ignores the region as a whole. Consequently, it can disregard the relationship between domestic factors and exterior factors.

Another problem could appear when the international context of the relationship between small states and regions is neglected, although the study of these can allow the researcher to gain a closer insight into the factors that motivate or force small states to construct, or support the construction of, regions.

In order to minimise such issues, this study suggests that an emerging theoretical approach is required to understand why Ecuador and Uruguay have supported the creation of UNASUR and continue supporting its development.

This emerging theoretical approach is developed on the basis of the leading research question for this study in combination with preliminary insights obtained through the first contact with the empirical data, such as the UNASUR treaty, the
constitutional charter of the Ecuadorian and Uruguayan states, as well as the first-person semi-structured interviews.

Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest that the procedure of quizzing qualitative data with the research question can help to identify an appropriate existing theoretical framework or design a framework for the analysis of qualitative data.

This study adheres to the idea of an emerging theoretical framework and bases it on the concepts explained above and on the social constructivist perspective to study international relations. Hence, this study relies upon the idea of an inter-subjectively constructed reality. Shared ideational factors constitute the driving force for the construction of social international structures, and the identities and interests of international political actors are shaped by shared ideational factors.

For the purpose of this study, identity, as one ‘property of intentional actors that generates motivational and behavioural disposition’ as suggested by Wendt (1999: 224), provides the main explicatory basis for the characterisation of small states within the construction of a pluralistic cooperative community. This perspective is in congruence with the concepts of identity and pluralistic cooperative community as clarified above.

Further factors, such as the interest in constructing, maintaining and strengthening national and regional peace, a collective identity, and international communitarian cooperation are also relevant. Nevertheless, as suggested by Finnemore (1996), the formation of national interest takes place within the realm of identity. Hence,
elements of the identity of national actors can be influential factors in the engagement of small states in the formation of regions.

According to the clarified approach to categorising small states in the formation of regions, both material as well as ideational factors are significant for the understanding of their actions or inactions.

Figure 2. Conceptual framework: identity as factor of influence in the region-engaging character of small states

These actions or inactions in international relations are social behaviours and take place in a historical context that is important to understand. Therefore, this framework includes antecedent political phenomena relevant to the understanding of the process of South American integration [figure 2].
Regarding this, the first step of the analysis requires the identification of such relevant international political events to be understood. Interaction with the data and the direction given by constructivism, as well as the research question, have helped to select the themes and political phenomena to be analysed [figure 2].

According to social constructivism, international political events and the interdependence of states also facilitate the construction of identities and of interest in a process of identification of shared identitarian elements.

However, identity as defined above can be progressively shaped through the constant interaction of states and through the socialisation of these shared elements of identity by one or many actors (Wendt, 1994, 1999). Hence, the interaction enables states to identify the ‘me’, the ‘other’, and the ‘us’ and ‘them’ in a process of progressive feedback which enables them to arrive at a position of the ‘us’ phenomenon as illustrated in figure 2.

Moreover, an understanding of the regional and identitarian elements are the basis for comprehension of the decision-making process. This reaches agreement with Finnemore’s (1996) suggestion that identity plays a decisive role in the decision-making process regardless of material or ideational return.

Furthermore, from the theoretical elements viewed above, it has been possible to infer that within the context of regionalism small states that strongly identify themselves with a regional identity or have more identitarian national elements reflected in the regional identity are more likely to be region-engaging states.
It is for this reason that the study of the shared identitarian links of the single small states, Ecuador and Uruguay, alongside the idea of the South American identity, should be investigated in order to identify the motivations for their support for the construction and consolidation of UNASUR.

In this context, it is significant to ask in the research if the construction of UNASUR has received support by Ecuador and Uruguay due to identitarian motivations which can be found by discovering identitarian links and identifying the arguments of political actors supporting this.

Similarly, the constructivist view of role and behaviour change suggest that once identity and a role are defined the results of cooperation are more likely to be as the expected rules determine (Nabers, 2011; Harnisch et al., 2011). This idea has helped to identify the third step to be studied here as suggested in figure 2.

Step three includes study of the actions of states as international actors in order to understand the result of the role they play within the whole process of action and interaction of states in UNASUR’s framework.

The selection of political events has been based on the role played so far by the case studies, Ecuador and Uruguay. Ecuador has already played the role of President Pro Tempore, the leader, within UNASUR, whereas Uruguay has merely been a member. But, it has the opportunity to play the role of President Pro Tempore in the future according to the agreed regulations of the UNASUR Treaty.
This region-engaging action finally leads to integration as the end result of the process of interaction of states. This end as suggested above can take the form of a pluralistic security community, or can also remain as an international cooperative community which requires further theorisation.

However, this study's objective is not to theorise such kind of cooperation. It aims to find some insights that help the understanding of the region-engaging character of Ecuador and Uruguay for their support for the construction and strengthening of UNASUR.

The focus on the factor of identity and ideas aims to explore the explanatory power of social constructivist perspectives in studying small states in the construction of the South American region. This is based on the assumption that Latin American and newly South American ideas about cooperation, collective values, norms and further elements of a regional identity are fundamental factors for understanding the behaviour of Ecuador and Uruguay in this process. The following section will shed more light on the application of this framework and on the empirical analysis of the data gathered for this study.

2.5 The Process of Analysing the Region-engaging Character of Ecuador and Uruguay in UNASUR: A Case Study Methodology

The proposition that small states, specifically Ecuador and Uruguay, are considered as region-engaging countries can be explain and understood from various perspectives. It is related to the way researchers look at the engagement of small
states in the construction of the UNASUR and how the different perspectives define a case of study.

The materialist perspective to study small states as highlighted in the previous chapter would suggest that Ecuador and Uruguay are region-engaging states as they are interested in some material and security benefits. In order to explain such claims, approaches indebted to a materialistic view would employ a positivist approach to knowledge as they are committed to such view (Kurki & Wight, 2010).

The use of a variety of ‘hard’ data, including the numerical data and statistics about the investment in the military of the South American countries in the years that enclose the creation and strengthening of the UNASUR could form the basis of such analysis. This would also highlight the geopolitical weaknesses of the small countries in regard to regional or extra-regional powers as shown by Fernández (2012). I do not want to claim that the use of such an approach is wrong, but it dismisses factors such as the idea of a South American identity, the meaning of values, norms and a collective South American history which are fundamental elements for the formation of the UNASUR.

On the basis of the theoretical thinking of instrumentalists as shown in the previous chapter, including neo-constitutionalists and neoliberalists, small states would engage in the construction of the UNASUR as there is no major cost to join the UNASUR. The hypothetical questions could be why should small states not join the UNASUR when they would not have major loses when adhering to the idea of a South American identity, and does constructing the UNASUR not demand major
economic costs? However, the fundamental assumptions of instrumentalists such as the principle of a competitive international environment are not the fundamentals of the UNASUR. The settings of the UNASUR is based on the principle of equality of the states and the principle of communitarian cooperation wherein states complement each other for the solution of similar issues and interests.

Moreover, in a similar way to the materialists, instrumentalists base the construction of knowledge on a positivist philosophy which has been linked to the gathering of numerical data (mainly by using statistics) that would help to ratify or reject certain conjectures made about small states that are supposed to act in a competing self-interested international environment. However, important factors for the understanding of such social realities of small states being either ‘region-engaging’, region-constraining’ or region-adapting’, including complex factors of collective identity, historical context and international political circumstances are disregarded by these perspectives.

Firstly, ideas of a collective South American identity are one of the fundamentals for the construction of the UNASUR as mentioned above. Such ideas can be explained and understood by employing an interpretivist methodology and on the basis of a qualitative interpretative analysis as ideas are exposed to contain subjectivity. A certain grade of subjectivity is unavoidable particularly in the selection of purposive case studies.

Secondly, the historical context is important in the study of international relations. South America of the twenty-first century is different to that of the 1960s. World
politics of the twenty-first century are different to those of the 1980s, and as Hay (2003), Goetschell (1998a), and Wivel (2010) suggest, small states are now not under threat of being overrun by big powers as was the case at the beginning of the twentieth century, instead they look for strategies to construct a safe and peaceful international environment (ibid.).

Furthermore, the importance of the historical context of the time frame of this study as well as the studied historical period is important for the understanding of the role of small states in the construction of regions. This perspective allows the country’s, region’s and global history, as factors that can influence the behaviour of small states, to be taken into consideration. Hence, an interpretative approach is the most appropriate perspective to understand the role of Ecuador and Uruguay in the process of constructing UNASUR.

The historical particularities of the creation of UNASUR and the historical collective background of the majority of the South American countries would be dismissed if an alternative approach underpinning a positivist philosophy to knowledge such as statistic analysis was taken into consideration. Moreover, the fact that UNASUR as a concept or as a meaningful idea did not exist until its foundation in 2008 can hardly be explained and understood from the perspectives that disregard ideas of a South American identity and the process of development of the ideas for the creation and establishment of UNASUR as an international organisation.

Thirdly, the historical circumstance of the individual country as well as of the region as a whole are also factors that are dismissed by non-interpretivist perspectives.
Historical circumstance is conceived here as the dynamics of national and international politics and the transformation of the national small state politically and socially. These are fundamental factors of certain South American small states of the twenty-first century that have influenced their engagement in regional politics and should not be disregard when studying their behaviour in regional as well as extra-regional politics.

Finally, the employment of case studies along with formal modeling and statistical studies are the dominating methodologies in international relations (George & Bennett, 2005; Harvey & Brecher, 2005). Whereas statistical studies and formal modeling focus on mathematical and quantitative related methods driven by positivist approaches to knowledge, case studies are related to qualitative analysis. Qualitative analysis, on the other hand, can also take either a positivist or an interpretative approach. Hence, case studies can also have a variety of types. Most of them are related to Miller’s approach to the selection of case studies to reduce bias (Gerry, 2007, 2008), but some academics classify them according to the nature and aims of the case study (George & Bennett, 2005; Levy, 2005; Maoz, 2005).

Positivist driven methodological case studies underpin the idea of objectivity in the process of acquiring knowledge and aim to explain factors of causality (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994; Gerry, 2007, 2008). These assumptions are not applied in this study for the following reasons. Firstly, the selection of small number cases (small-N cases) imply a purposive method. Hence, it implies subjectivity by nature. There is an aim attached to such selection which contains a subjective factor. Secondly, the construction of knowledge of subjectively selected cases suggests
certain personal intervention in the ways of obtaining data and its analytical interpretation as factors of proof. Thirdly, a constructed reality to which this study adheres unavoidably contains certain subjectivity that is not possible to objectibly explain. Such social reality can be interpreted and understood, but is unlikely to be objectively explained. Finally, the expressions of ideas, desires and subjective views that form the data collected for this study contain elements that enable us to understand the behaviour of political actors, and as such remain intrinsic to the cases of study.

Hence, this case study is closely related to what Levy (2005) calls ‘interpretative or discipline configurative’ case study as it focusses on specific aspects of single small states and the process of analysis is based on the constructivist view that the idea of collective South American identity plays an influential role in South American regional politics.

Ecuador and Uruguay as case studies have been purposively selected. This means that there has been a certain degree of subjectivity in the selection of small-N cases, and in the selection of comparative factors within each case which will be clarified below. Firstly, researchers aim to design research frameworks that could allow data to be collected cumulatively as suggested by Bennett and Elman (2007).

The proposed constructivist (emerging) research design has been constructed in order that it enables the study of the region-engaging, region-constraining and region-adapting character of small states as single case studies or as in a comparative study. The suggested indicators of actions of the international actors
and the theoretical assumptions affecting the engagement of small states would facilitate this. Hence, the selection of case studies is related to the aims of the study and to the understanding of a case. Here, a ‘case’, as suggested by George and Bennett (2005), is ‘an instance of a class of events’ which could involve a variety of phenomena taking place over time (p. 17). For Miles and Huberman (1994) the phenomenon of interest to a researcher in a case study may be a person, process, event, group, organisation, or state, among others. In this study, the main phenomenon of interest is the small state as an agent in international relations, and more specifically the region-engaging character of Ecuador and Uruguay in the process of construction and consolidation of UNASUR as mentioned above.

Moreover, this study aims to empirically present and discuss some insights about why the small states, Ecuador and Uruguay, have supported the formation and strengthening of UNASUR, and highlight identitarian or identity-like elements that have probably influenced the behaviour of Ecuador and Uruguay in the process of UNASUR’s construction and consolidation, as highlighted in the previous chapter. The term empirical is understood here to mean the process of interpreting both directly and indirectly produced data in order to discuss them in contrast with existing studies and the theoretical principles underpinning this study.

Hence, the scope of this study embraces a variety of elements of the field of small state studies in combination with regionalism considered here as a form of international cooperation on various levels within a geographically imagined South American area, as suggested above. This constitutes the main international political environment of the states investigated here, and the process of construction and
consolidation of UNASUR is considered here as the pillar of the South American region.

The selection of these cases has been based on a combination of factors including the prominence of these states in the construction and strengthening of the UNASUR. In the first place, the prominence of such states has been inferred from the preliminary analysis of primary data (historic documents) and secondary literature. At the same time, the suggested purposive selection facilitates a deeper study of the two particular cases of, Ecuador and Uruguay, within the context of the whole region, in order to better understand factors of national identity and elements of collective regional identity that have possibly influenced the region-engaging character of these small states.

Secondly, this purposeful selection facilitates the analysis of possible explanatory factors of a progressive political event allowing the understanding of changes that may have happened over a period of time. Thirdly, it adjusts itself to an interpretivist epistemological approach without having to deviate from the principles of a constructivist ontology that underpins this study. This is also compatible with the ontological and epistemological principles of social ‘conventional’ constructivism that aim to take the middleground between the radicalist positivists and radical reflectivists (Adler, 1997; Fierke, 2010).

Fourth, the selection of these cases present the fundamental advantage for studies attempting to examine factors of shared identity that have likely influenced the behaviour of Ecuador and Uruguay in the construction and strengthening of
UNASUR as both small states share such historical and cultural factors. Hence, these cases can be analysed comparatively on the basis of the following criteria: first, since they have been involved in regional international projects on a sub-regional, Latin American and continental level, it is assumed that they have also supported the formation and consolidation of UNASUR. It follows that, they can be considered as region-engaging small states as a fundamental basis for comparison.

Secondly, both states now have a democratic political system following a military dictatorship. Both are relatively old small states; since they both became independent in the 1830s they are among the oldest republics on the planet. They share a language, a history, and some of their norms, values and beliefs with their fellow members of UNASUR. In other words, they have elements of a collective regional identity that can be compared in this study.

But whereas Uruguayan political institutions traditionally belong to the most respected and professional of the South American continent, Ecuadorian political institutions have suffered from relative weaknesses and low levels of professionalism. For instance, Uruguay has historically been a state with high political stability. Since returning to democracy the state has not suffered from major political or institutional disturbances, whereas Ecuador has suffered throughout its history from political instability; from 1997 to 2007 it was presided over by seven different governments. These have all helped to shape a national identity that can be an obstacle for the development of a collective South American identity. But, has such differing history had its effect on the politics, both domestic and international, and particularly on the engaging character of these small states? The comparison of
these factors can help to deeply understand the power of national as well as of collective ideas, and identitarian elements supporting the construction of the UNASUR.

Moreover, Ecuador is a very diverse country. It has a national society built by a large group of mestizos; and in addition, it possesses 14 nationalities which trace their roots to pre-Hispanic ethnicities. In contrast, Uruguayan society is relatively homogenous and does not possess such social groups as pre-Hispanic ethnic nationalities. Here too, the comparative study of such a difference between these two small states can help to understand if such factors have influenced their international politics in different ways.

Furthermore, Ecuador is the South American small state with one of the highest records of border conflicts with its neighbouring countries. This means it has developed a culture of insecurity, whereas Uruguay has enjoyed relative international peace and a good relationship with its neighbour states for the last 140 years. Has this impacted on their different approaches to conducting international politics, particularly in relation to the construction of the UNASUR?

Finally, Ecuador has played the role of President Pro Tempore of UNASUR, whereas, as yet, this role has not fallen to Uruguay. It may be fair to assume that the possibility of a small state like Ecuador or Uruguay being able to play such a leading role of President Pro Tempore, and thus make a strong contribution to the region’s consolidation, might have proved a motivating force to each in its support for the construction of UNASUR. The contrasting analysis of Ecuador’s role as President
*Pro Tempore* and Uruguay’s role as member state of UNASUR can provide more insights into the factor of the power of roles within an international organisation and the importance of identifying itself as a part of the group in order to achieve collective aims.

Various other factors may also influence the behaviour of these two small states within the framework of UNASUR. Those pointed out here are merely factors linked to the purposive selection and the main aims of this study. Others of importance will be further analysed later in the study as explained below.

### 2.6 Sources of Data and its Interpretative Dimension

This study, as clarified above, considers the engagement of small states as embodied in the signing, ratification and depositing of treaties, declarations and in conventions with regional international relevance, and conversion to integration as a policy of national interest. It aims to show that these actions are an expression of a nationally binding consensus within both countries, since the study considers the small state to be a corporate actor.

Small states’ participation in the politics of the region, such as in presidential and ministerial meetings, their presentation and development of integration projects and their promotion for new institutions for cooperation are considered here as further evidence on which to base this interpretation.
A variety of factors may have influenced the formation of UNASUR, as suggested by Sanahuja (2010). Many others may also have played a part in the support from small states’ support in constructing a regional organisation of states, as demonstrated in the literature review.

My use of the theoretical principles which inform this study’s conceptual framework and, indeed, the research question itself (why have Ecuador and Uruguay supported UNASUR’s construction and consolidation?) stem from these observations, and became my guidelines for selecting my data collection and data analysis methods.

When I first came into contact with documents such as the 2008 UNASUR Treaty, the Ecuadorian Constitution of 2008, and the Uruguayan Broad Front Party’s 2005-2009 Governmental Plan, I was further prompted in the direction of a cross-case analysis method.

My first interview with an ex-official of the Ecuadorian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed my decision; the collection of data from a combination of three sources (documents, interviews and political speeches) would capture the debates of the decision-making process and clarify why both countries support UNASUR’s construction.

Following various interviews and the gathering of more data, I identified six main themes related to the engagement of Ecuador and Uruguay in the construction of the South American region: 1) visions of national and regional peace, 2) the similar political ideology of their political elites and national leaders, 3) the expectations they
placed on a new form of international cooperation, 4) their identification of links between national and regional identity, 5) the influence of external forces, and 6) a dissatisfaction with existing mechanisms for international economic cooperation as a means of integration.

The evidence to illustrate their vision of national and regional peace and international cooperation are defined here as narratives of international regional projection and statements of the national political objectives entertained both by governments themselves and by influential elite groups. This includes documents such as treaties, declarations, agreements and memoranda signed in unanimity within the framework of UNASUR and its predecessor organisations.

Evidence can also be drawn from statements made by members of the political elite or national leaders calling for international cooperation in the area of security; for maintaining and strengthening national and regional peace, and documented in their speeches addressed to the nation’s population and to other states of the region.

Features of a national and regional identity can be furthermore recognised in claims made in the preamble of treaties and agreements as well as in the promotion of integration projects and the public speeches of members of the political elite and national leaders within an international political environment.

Similar narratives concerning both national and integration politics, documented in statements and governmental programmes of the national parties in power and the speeches of members of the political elite and national leaders, can show the extent
to which political ideological similarities between national political leaders and cognitive communities exist. Moreover, the study also relies on information gathered through field trips, and taken from my own personal experience.

Increasing dissatisfaction with regional international mechanisms for economic cooperation and integration, and the influence of external forces are considered here to be reflected in the narratives of members of the political elite and national leaders, and in the claims they have made, as documented in interviews and political speeches.

These can also be identified in official governmental press releases, and bilateral and multilateral declarations and agreements. It also comprises ideas, objectives and projects expressed in the Ideological Manifestoes; Political and Action Plans of the governing parties from both, Ecuador and Uruguay.

The use of statistical or quantitative methods has been avoided in this study based on the conviction that such methods narrowly enable the understanding of historical transformation, political processes and political actions that underpin ideas, and identitarian elements of a collective identity that form the core of this investigation. Moreover, the kind of data gathered (documents, semistructured interviews, and political speeches) can be satisfactorily analysed by employing a qualitative interpretative method as suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994). So, the use of cross-case analysis has been selected, and it relies on an interpretation of the levels of action or interaction of states, or of the factors influencing the small states’ behaviour. These levels are regarded as high (H), medium (M), and low (L). This
categorisation is based on the degree and significance of engagement evident in the data in accordance with the criteria for a region-engaging small state as suggested above.

As can be seen, the study relies on an appropriate analytical judgement of the level of significance of the evidence identified in the data that is inferred by contrasting with the indicators of political action of small states proposed in the analytical framework, in relation to the research question and on the basis of an interpretation which, as suggested by Hey (1995), facilitates accurate insights into the environment and dynamics of the local and foreign politics of the researched states.

This qualitative interpretative analysis has been conducted by examining a set of speeches made by political officials in both countries, by conducting semi-structured interviews of members of both their political elites, and by reading documents from South American presidential and ministerial meetings between 2000 and 2012. Firstly, I isolated the meanings, narratives and statements they contained. These I have then interpreted and developed chronologically, to form two single case studies. To them I applied a cross-case analysis approach as developed by Miles and Huberman (1994). They suggest that the cross-case analysis method can be applied to develop descriptions of cases, explore their similarities and divergences, build explanations, develop propositions and make generalisations across them. This study explores the similarities and divergences of cases and also aims to gain explanatory insights into the influence of identitarian collective elements in the behaviour of small states, as mentioned above.
Moreover, this method supports the examination of various kinds of qualitative data, and in order to strengthen the results of the analysis, the insights gained in each case study are further discussed and contrasted with each case and with existing studies.

Finally, the use of special analytical software and further digital tools is also possible in cross-case analysis (ibid.). However, this study has employed NVivo software for qualitative analysis as a sole tool for the organisation and manipulation of raw data. The data is drawn from archival documents from 2000 to 2012. These include information regarding the introduction of the Initiative for Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA), and the creation of the South American Community of Nations (CSN). They also describe the creation of UNASUR and its development until the sanctions imposed on Paraguay in 2012, (obtained from http://www.iirsa.org and http://www.unasursg.org).

This data has been selected and reduced to 184 documents, which were chronologically classified with the support of NVivo, coded according to the emergent themes or within-cases mentioned above and analysed using a preliminary within-case method. These documents are referred to in this study as IIRSA and UNASUR documents with their respective year of publication.

This information was then complemented by 800 chronologically classified official press releases from foreign offices and national media regarding the political participation, action and inaction of Ecuador within regional international processes (acquired from http://www.cancilleria.gob.ec ; http://www.elciudadano.-gob.ec ;
http://www.movimientoalianzapais.com.ec). Further important data includes the minutes of plenary sessions of the Ecuadorian National Assembly within which the debates for the ratification of the UNASUR treaty were conducted.


Further important sources of information used are the minutes of the plenary sessions of the Chamber of Representatives and the Chamber of Senators of the Uruguayan Parliament where the debates were conducted and the decision made to ratify the UNASUR treaty.

I have made use of five semi-structured personal interviews with high profile members of the Ecuadorian political elites and a set of nineteen political speeches of governmental officials regarding South American politics (seven were personally recorded during direct participation in academic events in Quito in June 2012, and twelve are transcripts of political speeches made by the presidents and ministers during the period 2000-2012. These were obtained from http://www.presidencia.gob.ec and http://www.cancilleria.gob.ec).

The study of Uruguay also draws on six semi-structured personal interviews to political figures from past and present governments. I have also made use of a set of
nineteen political speeches of governmental officials (seven were personally recorded during direct participation in an academic event in Montevideo in April 2012, and twelve are transcripts of speeches and debates obtained from http://www.parlamento.gub.uy and http://www.presidencia.gub.uy). Appendix 1 includes the clarification of the selected, organised data of the three types of data for both cases.

Finally, these public speeches of high governmental authorities regarding their foreign policies within UNASUR were recorded and gathered over a ten-month period of fieldwork in Ecuador and Uruguay between September 2011 and June 2012, and include public speeches made by the Ecuadorean president, Rafael Correa, and the Uruguayan president, Jose Mujica, before 2013.

The semi-structured personal interviews with members of the political elite of both states were conducted from February to June 2012, and in June 2013. Appendix 2 shows the process of data collection and a sample of questions asked to the interviewees.

On the basis of the cross-case analysis as suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994), the documents, the transcribed political speeches and interviews were first analysed singly within each case, in the following six stages.

First, the chronologically organised documents, transcripts of speeches and interviews were preliminarily coded. This facilitated the inductive application of a mix-
match method of descriptive or topical coding, structural or interpretative coding, and pattern coding according to the themes identified in the first contact with the data.

This also enabled the development of ten descriptive codes and ten interpretative or structural codes\(^3\) in accordance with the main focus of this study and its underpinning theories, which were inductively applied in an analysis of each case’s internal data, as suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994). This also helped to find the links between the national and international historical contexts contained in the different kinds of data.

Secondly, the results of this process were further examined and categorised into patterns of nodes and organised in folders according to the main focus and the six study themes for each case study. Appendix 3 contains the list of the most relevant emergent themes and nodes identified and developed throughout the data analysis.

This enabled a refinement of the data and determination of its location in the chronologically ordered list for a deeper within-case study, in relation to the historical context of the most relevant narratives, terms and expressions that convey my evidence.

Thirdly, further analysis facilitated the identification of a pattern of nodes. This was carried out on all sets of themes. These nodes and theme patterns were interpreted

\(^3\) The literature uses codes and nodes in an alternating way to mean the same. In this study, codes and nodes are tags or labels that assign meaning to themes, expressions and concepts that are found during the data analysis.
in accordance with the circumstances and historical context within which the utterances, statements and claims were made.

This was complemented with memos concerning the insights, perceptions and inferences noted down as the research was conducted. This constituted a preliminary step for the writing and discussion stage.

Fourth, the contrast between memos with the most salient themes and nodes and a comparison with theoretical explanations facilitated interpretation of the evidence and the improvement of the written memos. These memos formed the foundation for the final inferences and written stage.

Fifth, on the basis of the theoretical framework, the patterns of information and codes previously created were examined and relationships identified. This helps delineate connections or links between the relevant factors that help to understand by inference the engagement of Ecuador and Uruguay in UNASUR.

The use of three sources of data, namely documents, interviews and speeches, further enabled comparison of the inferences from the different data sets with each other, and the observation of corresponding themes emerging throughout the data analysis process. As recommended by Bryman (2012), this can help to avoid pitfalls and potential preconceived notions of propositions’ proof.

To conclude, the insights obtained through the study of each individual case of Ecuador and Uruguay, either as single case studies or within-case study, were
subsequently analysed by contrasting the two cases as suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994).

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter has aimed to clarify some concepts underpinning this study, to define a theoretical framework and to depict the methodology employed in the investigation. Consequently, ‘small state’ has been defined here as the social construction of a sovereign political entity whose quality of small-ness is based on the shared understanding and collective recognition of states characterised as ‘small’ within the national and international community. Such a state exhibits an identity and possesses agency, and as such it prompts an arena for government action beyond its national borders.

A region has been considered here as a cooperative community which develops from the interaction of states, and from their decision to cooperate on the basis of shared identitarian elements which allow them to identify with one another, define collective interests and shared issues, and collectively resolve any problems that spring from them.

Small states as international political actors in the construction of regions can be classified as ‘region-engaging’, region-constraining’, or ‘region-adapting’. This categorisation of small states constitutes the first step towards defining a constructivist framework for the study of Ecuador and Uruguay in UNASUR.
The conceptual framework is based on elements of social constructivism. Wendt’s (1999) social constructivism and Adler and Barnett’s (1998) theoretical framework for analysing emerging security communities, characterised here as pluralistic cooperative communities, are combined with elements of role theory developed by Nabers (2011) and Harnisch et al. (2011). Moreover, this framework is underpinned by fundamental constructivist assumptions such as the influence of identity on a state’s behaviour and the definition of its interests, as suggested by Finnemore (1996) and Wendt (1999).

It highlights the way of understanding identity and identity change as concepts which help to explain the behaviour of small states in the formation of regions as pluralistic cooperative communities. This chapter has also given an account of a case study methodology, which can fit the type of interpretative case study as suggested by Levy (2005), as the purposive selection and the aims of these case studies are entwined with constructivist theoretical principles of collective identity formation and interest.

Finally, this chapter clarifies the process of data analysis through the use of cross-case analysis. The qualitative data gathered and analysed comprises semi-structured interviews with members of the political elite, archival documents from Ecuador and Uruguay, and political speeches.

In order to answer the research question, these data have been selected according to information evident in them concerning the interest in maintaining national and regional peace, the similar political ideology of the political elite and national leaders,
the interest in international communitarian cooperation, the elements of identification of a collective or regional identity, the influence of external forces, and an increasing dissatisfaction with existing regional organisations.
Chapter 3: Small States in the Construction of the South American Union of Nations (UNASUR): Case Study Ecuador

3.1 Introduction

In July 2009, Ecuador ratified the UNASUR Treaty that had been signed by all South American heads of state and the government in May 2008. Consequently, Ecuador became the second South American state after Bolivia to support the consolidation of this new project of South American integration.

This decisive position of Ecuador demonstrated an evident endorsement for the construction of the South American region on the basis of creating an authentic South American identity, as is stated by the UNASUR treaty.

This region-engaging behaviour of Ecuador is in contrast with its position regarding the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) project driven by the United States of America. Ecuador had been negotiating with the USA for the creation of this continental free trade area, as had many of the South American states, but discontinued its negotiations shortly before signing the foundational treaty of UNASUR.

On the basis of the research question for this study (namely, why has Ecuador supported the creation and consolidation of UNASUR?) and the set of concepts clarified above, my investigation has analysed a set of archival documents, interviews and political speeches, as explained in the previous chapter, and has
identified an increasing interaction of the Ecuadorian state with most of the South American states over the last decade.

This political dynamic of Ecuador with the region is likely to have influenced its behaviour in international relations, and its preferences in regional politics. Consequently, it has probably influenced the Ecuadorian role in regional integration.

This chapter presents an interpretative insight into the process of Ecuadorian action in the creation and consolidation of UNASUR. Its first section elucidates the historical context of the Ecuadorian domestic politics before the creation of UNASUR. The second section further clarifies the underpinning motivations for Ecuadorian support for the creation of UNASUR, and the third section looks at the role taken by Ecuador in the process of consolidation of UNASUR, exemplified through the process of creation of the South American Defence Council (CSD), and the process of ratification of the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR.

3.2 The Sick State and Disappointment with the Economic Mechanisms of Integration: Historical Background

The analysis of the minutes of the plenary sessions of the Ecuadorian National Assembly shows that the representatives of the Ecuadorian people did not hesitate to approve the UNASUR treaty, nor did they amply question the significance of this new South American integration project. The Ecuadorian National Assembly discussed it between March and May 2009, and ratified it following a short debate in a plenary session of the house on 14 May 2009.
There was minimum objection to the ratification of the treaty. Out of the 59 Ecuadorian Assembly members, 51 voted in favour, two voted against and there were six abstentions. This legally enabled the Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa to sign and publish the declaration ratifying the foundational treaty of UNASUR on 15 July 2009.

One of Ecuador’s motivation for the ratification of UNASUR membership is based on the compatibility of the UNASUR treaty with the new Ecuadorian Constitution of 2008. Articles 423, 417, and particularly article 416 of Title VIII, clearly emphasises from paragraphs nine to eleven that Ecuador:

‘9. Recognises international law as a norm of conduct of the states and demands the democratisation of the international organisations with a fair participation of the member states within them. 10. Fosters the construction of multipolar global order with an active participation of the economic and political regional organisations, and the strengthening of the horizontal relationships for the construction of a solidary, diverse, multicultural, and just world. 11. Primarily promotes the political, cultural and economic integration of the Andean region, South America, and Latin America’ (Ecuador: Asamblea Nacional, 2008:186).

Moreover, the President of the Commission for Foreign Affairs of the National Assembly, in Housing Act 040, 2009, justifies this Ecuadorian decision by arguing that UNASUR contains hope for a new political direction for South America with a shared history and values, a decision that set up the foundation of the Great Fatherland envisaged by the Libertador, Simón Bolivar. He assures that their decision to support the consolidation of UNASUR by ratifying its treaty also contains the hope for:
‘…another future, one which will enable us to live as humanity deserves, which is much more than just a response to the crisis of global capitalism. One which is much more than a cultural and political response to the North American imperialism…’ (Ecuador: Asamblea Nacional, 2009: 111).

‘…the Union of South American Nations is justified by the imperative vocation to unify and create integrated spaces between our states, our cultures and languages, to unify our peoples with a universal destiny, as South America is much more than one culture, nationality and state. It is a real entity in itself …which when consolidated will have tasks to fulfil’ (Ecuador: Asamblea Nacional, 2009: 113).

This analysis identifies three historical aspects prior to the signature and ratification of the UNASUR treaty that help to show why Ecuador found it imperative to support the consolidation of this project of regional integration.

One is the national political situation, the other is Ecuadorian external relations, particularly, and its relationship with the United States of America, Colombia and Peru; the third stems from the Ecuadorian disappointment about economic integration.

The first aspect has been elucidated by looking at the Ecuadorian cultural configuration on the one hand, and at the political developments of Ecuador in the decades prior to the signature of the treaty on the other.

Regarding the Ecuadorian cultural configuration: not including the mestizos and the white population, the Republic of Ecuador embraces fourteen nationalities which have been built on the basis of their ethnic origins. Together, they form an

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4 *Mestizo* is a term that according to the Dictionary of the Spanish Academy of Language is used to describe descendants of a mixed race, namely, of a white and Amerindian race.
Ecuadorian population of about 14.5 million. This composition of the population challenges any attempt to speak of a cohesive Ecuadorian nation.

Hence, the Ecuadorian identity is the ‘unfinished’ and ‘fragmented’ (Zepeda & Verdesoto, 2011: 21) jigsaw, which gathers values, norms and traditions from a mixture of Andean, European and African cultures.

This diversity of ethnicities, cultures and civilizations has, as a result, historically affected the consolidation of Ecuador’s collective identity. Hence, exclusion of the rural social population, of the indigenous nationalities and further ethnic minorities has been a customary aspect of the administration of the Ecuadorian state.

Moreover, Ecuadorian politics and economy has been dominated by a small elite group, who disregarded national common welfare in order to protect their personal interests (Barreiro, 2002). This dominant elite described as mainly “white” from European Spanish origin’ (Silva, 2004: 34) once had equal influence on the principles of the Ecuadorian state’s international relations.

However since the end of the 1980s, throughout the country more Ecuadorian people from ethnic minorities and discriminated rural areas have also been able to access higher education and have begun to request more social and political participation, as well as more social services. This is an Ecuadorian phenomenon shared with other Andean states such as Bolivia, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela.

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5 The Ecuadorian constitution of 2008 considers the Ecuadorian state as ‘plurinational’ state, a reference to the various ancestral ethnic and cultural groups that have historically inhabited Ecuadorian territory. This study uses the typical notion of nation, state or country to refer to the Ecuadorian national state as a political organisation that includes all ancestral nationalities.
These social groups have demanded more political participation in the national as well as in the international affairs of the state (Ramírez, 2011).

These demands caused a period of social unrest which threatened to paralyse the entire country, as roads were blocked and complete cities were occupied by the indigenous movements and civil groups. Hence, a formal recognition of the diversity of cultures, ethnicities and identities was made by the state through the National Constitution of 1998. This declared Ecuador as multicultural and multi-ethnic state.

Nevertheless, the social unrest did not cease as the economic neo-liberal policies implemented in the country collided with the demands of a more distributive justice demanded by the ethnic groups, a justice founded on a community-based economy which some Ecuadorian indigenous communities have traditionally maintained until now (De la Torre, 2006).

This view of national economy radically differed from the individualist capitalist-based economy of the state, but has indisputably influenced the transformation of national policies as well as the construction of a new Ecuadorian identity in recent decades.

In relation to the Ecuadorian political situation and its historical transformation, Ecuador was constitutionally founded as a member state of the Federative Nation of the Republic of Colombia with an independent government in September 1830.

From 1830 to 2012, it became one of the states with the highest number of constitutional and governmental changes. It had 105 governments, an average of 20
months per government, including many dictatorships. The last military dictatorship lasted from 1972 to 1979.

The Ecuadorian national constitution has changed 20 times, three times since returning to democracy, namely in 1979, 1998, and 2008. And the Ecuadorian nationalities have only been recognised in the political affairs of the state since 1996 when the Plurinational Unity Movement, Pachakutik Party, was created.


Political instability driven by the various ethnic groups and the socially excluded was exacerbated by nationalist and military groups who did not agree with the project to sign a peace treaty with Peru.

This project started during the Presidency of Sixto Durán Ballén, 1992-1996, following the last Ecuadorian-Peruvian border conflict in 1995, and culminated with the signature of the Treaty of Itamaraty in 1998.
The situation nationally deteriorated during the presidency of President Abdalá Bucaram, when he lost the support of the National Congress which removed him from power in 1997, illegally nominating as his successor the President of the National Congress, Fabian Alarcón, for the rest of the governmental period. This kind of political phenomenon repeated itself for the following ten years.

The global financial crisis further complicated the political situation as Ecuador’s economy started shrinking. The newly elected government led by Jamil Mahuad in conjunction with the political and economic elites, further exacerbated the socio-economic situation due to the implementation of inappropriate economic policies (Correa, 2011), resulting in a banking and monetary crisis.

This caused the closure of several banks, the retention of citizen funds for more than a year, the devaluation of the currency by 245% and its replacement with the US dollar (ibid).

Consequently, a civil-military alliance led by Antonio Vargas, leader of the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), and Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez overthrew President Jamil Mahuad on 21 January 2000, placing the Vice-president, Gustavo Noboa, in power for the rest of the governmental period.

These events catapulted Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez, of the newly created Patriotic Society Party, into power. This party, in alliance with the Ecuadorian indigenous left-wing party, Pachakutik, won the national elections in 2002.
In 2003, Gutiérrez assumed the presidency within a political environment of high mistrust and instability. Moreover, Gutiérrez’s national allies, the indigenous political organisations and other left-oriented social movements, campaigned for the cancellation of the US-American driven Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations. Instead they demanded the prioritisation of national socio-economic and Latin American-oriented integration policies (Buono, 2006).

These contrasting political views created a disturbing political environment as Gutiérrez’s government continued to negotiate the FTAA, causing the rupture of the political alliance only a few months into power. Consequently, social uprisings intensified across the country, becoming a daily routine in the capital city of Quito.

This discontentment manifested itself violently when President Gutiérrez, in an alliance with legislators of the Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano (PRE) and the Partido Renovador Institucional Acción Nacional (PRIAN), dismissed the Supreme Court of Justice, violating fundamental democratic principles and the National Charter which guaranteed the independence of the judiciary.

Consequently, a combination of social movements and the withdrawal of military protection for the president forced President Gutiérrez to abandon the presidential residency and look for protection, originally in the Brazilian embassy, on 19 April 2005. Some time later, he was flown to Brazil in a rescue manoeuvre agreed by Ecuadorian military forces (Lucas, 2005; De la Torre, 2006).
Following the overthrow of Gutiérrez, Vice-president Alfredo Palacio assumed the Ecuadorian presidency on 20 April 2005, whereupon he proclaimed the re-foundation of the state and the obligation to negotiate the Free Trade Agreement with the USA on an equal and sovereign basis.

However, the negotiations froze a few months later. Although the threatening political unrest had not ended completely by the end of his mandate in 2007, an economic recovery enabled him to claim that his government had recovered national independence and sovereignty, re-established democratic institutions, and reconstructed the national state in consensus with the rural communities and ethnicities.

A final factor considered here is the new Ecuadorian politics when the political movement Revolución Ciudadana or Movimiento País emerged in 2005. The Revolución Ciudadana can be characterised as a new tendency of left-wing oriented politics in Ecuador that emerged on the basis of an ideal of transforming the institutions of state. This can also be considered as the resulting civil reaction to a decade of high political instability, as highlighted above.

The idea of re-establishing the Ecuadorian state with a socialist-oriented agenda began taking shape with the creation of the Movimiento Patria Altiva I Soberana (País) in 2005, otherwise known as Alianza PAIS and Revolución Ciudadana, and the election of a new government led by President Rafael Correa.
Rafael Correa originally served the state as a finance minister for the government of Palacio in 2005, from which he resigned following a difference of opinion with financial advisors from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). He then stood victorious after the general elections of 2006 becoming the seventh president to lead Ecuador in ten years. In January 2007, he assumed power while the social unrest appeared to lessen.

In contrast to previous Ecuadorian presidents, who came from economically privileged families, Rafael Correa grew up in a lower-middle class family from the coastal city of Guayaquil. His Catholic beliefs and involvement in various social projects in the Ecuadorian Andean regions have helped him gain a clear understanding of the various life perspectives of the Ecuadorian nationalities as well as the opposing views of the role of the state amongst the Ecuadorian people.

Moreover, his education in Ecuador itself as well as his sponsored, post-graduate studies in Belgium and the USA have helped him to have a more accurate understanding of international political and economic dynamics and their influence on the affairs of the Ecuadorian state.

Furthermore, his experience as a lecturer in Political Economy in Quito, his direct contact with indigenous communities as a volunteer as well as his basic understanding of the Quechua language, the main means of communication between the indigenous nationalities, has allowed him to portray himself as a politician who gathers under his leadership the diversity of the country and defies the threats of sectarian, regionalised or elite groups in Ecuador.
President Rafael Correa’s identification with the diversity of the whole nation as well as with the Western democracies has been supported by his political discourse. This entailed disapproval of the traditional political and economic elites and accused them of speaking in Spanish but dreaming in English.

The combination of these factors with a pro-South American discourse has helped Rafael Correa and the Alianza País to present themselves as possible saviours of a country that had been on the edge of a political tragedy between 1997 and 2007. *Alianza País* was then in need of major popular support. They won this by their decision not to put forward candidates for election to the National Congress, in a symbolic rejection of the political practices of the past.

In this way, the legitimacy of Correa’s governmental policies was based on the support of the electorate for his socially-oriented project for Ecuador. His political movement governed without a single representative in the National Congress in 2007, and many of the members of his cabinet were recruited from universities, with no major political experience. This displaced a distance from the old political practices, and was seen as a signal of renewal.

The proposed reconstruction of Ecuadorian political institutions still represented one of the major challenges for Correa’s leadership and his political organisation *Movimiento País*, since the process required the approval of the National Congress, the legislative house, still dominated by some of the old political parties. It was the
National Congress’s prerogative to approve a referendum to elect a National Constitutional Assembly to formulate the new National Constitution.

However, public polls showed the continually increasing acceptance of Correa’s political leadership. He has reached the highest level of approval obtained by a leader in recent decades at about 82% (Vazquez and Saltos, 2011).

Hence, following various civil demonstrations in front of the National Congress building, the National Congress was forced to approve Alianza País’s plan of electing a National Constitutional Assembly for the formulation of a new Ecuadorian Constitution.

The elected National Constitutional Assembly started its deliberations on the new legislation for a new constitution in Montecristi, Manabí, on 30 November 2007. The new Ecuadorian Constitution was then approved by a national referendum on 28 September 2008.

This political transformation ended a decade which I have characterised as the decade of the sick Ecuadorian state. At the same time, it was a political transformation which set up new norms for the Ecuadorian state’s political action in the regional integration process.

This political instability and the consequent transformation of Ecuadorian norms are deeply embedded within the second aspect to be considered in this section, namely Ecuadorian external relations.
My investigation has identified one process that ends with the arrival of the Revolución Ciudadana to power, and another starting with the beginning of the reform of the Ecuadorian state. The latter process took place while the UNASUR treaty was being negotiated. As a result this process will constantly reappear, embedded in the further historical events analysed here and throughout this study.

In relation to the period prior to the arrival of Rafael Correa to power, this study has identified that Ecuadorian external relations were dominated mainly by its relationship with the USA, and to its neighbour states Colombia and Peru. However, there is little evidence of an Ecuadorian foreign policy during this period. The Ecuadorian exterior policies were mainly improvised and determined by its responses to other states’ actions.

Francisco Carrión, one of the senior Ecuadorian diplomats and a Foreign Minister during the last years of Palacio’s government, assured me in a personal interview in 2012 that ‘there was neither a state policy nor a governmental political strategy’ during this period.

Nevertheless, analysis of documents from the Ecuadorian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 2000-2008 shows an attempt to design a national plan for foreign policy, the PLANEX 2020, in 2006.

This was intended to redirect Ecuadorian international relations. Here, relations with the United States of America, Colombia and Peru were still considered the
Ecuadorian state’s international priority. In regard to this, Ecuador maintained closer relationships with these three states in two main fields. One is related to national security in military terms and the other involves the area of international trade. The other contains economic cooperation.

In the first place, following the Second World War, the Ecuadorian and US American relationship in the field of security can be described as discreet due to the US American guarantor role for the Ecuadorian and Peruvian signature of the Rio de Janeiro Protocol from 1942. This was signed following the Ecuadorian-Peruvian border conflict in 1941.

However, Ecuador as well as the other Andean states such as Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, fell into a dependent and compliant relationship with the USA at the beginning of the 1990s (Barreiro, 2002).

In the case of Ecuador, this tendency was further radicalised when the Ecuadorian air force base of Manta was conceded to the USA in 1999, and the Plan Colombia implemented by the neighbour country of Colombia with support of the USA in 2000.

Secondly, Ecuador traditionally aimed to maintain cordial relationships with Colombia in the area of security. Hence, the Northern Ecuadorian borders shared with Colombia were not substantively conceived as a major security problem for Ecuadorians until the end of the twentieth century, despite the evident Colombian national crisis caused by the presence of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) and further militarised groups on the other side of Ecuadorian territory.

However, these armed groups became an obvious issue for Ecuadorian security when the Colombian government launched Plan Colombia in 2000 (López, 2004; Saavedra, 2007). This aimed to eradicate coca plantations in the Colombian Amazonian region by the use of military force. This region had largely been under the administrative control of the FARC. Hence, the implementation of Plan Colombia caused the displacement of Colombian refugees from the zone of combat to Ecuador.

Moreover, the use of the military base of Manta by the USA and the support of the USA for Plan Colombia transformed Ecuadorian neutrality in the Colombian conflict into indirect support of Plan Colombia. These issues started challenging Ecuadorian security in the North Amazonian region.

At the same time, the concession of the Ecuadorian air force base of Manta to the USA for a ten year period in 1999 exacerbated the discontent of civilian groups with the government led by President Jamil Mahuad, as this compromise was made by breaking the constitutional laws of Ecuador.

The Ecuadorian Constitution of 1998 in its Article 161, sub-section 2, ruled that treaties or agreements establishing a military alliance required the approval of the National Congress.
However, analysis of documents of the audit made by the Commission for Foreign Affairs of the National Assembly in 2009, shows that this agreement, signed by Ecuador with the USA under the government of Jamil Mahuad, was without the approval of the Ecuadorian National Congress.

Finally, the relationship with Peru in the field of security started improving as the historical border conflict was solved through the Peace Agreement of Itamaraty, Brasilia, in 1998.

Three military conflicts had been conducted by Ecuador against Peru in the twentieth century. Two of them were fought in the final decades of the last century as a consequence of undefined borders.

One of these arose in 1981; and a new border conflict occurred in 1995, and threatened to stifle attempts to establish an amicable relationship between the two countries. But the resulting peace agreement terminated a long period of international instability in the region, and facilitated the coordination of projects for development on a bilateral as well as on a multilateral basis.

Regarding the area of economic cooperation and international trade with the USA, Ecuador (as most South American states) has been exposed to the strong economic influence of the USA since the beginning of the last century.
This is, quite simply, related to the lack of diversification of Ecuadorian international trade. Ecuadorian products have been sold mainly to the US market. In this way, trade became a means of political manoeuvring in the Ecuador-US relationship.

The Ecuadorian trade concentrated so intensively on the US market that some of the Ecuadorian members of the elite accepted '99.5 per cent' dependence on the USA in the 1980s and 1990s. In this bilateral relationship, its position as a small state converted Ecuador into a country of dependency and compliance with the USA (Hey, 1993: 553; 1995a).

Moreover, the Ecuadorian elite groups were blinded by their personal interests and could not envisage a state united by a common good (Barreiro, 2002). They implemented neo-liberal measures which did not consider the welfare of the majority of Ecuadorians. For example, they implemented policies in accordance with the Washington Consensus which clearly did not favour all state’s inhabitants.

This Ecuadorian-US relationship was further influenced through the US Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) project which aimed to expand the newly created North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) to the whole of America as a continent.

Members of the Ecuadorian elite from the field of international trade and politics supported this US project until the late years of the Presidency of Alfredo Palacio. In contrast, civil groups and the indigenous population opposed the FTAA, refused the governmental priority of paying foreign debts at the expense of social services, and rejected pro-US foreign policies.
However, negotiations for the FTAA intensified at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Meetings were conducted in Quito under the leadership of Ecuador within the various Sectorial Committees. Ecuador, as part of the group of small economies and as a member of the Andean Community of Nations, held regular meetings on a bilateral or multilateral basis in order to find common South American positions and negotiate with the USA.

Despite this, the FTAA project found various hindrances related to the vulnerability of small states and the opposition of civil and political groups. The arrival of the indigenous party, Pachakutik, to form the government in 2003 can be associated with the collapse of negotiations over the FTAA in Ecuador, as they and other left-oriented social movements demanded their cancellation.

However, President Lucio Gutierrez’s open statement of a special friendship with, and commitment to the USA, and his signature complying with the demands of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) impacted on the stability of his government and lost more popular support.

This ended with his removal from power in April 2005. Nevertheless, as the failure of the FTAA was envisaged, it was transformed into the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on a bilateral basis. Ecuador undertook such negotiations under the government of Lucio Gutiérrez, but the US and Ecuadorian FTA project was frozen during the government of his successor, President Alfredo Palacio.
The failure of the FTAA can be related to the third part of this section, namely, the disenchantment of Ecuador with economic cooperation. The disappointment increased not only within the civil society, but also within academic circles and among new political organisations. Moreover, their scepticism was expanded to existing mechanisms of economic cooperation in the region, despite their functionality.

In relation to this, Ecuadorian membership of various regional mechanisms for economic cooperation such as the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), and the Economic System for Latin American and the Caribbean (SELA) shows an evident tendency to support regional integration.

The CAN is one of the most relevant mechanisms of economic cooperation and integration for Ecuador, in terms of economic, cultural and historical relationships with its immediate neighbours Colombia and Peru. For that reason, this study has focussed on Ecuadorian disappointment with the CAN.

The case of the CAN portrays one of the most salient examples of Ecuadorian disenchantment regarding economic integration. Although the Andean Community of Nations (CAN) is one of the oldest instruments of economic integration of the Andean states, it has not been able to offer its member states sufficient strength to make them feel a crucial part of the community.
It was created in 1969 as the Andean Pact and included Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, but the departure of Chile in 1976 and Venezuela in 2006 are evident examples of an identity weakness. This disenchanting process of integration has been viewed by some researchers as a failed economic integration process (Vieira, 2008; Dabène, 2009).

Notwithstanding this, the CAN is still considered as an important source for the new idea of integration of the whole of South America. In the eyes of the Ecuadorian political and academic circles interviewed for this study, the CAN may not have delivered its projected objectives and expectations, but it is still considered as a fundamental resource for the integration of the South America of the twenty-first century.

These views overlap with the establishment of UNASUR within which the CAN, MERCOSUR, Chile, Surinam and Guyana are considered as the basis for the framework of UNASUR and are expected to converge into an economically integrated South American region (UNASUR, 2008).

Further weaknesses could be identified, such as a poor sense of mutual commitment as an Andean community. Although the institutions of the CAN such as the Andean Corporation Fund (CAF) and community links such as the Andean passport represent indisputable elements of an Andean communitarian identity, the fragile CAN was further weakened by the introduction of neoliberal measures into South American economies, and the overwhelming economic influence of the USA in
recent decades. The effect was to further detach the member states of the CAN from one another.

On the other hand, Ecuador’s strong economic ties to the USA developed a close bond amongst certain economic elites with the USA, and influenced Ecuadorian behaviour to the detriment of its commitments with the CAN.

For instance, the US American oriented policies introduced by the Ecuadorian president, Febres Cordero, violated Decision 24, the Statute on the Common Treatment of Foreign Capital and Technology of the Andean Pact, to favour an agreement with the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), an agency dependent on the US government (Hey, 1993).

Hence, Ecuador’s tenuous economic interaction with the South American states due to the military dictatorship led by Guillermo Rodriguez Lara 1972-1979 was weakened further. The role of Ecuador as a member and founder of the CAN changed, taking on the role of defector.

Moreover, the unsolved border conflicts of the Andean states put a further strain on the development of an integrated Andean area with an authentic identity. The border conflicts of Ecuador with its neighbouring partner states clearly affected commercial exchange.

For instance, the economic and commercial interaction between Ecuador and Peru was reduced from a value of approximately $170 million in 1990 to about $109
million in 1995, the year of the border conflict (Jaramillo, 2010). And although the reconstruction of the Andean Pact as the Andean Community of Nations in 1997 aimed to include diverse social and political areas in a process of economic and market-related integration, the old political practices of the members permeated CAN's functioning.

For instance, Venezuela's defection from the CAN in 2006 was considered a radical protest of President Chavez against the decision of Colombia and Peru to individually negotiate a Free Trade Agreement with the USA, arguing that the CAN mainly favoured goals related to the liberalisation of the market (Vieira, 2008).

Furthermore, the CAN could not find real measures to help solve the conflicts between Ecuador and Peru in 1981 and 1995, despite initiatives introduced to persuade the Andean states to construct a zone of peace, such as the Declaration of Peace and Reciprocal Trust agreed in the Galápagos in 1989.

Finally, open regionalism which involved the deregulation and liberalisation of the regional market in the 1990s without taking into account the collective aims of the CAN did not bring positive results for Ecuador. Instead, documents both from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL, 2005) and from the Andean Corporation for Development (CAN, 2005) -presented to the High Commission of Delegates for the treatment of asymmetries, benefits and challenges of the South American integration- show that, particularly in Ecuador, the existing level of economic integration contributed to increased unemployment, the decrease of life expectancy, and a widening social gap between rich and poor. Ecuador was
considered as one of the most vulnerable small states in South America in the integration process based on a competitive economic framework.

This disappointment has been corroborated within the political speeches I analysed. These express an evident support for a new kind of integration which reflects the reality of the South American states. That view is shared by most of the interviewees consulted for this study, who describe CAN as obsolete, an organism that is not working, a divided organisation. They see UNASUR as timely and as a sign of hope for a new kind of South American integration.

3.3 Overlapping Factors between the Ecuadorian Nation-state and the Idea of UNASUR: The Prospect of a New Kind of Cooperation

Some of the further factors this study has recognised as influential in Ecuadorian engagement in the construction of UNASUR are, in the first place, the harmony between Ecuador’s political ideology and the UNASUR project, after the arrival of Alianza País and Rafael Correa to power. Secondly, there is also an argument for Ecuadorian support based on the overlapping elements of Ecuadorian identity with the collective or regional identity portrayed in UNASUR.

In relation to the first factor, this study has not identified clear evidence of an ideological correlation between Ecuadorian governments and other South American governments regarding the idea of a South American Union until the end of 2006.

During the last year of the presidency of Alfredo Palacio, from 2005 to 2007, many South American countries already had left-wing oriented governments. The socialist
president, Hugo Chávez, had been in power for six years in Venezuela, Brazil was
governed by left-wing president, Luiz Ignácio Lula da Silva, Argentina had had
another left-wing oriented president, Néstor Kirchner in power for one year, and
Uruguay elected a left-wing government lead by President Tavare Vazquez in 2004.

This new wave of left-oriented governments tended to define the kind of integration
to be constructed in South America, namely where a socio-political oriented
integration was prioritised over a more market and commercially-directed integration.
And this tendency was being strengthened in response to the national electorate’s
preferences in most of the South American countries.

Whereas Chávez in Venezuela, Lula in Brazil, Kirchner in Argentina, and Vazquez in
Uruguay were able to play a more active role in the construction of the South
American region as well as in the development of a positive relationship with their
national civil groups and political activists, the Ecuadorian presidents were not able
to share a consensus with the nation’s social groups. Additionally, as shown above,
Ecuador was not in a position to influence either regional or continental politics until
the beginning of 2007.

The arrival of the political movement Alianza País/Revolución Ciudadana and
President Rafael Correa to power in 2007 shows, in the first place, a change in the
Ecuadorian approach to the relationship with the USA. Secondly, there was now a
predisposition towards more South American integration as a new projection of
Ecuadorian integration politics. Indeed, this position was decided before the arrival of
Alianza País/Revolución Ciudadana to power. The Ideological Manifesto or Action
Programme of this political movement from 2005, and updated in 2010, states that *Alianza País*,

‘...defends the sovereign presence of Ecuador in Latin America and the world with neither foreign tutelage nor servitude to powers and foreign projects that are alien to the reality and well-being of our people... ...and strives for the integration, solidarity and cooperation with the people of Latin America and its compromise with the creation of alliances South-South’ (Alianza País, 2010: 11).

‘...the UNASUR generates further areas of integration that promote Latin American and Caribbean interest. Hence, it requires being strengthened and equipped with institutions and provided with the building for its headquarters in the centre of the planet’ (Alianza País, 2010: 48-49).

The political campaign of *Alianza País* promised the revision of contracts between Ecuador and international oil corporations, the evaluation of foreign national debts and a mandatory request to the USA to withdraw her military forces from the air base of Manta when the agreement ended in 2009, among other items.

Once in power, President Rafael Correa announced the reduction of the payment of the national debts to foreign creditors from about 40 percent of the national budget, as had been the priority under previous governments, to below five per cent. Most of the debtors belonged to investment corporations with US participation.

Moreover, an Integral Auditing Commission for Public Credit of Ecuador (2008) declared that some Ecuadorian international debts were irregular and fraudulent. The expulsion of the representatives of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) from Ecuador further sharpened these measures, which were based on the argument that the IMF’s representatives had tried to impose their ideas on the affairs of the
Ecuadorian state during Correa’s first engagement in Ecuadorian politics as a Finance Minister in 2005.

These measures are also connected to the Ecuadorian discourse regarding the new kind of South American identity within UNASUR. Support for this position became a fundamental support for the new government of Alianza País’ platform, and UNASUR became the focus of its integration politics. President Rafael Correa’s statement about the construction of the premises of the General Secretariat of UNASUR in Quito on 11 March 2011 shows this plainly when he points out that,

‘…we have left behind that region which once used to be insulted, humiliated and dishonoured by everybody, starting with arrogant foreign diplomats and ending with international bureaucrats who came to check on us, to oversee our data, to tell us what to do and what not to do. These days, if a commission of the IMF offers to come with such intentions, they will have to return as soon as they disembark, as no country will tolerate it anymore’ (Presidente Rafael Correa, 2011).

Moreover, Rafael Correa’s approach to South American politics was implemented by incorporating promises of the political campaign into the National Developmental Plan 2007-2010. This document stated that the contract with the USA regarding the military base of Manta would not be renewed.

Instead, Ecuador would, ‘…establish an understanding with Brazil for the utilisation of its Amazonian security system to tackle illegal activities in Ecuadorian territory’ (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio e Integración, 2007: 25). As a result, the US military forces withdrew from Ecuador in 2009.
These new Ecuadorian policies are also related to an Ecuadorian intention to harmonise new national policies with the contents of the UNASUR treaty, which at that point were under construction. These ideas were conveyed in the Ideological Manifesto of Alianza País from 2005 and 2010, which stated that,

‘...Alianza País supports the socialism of Buen Vivir [the good life]. It identifies itself with the common welfare and happiness of every individual, which is neither achieved by accumulating large quantities of wealth nor by excessive consumption, but by maximizing the personal and collective talents and capabilities...’ (Alianza Pais, 2010: 6).

‘...one strategic objective of Alianza País is Latin American integration and cooperation, and solidarity with the struggle of oppressed social groups around the planet...’ (Alianza Pais, 2010: 9).

The Ecuadorian National Plan for Development 2007-2010 also integrates this in its strategic guidelines for Ecuadorian foreign policy, in which the construction of UNASUR is highlighted as a priority area for Ecuadorian foreign policy.

Here, Ecuador's contribution to the definitive version of the constitutive treaty of UNASUR was also considered as a particular strategy. Ecuador's aspirations are explicitly manifested in its support for a new model of integration, as long as this is based on complementary and cooperative principles, rather than of a competitive-oriented integration process.

Many of these ideas are also highlighted by the report of the Reflective Committee regarding the challenges and opportunities offered by South American integration. Consequently, both Ecuadorian and regional objectives began to merge, due to the fact that the distribution of wealth within the population, the reduction of the social gap between rich and poor, the reduction of quantitative and qualitative asymmetries
within the nation-state, and within the South American states as a whole, are also principles incorporated into the UNASUR treaty.

Moreover, a connection between Rafael Correa’s views on South American integration and those of the leaders of other South American states with left-wing oriented governments started to consolidate as the regional tendency of a socialist-oriented UNASUR overlapped with the national policies introduced by the new government.

At this point in history, President Hugo Chávez had been in power for seven years in Venezuela, Brazil had been governed by Luiz Ignácio Lula da Silva for three years and Argentina had also had President Néstor Kirchner in power for three years. At the same time, socialist-oriented governments were also leading other countries such as Tabaré Vazquez in Uruguay, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Michelle Bachelet in Chile.

Finally, this correlation of views on national and regional integration with those of the new Ecuadorian government enabled Ecuador to obtain the consensual nomination of Quito as the permanent seat of UNASUR’s administration during the presidential meeting at Margarita, Venezuela, in April 2007.

Equally region-engaging was Correa’s proposal of an Ecuadorian representative as the first Secretary of UNASUR. This Ecuadorian proposal was echoed by the South American states during this meeting. Both, the holder of UNASUR’s first secretaryship and the seat of the Secretariat were confirmed by the South American
states in 2008. However, the Ecuadorian ex-president, Rodrigo Borja, declined the offer of this leading regional role and UNASUR’s immediate inception as an institution was postponed.

The other relevant factor mentioned throughout this study is the link between Ecuadorian identity and the collective identity of the region. This analysis has isolated various identitarian elements of Ecuador that overlap with those of the region portrayed in UNASUR.

Both Ecuadorian political actors and the documents studied show various references to these as motivational factors for Ecuadorian support of the UNASUR’s consolidation. These identitarian elements are classified here into three categories: institutionalised shared norms, shared identification features, and shared values and beliefs.

The construction of an authentic South American identity and its consolidation has been progressively introduced and expanded since the Communiqué of Brasilia and further documents that give an account of the first meeting of South American heads of state on 31 August and 1 September 2000.

In the Cusco Declaration 2004 on the creation of CSN, this idea is expanded and strengthened and a long list of South American states’ shared characteristics are included, arguing that these have motivated,

‘...[the development of] a South American integrated area in politics, economy, environment and infrastructure that strengthen, the distinctive South American identity in order that ...it contributes to strengthen Latin America and the Caribbean
in order to achieve a weighty presence and representation in international fora’ (IIRSA, 2004).

Four years later, the signature of the foundational treaty of UNASUR 2008 further expanded this list and instituted a set of norms, identification features and values as shown in figure 3. Most relevant is the expressed idea of a,

‘...consolidation of the South American identity by progressively recognising the rights of national citizens of member states residing in any of the other member states, with the objective of achieving a South American citizenship…’ incorporated in the treaty (UNASUR, 2008).

The kind of documents displayed in figure 3 contain the national and regional norms that have been instituted and form the basis for Ecuadorian support for the construction and strengthening of UNASUR.

Nationally, the main four documents shown in figure 3 are the basis for justification of Ecuadorian engagement in the construction of UNASUR. In particular, the Ecuadorian Constitution of 2008, the National Plan for Development 2007-2010, and the Plan of Action of Alianza País, the political movement in power since 2007, contain consistent expression of elements of identity as one of the justifications for Ecuadorian engagement in UNASUR.

Regionally, the UNASUR treaty is the main regulatory document, which following signature and ratification by Ecuador, constitutes an abiding international instrument. Moreover, the norms derived from this treaty are also mandatory (see below), and most find justification in the idea of a South American identity and the consolidation of South America as an integrated political region.
In contrast to this clear regional drive to consolidate a South American identity, which was mainly driven within a collective of regional political elites, the Ecuadorian national political discourse shows minimal evidence of belonging to and inputting into the construction of a South American collective identity, until the arrival of Alianza País and Rafael Correa to power.

For instance, Gustavo Noboa’s speech in Brasilia 2000 did not highlight the identitarian features Ecuador shared with the other countries of the region. Instead he suggested that,

‘…the process of hemispheric integration, Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), poses a serious challenge owing to the economic impact that it will have on our countries. Ecuador trusts that this process, when concluded, will produce high economic growth…’ (IIRSA, 2000).

Similarly, Lucio Gutiérrez did not make any appeal to the other countries on the basis of national identitarian elements and shared South American values in his
speech via video conference regarding the preliminary meeting to the creation of the CSN in Cusco, Peru on 7 December 2004. Instead, he emphasizes that,

‘...it is important to construct a proposed and strategy to confront the impact of the free trade agreement, the FTAA and the deepening of the free trade zone between CAN and MERCOSUR...’ (Presidente Lucio Gutiérrez, 2004).

In contrast, the Ecuadorian reference to a shared identity with the other states of South America began capturing the political discourse nationally and internationally with the arrival of the Alianza País and Rafael Correa to power in 2007.

The use of symbolic discourse associated with South American identity is progressively and consistently used by President Rafael Correa and other members of the Ecuadorian government. This has been given prominence particularly by the international appearances of President Rafael Correa, as in the meeting for the creation of the Banco del Sur, South American Bank, in Buenos Aires in December 2007, where he started his speech by recalling the major historical integrationist figures of South America in the following manner,

‘..."For us, the fatherland is America", said Bolívar, and such a statement, that appeared utopian or misguided due to the resignation and submission of the governments of the continent to the absolute powers, is becoming reality...’ (Presidente Rafael Correa, 2007).

Ecuador’s new regional political discourse is underpinned by the institutionalisation and strengthening of new identitarian elements in how the nation perceives itself. This process includes shared norms introduced and reinforced with the creation and approval of the new Ecuadorian Constitution of 2008.
The Ecuadorian Constitution 2008 in its title VIII specifies with Articles 417, 423 and 425 the Ecuadorian procedures to support Latin American integration. Article 423 specifically states the obligation of Ecuador with regard to regional integration in seven sub-sections, including collective strategies in the management of natural resources, and strengthening the harmonisation of the national legislation systems.

The new Ecuadorian normative also overlaps with the regional normative which ties the Ecuadorian norms to the regional normative in accordance with Article 12 of the Treaty of UNASUR which states that,

‘...the normative pieces originated in the organs of UNASUR are obligatory for all member states as long as these have been incorporated into the juridical system of every state in accordance with their internal procedures...’ (UNASUR, 2008).

By means of the above, together with the consensus clause required at all levels of the decision-making process and the allowance made for any member state to present projects of common interest, which may be developed and implemented within the objectives of UNASUR, as stated in Articles 12 and 13, Ecuador was offered an unusual opportunity to become the leader of the South American region and to act at the same level as larger neighbouring states such as Brazil and Argentina.

So it can be seen that the policies agreed by Ecuador within the framework of UNASUR are full of potential with regard to Ecuador’s new politics and bind the country to the regional project.
These policies include norms created by decisions and declarations of the councils of heads of state and government, the resolutions of the Council of Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the declarations of the sectorial councils and the regulations of the council of envoys.

The other category in which Ecuador is connected to the South American region is through shared identification features. As shown in figure 4, the main elements of collective identification on which South American region-construction has been based include various features of the Ecuadorian identity.

These, among others, would be its multi-ethnic (including Indo-American ethnicities), its multi-lingual character (including Spanish and Indo-American languages) and its multicultural nature as a nation, combining the influences of European and African immigrants, the legacy of its status as an ex-European colony and shared history with other states.

These regional features incorporated in the UNASUR treaty are enshrined in sub-section four of Article 423 of the Ecuadorian Constitution, which states that Ecuador aims:

‘...to protect and promote [the following]: cultural diversity, multicultural practice, the conservation of the cultural heritage and the common Latin American and Caribbean historical memory, as well as the creation of a communication network and a common market for cultural industries’ (Ecuador: Asamblea Nacional, 2008: 188).
Figure 4 shows these shared features of Ecuador with the other South American states and the idea of a South American identity instituted through the signature and ratification of the UNASUR treaty. In fact, the UNASUR treaty institutes the shared history of the South American states, their aspects of ex-colonial states and therefore their multicultural and multilingual elements of diversity as the basis of the collective regional identity.

Similarly, the constitutional ratification of Ecuador as a state with a diversity of cultures, languages, nationalities, ethnic minority groups, communities and collectives has been regulated by Articles 56 and 57 of the Ecuadorian Constitution of 2008.

These norms specifically develop the rights of the nationalities and collectives of Ecuador, including them fully into the newly re-established Ecuadorian identity which...
reflects the transformation of the Ecuadorian state and shows the links with the aspects that underpin the construction of the South American identity within the UNASUR project.

In order that such Ecuadorian principles of multi-nationality and interculturality are implemented and further consolidated nationally and regionally, the National Council for Equality has been created whose duties are, among others, to oversee the development of such principles (ibid).

Moreover, a mechanism for strengthening and presenting Ecuador as a multicultural and multi-national state abroad was implemented by recruiting and incorporating more than 50% of the 70 civil servants for the diplomatic service from the fourteen ancestral nationalities and ethnic minority groups in 2012 (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio e Integración, 2012).

The possession of newly graduated diplomats from various ethnic backgrounds presents the possibility to the country to be represented abroad by a multicultural diplomatic team, including within UNASUR.

This Ecuadorian identity-transformation can also be reflected and guaranteed in the agreement made by the South American states, as the UNASUR treaty guarantees to support the diversity, inclusion and development of the various existing ethnicities and corresponding nationalities of the region, as highlighted above.
In this context, UNASUR tends to be viewed by Ecuador as a strategic lever to propel Latin American integration, as well as to maintain and strengthen the main elements of Ecuadorian and collective South American region identification which lies in the shared history of solidarity of our multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multicultural nations that have fought for emancipation and South American unity, enabling South America to emerge as a region (UNASUR, 2008).

Figure 5. Shared values and beliefs between Ecuador and the region

This social orientation of inclusion and representation as part of the Ecuadorian projection were fused together in the new Ecuadorian Constitution 2008 which in its Article 1 states that Ecuador is a democratic, sovereign, independent, unitary, multicultural, multi-national⁶ state of social justice.

Finally, a third set of identitarian elements, on which the motivation of Ecuador for supporting the creation

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⁶ The Ecuadorian Constitution 2008 states that Ecuador is a multi-national state. This statement recognises the various ethnic and social groups with ancestral-cultural background as nationalities which comprise the Ecuadorian state.
and consolidation of UNASUR is also based, has been distinguished and consists of
the shared values and beliefs.

As shown in figure 5 many Ecuadorian values are reflected in the set of values
underpinning the whole regional identity. The idea of a region of peace is a
correlative of the Ecuadorian national idea of a territory of peace; the regional values
of self-determination of the people and non-intervention are consistent with the
Ecuadorian national values of sovereignty.

Hence, many of such values are bonded with the values of fellow South American
states through the UNASUR treaty which forms the South American region’s set of
values.

These values underpin internal political decisions which govern Ecuador’s foreign
policy. For instance, the Ecuadorian strategic plan for foreign policy 2011-2013
specifies the nature of Ecuadorian engagement abroad following the arrival of the
Alianza País and Rafael Correa to power and the institutionalisation of new values in
the Ecuadorian national charter.

Moreover, there is a new view of social development linked to the idea of regional
integration operating in Ecuador. This is conceptualised from a human development
perspective that goes beyond the typical macro-economic concept of the
development of a state as the pre-condition for development of a society –a concept
that operated in most third world countries in the twentieth century.
The Ecuadorian new view of socio-economic development underlines the social and ethical values linked to the Ecuadorian belief in integration. The Ecuadorian strategic agenda for foreign policy, *Agenda Estratégica de Política Exterior* 2011-2013 clarifies this, pointing out that Latin American integration processes should,

‘…take diversity into account, and so abandon the single dominant single idea of recent decades, that solely pursued objectives for the improvement of macroeconomic results. [It should] prioritise the social justice and equity, the preservation of the environment for future generations, the technological improvement for the organisation of economic structures, the gradual eradication of external dependency, the reduction of asymmetries within the region, and an international role that facilitates a reduction of the gap between poor and rich nations’ (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio e Integración, 2011: 105).

This vision is also related to further values in foreign affairs such as the protection and development of human rights, international solidarity and ideas of equality, and the aforementioned non-intervention in internal affairs, national sovereignty and the self-determination of the people. The latter two have traditionally been supported by the Latin American states throughout the twentieth century within the context of the United Nations as values of national sovereignty (Waltz, 2001).

In relation to these latter values, the Ecuadorian decision-maker in international affairs is also bound to the Preamble of the new Ecuadorian constitution before making decisions about international agreements. This is of more relevance for the region-engaging character of Ecuador regarding the construction of UNASUR as the preamble of the Constitution of Ecuador 2008 states that the Ecuadorian people decided to construct,

‘…a new form of coexistence, in diversity and harmony with nature, in order to reach the good life; *sumak kawsay* … democratic country, committed to Latin American
integration (dreams of Bolívar and Alfaro), and peace and solidarity with all states of the earth’ (Ecuador: Asamblea Nacional, 2008: 21).

The *sumak kawsay*, or good life, refers to the aim of achieving certain standards of well-being by living in harmony with nature in a democratic country (Secretaría General de Planificación y Desarrollo, 2009). This clearly includes the symbiosis of the diverse elements of Andean and Western-oriented thought that forms the new Ecuadorian identity.

On the other hand, the inclusion of the dreams of Alfaro, one of the liberal Ecuadorian presidents who made considerable efforts to unify the country at the beginning of the 20th century, symbolises the new nationalism projected by President Correa in relation to the idea of a Latin American integration associated with Simón Bolívar, the protagonist of the emancipatory revolutions in South America.

As shown in figure 5, values such as social justice, solidarity, social equity, strengthening of the democratic institutions, a culture of peace, and protection of nature, were also introduced as fundamental values of the South American region which underpin South American identity.

The incorporation of this set of shared values into the UNASUR treaty has been supported by Ecuador in consensus with its fellow South American states to ‘consolidate a South American identity through the progressive recognition of rights of national citizens from any other member state of UNASUR in order to attain South American citizenship’ as mentioned in Article 3 of the UNASUR treaty.
The rationale presented in document 040 about the minutes of the Ecuadorian National Assembly to ratify the UNASUR treaty on 14 May 2009 also refers to the above, and to further Ecuadorian values inserted into the treaty of UNASUR in order to construct and consolidate a South American identity. The Assembly member and Vice-president of the Commission for Foreign Affairs, Pilar Núñez expresses this with the following statement:

‘…what a coincidence, I must admit, that the elements that definitely guided the construction of a libertarian constitution in Ecuador find expression in those values that substantiate the ideal of the Latin Americans, and of the twelve mutually engaging peoples of our countries that signed the treaty…’ (Ecuador: Asamblea Nacional, 2009:115-116).

In conclusion, the political development within Ecuador for the reconstruction of the state found a parallel regional political development that was constructing the South American region. The tendency to harmonise the norms, identitarian elements, values and beliefs responds to an underpinning motivation of Ecuador to support the construction and consolidation of UNASUR.

3.4 The Prospect of Communitarian Cooperation and the Creation of Councils within UNASUR

This analysis has enabled comprehension of the distancing behaviour of Ecuador towards the South American project in the decade prior to 2007, which changed in the following years when the idea of South American integration itself changed into one of socio-politically oriented integration.
It also provides an insight into the incorporation of the idea of the free market for South America as an important basis for the whole idea of UNASUR. In the end, UNASUR prioritised the political, social and security fields as the primary areas of cooperation, and subsumed the area of economic cooperation as a complementary and long term objective.

Across this analysis, it has also been possible to identify that Ecuador hosted more presidential meetings between 2007 and 2012 than in the seven preceding years. From 2000 to 2004, the heads of state and governments of South America met three times and the aim of that initiative was primarily one of physical and energetic integration. Whereas from 2008-2010, they met nine times and the areas of discussion and cooperation included many new areas such as political dialogue, security and defence, health and education, which were coordinated by the corresponding councils and technical teams.

This investigation has focussed on two special events within these areas of cooperation that further elucidate the reasons for Ecuador's intensive engagement in the consolidation of UNASUR. These are the Ecuadorian role as President Pro Tempore and the creation of the South American Defence Council.

Regarding the Ecuadorian role as President Pro Tempore, it is useful to remember that the constitutional bodies of UNASUR are the Council of the Head of State and Government, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Presidency Pro Tempore, the Council of Envoys and the General Secretariat. In addition, the Energy
Council of South America was created, and the creation of the Defence Council of South America was agreed by December 2008.

These initial bodies needed further functional regulations in order to be operative despite the fact that the constitutive rules of the Foundational Treaty regulated the membership and foundational roles as well as specific functions. According to this, the Presidency *Pro Tempore* must be led by every member state and must be passed on annually to a new member, in alphabetical order.

Moreover, Ecuador was nominated Depository of the Instruments for the UNASUR’s legal international recognition which in conjunction with the role of President *Pro Tempore* of UNASUR transformed Ecuador into a direct actor in the consolidation process of UNASUR since the signature of its treaty.

Ecuador assumed the role of President *Pro Tempore* of UNASUR on 10 August 2009 and maintained it until November 2010. It was the second state after Chile to lead the regional integration process during a period of high significance for the country, the region, and the planet.

The main economies of the globe were experiencing one of the worst financial crises in the last fifty years. So tension ran high over possible effects on South America, as the South American states were just recovering from the economic crisis of the end of the twentieth century and beginning of the twenty-first.
The USA announced the installation of military bases in Colombia following Ecuador’s refusal to extend permission for its forces to remain in Manta, and the whole Ecuadorian political system was in transition following the approval of a new National Constitution in September 2008.

Then following the initiation of the Ecuadorian mandate as President Pro Tempore on 9 August 2009 further coordination was required as the Council for Health was created, and the consolidation of the Council for Defence also needed further coordination.

Furthermore, four new councils were created during Ecuador’s Presidency. These include the Council for Development, the Council for Education, Culture, Science, Technology and Innovation (COSECCTI), and the Council for Infrastructure and Planning (COSIPLAN), by means of which the IIRSA was subsumed onto the coordination of the Council of Infrastructure and Planning, and by the end of 2012, UNASUR had twelve councils from which Ecuador coordinated the COSECCTI until the end of 2011.

Hence, more meetings and workshops within these new councils and corresponding technical groups were called into being during this period in order to set up the functional frameworks. This strengthened the Ecuadorian perception of belonging to a collective identity, its autonomy in decision-making and its ability to freely engage in the region that it was considered to be part of.
A statement from Ecuadorian Foreign Minister Ricardo Patiño demonstrates this Ecuadorian perspective regarding the construction of a sense of ‘we-ness’ and of belonging to a region that follows when small states are included in regional affairs and in the construction of such collective projects. In his speech on integration on 17 May 2012, he suggests that the Ecuadorians are now the designers of their own destiny as:

‘...we are now the agents of progress... we are the architects of this new political and economic moment that is no longer suppressed by any doctrine or by any international entity that defines what constitutes the global economy. Now, we are defining our own international and national path... ...But integration is not just a set of declarations and good intentions. No, in the twenty-first century, integration is characterised by the cessation of the old paradigms... Today, integration has as its priority the strengthening of interior institutions in order that exterior institutions are also strengthened’ (Ministro Ricardo Patiño, 2012).

This affirmation is also related to the choice of Ecuador as host country of the General Secretariat of UNASUR, which aims to be the centre of coordination of the different regional politics of the member states. This and the Ecuadorian role as the depository of the instruments for the ratification of the UNASUR treaty have driven Ecuador to engage in regional political affairs.

As depository of the instruments of ratification of the UNASUR treaty by all its members, Ecuador was in a position to maintain continuous diplomatic interaction and dialogue with all its fellow member states. Similarly, Ecuador as the host of the permanent General Secretariat was eager to coordinate the negotiations for the choice of the first Secretary of UNASUR in order to consolidate UNASUR’s institutions.
This new international role of Ecuador has been strengthened further since 2010, as the government of Rafael Correa and its political project was supported by the people for the fifth consecutive time after winning the general elections in April 2009. This is corroborated by the statements made by the interviewees for this study who in 2012 considered the region-engaging character of Ecuador in UNASUR as a strategic Ecuadorian move.

In January 2010, Ricardo Patiño was appointed Ecuadorian Foreign Minister and during his time in office he was able to gather support from outstanding member states to achieve a timely ratification of UNASUR’s treaty. This role was strategically combined with the role of President Pro Tempore of the Sectorial Councils, and of Foreign Ministers of UNASUR which further legitimised the treaty in the eyes of the South American states.

Following the ratification of the treaty by Ecuador in July 2009, the ratification by further South American states also became a national aim due to Ecuador’s new constitutional mandate which makes integration a fundamental objective of the Ecuadorian state.

Consequently, the Ecuadorian government have based their political action in the region on this constitutional mandate. In an academic event regarding Ecuador’s participation in UNASUR and the construction of a South American citizenship in June 2012, high Secretaries of the Ecuadorian state, Lorena Escudero and Carlos Larrea, affirmed that,
‘…Ecuador has much to propose regarding this, the construction of a South American citizenship, due to its strong constitution…. which supports multilateralism, and prioritises Latin American integration, and peoples’ diplomacy for achieving human development…’ (Escudero, 2012).

‘…the constitution of 2008 inspires social qualities and an integrationist spirit, and recovers basic functions of the state in terms of national sovereignty and national interest…’ (Larrea, 2012).

Hence, Ecuador has engaged in this project due to national as well as regional obligations, as Article 12 of the UNASUR treaty states that all norms are binding to the member states, and Article 26 regulates that the ratification instruments should be deposited with the Ecuadorian government, and 30 days after the reception of the ninth ratification, the Treaty should enter into force.

The newly appointed Ecuadorian Foreign Minister, Ricardo Patiño, made the achievement of UNASUR’s ratification a national objective and campaigned across the region. This made possible the ratification of the UNASUR Treaty by six further states, namely Argentina, Chile, Guyana, Peru, Surinam and Venezuela. And by the end of the term of Ecuador as President Pro Tempore only Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay and Uruguay had not yet ratified the Treaty.

Only a few months later, on 11 March 2011, the treaty entered into force following the ratification by Uruguay. Finally, the confirmation of Brazil and Colombia at the end of 2011 consolidated the region and the UNASUR Treaty has been enforceable in the whole of South America since 2012.
The role of President Pro Tempore was also intertwined with the Ecuadorian input into the consolidation of the South America Defence Council (CSD), another institution to be referred to in this section.

The construction of the CSD can be traced back to two major issues highlighted during the first meeting of South American presidents in Brasilia 2000. One is the collective protection of the region’s natural resources, and the other is international organised crime. Two more issues were included later when political instability and the presence of the US American forces in South America became an issue to the security of the region. Therefore, this section will merge these issues into two major Ecuadorian concerns that have influenced Ecuadorian support to consolidate the CSD.

The first issue, Ecuadorian security, includes the idea of strengthening the new state, which according to the new Constitution 2008 aims to be a territory of peace. This means that the state aims to guarantee internal peace free of violent social unrest and to enable democratic political stability.

At the same time, it promotes peaceful relationships internationally. The aim of internal peace is a clear reaction to the continuous years of political instability and undermining of the role of the state in Ecuadorian society, as outlined above. The second stems from an agreement with its neighbours to construct a region of peace. This agreement has been maintained since the signature of the Peace Treaty of Brasilia in 1998.
The latter event became one of the bases for the strengthening of the idea of South America as a zone of peace. This can be seen in the Brazilian Communique of 2000 which states that,

‘Peace and an environment of friendship and cooperation between the twelve South American states are characteristics that favourably distinguish the region in the international context. The permanent solution of territorial disputes, following the example of the 1998 treaty between Ecuador and Peru, constitutes a recent demonstration of the prevailing spirit in South America that will create a region of peace and cooperation from this part of the world….’ (IIRSA, 2000a).

With the creation of the CSN in 2004, this idea was introduced within a political context as one of the bases for the creation of the South American region. Only two years later, this idea further developed into the creation of an entity that allows South American military systems to cooperate, as the police forces of these countries had previously been doing.

The Conference of the Military Chief Commanders of the extended MERCOSUR (including Bolivia and Chile) in 2005, in Chile, took this initiative and signed an agreement in Santiago in June 2008 while the Brazilian initiative to create the South American Defence Council was officially promoted in order to include all South American states.

The appointment of Nelson Jobim as Brazilian Defence Minister enabled Brazil to promote this project across the region between March and May 2008. The project was presented on 23 May 2008 to the heads of state of South America during their official meeting for the signing of the Foundational Treaty of UNASUR.
As Brazilian Minister Jobim clarified, this initiative was an idea which required joint planning and agreement by all twelve South American states. It did not aim to be a military alliance similar to NATO. Instead it was envisaged as a forum to discuss defence policies in order to construct a common South American position in multilateral international forums such as the Inter-American Junta of Defence.

Out of the twelve South American states, Colombia initially hesitated, but following the official reception of the project by UNASUR on 23 May 2008, Colombia announced its participation in the negotiations to define the goals and institutional contents of the CSD.

In contrast, the initiative was seen by Ecuadorian officials as a clear signal that all twelve South American states were determined to consolidate their union and create an authentic South American identity reflecting their national interests and strengthening national and regional sovereignty (Rivera, 2009; Ponce, 2010a, 2012).

In March 2008, diplomatic relations between Ecuador and Colombia broke down after the bombing by Colombia of Angostura, in the north-east of Ecuador. Ecuador was reassured when it became clear, from Brazil’s promotions of its ideas at the time that the CSD initiative was in accordance with Ecuador’s own aim for a peaceful region. But the 2009 announcement that US forces must withdraw from Manta presented a risky challenge due to the fact that the USA had been Ecuador’s major trading partner.
Again, the announcement of a reform to the Ecuadorian Ministry of Defence caused serious issues to be confronted. It was alleged there was a conspiracy against the government’s policy of modernising the system by introducing civilian administration into the roles traditionally filled by military officers. The death of Guadalupe Larriva, first ever civilian Minister of Defence, in a helicopter accident on 24 January 2007, only nine days into service, emphasised the difficulty of this undertaking.

The Brazilian Defence Minister, Nelson Jobim, visited Quito on 20 April 2008 to promote their CSD initiative and found official support from President Correa and Defence Minister Ponce. This project was accepted by a meeting of the Heads of state in Brasilia on 23 May 2008.

A working group composed of military and civil representatives drawn from of all twelve states was set up. After four negotiating meetings, a final set of principles had been agreed in Santiago de Chile by December 2008. These principles were officially endorsed in the declaration by the heads of state which created the CSD on 16 December 2008.

This declaration states three general and eleven specific objectives of the CSD, including: a) to consolidate South America as a zone of peace, both as a basis for the stability of democracy and the integral development of our people, and as a contribution to world peace, b) to construct a South American identity in the area of defence, taking sub-regional and national characteristics into consideration, in order to strengthen the union of Latin America and the Caribbean, c) to generate consensus in order to strengthen regional cooperation in the area of defence.
In order to accomplish these aims, a commission for the setting up of the CSD constructed an Action Plan for 2009-2010 between January and March 2009. This Action Plan focused on the formation of a South American identity with regard to defence, and another central common goal, around which further areas of interest were discussed, was the promotion of regional peace and development.

Relevant conclusions for Ecuador are, the promotion of peace and the pacific solution of controversies; identification of measures to foment mutual trust through dialogue; the construction of a common South American position to present in the international world order; identification of measures to reduce asymmetries and the fortification of cooperation in security in order to consolidate the South American identity in defence (Consejo Suramericano de Defensa, 2009).

Ecuadorean involvement in South American politics intensified when Ecuador obtained the Presidency Pro Tempore of UNASUR on 10 August 2009. According to the UNASUR regulations, the Presidency of the South American Defence Council (CSD) also had to be transferred to Ecuador, and Ecuador had a duty to follow the Action Plan for 2009-2010 agreed in Santiago, Chile in March 2009.

The guidelines for policy and for involvement of the member states of the CSD demanded the coordination of CSD’s activities in the following four areas: defence policy, military cooperation including humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations, defence industry and technology, and education and training.
Ecuador concentrated on modernising the Defence Ministries to bring it more under social control. In many South American countries, including Ecuador, Defence Ministries were still influenced or directed by military officers.

Hence, residue of the dictatorships became an issue for civilians and politicians. The democratisation and civil direction of the defence ministries has also been a particular challenge for Ecuador, since the democratic system was relatively weak and the military continued playing an influential role in national politics as ‘guarantors of the juridical system’ of the state (Pérez, 2010: 133).

The transformation of the Ecuadorian Ministry of Defence propelled by the Ecuadorian constitution of 2008 is therefore also linked to the transformation of defence systems at a regional level.

Other areas pursued by Ecuador include the reestablishment of the political dialogue with Colombia and assurances given by Colombia of a policy of non-violence. This followed suspected misuse of the Ecuadorian Airbase of Manta by the US Air force to support the Colombian forces in the 2008 bombings in Ecuadorian territory.

In turn that triggered a wave of mistrust in the behaviour of the US American forces and Colombia, due to the fact that Colombia had offered to host seven US American military bases since 2009.
Both events caused a negative reaction from most of the South American states and a diplomatic breakdown between Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela, which had the effect of identifying a common threat to the majority of South American states.

As a result, Ecuador called an extraordinary meeting on 28 August 2009, at which the heads of state and government of UNASUR confirmed the position of Ecuador in the Declaration of Bariloche highlighting that:

‘…the presence of foreign military forces, with their means and resources tied to their own interests, must not threaten the sovereignty and integrity of any South American nation, and consequently the peace and security of the region’ (UNASUR, 2009a).

These events furthered the construction of new mechanisms for the establishment of trust and transparency between the South American states under the coordination of Ecuador as holder of the Presidency Pro Tempore of UNASUR and of the CSD.

The meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Defence of the CSD on 15 September and 27 November 2009 in Quito yielded an agreement to work together to achieve the three common objectives for the construction of mutual trust: transparency in the defence policy of the member states, reassurance to all member states about the non-use of national military bases by extra-regional forces to intimidate or threaten any South American state, and the bolstering of South America as a zone of peace as proposed by Ecuador.

These first steps also included negotiations for an action plan to further construct mutual trust. The action plan negotiated and agreed between January and May 2010
was created in four meetings held in various Ecuadorian cities. They defined specific procedures for work on transparency and exchange of information.

These covered the defence system and military budget, intra- and extra-regional activities, measures in the security field, specification of guarantees, and the procedure for accomplishment and verification of these mechanisms.

This process was reinforced with a further meeting of the working group and representatives of the CSD member states on 15 July 2010. Here a new agenda for 2010-2011 was agreed. This aimed to continue the same themes and areas of work until there was ratification, and invoked the UNASUR treaty in order to deepen cooperation.

All these efforts by Ecuador to construct international regional peace were obscured by an attempted coup d'état on 30 September 2010 by a mutiny of the Ecuadorian police and some members of the military. This demonstrated both the weaknesses of Ecuadorian institutions and the challenges to the consolidation of UNASUR.

Both, the nation itself and the zone of peace found themselves under threat, as Ecuador was still the holder of the Presidency Pro Tempore of UNASUR and the CSD.

However, there was an immediate reaction by Ecuadorian civil society in support of the government. In addition, UNASUR met the same day in Buenos Aires and gave
a clear message of zero tolerance to the disruption of democracy in Ecuador and in the region.

The Declaration of Buenos Aires from 1 October 2010 and the continuation of CSD meetings on 23 and 25 November 2010 ratified the way to consolidation of the region as a community. An agreement regarding mechanisms for the development of mutual trust in the region provided evidence of the willingness to strengthen the process.

This was confirmed in meetings on 26 November 2010. As a result a mechanism for upholding democracy and political stability was introduced, making sanctions a consequence of any attempt at internal disruptions.

To conclude, the following years showed a decrease in national and international tension. Ecuador’s relationship with Colombia and Venezuela stabilised as a result of a timely mediation by the Secretary of UNASUR, the ex-president Néstor Kirchner (now deceased).

The policies of transparency and mutual trust were further developed within the CSD, which clearly shows an improvement in the development both of South American identity and of regional international trust.

The initiative to create a South American School of Defence in Ecuador with the remit of training and screening both civil and military personnel from the South
American states is one such instruments for the consolidation of trust, peace and the region.

This Ecuadorian idea, voiced in November 2012 in the VI official meeting of UNASUR and in the IV meeting of the CSD in Lima, Peru, is a current example of Ecuadorian region-engaging politics.

In another direction, Ecuador's diplomatic relationship with the USA deteriorated in April 2011. Ecuadorian president, Rafael Correa, declared the US Ambassador, Heather Hodges, *persona non grata* after electronic messages released by WikiLeaks suggested possible interference in Ecuadorian political affairs.

The tensions caused by this event were revived one year later when the founder of WikiLeaks, Julian Assange, was granted asylum by Ecuador and was consequently allowed to reside in the Ecuadorian Embassy in London.

### 3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has aimed to clarify the motives for Ecuadorian support for the creation and consolidation of UNASUR. In summary, six main factors need to be highlighted again. They are:

- the expectations embodied in the change from a politically unstable state to a state with functions in accordance with the democratic principles of the region
- the way in which disenchantment with the economic mechanisms for regional integration has gone hand-in-hand with the perspectives offered by the UNASUR, of a more socially-oriented regional integration and of communitarian cooperation
- the overpowering military presence of the USA and Ecuadorian economic dependence on USA have triggered a negative reaction from Ecuadorians. This was associated both with the insecurity created by diplomatic impasses with Colombia, and at the same time with Ecuador’s determined efforts to construct a territory and region of peace in accordance with its new national constitution.
- the role of President Pro Tempore enabled Ecuador to promote its political priorities regarding the discussion and formulation of solutions for regional issues
- the strong identitarian ties between South American states that have been collated into one regional collective identity in the UNASUR
- the arrival to power of the political movement Alianza País and Rafael Correa. This brought a new order into national and integration politics, showing how Ecuador’s ideas of regional integration overlapped with the ideas of most South American governments during the years of UNASUR’s consolidation.

All these can be considered as influential factors on the Ecuadorian region-engaging approach to the construction of UNASUR and the formation of a South American region. This process has already been confronted by various challenges, such as the diplomatic breakdown between Colombia and Ecuador, the presence of the US American forces in South America and constant political instability in its member
states. Notwithstanding the above, this study has shown that small states can be region-engaging states, and that identity can play a fundamental role in their international political action and decision-making processes.
Chapter 4: Small States in the Construction of the South American Union of Nations (UNASUR): Case Study Uruguay

4.1 Introduction

On 15 December 2010, Uruguay officially published a governmental document, Ley N- 18.708, ratifying the Constitutional Treaty of UNASUR which had been signed by the South American Heads of State in 2008, and was approved by the Uruguayan parliament following debates in the Chamber of Representatives and in the Senate on the 4, 25 and 30 November 2010, respectively.

With this, the minimum requirement, the ratification of the nine national parliaments or assemblies was accomplished, and UNASUR obtained the status of an international organisation with legal significance.

In contrast, the Uruguayan support for the US project of building a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) was withdrawn after thirteen years of negotiation and shortly before the signature of the UNASUR treaty.

In addressing the research question for this study, namely why has Uruguay supported the creation and consolidation of UNASUR, it has become transparent that this support can be traced back to a change in the Uruguayan electorate's political preference, in favour of a government which sought a new type of regional integration and cooperation in South America on the basis of political dialogue between states that share a collective identity and ideological affinity, among other factors.
This chapter presents this and further insights obtained through an interpretative analysis of the nature of Uruguay’s region-engaging activity in the creation and consolidation of UNASUR. The idea of a region-engaging small state, as well as those of national and regional collective identity, cooperation, integration and regionalism continue to inform the constructivist conceptual framework within which this case study is conducted.

Analysis of archival documents, of political speeches, and of six interviews with members of the political elite and some secondary literature has also enabled me to identify in the first part of this case study, the informative historical factors antedating this process which are elucidated in the first section of this study.

The second section presents the main identitarian ties of Uruguay with the region as arguments for the Uruguayan support for the creation of UNASUR. And the last section of this investigation examines Uruguayan involvement in the process of creation of the South American Defence Council (CSD) and the South American Council for Health (CSS) within UNASUR as examples of the the Uruguayan role as member of UNASUR and of a new way of Uruguayan regional communitarian cooperation in twenty-first century South American integration.

4.2 Uruguay in Transformation and its Dissatisfaction with the Mechanisms of Economic Integration: Historical Background

Uruguay is one of the smallest states in numerical terms within the South American region. It emerged as an independent political entity in 1830 following its struggle for
independence from Spain. This was a result of agreements between those who fought for the creation of an independent political entity, the empire of Brazil, and the newly created Republic of Argentina regarding an independent Republic of Uruguay.

Brazil and Argentina also aimed to avoid further disagreements about claims of both larger countries on Uruguayan territory by creating an independent state. So, Uruguay, one of the oldest South American small states, is historically bound to its neighbour states, and has maintained friendly ties with them, being one of the states with fewest international armed conflicts in South America.

Moreover, Uruguay’s geographical position between Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires, some of the largest economic and population centres of the American South Atlantic coast, combined with the influence of European emigration to alternative commercial ports established in Uruguayan waters, have converted Uruguayan society into a society of immigrants with a relatively cohesive identity, maintaining close ties to neighbouring national societies and to its European ancestors.

Moreover, its relative wealthy society, its respect for state institutions and support of liberal thinking were also characteristics that underpinned Uruguay’s image as the ‘Switzerland of the Americas’ until the 1960s (Roniger & Sznajder, 2003).

Furthermore, Uruguay was traditionally a country with a high level of political stability, and with the continuity of a bi-party political culture until the end of the twentieth century. The Colorado party and the (Blanco) National party were created
shortly after the nation’s foundation and governed alternately until the beginning of the 2000s.

Uruguay is also one of the South American small states that historically has maintained its original national political charter, though allowing modifications. One of these was enacted in 2004, following a civil demand that lasted since the return to democracy in 1985.

Modifications in the main tenets of the state are also related to a transformation of Uruguayan political culture, which began to change following the expansion of socialist and communist thought throughout the Latin American region in previous decades.

This transformation of the socio-political culture also impacted on Uruguayan society in the late 1960s, affecting national pride and identity, as the clash of divergent political groups ended in a rupture of the democratic system. The civil-military coup d’état on 27 June 1973 installed a military dictatorship in the following years which became one of the bloodiest in South America and split Uruguayan society into offenders and victims.

This period of Uruguay’s socio-political transformation can be considered as a political development it shared with most South American states which functioned together under military dictatorships by means of undisclosed military cooperation.
Studies suggest that the level of secret military collaboration and action across borders to combat and even annihilate communists, socialists and left-oriented political activists, as well as personalities critical to the military regimes, were highly coordinated and planned across the region (Slack, 1996; McSherry, 1999, 2002; Paredes, 2004).

For instance, ‘Operation Condor’, which involved Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay, later joined by Ecuador and Peru, caused thousands of killings including those of women and children (Slack, 1996; McSherry, 1999, 2002).

In this way, Uruguay’s socio-political issues became increasingly similar to those in South American states. Following the 1985 return to democracy, Uruguayans were confronted by a challenging democratisation process, in common with the other South American societies.

Not the least of their difficulties were the peaceful reincorporation of the military into a democratic system, and reconciliation with the left-oriented political activists and other affected citizens. This was more challenging within a small national population of about 3.5 million people within which the possibilities of personal and direct contact between the parts are higher compared to countries with larger populations.

In contrast to the other South American small states, however and despite the negative effects of the dictatorship on its socio-political structure, Uruguay’s political stability can be considered as relatively high. It has maintained a political culture of
respect for the national and international institutions, for international law, and has prioritised the professionalisation of its state administration.

During the six presidential terms since 1985, Uruguay has had five presidents in the six periods of presidency, all of which ran to the standard five years in the following sequence: Julio M. Sanguinetti, 1985-2000; Luis Alberto Lacalle, 1990-2005; Jorge Batlle Ibáñez, 2000-2005; Tabaré Vázquez, 2005-2010, and José Mujica, 2010-present.

It is noteworthy that the last two presidential periods have further transformed the political landscape into a predominant party system. During the presidency of Jorge Batlle, the leftist party Frente Amplio (FA, Broad Front) created at the beginning of the 1970s and strengthened by the return to democracy, overthrew traditional parties, the Colorado and Nacional parties which had been losing support since the 1990s.

Moreover, the regional financial crisis, the decrease of the Uruguayan exports and a short stagnation in the integration process within the MERCOSUR, and the subsequent social unrest, presented a challenge for the Colorado government of Jorge Batlle when its co-legislator, the National party, withdrew political support.

Consequently, the bi-party politics of Uruguay came to an end in 2004 when the socialist Tavare Vázquez and its party Broad Front were elected to power. This historic domestic political change also had impacted on Uruguayan views about South American integration. The approach of the new government supported more
active Uruguayan involvement in the region, confirming the country’s region-engaging character.

Uruguay has become a region-engaging small state due to its involvement in the creation and maintenance of the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) and its membership in the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) from the year of its foundation are examples of the region-engaging character of Uruguay. Such traditional commercial ties have been linked to the shared history with its neighbours and the family-links of Uruguayan society with the neighbouring national societies.

As the host of the General Secretariats of both ALADI and MERCOSUR, Uruguay has traditionally played a region-engaging role in South America. Ever since the creation of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL) in February 1948, its engagement in the creation of mechanisms for economic integration was recognised through the appointment of Montevideo as host of the General Secretariat of the Latin American Free Trade Association (ALALC), created in 1962.

The ALALC, (transformed into the ALADI in 1980), has included ten of the states of South America. Only Guyana and Surinam have never been included; instead, further Latin American states such as Mexico have been members since the organisation’s foundation.

Furthermore, Uruguay shows consistent participation in the process of construction of the South American region. From its beginnings as the Initiative for Integration of
Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA) 2000, Uruguayan presidents and representatives of the Uruguayan diplomatic service have integrated these negotiations within this project, and included special groups for the coordination and cooperation.

Despite the withdrawal of popular support to President Batlle at the end of 2004, Uruguay was involved in the creation of the South American Community of Nations (CSN) in December 2004, and since 2005 has participated in the transformation of the CSN into UNASUR in 2008 and in its institutional consolidation in 2011.

The final parliamentary debates in November 2010, whereby Uruguay decided to support the consolidation of the South American region through the confirmation of the UNASUR treaty, confirmed the traditional region-engaging character of Uruguay.

Acts of Parliament contain the arguments expressed by Foreign Minister Luis Almagro at the Commission for International Affairs of the Chamber of Representatives on 4 November 2010. As he expressed,

‘We understand that Uruguay has to be an active agent in the South American integration process… …This area of integration that UNASUR aims to construct includes certain areas which are still being discussed in meetings regarding cultural, social, economic matters and related to social, education, energy, infrastructure and environmental policies. According to the treaty, the idea is to generate an environment for dialogue and the exchange of information with the aim of attaining social inclusion and civil participation, and strengthening democracy and reducing asymmetry’ (Uruguay: Comisión de Asuntos Internacionales de la Cámara de Representantes, 2010: 3).

This argument is based on various common principles which connect the political position of Uruguay and the aims of UNASUR, as expressed in its Article 3 of the
foundational treaty, 2008. Particularly, in its governmental plan for the years following 2004, the left-oriented political party Broad Front (*Frente Amplio*) highlights a reinsertion of Uruguay into regional integration processes.

This view of Uruguay’s regional role has been corroborated by political figures from both the present and the previous Uruguayan governments in interviews for this study, such as *Diputado* Martínez-Huelmo, member of the Commission for International Affairs of the Chamber of Representatives (*Diputados*).

Yet interviewees from the political opposition view this integration process with scepticism regarding its appropriateness for a small economy. The opposition had a very different view of UNASUR. Senators Sergio Abreu and Ope Pasquet, in a personal interview in May 2012, suggested UNASUR was a plan by Brazil to consolidate its hegemony in South America.

The scepticism of some traditional politicians is congruent with the argument against UNASUR expressed by *Diputado* Vázquez from the *Colorado* party who voted against the ratification of the treaty on 25 November 2010. This parliamentary debate demonstrates dissatisfaction with the previous processes of integration, and the political opposition’s doubts about UNASUR, by suggesting that ‘this is the ninth or tenth attempt at integration. All, including MERCOSUR, have slowly languished’ (Uruguay: Cámara de Representantes, 2010a: 122).

All the same, the UNASUR treaty gained the Uruguayan parliament’s approval during these debates. Uruguayan commitment to the South American project has
illustrated two aspects of the country’s politics, both national and regional. Both blend with socialist ideology of recent governments.

Regional policy embraces the common South American understanding that to collectively overcome both new challenges and old ones, a new mechanism to achieve regional integration was required, quite different from previous attempts which supported mainly regional economic integration. So, international cooperation for the solution of common socio-political issues and diplomatic impasses, among others, was envisaged and proposed within UNASUR.

The other embodies the endeavour of the newly elected leftist government to consolidate itself as the new political leadership in Uruguay, at the same time as making a positive contribution to the new era of South American regional politics.

Regarding regional politics, two phenomena need to be elucidated, which pre-date the signature of the UNASUR treaty. One is the influence of the United States of America and Brazil on the whole South American region and within this particularly on Uruguay.

The other is the Uruguayan region-engaging character within the Latin American context and its late discontentment with the economic mechanisms of integration. Both factors have contributed to the invigoration of the interrelationship between South American states in the decades before the foundation of UNASUR.
In the first place, when contrasting secondary literature with documents of the Uruguayan Foreign Office from 2000-2004, it became clear that the interrelationship of the South American states had deepened since the beginning of the 1990s.

Despite the fact that South American small states, particularly Uruguay and Paraguay were oscillating between the influences of Brazil and the USA, the decisive Brazilian idea of creating a South American Free Trade Area (SAFTA) began to overthrow the US ‘Enterprise Initiative for the Americas’ at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

This US project was introduced by President George W. Bush senior in June 1990 followed by the creation of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) in 1992, and the expressed intention to extend it to the whole continent (Hurrell, 1995a; Carranza, 2000; Phillips, 2005; Vieira, 2008); whereas the idea of a SAFTA was introduced to South American presidents by Brazil in 2000 as the Initiative for Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA).

On the one hand, the USA had persevered in establishing its hegemony in the continent. It based this on the ‘Monroe Doctrine’ of the 1820s, and on its endorsement of the idea of ‘Pan-Americanism’ at the dawn of the twentieth century. It reinforced this in the 1940s by technically, economically and logistically updating the idea and supporting the creation of adjacent new institutions.

The Inter-American Defence Board was created in 1942. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance was signed in 1947 and the re-foundation of Pan-American
Union as the Organisation of American States (OAS) was established in 1948. These consolidated the supremacy of the USA in the continent and put Uruguay as well as most other Latin American states under its direct influence.

However, this US influence tended to decline in the region. This was due to the failure of the project ‘Alliance for Progress’, an aid programme for Latin America which provided financial support as a developmental aid for poor states in order to fight the expansion of Communism in the region in the 1960s (Taffet, 2007).

Moreover, direct and indirect US military interventions in small states, as well as US support to some bloody military dictatorships during the 1970s and 1980s, further damaged the image of the USA in the region (Poggio, 2012). In Uruguay, open US support for the 1973-1985 dictatorship aggravated the political divide. The impact of this was felt on the democratic institutions and society as a whole. Its ultimate result was the reconstruction of the Uruguayan identity, as discussed in the next section.

In contrast to the US vision for South America, Brazil has historically been a discrete political regional actor, until, that is, the late 1970s when the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organisation (OTCA) was created. The limited role played by Brazil in the creation of a cohesive region in South America was then replaced by a calculated Brazilian geopolitical plan for its role in the region and in world politics in the twenty-first century.

This empowered Brazil to open itself towards the region from that time, and it was further strengthened when Brazil and Argentina included Uruguay and Paraguay to
make a first step towards building a peaceful region through the creation of
MERCOSUR in 1991. This was followed by the Brazilian idea of expanding it further
as a SAFTA into the whole South American region (Carranza, 2000).

Through the creation of MERCOSUR and the OTCA, Brazil had succeeded in
gathering all South American small states under its influence by the beginning of the
1990s, and had the advantage of not being mistrusted amongst Latin American
states to the same extent as the USA. It also shares its borders, a variety of political
values, history and further identitarian features with most of the small states which
enabled small states to demand more action of Brazil in certain shared issues such
as coordination to control the destruction of the Amazon area.

This increasing involvement of South American small states around Brazil and
Argentina was further stimulated in reaction to the US proposal in 1994 of expanding
NAFTA to the whole hemisphere as a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).

This attempt to open all American states’ borders to the market not only
demonstrated the US position of trying to re-establish herself as the leader of an
emerging continental economic regime (Phillips, 2005; Hurrell, 1995a), but it also
gathered together all South American states around the negotiation tables for a long
period of time.

Analysis of Uruguayan Foreign Office documents from 2000 to 2004 shows that
Uruguay showed a clear interest in supporting the FTAA project at the beginning of
the century during the government of President Jorge Batlle. The negotiations were
conducted within the various thematic Commissions of the FTAA project, and both Uruguay and other small states obtained particular assistance due to the considerable asymmetries of the economies across the continent.

Consequently, Uruguay and the other South American states constantly interacted with each other in order to construct common interests to negotiate with the USA. The interaction was conducted either bilaterally, or multilaterally within the framework of sub-regional organisations such as MERCOSUR, or as members of the special groups of states with small economies.

The extent of the negotiations increased following the Summit of the American States in Quebec in April 2001, as the opening of national markets was expected to take place by the end of 2005. As a result, various small states began to openly express their position and their concerns about the possible effects of the FTAA on their national markets and on their own societies.

The fifteenth meeting of the Negotiation Commission for Commerce of the FTAA in Puerto España, Trinidad and Tobago, in October 2003 provided evidence that Uruguay had started questioning the real benefits of the FTAA. Here, Uruguay demanded clear anti-dumping policies to eliminate subsidies on exportable products, particularly on agricultural goods, a worry which was shared with most of the South American states, but particularly with Brazil as one of the main producers of agricultural commodities in South America.
Uruguay also demanded of the FTAA that it ‘neither restrain nor impose’, a demand that for a small state with a weak economy was only attainable in accordance with the closest fellow states.

Despite prompt support from some South American states for the establishment of Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with the USA on a bilateral basis (such as Chile in 2003), these negotiations with the other states of South America stagnated following the meetings in October 2004. In particular, Venezuela officially voiced its reservations about continuing the negotiations due to various diplomatic impasses with the USA.

Moreover, the idea of expanding this initiative to the whole continent found a variety of barriers and the opposition of organised anti-American civil groups, environmentalists, new left-oriented governments, and academics. Such politically engaged groups interpreted this initiative as another US strategy to dominate the continent by introducing a hemispheric economic regime with neoliberal rules.

For many critical political writers, such measures were debilitating the role of the national states and further empowering private transnational business (Godio, 2004; Buono, 2006; Múnera, 2006; Ruiz, 2006). In Uruguay, such economic and political measures taken by the government of the traditional parties were policies directly confronted by the Uruguayan socialist Broad Front party.

However, President Batlle’s support for the FTAA endured until the end of his mandate. One of his arguments for support for this US project was that during the
2000 to 2003 Uruguayan crisis, the ‘only country that gave us a hand was the USA’ (Presidente Batlle, 2012).

An opposing argument from left-oriented politicians and writers points out President Batlle’s personal friendship with US American president, George W. Bush junior. This interchange of personal interest favoured US interests despite the collision between the FTAA’s aims and the expectations of the great majority of Uruguayan society.

Furthermore, academics and critical political activists suggested that free trade between asymmetrical economies was impoverishing the weaker economies. The population was dissatisfied with the inability of traditional Uruguayan political forces, the *Colorado* and *Nacional* parties, to resolve the social problems created by the neo-liberal policies supported by the USA (Díaz, 2005; Rodríguez, 2005; Múnera, 2006).

A report from CEPAL (2005) regarding the challenges of South American integration highlights a causal relationship between the neo-liberal policies introduced in the Latin American region and the rise of unemployment, increasing poverty and health deprivation, and a considerably increasing gap between rich and poor from 1998 to 2003, which also impacted on Uruguay (CEPAL, 2005).

Consequently, support for the FTAA declined in Uruguay, as it did in most states of the region in 2005, since many South American states, including Uruguay, adopted leftist governments, which were directly opposed to the establishment of the FTAA.
At the same time, such socio-economic developments triggered a wave of dissatisfaction with the existing mechanisms of regional integration, as these also showed limited capability to contribute to the solution of political, social and economic crisis in their member states.

While Uruguayan support for the FTAA started declining by the end of President Batlle’s government of 2000-2005, the Brazilian idea of a SAFTA was pushed into the foreground through the introduction of the IIRSA as the initial step towards the construction of a South American region.

The IIRSA was introduced in September 2000 as a prelude to the creation of a free-trade zone in the region. Although South American states fell into a deep financial and foreign debt crisis at the end of the 1990s, Uruguay did not withdraw its support for this project. UNASUR documentation shows that Uruguay was involved in numerous negotiations and presidential meetings since the initiation of IIRSA in 2000, until 2012, when UNASUR imposed sanctions on Paraguay.

Within the context of the conflict of interest between these influential continental forces, for Uruguay and most South American small states the pendulum finally began to swing following the fifth Summit of the Americas in Mar del Plata, Argentina, in November 2005.

This made it clear that many South American states were not prepared to further engage in the negotiations. The FTAA project was condemned to failure following
thirteen years of negotiation, over fifteen meetings of the Negotiation Committee for Commerce, eight ministerial meetings and five summits of the leaders of the American states.

Nevertheless, these FTAA negotiation meetings further drove the South American states to interact and communicate with each other in order to identify common economic issues and construct a collective interest. Moreover, the failure of the FTAA project signalled both the decline of the USA’s overpowering influence in the region and the rise of Brazilian influence in South America.

At the same time, Uruguayan scepticism about the effectiveness and appropriateness of an economically and commercially integrated South American region appears to have been increasing.

This last argument is related to the second phenomenon that preceded the consolidation of UNASUR through the support of Uruguay, during the first year of the government of President José Mujica. This factor involves the increasing dissatisfaction of Uruguay with the suitability of the existing mechanisms of regional integration, the ALADI and the MERCOSUR, and their impact on the socio-economic development of Uruguayan society.

On the one hand, international economic cooperation within ALADI illustrated two major weaknesses concerning regional integration in Latin America that captured the political discourse of the Uruguayan political elite. These weaknesses are related to the following two factors: the apathy shown by regional economic mechanisms of
integration towards questions of democracy and human rights, and the scanty loyalty of their members to commonly agreed regulations.

For a start, most of the *coup d'états*, military dictatorships and related torture of thousands of South American civilians who mainly belonged to left-oriented political organisations were perpetrated while the ALALC/ALADI was officially in being (Slack, 1996; McSherry, 1999, 2002; Paredes, 2004).

Secondly, the ALALC/ALADI did little to counter the atrocities of the military dictatorships. Instead, the ALALC was transformed into ALADI while thousands of South American civilians were being tortured by these dictatorships (McSherry, 1999, 2002). Thirdly, democracy was not a requisite for the functioning of the ALALC/ALADI. Hence, the new left-oriented governments of South American states, and particularly of Uruguay, could hardly trust ALALC/ALADI again as a regional instrument to construct and maintain national and regional democracy and peace.

Moreover, the argument that the failure of regional integration is due to the low commitment of its members to the rules of the ALADI and other instruments of Latin American economic integration (Vieira, 2008; Dabène, 2009) has been corroborated by analysis of the documents regarding the debates for the ratification of UNASUR in 2010.

The breach of Article 44 of the ALADI Treaty regarding commercial agreements with third parties, and the extension of these policies to small states favoured by the clause regarding benefits for less developed economies were matters of great
concern to Uruguayan policy-makers over the old mechanism of economic integration.

This clause was violated by Mexico in 1994 when the NAFTA came into force, followed by Chile in 2003 when it established a FTA with the USA. In addition to this, the ALADI did not have the power to gather together its member states in a common front to resolve the debt and financial crisis of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s. For these reasons, since 2005 the new Uruguayan government built by the Broad Front has spoken of changing the old type of regional integration.

On the other hand, this perspective of altering the type of regional integration, can also be understood as a reaction to the stagnation of the current economic regional integration, and to its low success rate for resolving MERCOSUR member states’ disputes since the end of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s.

Moreover, the focus of small states on exports to one or two major markets affected friendly relationships between the South American states in various ways, and small states’ dependency was reinforced (Hey, 1995, 1995a; Correa, 2010). For instance, Uruguay became economically dependent on trade with Brazil and Argentina within the newly created MERCOSUR. As a result, the Brazilian financial crisis strongly impacted on the Uruguayan economy at the beginning of this century, causing a variety of commercial disputes with both these neighbours.

Disputes with Argentina were further exacerbated as the government led by President Batlle in 2002 approved the construction of pulp mills on the shores of the
river Uruguay, on the border with Argentina. The environmental effects of these plants were the cause of a long dispute with Argentina as the Argentinian neighbourhoods opposed the installation of the pulp mills because of the pollution. Moreover, the MERCOSUR Decree 3646 setting a tax of 150% on the exports of tobacco to Uruguay triggered controversy with Brazil, which further affected the unpleasant relationship in 2003 caused by the Brazilian financial crisis and the cut to Uruguayan imports.

Despite this, Uruguay continued being a supporter of the Brazilian-proposed idea to construct the SAFTA since its introduction as the IIRSA project. The analysis of documents regarding IIRSA confirms that as a result of President Batlle’s participation in the first meeting of Heads of the South American states in Brasilia in 2000, and the input of the Presidency Pro-Tempore of MERCOSUR directed by the Uruguayan Ambassador, Guillermo Valles, in 2003, Uruguay supported the idea of establishing a free market in the South American region.

The first clear attempt was made when representatives from the CAN and MERCOSUR aimed to achieve an agreement for the establishment of a South American free market, conducting a series of negotiations in Montevideo from August to December 2003. Finally, this plan was incorporated in the Foundational Document of the Community of South American Nations (CSN) in 2004 as a long term aim.

However, in the following years when the leftist Tavaré Vázquez came to lead Uruguay in 2005, this uneven path of economic integration did not improve despite
the creation of a joint High Commission with Argentina, within the framework of MERCOSUR, in the attempt to solve their controversies. Instead, a variety of new disputes appeared and brought the bilateral dialogue to a standstill by the end of 2009. Documents regarding the debates about the ratification of UNASUR suggest that at the beginning of 2010, Uruguay had at least 18 unresolved bilateral issues with Argentina.

Furthermore, a case regarding the dispute about the environmental pollution of the Uruguayan pulp mills that could not be solved within MERCOSUR has been at the International Court of Justice at The Hague waiting for a judgement since 2006.

Arising from this, the left-oriented governments of the region began to search for a new kind of cooperation forum, and out of this grew the idea of transforming the CSN into the UNASUR. The signature of the UNASUR treaty in May 2008, and the confirmation of Uruguay in November 2010 as this ninth state, enabled UNASUR to consolidate itself and to be registered at the United Nations Organisation as a regional international organisation with binding powers on 11 March 2011.

To summarise, this sketch of the historical background has shown three relevant trends of the Uruguayan and regional political developments. First, Uruguay has traditionally been a region-engaging small state. Second, more communication and interaction of Uruguay with the other South American states has been triggered through the various continental, regional, and sub-regional integration projects during recent decades.
Third, the studied economic integration mechanisms have shown to be insufficient in achieving a peaceful resolution of the economic and social crisis of Uruguay and the region, and for settling the controversies between states of the region. It was this combination of factors which impelled Uruguay to search for a new form to cooperate with other states and to conceive a political cooperation which has been defined here as communitarian cooperation.


This section focuses on two further significant factors that have influenced Uruguay in its decision to support the consolidation of UNASUR. These factors are first, the arrival of a leftist or socialist party - Broad Front - to the political leadership of the country; secondly, the positioning of elements of a collective identity as a pillar for the establishment of a new form of cooperation in the interests of South American integration.

Regarding the first factor, the Broad Front has been leading the country since 2005, when it came to power for the first time since its creation in 1971. This change of preference by the Uruguayan electorate ended the 174 year hegemony of the bi-party politics of the Colorado and Nacional parties.

The history of the formation of the Broad Front and its political platform show that it comprises a variety of political groups that range from radical communist to centre-right oriented dissidents from the traditional conservative Colorado party. Hence, the
Broad Front party represents a diversity of political views that could in time challenge its structures and long term objectives.

The enactment of the government by the Broad Front since 2005 has embodied two aims: to consolidate itself as a third efficient leading party in the country and to maintain a positive international image of a traditionally stable and a region-engaging small state.

Nationally, the Broad Front party started by increasing public investment in health and education, creating more jobs, guaranteeing employment stability to those public servants working under unstable work contracts in previous years, and increasing salaries. Some of these experiences were shared and extended regionally as will be clarified in the following section on the creation of the South American Council for Health (CSS).

Regionally, the Broad Front party attempted to further insert Uruguay into the region as an active political agent, enhancing its traditional role as a region-engaging small state, but looking for a new kind of integration that sees cooperation as mutual action between partner states and includes the socio-economic development of the majority of the people. In this way, the challenge it faced was how to position and expand such ideas in the international political context.

The creation of the CSN in 2004 introduced a political framework to support activities conducted within IIRSA. From 2005 onwards the original Brazilian idea of establishing a free market zone in South America underwent a process of
transformation into a more general concept of South American integration. This was the new regional political environment in which Broad Front had to position its principles about regional integration.

This has been a common phenomenon among South American states. Some studies see it as a result of the national electorate’s changed political preferences across the region since the turn of the century (Sanahuja, 2010, Fernández, 2011); but Gardini and Lambert (2011) prefer to characterise it as a cyclical phenomena, in the course of which consistency with established foreign policy is not guaranteed.

Evidently, most South American conservative political parties that had strong ties with the main economic sectors were the dominant political organisations in the 1980s and 1990s, but lost their electorate’s support in the twenty-first century.

Hence, the newly created parties or modern left-oriented parties were governing South America by 2010, and came to power with an agenda that aims to change the neo-liberal practices introduced by their predecessors into more socially-oriented policies. The election of the socialist Tabaré Vázquez to the presidency of Uruguay in 2004 is one such transformation in the preferences of the South American electorate.

In short, the Uruguayan involvement in shaping the communitarian cooperation and the founding of UNASUR is the outcome of five crucial historical years. These years saw a shift in ideas, from the initial economic cooperation based on building a South
America Free Trade Area (SAFTA), to a communitarian cooperation based on the socially-oriented UNASUR.

A first relevant step was made with the installation of the Special Commission of High Representatives of the South American States on 5 December 2005 in Montevideo. The other strategic impetus towards UNASUR’s consolidation came through the official government publication of Uruguay’s ratification of the UNASUR treaty on 15 December 2010.

As mentioned above, Uruguay was represented throughout the creation of UNASUR by high state representatives, including the Head of State, despite the changes in domestic politics. Declarations by Foreign Minister Reinaldo Gargano, from the government of Tabaré Vázquez, in 2005, show that Uruguay’s economic, social and political regional engagement, to which they adhere, was intended to support integration as a further step towards the integration of the whole of Latin America.

This statement made no clarification about the kind of cooperation or integration that Uruguay was aiming to adhere to. However, an analysis of the reports and minutes of the parliamentary debates of the Special Commissions from CSN in 2005 to 2007 show that Uruguayan involvement varies. It ranges from being the host country for the initial meetings, to leading such meetings in conjunction with Venezuela.

These meetings covered the treatment of asymmetries in the region, identification of the challenges and benefits of a future new South American integration, and the drawing-up of the UNASUR treaty.
During these meetings, Uruguay’s concern about a more socially-oriented integration for South America, as declared by the Broad Front party, found agreement among most South American states. The documents of the High Commission and the reports of the ALADI, CAN, MERCOSUR and Inter-American Development Bank, concerning the challenges and benefits of integration, advised the heads of South American states to prioritise structural and social problems across the region.

These suggestions were related to a new kind of cooperation for improving the population of South America’s living standards. The principles put forward included solidarity and equality as the basis for the assurance of every state’s cooperation.

Hence, the existing consensus clause, implemented since 2000 in IIRSA projects, was reinforced as a guarantee of equality between South American states. These principles can be considered as fundamental to the development of a new form of cooperation known here as communitarian cooperation.

Small states’ achievements in their construction of UNASUR can be related to the direct involvement of Uruguay since 2005 in the formation of a new regional organisation for international cooperation.

President Tabaré Vázquez’s attendance at the presidential meeting of Cochabamba, Bolivia in 2006 should not be regarded simply as a symbolic expression of support by the president for this project. It also symbolises the support for a common understanding of the reasons for incorporating social elements in the treaty, and for
measures to reduce poverty and economic asymmetries within both the national and regional context.

The ideal of regional integration reflects the political position of the Broad Front expressed already in the party guidelines from 1990, and reinforced through the governmental guidelines from 2003 and 2008. It is true to say that this regional agreement is in general harmony with the left-oriented Broad Front's policy of pursuing new forms of integration.

However, the creation of this new international organisation triggered other concerns that Uruguay shared with other South American small states. These concerns are particularly the financial capability of small states to maintain permanent posts both for government departments involved in the new integration structures and in the old ones as well.

Most of the members of the political elite interviewed for this study corroborated these concerns. Their arguments are related particularly to the small budget of a small state and the replication of official roles in different international organisations and institutions. The duplication of roles, as suggested by Diputado Martínez Huelmo, may ‘thwart cooperation and will cost more to the state’ (Martínez Huelmo, 2012).

Moreover, regional organisations such as ALADI and MERCOSUR have not only been centres of expertise. They have also been expressions of identity. It is recognised that these have been important forums where the majority of South
American states have been able to interact and to identify both their shortcomings and potential.

This view was acknowledged by members of the political elite such as the Uruguayan president, Tabaré Vázquez, and the Venezuelan president, Hugo Chávez, who in an open letter suggested the incorporation of such experiences into the new integration project. Such thoughts were reproduced in the final document prepared by the Strategic Commission formed to reflect on the new form of integration for South America. In this document it was pointed out that Uruguay supports these initiatives and that,

‘The construction of a new type of integration should not only be based on commercial relations, especially when everybody knows that the region tolerates diverse international regimes such as MERCOSUR, CAN, CARICOM, and Chile. South American countries should also seek a wider coordination of their economies and their production. This would take the form of focusing on commercial union and on new ways of cooperating socially, politically and culturally. The ultimate aim would be to construct a balanced integration and an agenda of social integration…’ (IIRSA, 2006a).

In the meetings of governmental delegates and high representatives in 2007 and 2008, many of these ideas were also discussed and incorporated in the final document of the treaty of UNASUR.

On the one hand, the treaty included a high number of vague concepts that look to find consensus and approval by all parties (Sanahuja, 2010). On the other, it reflects the complexity of a diverse continent, asymmetrical in the areas of economics, politics and social relations. Notwithstanding this, the signing of the UNASUR treaty in Brasilia in May 2008 by all South American states demonstrates that all parties
were willing to initiate a new kind of cooperation as a means towards South American integration.

This consensus between Uruguay and the other states of the region reflects continuity in Uruguay’s maintenance of stable regional politics during the presidency of Tavaré Vázquez. It can also be interpreted as the mechanism used by Broad Front to position itself as a cautious political organisation in an unknown area of international relations in order to maintain its electorate’s support and consolidate itself as the new leading party in Uruguay.

At the same time, this tactical political move of the Broad Front kept open the possibility of supporting the establishment of a new political era in South America, which was dominated by left-oriented political organisations by 2010. Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay, Venezuela, and, since 2008, Paraguay were by then led by left-oriented governments. Consequently, a more politically and socially oriented form of South American integration obtained more support.

This rather cautious move in regional politics of the first presidential mandate of the Broad Front has been carefully matched by the newly elected government for the party’s second period of leadership. The newly elected president, José Mujica Cardona, an ex-member of the Marxist guerrilla group the Tupamaros, inaugurated the second governmental period in March 2010, following a long trajectory of political activism which forced him to serve 14 years prison during the dictatorship in the 1970s and 1980s.
His government decided to modify the country’s foreign policy, which until then had been a traditional Uruguayan approach of rigidity and bureaucratic diplomacy. Instead, he introduced the policy which prioritised ‘dialogue’ and the ‘convergence’ of interests with the neighbouring states, initially applied with Argentina and then steadily implemented across the region. With President Mujica, it became clear that Uruguay expected to support UNASUR as a new path to integration in which communitarian cooperation could take place.

UNASUR offers the possibility of political dialogue and the convergence of interests on the basis of a shared history, shared identity and similar socio-political challenges, whereby every member state can contribute with its capabilities and experiences to complement each other.

Luis Almagro, the Uruguayan Foreign Minister under the government of Mujica explained this to the Commission for Foreign Affairs of the Chamber of Senators and Representatives during the sessions regarding UNASUR in May and November 2010, and confirmed this in a personal interview in April 2012 highlighting that,

‘…every one of us [countries] has something to contribute to the integration….and we need to decide in which area we can contribute most……Uruguay in health for example…’ (Almagro, 2012).

However, the involvement of every state in the interests of a fully legitimated action demanded the parliamentary ratification of the treaty by its members and the process coincided with the national elections.
President Vázquez requested parliamentarian approval of the treaty in November 2008, and the Chamber of Senators approved it in April 2009 when there was scepticism in Uruguay about Argentinian self-interest in nominating ex-president Néstor Kirchner as the General Secretary of UNASUR due to the fact that Uruguay and Argentina could not solve their commercial and diplomatic impasses during his presidential period in Argentina.

Consequently, this Uruguayan scepticism regarding the neutrality and appropriateness of UNASUR, and the prospect of an unfriendly General Secretary, triggered the Uruguayan political position of ‘no election means no rejection’, ‘no voto no veto’, in order to overcome domestic political pressure and opposition. In Uruguayan political circles this meant that Uruguay could contribute to the consolidation of UNASUR taking a neutral role in Kirchner’s nomination.

However, the ratification of the UNASUR treaty in November 2010 was not achieved solely as the result of a new foreign policy of the new President José Mujica. It was also in the interests of Uruguayan national strategy to legally position its concerns and views about South American integration into the regional political context.

Popular acceptance of President Mujica’s ideas reinforced the pattern of regional politics started by President Vázquez, but Mujica made changes in the foreign office from a proud conservative nationalist office, still highly influential during the mandate of his predecessor, to a foreign office more open to political dialogue.
President Mujica was elected on 29 November 2009, positioned on the first of March, and dialogue with Argentina was re-established in May and June 2010. On one hand, the reestablishment of dialogue with Argentina favoured the Argentinian aspirations underlying the nomination of ex-president Néstor Kirchner as the new UNASUR General Secretary. On the other, his nomination with the required agreement of Uruguay enabled Uruguay and Argentina to resume political dialogue and facilitated the resolution of their diplomatic impasses.

The rapprochement of Uruguay and Argentina at the beginning of Mujica’s mandates benefited not only the two countries concerned, but also the whole region. Not only was political dialogue restored, but trade across the Uruguayan-Argentinian borders was freed up, which was beneficial for the Uruguayan economy. As an adjunct, Uruguay’s tacit agreement enabled Argentina to position ex-president Néstor Kirchner as the first General Secretary of UNASUR on 4 May 2010. Thirdly, the nomination of the first General Secretary confirmed the establishment of UNASUR and further strengthened its consolidation.

This Uruguayan decision to ‘go along with the consensus in order that South America should have a chance to insert itself as a unit on the international scene’, as President Mujica expressed it during the presidential meeting of UNASUR in May 2010, illustrates the region-engaging role of Uruguay in the building of South America as a region. It also demonstrates that a change in the approach to regional cooperation was able to facilitate the resolution of international conflicts, strengthen the development of a ‘we-ness’ and contribute to the consolidation of a South American identity.
Moreover, the idea of this new approach to regional cooperation impacted on most parts of the Uruguayan political elite to such an extent that even some opposition members of the parliament began to develop a positive view of UNASUR. For instance, Senator Da Rosa of the opposing *Nacional* party speaking in the Chamber of Senators on 30 November 2010 stated that they would support the confirmation of the treaty, giving as his reasons that,

‘This process...aims for integration of the South American countries and establishes certain objectives... Among these objectives, we find the promotion of political dialogue..., support for social policies, the coordination of areas of education regarding the commonalities of the states, ...protection of democracy, promotion of social inclusion...the intention to reduce asymmetries between the member states, all these areas we consider important areas for Uruguay...’ (Uruguay: Cámara de Senadores, 2010: 52).

Finally, the ratification of Uruguay as the ninth instrument for the legal validation and international recognition of UNASUR enabled the leftist Broad Front to portray itself to its electorate as an established party of the country. At the same time, it projected Uruguay as a crucial regional political actor conscious of its historical tradition as a region-engaging state.

Another important factor contributing to the building of UNASUR is the reliance on common elements of national identities as sources of a collective regional identity. This analysis has revealed the identitarian factors linking Uruguay’s concepts of its national identity with the wider concepts of South American identity which UNASUR first proposed and then expanded.
These factors can be categorised as established shared norms, shared identification features, and shared values and beliefs as shown in figure 6. All these can be considered as identitarian factors that underpin the construction of a collective identity (Wendt, 1994, 1999). Hence, all Uruguayan norms, identitarian features, values and beliefs shared with the other South American states and given established status within the UNASUR are sources for the wider South American identity.

A set of norms, identitarian features, values and historical events are interrelated between Uruguay and the norms, values and beliefs underpinning the creation of UNASUR. These factors linking Uruguay and the other South American states constitute joining elements between the Uruguayan state and the umbrella framework of the South American region conveyed in UNASUR.

Firstly, various formally institutionalised and informal Uruguayan norms enable the state to support regional integration as shown in figure 6. One of these main institutionalised norms is embedded in the Uruguayan political constitution. A subsection of Article 6 of this states that,

‘...the Republic will assume the social and economic integration of the Latin American states, particularly within the area of common defence of its products and natural resources. Equally, it will foster the efficient complementation of its public services’ (Uruguay: Poder Legislativo, 2004: n/p).

This argument was highlighted by Uruguayan supporters of the consolidation of UNASUR and could not be rejected by those who opposed them, since the constitution itself reflects the region-engaging character of Uruguay.
Uruguayan presidential declarations are also legally binding. Presidential Declaration N- 18,708 (15 December 2010) binds Uruguay to respect the regulations of UNASUR, since in ratifying the UNASUR treaty the president expresses the will of the whole Uruguayan people.

Figure 6. Institutional regulations of Uruguay and UNASUR that legitimise political Action

A less mandatory source of Uruguayan regional political action, but still highly relevant due to the party’s position regarding regional integration of the government in power during UNASUR’s period of construction is found in various documents of Broad Front. These comprise the foundation documents from 1971-1984, the Action Plan of 1990, and the Governmental Guidelines for 2005-2009 and 2010-2015 which declare explicit support for Latin American integration.

As show in figure 6, Uruguayan protocols are enshrined in the regional regulation covered by UNASUR’s own protocols. These are binding on Uruguay as long as the
process of drawing up the protocols has been achieved by consensus. Article 12 of UNASUR’s Constitutive Treaty embeds the expectations regarding national and regional protocols. It therefore obliges Uruguay to abide by these regional regulations. This is explicitly stated:

‘…the regulations that originated in UNASUR’s institutions are binding on all member states as long as these had been incorporated into the juridical system of every state in accordance with their internal procedures...’ (UNASUR, 2008).

That is to say that the Treaty of UNASUR, the Decisions and Declarations of the Heads of the South American states and the Regulations and Resolutions of the Councils of UNASUR form abiding norms for Uruguay as well as for the further signatory states of the South American region.

On the one hand, the linkage between these institutional national and regional norms enables Uruguay to legally position itself in a further role, as leader of the integration process when it obtains the Presidency Pro Tempore of UNASUR. This will enable it to further influence the construction and consolidation of UNASUR. This was one of the main arguments in the debates from April to November 2010 regarding the ratification of Uruguayan membership in UNASUR.

On the other hand, the national and regional connection through these norms limits Uruguay, since it must abide by them and behave accordingly. In that way, Uruguay is trapped in the small state’s dilemma over whether to choose influence or autonomy, as Goetschel (1998) characterises small states in integration processes.
It is true to say that the historical development of the Broad Front party represents the historical change in Uruguayan political culture and identity. Regarding this, two historical factors have impacted on the identity of Uruguay and the whole region shaping Uruguay’s identity even more, so that it fits better into the whole South American context.

One of these is the creation of the Latin American Free Trade Association (ALALC) in 1962, in which the Uruguayan discourse was based on the integrationist virtues of the free market, whose benefit was seen as its ability to unify the region and collectively confront the economic overpowering influences from outside it (Ministerio de Hacienda, 1962).

The other is the transformation of the Uruguayan political culture and the shared identification features that have historically linked Uruguay to the Ibero-American states, as shown in figure 7.

These features of a shared collective identity were directly highlighted by the re-establishment of dialogue with Argentina. Here the Uruguayan political elite stresses that ‘yes we are brothers with Argentina, yet we have many conflicts’. However, conflicts are part of cooperation and it is to be expected that conflicts (in the sense of diplomatic or commercial impasses) arise in a process of cooperation (Groom, 1990).
Figure 7. Identitarian features shared between Uruguay and other states in the region

As shown in figure 7, there are relevant Uruguayan shared identification features embedded in the identitarian elements of the South American identity. These serve as principles on which dialogue can be re-started, conflict resolved and the region strengthened.

The list presented here of identification features of both the Uruguayan and the South American identity is not exhaustive. Instead, these only represent the features captured in the process of this analysis. Most relevant for this investigation are those identification features that bond Uruguay to South America and South America to Uruguay, which are documented above as linkages between national and regional identity.

In addition to the historical transformation Uruguay shares with most of the South American countries, there are further identification features that connect Uruguay to the region. They are derived from a long, shared historical development in the region. These include: speaking the Spanish language, being ex-European colonies, belonging to a Latin American idea, possessing a variety of ethnic backgrounds,
being a society built from a blending of immigrants with local ethincal influences, and more recently through the existence of a South American ideal and through membership of UNASUR.

Figure 8. Values and beliefs shared by Uruguay with the region

These are the basis of the political discourse, and therefore they are not less important. These are fundamental features that reverberate in the public speeches of politicians, at academic congresses, and in the discussions of students of the region. It is within such meetings that the idea of South American identity has begun to be propagated, arguing a need for a new kind of cooperation and new form of integration within the UNASUR.

Finally, these arguments are also rooted in the values Uruguay shares with the other South American states and such values illustrated in figure 8 are entwined with the historical development of the whole continent.
As shown in figure 8, these Uruguayan values can be found ingrained in the UNASUR treaty and in the arguments supporting the outcomes of the meetings of the Heads of State and governments, as well as in Uruguayan debates about their membership in UNASUR.

On the one hand, these political values and principles (such as the protection of democracy, respect for sovereignty and non-intervention, respect for human rights and states’ equality) have been upheld by Uruguayan governments, past and present, and are embedded in UNASUR as figure 8 illustrates.

On the other hand, the transformation of both Uruguayan society and of the people of the South American region have been driven by the collective efforts to re-establish, strengthen and maintain shared social values (such as solidarity, respect for differing political thinking, tolerance of diversity, and freedom of speech, among others).

These values of freedom, zone of peace and respect for diversity have taken on great relevance in twenty-first century Uruguay, and indeed, in the whole of South America, since the reintegration of the leftist party Broad Front (with its various branches composed also of the leftist group stemming from the ex-guerrilla group MLN-Tupamaro) has gradually impacted on Uruguay’s political culture. Following demands for a review of cases of torture and human rights violations under the dictatorship, the question, ‘What kind of people are we?’ has arisen. The result has been a challenge to the values and principles that was used to underpin Uruguayan identity in the previous century.
The impact of the leftist political leadership on such social Uruguayan issues, and the response of the government to the increasing demand for justice, are also factors that affect the identity of a state. The creation, during the presidency of Jorge Batlle, of a commission to investigate the cases of torture and forced disappearance is an example of social issues that can change the national identity of a country.

However, the demands for a collective and coordinated investigation across countries such as Argentina, Chile and Paraguay show that the shared negative history of a region needs to be dealt with as members of a whole.

This process of civil reconciliation of the members of the Uruguayan society, and the adaptation to a left-oriented government are characteristics of the Uruguayan state that are also shared with most of the South American states in the twenty-first century, and have further blended Uruguay in the region. Most of such Uruguayan shared political principles and identitarian elements (that can be summarised as shared norms, culture and values) are deeply embedded in the fundamentals underpinning the creation of UNASUR as shown in figure 8.

4.3. The Prospect of Communitarian Cooperation and the Creation of the first Councils of UNASUR

In common with other small member states of UNASUR, Uruguay can find enough space to engage, despite their weak material power, in the process of instituting, developing and executing regional projects. The large scope for cooperation offered by the UNASUR framework makes this possible, as the UNASUR treaty is so broad
that every area of the state and civil society can be selected as an area of cooperation.

The integration mechanisms that have enabled South American states to cooperate for decades have created a friendly environment. This allows political actors to interact with each other and identify centres of communitarian cooperation within an ‘ambience of cordiality and comradeship’ as suggested by the Uruguayan Diputado Martínez Huelmo, and corroborated by the Ecuadorian Foreign Minister in personal interviews in May 2012 and June 2013, respectively. Here, the elements of a shared identity such as shared history, culture, language and values also facilitate communication and interaction.

Archival records also show that Uruguay has participated consistently. It contributed to the process within the IIRSA, as a member of CSN and as founder of UNASUR as mentioned in the historical background of this study. These engagements show the country’s willingness to strengthen the South American region through communitarian cooperation.

However, it is beyond the reach of this study to look at all the cases of Uruguayan communitarian cooperation within the context of UNASUR. Therefore, a closer look at two particular cases can help to elucidate how it has employed communitarian cooperation in order to link its national policies with those of other states across the South American region.
The first case looks at Uruguay’s involvement in the creation and regulation of the South American Council for Health (CSS). The second case draws on the formation of the South American Council for Defence (CSD) to illustrate Uruguayan involvement in the South American integration process.

Regarding the first case, this study has distinguished an ever growing Uruguayan endeavour to define policies that allow national states to cooperate across their borders. Here, Uruguayan experiences acquired within MERCOSUR, particularly in conjunction with Brazil, have become the basis for their engagement in the whole region.

The Uruguayan involvement in this particular area is rooted in two particularities of this small state. One is the historical region-engaging character of Uruguay. The other stems from the political ideology of its leftist government, which has envisaged a social policy that can extend to the whole region.

The governmental plan of the Broad Front for 2005-2009 contains indications of two relevant aims of the Uruguayan government. One is the public investment in national health services as a formula to re-formulate the social policies of the nation. The other shows its support for regional integration, particularly Latin American integration, as long as it benefits the majority. This means that both state and region should promote universal access to social security and health services, for instance.

Already, under the conservative government of President Jorge Batlle in 2002, Uruguay and Brazil initiated joint health projects in shared populated border areas.
These were for monitoring the outbreak of epidemics and for immunisation, and there were also environmental and other health programmes coordinated by a Binational Commission for Health.

In this way, Uruguay accumulated experience in the area of health within MERCOSUR. This and a socialist-oriented policy for the country and the region were further strengthened with the inauguration of the government led by Tavare Vázquez.

Once in power, the new Uruguayan government passed governmental Decree N.17, 930 of 19 December 2005, giving approval for the creation of 5,170 jobs. This aimed to provide the population with a better health service and give assurance to this service’s administrative and professional workforce.

From 2004 to 2007, state investment in public health increased by 56 % related to the previous government, and according to the approved political agenda of the V Congress of the Broad Front 2008, the government aimed to continue with the transformation of the public health service in order to make it more accessible to the whole population.

This Uruguayan experience became a solid basis from which to expand the initiative across the region, as President Vázquez showed in his speech to his regional colleagues. This speech was made at the Montevideo meeting on 26 to 28 June 2006, which was called in order to promote policies for racial equality in Latin
America. Here, the promotion of free access to the public health service was one of the fundamental objectives.

This perspective was supported by the Special Commissions for negotiation of South American integration, and the analysis of its future, in which Uruguay played a leading role as mentioned above. This highlighted the connections between poverty, poor health and underdevelopment in the region, and suggested the creation of a South American network of public health.

This project aimed to coordinate cooperation in vaccination programmes, collective production or acquisition of basic vaccines and other medicines, and to support the coordination of further shared developmental projects. In this way, regional integration became a mechanism for collective action to find new forms of cooperation to help states overcome such challenges.

Health policy was one of the first areas of cooperation incorporated in UNASUR’s plans. Three months after the signature of the UNASUR treaty, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs proposed, at their August 2008 meeting in Chile, the creation of a Council for Social Policy. It was envisioned that this would include education, social development, health and culture. But instead of creating an institution with such a wide range of responsibilities, the states decided on the creation of sectorial councils which would separately coordinate the policies in their specific areas directed by the sectorial ministers of every member state.
Soon afterwards, the creation of the South American Council for Health was created by the Heads of States of UNASUR during their meeting in Costa de Suaípe, Brazil on 16 December 2008.

Regulation J of Article 3 of the 2008 UNASUR treaty was invoked as the founding argument for the creation of the South American Council for Health (CSS). The regulation states that UNASUR should promote ‘universal access to social security and health services’ as one of its specific objectives. In this way the creation of the CSS was foreshadowed by this specific objective. Its aim is to assemble the experiences already gained in the field of health within the existing regional organisations such as MERCOSUR, the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organisation (OTCA), the Andean Health Organisation (ORAS), and others, and coordinate their undertakings under the umbrella of UNASUR.

The first meetings of the CSS in Santiago, Chile in 2009 were centred on the definition of its attributions and the formation of collective technical work groups such as the Group for Epidemiological Mapping which later delivered the common Declaration of the CSS of 8 August 2009 in Quito to fortify this process. The Uruguayan governmental position regarding the supremacy of public health over commercial and economic private interests prevailed in these working meetings.

The declaration from Quito illustrates the decision of the South American states to cooperate within their environment. This can be considered as communitarian cooperation, as it is not based on a competing market-oriented approach, but on
solidarity and a complementary effort for developing common social policies for the region.

The election of José Mujica to the Presidency in 2009 gave popular confirmation to the Broad Front for a new presidential period. In this way the positions and ideological vision of the socialist government’s stance on regional and national politics were validated.

At the national level, the newly elected government brought a challenging legislation project up for discussion intending to regulate the consumption of cannabis on the basis of public health. This might also impact on drug consumption regulations across the region. This was a conceivable aim, as many new institutions for cooperation and shared development and the implementation of common projects, as well as investigations and the harmonisation of national policies, have been created within UNASUR since 2010. This has been due to the fact that most of the South American states are now governed by governments with similar ideological tendencies.

Most of these projects have also been articulated in one central institution, created about 16 months after the initiation of CSS, whose Coordinating Committee presented the Five-year Plan 2010-2015 on 28 April 2010. Here, the harmonisation and recognition of standards, medical procedures and protocols are some of the most relevant proposed strategic guidelines.
On the one hand, this project presents the vision of consolidating South America as an integrated area that contributes providing health services for all (UNASUR, 2010]). A first step to achieving this aim was taken by setting out policies that enabled the standardisation of common specialised terminology, and protocols that help to improve communication within the region. On the other, it shows the predisposition of all South American states to fulfil a regional project in the area of social development and health that links the national interest to the regional common interest.

This Five-year Plan sets out the UNASUR vision of consolidating South America as an integrated space that could contribute to the health services for all. This is based upon the premise that solidarity, human rights, equality and citizen participation are basic principles of CSS.

And in order to achieve such aims, the project to create a Network of Schools for Public Health (RESP-UNASUR) was also presented to the Council of Presidents on 30 November 2010, and approved through Resolution 6/2011 of the CSS of 14 April 2011 in Montevideo. Most of these goals are enshrined in the principles grounding the politics of recent Uruguayan governments and can therefore be seen as part of the Uruguayan ideas of regional integration.

In addition, support was given by Uruguay for the creation of the South American Institute for Government in Health. This project, initiated in 2010 in Cuenca, Ecuador, aims to promote the exchange of experience and knowledge, and to invent new policies for governments in the field of health. This new path of cooperation shows a
national and regional harmonisation of policies in a way that differs from previous approaches to regional integration. In this new approach the small state is a constant actor in regional politics.

In conclusion, the preparedness of Uruguay and all other South American states to support regional cooperation in the area of health demonstrated three points. First, it illustrated a new mode of cooperation which would benefit the community as a whole. Secondly, the region-engaging character of Uruguay manifested itself in the voluntary consent it gave to these projects. Thirdly, this Uruguayan consent can be linked to the political views of the left-oriented government, views which are identical with the aims of the CSS.

This study has also illuminated the way in which, during the creation of the South America Defence Council (CSD), a regional environment of mistrust between the South American states has been transformed. Confidence and trust have been built between UNASUR’s member states, as a preliminary to establishing regional peace as suggested in the UNASUR treaty. Uruguay as a member of UNASUR has directly participated in this process.

Two aspects of trust building have been identified in this context. One consists of the re-establishment and consolidation of trust between the states across the region in order to consolidate South America as a region of peace. The other is observable in the way that popular trust in the nation-states’ democratic institutions has been consolidated.
Regarding the first aspect, this investigation has distinguished some patterns of behaviour in Uruguay showing a latent and consistent support for the establishment of a South American zone of peace throughout the last decade. Despite the various diplomatic impasses between states of the region, there has been a constant appeal of the Heads of Government of South America to the national states to construct a region of peace. This idea has been unanimously declared as an aim of the South American integration process since the introduction of the IIRSA in 2000.

Uruguay portrays an example of how a small state can construct and maintain international peace and friendship with its neighbour states throughout the centuries. Its last international conflict dates back to the 1860s-1870s, when Uruguay took part in the Great War as a part of the Triple Alliance jointly with Brazil and Argentina against Paraguay.

Following this conflict Uruguay has managed to establish a policy of respect for sovereignty, for the principles of non-intervention and self-determination of the people, and for international law, as the leading strategy of its foreign policy. This has allowed Uruguay to avoid any behaviour that could affect the historical rivalry of its big brothers, Argentina and Brazil.

Although cooperation within ALADI and MERCOSUR was mainly restricted to the commercial area, a new era of friendship and cooperation between the big and small states of the Southern Cone (the southern geographical area of South America) started in the 1980s and was strengthened when all member states of MERCOSUR,
plus Chile and Bolivia gathered in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, in December 2004 to sign an agreement to cooperate in the field of security (Gutiérrez, 2008).

Uruguay has also managed to maintain a friendly relationship with its neighbouring partner states and avoid major confrontations with extra-regional international agents. This sensitive issue for the security of Uruguay as a small state has been handled by Uruguay in a consistent way by condemning any extra-regional threat to the region.

This behaviour of the Uruguayans is congruent with Argentina’s aim to gain support and include all neighbours in condemning the hostile acts of the United Kingdom regarding the Falkland Islands. The collective voice expressed in the common declarations on the security of the South American states since the introduction of IIRSA shows Uruguayan support for the formation and strengthening of the region as well as the ‘we-feeling’ of a consolidated region.

Moreover, Uruguay’s support for Argentina’s demands not only has a strategic implication due to the Uruguayan geostrategic position, but also stems from their shared history and culture, and their common interest in maintaining international trust.

At the same time, this idea of including all states in a common space of regional cooperation was strengthened by the common need to tackle remaining issues from the times of social divide, excessive nationalism and dictatorships. The approval in Chile in June 2008 of the Brazilian initiative concerning the agreement to cooperate
in the field of security laid a solid foundation for the construction of an institution that includes all South American states.

As a member of MERCOSUR, Uruguay took part in forming the basis of this new South American dialogue. Furthermore, although Brazil’s initial ambition was to restrict this project to commercial arrangements in the field of military industry, and joint short military exercises (Saint-Pierré, 2008), the CSD took a rather political approach which found support from Uruguay in the joint Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of South America in December 2008. This enabled the creation and consolidation of the CSD in the following years.

The general objectives of the CSD reflect the vision supported by Uruguay throughout the process of the creation of UNASUR. The statute of creation of the CSD reflects most of Uruguay’s traditional endeavours regarding Latin American integration.

In creating the CSD, the South American states have voluntarily decided to:

‘a) consolidate South America as a zone of peace, based on the democratic stability and integral development of our people, as a contribution to world peace, b) construct a South American identity in the area of defence that takes into account sub-regional and national differences, and contributes to the strengthening of the Latin American and Caribbean unity, and c) generate consensus for the strengthening of regional cooperation in the field of defence’ (IIRSA, 2008a).

Uruguay’s shared history and shared borders with both bigger neighbours Brazil and Argentina has not only obliged it to develop the ability to coexist in an environment of relative peace, but also to cooperate internationally as part of the South American
contingent of forces for maintaining international peace. A clear example of this is the Uruguayan contribution to the UN peace keeping forces, by sending a national contingent to the UN peace keeping task force in conflict zones.

In October 2008, Uruguay maintained a contingent of 2,533 personnel in sixteen peace operations within the framework of the UN (Uruguay: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2008: N.75/08). A great number of them formed the South American contingent to the UN Mission to maintain stability in Haiti in 2008, which later became the contingent of UNASUR for the reconstruction of Port-au-Prince, Haiti following the earthquake from January 2010.

This experience and its traditional approach to international norms gave Uruguay a place as a serious partner in the field of security. Moreover, its official declaration of respect for international law, and for peaceful resolution of the conflict between Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela following the conflict of March 2008 reflects the Uruguayan vision of the establishment of a mechanism to build and maintain trust as the basis of regional peace.

This position is linked to the traditional characteristics of Uruguay, which has historically supported the defence of international regulations and the maintenance of peace nationally and regionally. The establishment of the CSD has not only been considered as a mechanism for establishing international peace within regional political circles, but also as a mechanism for the modernisation of the military and the Defence Ministries.
This tendency is related to the views of the Uruguayan Defence Minister, Dr José Bayardi, who participated in, and signed the declaration for, the creation of the CSD and at the same time initiated a process of transformation of the Ministry of Defence and the role of the military in Uruguay, starting in 2006.

This drive to transform the role of the armies as well as the structure of the Defence Ministries is related to a final factor regarding peace. This factor stems from the search for a method that helps states to maintain democracy, political stability and national peace. Like most South American states between the 1960s and the 1990s, Uruguay, as mentioned above, suffered a dictatorship which had no respect for democratic institutions or human rights.

Moreover, the need for a mechanism to support democratic principles and political stability became clearer as the threat to democracy continued to be an issue in South America. Venezuela’s attempted coup d’etat in 2002, the various coups d’état in Ecuador until 2005, and the attempts to overthrow the Bolivian president, Morales, in 2008 lurked in the background during the negotiation of the DSC.

In this way, the establishment of regional peace was directly linked to the establishment of national peace. At the same time the CSD became an instrument of cooperation over transforming national military institutions in order to resolve remaining border issues between the members of UNASUR, as well as for constructing a collective response to extra-regional threats.
The existence of US American military bases in Ecuador until 2009, and in the following years in Colombia, were political events repudiated by the Uruguayan leadership. Similar perceptions were voiced by Uruguay regarding the presence of British military forces in the South Atlantic, specifically on the Falkland Islands.

President Vázquez depicted the importance of cooperation in the area of security for the South American neighbouring states as well as for the whole region with the following statement,

‘I believe that in order to arrive at the land of peace, that land of democratic health, of sovereignty which fights against a variety of pathologies, no doubt we have to struggle fiercely to eliminate the pathologies that we are suffering from…. …In order to establish a region of peace, Uruguay also supports the resolution of controversies through peaceful means, by analysis, discussion and respect… …Therefore, Uruguay has openly rejected from the beginning, and still rejects, the installation of a foreign British military base on the Argentinian Islas Malvinas (Falkland Islands)…’ (Presidente Vázquez, 2009).

The pathologies referred to by President Vázquez can be related to the role of the military in Uruguayan society. Although Uruguay has traditionally showed a clear tendency to support and respect international norms and the democratic national institutions, the history of dictatorships and political instability experienced by Uruguay, and indeed, by all South America, can still be seen as a distinctly threatening phenomenon to democracy and political stability in the twenty-first century.

Particularly, the political stability and the maintenance of democratic institutions of small states were seriously threatened in small South American states such as Bolivia in December 2008, Ecuador in September 2010 and Paraguay in July 2012.
The experience of an ideologically driven campaign by the military, in conjunction with conservative right wing groups, against socialist- and communist-oriented political activists during the dictatorships has remained a challenge for national and regional peace as most of the South American states are now led by left-oriented governments.

The reforms made to the ministries of defence in 2010, which placed them under the leadership of civilians took place not only in Uruguay, but across the region. This points towards the gradual reconciliation between the different social groups in Uruguayan society. However, the new waves of political destabilisation and disrespect for democratic institutions particularly in small states represents a new challenge for Uruguay, as a small state governed by a leftist government.

The declaration of the Uruguayan Foreign Minister, Almagro, in the Chamber of Senators in July 2012 provides evidence of these worries, particularly when he highlights his position of imposing sanctions on Paraguay within MERCOSUR and UNASUR, as a response to the irregular removal from office of the Paraguayan president, Fernando Lugo, by his parliament. This is referred to by Almagro as a new way of destabilisation in the South American countries, stemming from a different ideology. He suggests that,

‘...in relation to the coups d'état in the region, the ideological implication that I found serious is that it seems that only left-oriented governments are affected by these ruptures of the institutions...' (Almagro, 2012a).

Notwithstanding this, the recent signing of a mutual statute for cooperation in the common protection of democratic values and political stability in the region, and its
ratification by most of the member states of UNASUR including Uruguay, demonstrates that the process of constructing a region of peace has followed its positive route. Moreover, the solidification of trust through the creation of institutions and common projects within the CSD has allowed small states to come closer to the bigger partner states.

Finally, although the data has not revealed a major input from Uruguay in this area of cooperation, its participation in the negotiation meetings, as well as in the sectorial meetings of the Ministries of Defence, and in the special working groups and joint projects, show the willingness of Uruguay to support the construction of South America as a region of peace, and definitely re-establish its traditional character as a nation of peace.

4.4. Conclusion

On the basis of the outcomes generated by this investigation, it can be concluded that Uruguay is a traditional region-engaging small state, and its support for the creation of UNASUR has, in the first place, been based on its traditional character. Secondly, the identitarian elements that link Uruguay to the region are also important elements in its motivation. This motivation is related to a third particular factor –that of the left-oriented ideology of the government in power in the last two governmental periods.

The study also shows recent Uruguayan governments’ affinity with the aims conveyed by the treaty of UNASUR and their ideas of a new mode of cooperation.
This idea of a new form of cooperation is related to the aspirations of the majority of South American governments and the need to transform both the national and the regional political structures that have dominated in previous centuries. This national objective is linked to the intention to definitely signal the rupture with the overpowering aspiration of the USA to maintaining its influence in South America.

Moreover, this chapter provides evidence of the stages preceding, during and after the signing of the UNASUR treaty, whereby Uruguay has participated in and contributed to its consolidation. What is more, this process of transformation demands a theoretical explanation which has not been referred to in this chapter, but the findings presented here smooth the path for a more vibrant theoretically-related discussion in the following one.
5.1 Introduction

The empirical within-case analysis or process-tracing applied to the study of Ecuador and Uruguay in the previous chapters made it possible to obtain some salient insights into the most relevant reasons for the support given by these two small states for the construction and consolidation of UNASUR. This chapter further examines these outcomes in order to locate similarities and differences between Ecuador and Uruguay. On the basis of these outcomes discerned from the gathered evidence collated in appendix 4, and summarised in figures 9, 10, 11, 12, this chapter also aims to draw more accurate conclusions regarding the motivations of small states to construct the South American region.

The chapter is divided into four themes which reflect the main arguments of Ecuador and Uruguay, as small states, for their support for the construction of UNASUR. The first part refers to the national political situation of Ecuador and Uruguay and their external relations prior to the signature of the UNASUR treaty.

The second part draws on the disenchantment of the small states with economically driven integration and their support of a political alternative for cooperation on the basis of the left-wing ideology of the governments in power, during the process of signing and ratifying the UNASUR treaty. The third section focuses on the identity factors within the two states studied, and considers these in relation to the idea of a
South American identity and its consolidation, and the consequent influence on the behaviour of Ecuador and Uruguay.

The fourth section highlights the importance of the role of states within the framework of UNASUR. To further illuminate the motivations of small states to support this integration process, I also consider the importance of the role of President Pro Tempore and the significance of acting in the role of ‘member’, using as an example membership the South American Defence Council.

5.2 National Political Situation of Small States and Interaction between States

The study of the parts played by Ecuador and Uruguay in the creation of UNASUR can be linked to various factors contained in the historical process of the formation of a region, and the role played in it by these small states, in a manner that can support a social constructivist approach to the study of small states.

One factor concerns the structural transformation of a system that has been driven by the agents -the states- through their governments and diplomats. The development of the IIRSA and the CSN as mechanisms for the spread of the idea of a South American identity, into UNASUR shows the process of ‘we-feeling’ construction.

During this process, the interaction and interdependence of both, Ecuador and Uruguay with the other South American states and extra-regional forces, such as the
USA, have progressively enhanced the process of negotiation, right up to the signature of the UNASUR treaty which further shaped the idea of a collective South American identity. Wendt (1999; 343) describes this process of interaction and producing interdependence between states as one of the ‘master variables’ in the formation of a collective identity.

**Figure 9. Factors influencing the decision-making of small states in the process of creation and strengthening of UNASUR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>National politics</th>
<th>Regional and extra-regional interdependence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| ECUADOR | • Demands for social inclusion & unrest (H)  
          • Political stability (L)  
          • Respect for democratic institutions (L)  
          • Ability to construct a foreign policy and long term planning (L)  
          • Issues related to national security (H) | • USA (H)  
                                                 • Colombia (M)  
                                                 • Peru (L) |
| URUGUAY | • Demands for social inclusion & unrest (M)  
          • Political stability (H)  
          • Respect for democratic institutions (H)  
          • Ability to construct a foreign policy and long term planning (M)  
          • Issues related to national security (L) | • USA (L)  
                                                 • Brazil (H)  
                                                 • Argentina (M) |

Interpreted Levels = (H)=High  (M)=Medium  (L)=Low

In the cases of the two small states studied here, the dynamics of the interaction and the agency conveyed by the action of Ecuador and Uruguay are related to the interior political situation of the small state. Figure 9 simplifies and illustrates the most relevant factors of national politics in both cases.
These factors are listed in the middle column of figure 9. The illustration of similar political phenomena in the case studies facilitated the interpretation of both similarities and differences, as well as showing the most likely influences of such phenomena on the supportive behaviour of Ecuador and Uruguay during the consolidation of UNASUR.

The right-hand column of figure 9 elucidates the analysis of each case study in relation to the main regional and extra-regional actors in the context of a bilateral relationship, and helps to interpret the possible influences of international actors on the behaviour of Ecuador and Uruguay in the process of region construction.

At the same time, it facilitates an understanding about the different situations of the two small states in the South American region in order to draw clearer conclusions regarding their behaviour in the construction of UNASUR.

As shown in this illustration, there are not only extra-national factors and agents influencing the behaviour of Ecuador and Uruguay but also domestic factors. Indeed, the understanding of the interior political events of these small states has been a basic requirement for comprehending their behaviour in the international context. Here, factors related to the ability to construct and put in place a foreign policy, factors affecting national security, democracy and the ability to deal with social unrest have been considered as factors of comparison.

As shown in figure 9, a strong consolidated democracy such as Uruguay’s is more likely to have a high level of political stability and respect for democratic institutions.
despite the possibility of having high demands for social inclusion at any particular time. Here, the governmental period of President Jorge Batlle has been highlighted as a crisis point of the challenge of social unrest in Uruguay.

As in the case of Ecuador until 2007, high demands for social inclusion resulted in violent civil unrest. Hence, changes in the dynamics of the state are also driven by the electorate which choose new political representatives in accordance with their new political preferences. These preferences can also influence foreign policy and the behaviour of the state, as shown in the case of Ecuador. This will be further clarified in the following sections.

In the case of Uruguay the demands for social inclusion have been interpreted as exerting a medium level of influence in changing international politics for the region. The changes in the style of national policy were driven by the preference changes of the electorate, causing a historical transition from traditional two party politics to a left-wing oriented government, and a three party system in 2005.

Consequently, the planning and defining of Uruguay’s foreign policy has also impacted on the country’s behaviour in regional politics under recent left-wing governments as already noted by Rodríguez (2005) and Fernández (2011).

However, Uruguay’s high level of political stability and the professionalism of the public administration enabled the country to maintain the basics of a firm traditional foreign policy until the installation of the government led by President Mujica. With
his arrival to the presidency, there has been a relaxation of Uruguayan diplomacy’s of the traditional views, and political dialogue with Argentina has been revitalised.

A different panorama became evident in the study of Ecuador. Ecuador displays a high level of social unrest as a consequence of a high level of social demands for more social inclusion, social justice and the political recognition of excluded ethnic groups. In the case of Ecuador, this high level of unrest has also resulted in a low level of political stability, which is related to a low level of respect for democratic institutions.

The low level of political stability, constant change of government and low professionalisation of the public administration resulted in reactive foreign policies as the case of Ecuador shows in its international projection and exterior representation until the beginning of 2007. Planning for a consistent political position and foreign policy was limited until the end of the government of President Palacio, as noted both by Jaramillo (2008) and Bonilla (2008). For this reason the social demands for change seem to have also influenced how political relations with other states in the region should be conducted.

The domestic political dynamics of Ecuador also provide evidence that a small state cannot be vulnerable only to exterior influences. The case of Ecuador shows that the vulnerability of a state begins within its own national formal and informal structure, and with political stability, as lacking political continuity and stability affect long term planning and the design of a foreign policy.
In the case of Ecuador, the suggestion that the vulnerability of the state is lower when small states are members of a community (Goetschel, 1998, Hey, 2003; and Steinmetz and Wivel, 2010) can also be applied to the vulnerability to its own internal political dynamics. UNASUR has been viewed by Ecuador as an appropriate international environment within which political instability can be reduced.

The mediation and resolution of the violent social unrest which had political implications for the unity of Bolivia in 2008, the prompt reaction to and denouncement of the attempted coup d’état in Ecuador in 2010 and the sanctions imposed on Paraguay in 2012 for the disruption of democratically elected leaders are some of the examples of the benefits of being a member of a regional international community. These political phenomena can also be linked to the issues affecting the national security of small states, which in the case of Ecuador and Uruguay is further clarified below.

The study of the historical background of Ecuador and Uruguay has also facilitated the understanding of the transformation of a ‘subjective interdependence’ or reproduction of individual identity, into an ‘objective interdependence’ or construction of the ‘we-feeling’ (Wendt, 1999: 343-345).

The ‘subjective interdependence’ as result of an asymmetrical relationship such as the one between Ecuador and the USA does not necessarily lead to the formation of a collective identity. Notwithstanding this, it can be said that the elements underpinning the formation of an objective interdependence or we-feeling remain in their premature stage, as, though social relationships can enable social actors to
identify common affinities and the elements of a common identity between them, it appears not to promote the formation of a collective identity.

In the case of Ecuador and the USA, this asymmetrical relationship has led to a split between them. As suggested by Bonilla (2008), the asymmetrical relationship between the two in the areas of economy and international security had as a result an economic dependency of Ecuador on the USA, whereby Ecuador had no choice but to cooperate, instead of cooperating voluntarily.

Moreover, the relationship between small states within the framework of UNASUR also needs to be taken into account, since in a competitive system, small states may coordinate in order to position their interests as suggested by Katzenstein (1985) and Thorhallsson (2000). In a non-competitive system such as UNASUR, in which communitarian cooperation is promoted, small states do not require such strategic alliances between them.

In the cases of Ecuador and Uruguay, there has not only been an evident increase of the interaction between them, but also with the majority of other Latin American states. Again, this increase of interaction was motivated through their participation in negotiation meetings for the FTAA project, within their own sub-regional international organisations and within the IIRSA and CSN.

However, figure 9 only illustrates the interrelationship of Ecuador with the USA, Peru and Colombia, and Uruguay with USA, Brazil and Argentina, since such relationships reflect the main interaction of these states before the creation of UNASUR.
Nevertheless, the objective interdependence between these two small states and the rest of the South American states has increased since 2000. The participation of these small states within the framework of IIRSA and CSN has been consistent and enabled the formal recognition of the clause of consensus as proposed by the states from the beginning of the meetings of the South American heads of state in Brasilia 2000.

On the one hand, the earlier medium and low level of importance, in terms of regional integration, the Ecuadorian relationship with Colombia and Peru respectively, began to climb following the peace agreement with Peru in 1998. This was despite the fact that these three states could not find a common objective for negotiations with the USA over the FTAA project, either as members of the CAN or as close neighbours who shared cultural ties.

This shows the presence of individualist identities still cooperating as egoistic units, or within an environment of ‘subjective interdependence’, prior to the internalisation of the idea of a collective identity by the actors, as explained by Wendt (1999). This can also confirm the non-existence of a security community in the Andean region until the beginning of the twenty-first century.

On the other hand, Uruguay maintained a close economic relationship with its neighbours Brazil and Argentina, which resulted in a relationship of dependency with Brazil. In contrast, the Uruguayan relationship with the USA was maintained at a minimum level, despite the personal relationship of President Batlle with George W.
Bush. As we can see, at the beginning of the twenty-first century cooperation took place in an individualistic, self-centred style, within the framework of economic cooperation, but without nurturing a nascent collective identity.

The behaviour of Uruguay and Argentina particularly began to change during the time that the idea of a South American identity was being widely accepted among the population, and gaining in strength. This point is corroborated by the arrival of President José Mujica to power which resulted in the activation of communitarian cooperation between these states. Uruguayan support for the perspective of a strong South American identity was reinvigorated by its support of ex-president Kirchner in his candidature as UNASUR’s General Secretary and by ratifying the signature of the UNASUR treaty.

Finally, the action and interaction of Ecuador and Uruguay with the other South American states, as well as with extra-regional actors, culminated in the signature of the UNASUR treaty in 2008. This shows that the wide social dissemination of the new regional identity presented by Brazil in 2000, supported by Venezuela, Uruguay and Argentina also found the support of Ecuador during the years of transformation of the CSN into UNASUR, and during UNASUR’s consolidation.

The signature of the treaty by all twelve member states can also be considered as the inaugural ceremony of trust between the actors, and this is one of the fundamentals for the emergence of a security community, as explained by Adler and Barnett (1998). This can also be related to the first acts of learning and internalising a collective identity as noted by Wendt (1999).
5.3 Political Cooperation as a Result of the Failure of Economic Integration

The original Brazilian idea of a South American Free Trade Area (SAFTA) was not frozen or completely rejected, as the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) project had been by most of the Latin American small states following the Summit of the Americas in Mar del Plata, in 2005. The introduction of IIRSA was based on the idea of SAFTA, and the CSN was the basis for the construction of UNASUR.

This ideal of economic cooperation driven by the regional free market has remained embedded in the idea of a South American integrated economic space, and it is reflected in the present intention of converging the CAN and MERCOSUR, and in the experiences of Chile, Guyana and Surinam during the processes of integration.

However, the UNASUR has given priority to political cooperation in the form of communitarian cooperation. Here, integration forms one of the main pillars of the discourse regarding South American identity, along with solidarity, social justice, the fight against poverty, the protection of democracy and support for the political stability of every member state.

Consequently, the initial engine of integration, South American economic cooperation, has been relegated to the position of a long term objective. This is the difference between the old kind of regionalism and the new kind of South American regionalism, that is to say, a new idea of integration driven by the framework of UNASUR.
Figure 10. Economic integration and ideology as influencing factors on the decision-making process for the creation and strengthening of UNASUR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Economic mechanisms of integration</th>
<th>Ideology of the governments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case study</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ECUADOR</td>
<td>• Satisfaction with the CAN (L)</td>
<td>• Impact of national leader (L &lt;2007; H&gt;2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Satisfaction with the FTAA project (L)</td>
<td>• Impact of governing party (L&lt;2007; H&gt;2007)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Impact of regional tendency (L&lt;2007; M&gt;2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URUGUAY</td>
<td>• Satisfaction with MERCOSUR (L)</td>
<td>• Impact of national leader (M&lt;2010; H&gt;2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Satisfaction with the FTAA project (L)</td>
<td>• Impact of governing party (L&lt;2005; H&gt;2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Impact of regional tendency (M)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interpreted levels = (H)=High (M)=Medium (L)=Low (<)=before (>)=after

In this process, the support given by small states to a change of focus on the type of cooperation was originally associated with the low satisfaction of Ecuador and Uruguay with the economic mechanism of cooperation and integration, as pictured in figure 10.

At the same time, this figure shows a split in the impact of the ideology of the national leadership and the governing political force regarding the decision to support the consolidation of UNASUR in both study cases.

In the diagram, the low levels of satisfaction with previous mechanisms of integration, combined with the impact of the ideology of the governing party correspond with the insights already gained regarding the competition of asymmetric
economies in South America. It seems that left-oriented leadership in government are more reluctant to adhere to a mechanisms of economic integration that supports a free regional market as the engine of integration. The idea of a South American free market is therefore most unlikely to have the support of left-wing governments of the South American small states.

On the other side of the coin, the prioritisation of political cooperation in the form of communitarian cooperation within UNASUR’s framework has obtained support from small states’ leaders and corresponding governing parties. Therefore, the profile and influence of ideology in the case of Ecuadorian leaders before 2007 appears as low level regarding the construction of UNASUR and high level after 2007.

This can also be linked to various other factors including political instability and the influence of extra-regional forces, since external forces, be these materially or ideationally (identitarian) driven, may not be interested in the establishment of a political unit for communitarian cooperation. Such influences affect more politically unstable small states as shown in the relationship of Ecuador with the USA.

The case of Uruguay also shows a split into types of leadership of the governing parties corresponding with level of state’s influence upon the contribution towards the construction of UNASUR. The arrival of President Tavaré Vázquez reinforced the idea of a South American union and the election of President José Mujica to power seems to have further influenced the increase of support for the consolidation of UNASUR. This particularity of the Uruguayan case can be also linked to three further factors.
Firstly, the low influence of the governing party before 2005 is related to the political decline of the traditional political parties of Uruguay, as well as the poor results of integration during the last period of the *Colorado* party. Secondly, the influence of a public service that has traditionally maintained a certain continuity of foreign policy could not be changed or replaced immediately. Such influence seems to have lasted for some years into the first government of the Broad Front party.

As illustrated in the middle column of figure 10, the interpretations of the satisfaction of Ecuador and Uruguay with the economic mechanism of integration clearly show peoples’ low satisfaction at the prospects of the economic integration processes continuing. Regarding the disenchantment of Ecuador with the CAN, it has been referred to as having a low level of satisfaction.

Ecuador’s view of CAN as an inefficient and ‘obsolete’ organisation is mainly related to two main phenomena. One is the poor ability to build a collective identity that contributes to the solution of conflicts such as the Ecuadorian-Peruvian border disputes, and the resulting poor commitment to economic agreements, and a low level of cooperation as noted by Vieira (2008).

The other factor producing a low level of Ecuadorian satisfaction with CAN, is the poor impact of economic cooperation within CAN on social development. However, more factors appear just as important in relation to the inefficiency of CAN. These factors are the weakness of the democratic institutions and low political stability.
which disrupts small states’ cooperation across borders. The Ecuadorian case from 1980 to 2007 is an example.

In contrast to this South American case, Western European small states rely on the strength of the democratic institutions in order to cooperate as corporate actors in some economic sectors, in order to counter the challenges of the world market, as hypothesised by Katzenstein (1985), and tested by Thorhallsson (2000). European small states have also developed smart state strategies (Grøn & Rogaczewka, 2013) to pursue their interests within a framework of competition, which due to their nature of economic and technological development can be viewed as healthy competition.

However, the economic framework of competition cannot be equally applied in the South American context due to economic asymmetries between countries. On the one hand, the larger states such as Argentina, Brazil and Colombia have a high level of technological and economic competitiveness. On the other hand, small states such as Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay have a low level of competitive economic capacity.

In that case, an economic framework for integration such as those employed in Europe, which Latin America attempted to replicate in the twentieth century, can lead to a subjective interdependence, instead of an objective interdependence, within which losses and gains are considered as ‘ours’ instead of his/hers or theirs, as noted by Wendt (1999).
The FTAA project for instance was rejected by both Ecuador and Uruguay on the basis of both the size of the economy and of the differing political ideology of the parts. These two examples demonstrate a failure in the attempts to employ economic mechanisms of cooperation as means of integration.

On the one hand, this continental project involved countries with world leading economies such as the USA, Brazil and Mexico which may have similar conditions in certain areas of their economies to a healthy competition. On the other hand, countries with an underdeveloped economy, such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Paraguay to whom assistance was given during the negotiation process, are more vulnerable to such asymmetrical relationships, and a free trade market as means of integration could further damage their weak economies.

The fact that assistance was given to small states such as Ecuador and Bolivia for the negotiation process of the FTAA shows that such asymmetrical relationships were not sustainable. This kind of relationship led to a dependent relationship and to what Wendt (1999) calls ‘subjective interdependence’ (p. 344-345). Hence, it can be seen that this kind of cooperation may not lead to integration.

Rather than this type of cooperation rooted in economics, it seems that, in the process of construction of UNASUR, it was other elements that prevailed –trust building, and the recognition of common goals, such as fighting poverty, or constructing a physical infrastructure that more closely links the societies of the continent– and were factors which enabled the formation of an objective interdependence, and a feeling of we-ness.
This Ecuadorian experience within CAN and the experience of further small states such as Uruguay within the other economic mechanisms of integration such as the ALADI questioned the appropriateness of commercial cooperation accompanied by a low level of political intervention. These events also exemplify another reason for the failure of the FTAA and for the support given to UNASUR.

Consequently, the transformation of the SAFTA into UNASUR on the basis of communitarian cooperation can be conceived as a response to the failure of previous projects of integration, and as an alternative offered by the left-oriented governments with the aim of finding alternatives that correspond with the South American situation, with contemporary international circumstances and with the demands of the South American societies.

These phenomena can also be evidenced by comparing Ecuadorian with Uruguayan behaviour during the process of creating UNASUR. As figure 10 shows, the satisfaction of both states regarding free trade mechanisms of integration is low. And this outcome was obtained despite the considerable effort made by Uruguay, as a traditional region-engaging state, to support previous attempts to keep ALADI afloat and to comply with the regulations of MERCOSUR.

Until 2010, Uruguay showed a low level of trust in the ability of MERCOSUR to resolve the high number of disputes with Argentina, despite the fact that Uruguay has traditionally been an international trader state. Most of its trade was conducted with extra-regional states until the beginning of the Latin American economic
integration process in the 1960s, and its international trade has traditionally been influenced by other states' policies (Díaz, 2003).

However, Uruguay’s small state characteristics and its membership of the MERCOSUR since the 1990s both challenged the capacity of Uruguay to overcome the relative economic and institutional disadvantages in relation to its main regional trade partners, Brazil and Argentina, which ended in a subjective interdependence and hindered the formation of a strong collective identity in the South American cone.

For these reasons, the perspective of establishing a new international regional institution that compensates for this relative disadvantage appears to have also influenced the Uruguayan decision to support the consolidation of UNASUR as a mechanism for resolving discords between member states by means of political dialogue.

This study has also sought to understand the particularities of individual cases. One such particularity is related to the ratification process of the membership of UNASUR. Ecuador did not question the issues of bureaucracy and public administration in the newly created international organisation and institutions of UNASUR as Uruguay did.

Uruguay’s concerns were not necessarily concerned with the type of cooperation within it. Its concerns were and still are related to the danger of repeating the old mechanisms of integration, for two reasons, namely the fears that this could
jeopardise the aims of UNASUR, and secondly, that the requirement of increasing the number of civil servants will put more financial strain on the small state.

Here, the smallness of the domestic political administration was evidently an issue for the Uruguayans. This case shows one typical characteristic of many small states within a highly institutionalised international environment, and the small size of a state can become a challenging factor for small states in international relations.

These Uruguayan apprehensions are a common challenge shared by small states in regional and world politics, as evidenced by the study of 19 small states within the European Union (Panke, 2010). The South American small states also display this deficit as mentioned above in relation to the negotiation about the FTAA project, as well as in relation to the support given by Brazil to Surinam during the accomplishment of its role as President Pro Tempore of UNASUR.

Nevertheless, this study has tried to explain that both Ecuador and Uruguay view UNASUR as a new regional instrument whose foreign policy could be significant, especially in an international environment where international corporations and economically stronger extra-regional agents continue to constrain the abilities of small states to satisfy the demands of their population when discharging their duties.

Although there are voices that view the consensual clause of the UNASUR as a weakness of this kind of integration (Bizzozero, 2008, 2010), UNASUR’s position as a new international player and as a regional representative of South American
identity and interests could help small states to position some of their national interests across and beyond the region.

For small states, this suggested weakness of UNASUR is instead an important source of motivation for their engagement in it, since the veto or consensus clause equips small states with similar tools to approve or disapprove regional policies and practical common projects.

What is more, the various failed attempts made by Uruguay and Argentina to resolve their economic and diplomatic disputes in the coordination of, and cooperation in, the environmental policies influenced Uruguay to view UNASUR as an alternative to the resolution of their diplomatic impasses. This Uruguayan position can be particularly noted in the process of, and debates for, the ratification of the UNASUR treaty.

The rise of left-wing governments is another relevant factor influencing the support given by Uruguay and Ecuador to the construction of UNASUR as a politically driven international regional organisation, and at the same time a rejection of the FTAA. As figure 10 illustrates, in both case studies, there has been a tendency towards supporting the idea of a South American identity when left-oriented governments arrive to power.

This process is related to the periods of government and the ideological change in the electorate in both case studies. Originally, the Ecuadorian leadership and governing party had a low impact on the motivation for supporting the creation of UNASUR before 2007. That motivation increased after the arrival of the socialist-
oriented government of President Rafael Correa and his political movement, Alianza País to power. This tendency was maintained until recently.

Here, Ecuadorian behaviour slightly differs from the behaviour of Uruguay, as Uruguay maintained a more stable attitude of moderation, or medium impact on the support of the idea of South American integration from 2005 to 2010. This Uruguayan behaviour may be explained by a more stable and professionalised Uruguayan public administration and civil service.

The arrival of President José Mujica, who belongs to the same socialist political alliance as his predecessor, the Broad Front, but has traditionally held strong left-oriented political views, injected more support for South American integration from the beginning of 2010. Hence, Uruguayan support for the consolidation of the region has further increased since that time.

The foreign policy, particularly the vision of regional integration of these small states through economic and free trade, has lost its force during the process of consolidating UNASUR. Instead, the idea of political collective action as communitarian cooperation for the resolution of shared socio-political issues became the engine of UNASUR. Here, a ‘cognitive community’ made up of the members of political elites belonging to the governments, and a political discourse concerning a common fate is noticeable in most fields of the construction process.

Although the left-wing party governing Uruguay since 2005 did not necessarily modify traditional Uruguayan foreign policy until the arrival of President Mujica to
power, the leading Uruguayan party reinforced the idea of Latin American integration on the basis of a more politically driven process as a requirement to retain the support of the electorate.

This Uruguayan behaviour is related, in the first place, to the breakdown of negotiations with the USA concerning the FTAA on a multilateral, and later on a bilateral, basis. This behaviour of the Uruguayan leadership after 2005 shows the intention of the party to comply with the proposal aired during the election campaign to display itself as a trustworthy new political party. Secondly, the direct intervention of President Vázquez in the negotiations and the hosting of the Special Commission demonstrate both the consistency of a political campaign, and the realisation of ideas into policies.

Thirdly, the presence of delegates, representatives and special envoys of Uruguay in the different negotiation groups and commissions embody the representation of the ideas of Uruguay, and their reinforcement of an ideological change from 2005. This linked Uruguay to the other national governments which were largely formed by left-oriented parties. Hence, they constituted a 'cognitive community' as defined by Adler (2005).

Moreover, the signature of the treaty by President Vázquez and its ratification by the Uruguayan parliament positioned Uruguay as a crucial political actor for the region, as this was the ninth (out of twelve members) instrument required for the legal validation and international recognition of UNASUR.
This political move of the new Uruguayan government led by President Mujica also obtained support from some opposing parliamentarians of the National Party, and enabled Uruguay to play a relevant regional role in the new integration process. Uruguayan ratification of the treaty allowed this regional organisation to reach an international status and to project itself as the leading instrument of South American integration.

Hence, the actions of the national leaders of Uruguay and the ideology represented by the governing parties was in accord with the socialist-oriented tendency of the region during the period of signature and ratification of UNASUR, demonstrating both a high level of discussion and the influence exerted by the Uruguayan parliament in regional politics.

In contrast, the Ecuadorian legislative traditionally played a weaker role in the international politics of the state. The figure of the president and the tradition of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs gathered together the major influences on international relations.

Moreover, in Ecuador the constant violation of constitutional rules by both the executive and the legislative powers of the state reduced the legitimacy of the national parliament’s demand to participate in the design of foreign policies, until the introduction of the new Constitution of 2008 and the renovation of the political elite. As a consequence, there was a period prior to 2007 when the presidential figure and the legislative powers exerted only a low level of influence on regional politics.
However, since 2007, there has been a high level of influence of the presidential figure and governing party on regional policies. This phenomenon is related to the arrival of the present governing political party and its maintenance in power. This government and the corresponding political movement, Alianza Pais, adhere to a left-oriented ideology. They also joined the socialist-wave of South America, and the wave of regional integration on the basis of a political rather than of an economic perspective. Hence, the new Ecuadorian political elite became a part of the integrationist cognitive community.

On the one hand, these factors influencing the behaviour of Ecuador and Uruguay differ slightly from one another in the degree of continuity and stability of political ideology and in its implementation in their national and regional policies. On the other hand, the ideological tendency of a left-oriented regional politics began to merge from 2007. Both states prioritised socio-political policies instead of an economic or commercial related integration.

In the case of Ecuador, the reassertion of national sovereignty that involves the reassertion of South American belonging, the promotion of active multilateralism, the diversification of Ecuadorian exports and the support of the South–South cooperation, the promotion of environmental projects, the provision of protection to the Ecuadorian population living abroad by defending their rights, free mobility of the people and universal citizenship, and the support for Latin American integration all defined the Ecuadorian agenda for foreign affairs under the government of Alianza Pais, as already highlighted by Zepeda (2011).
From this point, a new era of Ecuadorian international relations began with the arrival of Alianza Pais and Rafael Correa to the government who are inclined to consider UNASUR to be an appropriate regional integration process for the achievement of the Ecuadorian objectives regionally and internationally.

Before coming to the last reflection of this analysis, it can be said that the influence of the left-wing wave in South America on the creation of UNASUR (Sanahuja, 2010) can be noted, in the case of Ecuador, mainly in the last stages of UNASUR’s creation process. In contrast, Uruguay demonstrated a higher level of activity prior to the signature of the UNASUR treaty in 2008 by supporting the Venezuelan left-oriented view, and transforming the focus of UNASUR into a socio-politically oriented institution.

Finally, the actions of these small states can also be characterised as reactions to tacit issues affecting the national-states in that period of regional financial crisis. From this point of view, their support for the consolidation of UNASUR reflects also a pragmatic move to coordinate policies for tackling regional issues that could not be resolved without collective action under previous diverging ideological perspectives. The affinity of the left governments of Ecuador and Uruguay with most of the socialist governments of the region appears to have facilitated common action, as in the case of signing common political statements.
5.4 Elements of Identity as Explanatory Factors for Ecuador’s and Uruguay’s Participation in the Creation and Consolidation of UNASUR

The idea of South American integration in infrastructure and communication, as stated in the protocols of the first meetings of the heads of state, is based on the argument of constructing a South American identity. This argument has been reinforced throughout a process of international expansion of this idea which has been supported by a consistent incorporation of new elements into a set of norms, identitarian features, values and beliefs. This set of norms, identitarian features, values and beliefs links the identities of the South American states with one another and enables them to be viewed as constituent parts of the regional identity.

This suggests that South America was not a homogeneous region at the beginning of the twenty-first century, despite the recognition of a set of norms, identitarian features, values and beliefs that has historically been shared by most of the South American states. The fact that the twelve South American heads of state and governments of South America met in Brasilia in 2000 for the first time in history shows the beginning of trust building as a basic principle for the fusion of shared identities into a collective regional one.

Moreover, the period of regional division, and enmity between neighbouring states ended only two years before the meeting of Brasilia in 1998 when Ecuador and Peru signed the Itamaraty Peace Treaty. These international political events demonstrate the lack of trust between the South American states right up to the end of the twentieth century, despite them sharing various elements of a collective identity.
Yet it is these shared characteristics that, according to Wendt (1999), drive like-minded states to find elements of identity that can help to construct a collective identity. This statement corresponds with the political situation of South America in 2000, where all South American states had democratically elected governments which enabled them to identify a variety of identitarian features that became part of the political argument for their interest in creating and consolidating a region.

Hence, the signature of the UNASUR treaty and its ratification by all member states have helped to expand the idea of a South American identity which has been promoted by the member states in various political, cultural and academic events.

Civil and academic events such as the first Students’ Congress for Integration, which took place in Uruguay in April 2012, and the South American Cinema Festival supported by UNASUR confirmed the existence of an instituted idea of such South American identity and strengthened the construction of the ‘we-ness’ as a basis for the collective South American identity.

The construction of the we-ness, or objective interdependence, appears as a process whereby small states have used their identitarian features, norms, values and beliefs to weigh up the appropriateness of international actions. In the cases studied here, figure 11 summarises the main identity factors underpinning the idea of a South American region and a new kind of cooperation.

Both small states, Ecuador and Uruguay have national constitutional norms binding them to the process of integration. At the same time, the main regional norms given
institutional form in the UNASUR treaty became another mandatory norm. These actions are fundamental characteristics of region-engaging states as suggested in chapter two.

**Figure 11. Identity as a factor influencing the decision-making process during the creation and consolidation of UNASUR**

The diagrams also show a set of identitarian features, values and beliefs that are summarised within an intersection point that connects Ecuador and Uruguay to UNASUR as a whole. Relevant features of identity are the shared history of being an ex-European colony, having a shared cultural background and similar language. Important values that are institutionalised as well as conceived as principles of the South American regional unity include the respect for sovereignty and the principle of
non-intervention, tolerance towards liberal thinking and democratic principles, the principles of solidarity and social justice, and the sense of belonging to the Latin and South American idea of unity. These factors have been the pillars of the formation of trust and objective interdependence in recent years within the framework of UNASUR.

As figure 11 illustrates, the cases studied here show various elements of the Ecuadorian and Uruguayan identity linked to the identitarian elements of the region conveyed in the UNASUR treaty. This embodiment of the elements of all twelve national identities within UNASUR has helped to consolidate the South American international community.

This international community shows the three conditions highlighted by Adler and Barnett (1998: 31). Firstly, the ‘shared identity, values and meanings’ are embodied in the set of norms, identitarian features, values and beliefs as demonstrated in the previous chapters and depicted in figure 11. All these factors demonstrate a high level of influence to the support given by Ecuador and Uruguay for the construction and consolidation of UNASUR.

Secondly, the ‘many-sided and direct relations’ (ibid) as suggested by Adler and Barnett (1998) took place, in the case of UNASUR, through the various meetings of presidents, ministers, councils, working groups, and academic and social projects developed through the civil society belonging to the member states, including Uruguay and Ecuador. Thirdly, ‘some degree of long-term’ (ibid) objectives are contained in the aims proposed by UNASUR and approved by the states, such as
the consolidation of South America as a zone of peace which has been supported by both cases studied here.

Those shared elements of identity have had a high level of influence in the behaviour of both case studies as demonstrated in the previous chapters and in figure 11. Both Ecuador and Uruguay have constitutional norms that legitimate the actions of governments in favour of the process of creating and consolidating UNASUR. This support for South American integration is consistent with the ratification of the UNASUR treaty by both small states, despite their different approaches in the decision-making process.

However, each state has its own particular features. These two states also show their own identitarian characteristics, related to their particular behaviour in international relations. While Uruguay demonstrates bargaining strategies and a well-debated process for the ratification of UNASUR, to the extent that small states can be characterised as smart small states (Grøn and Rogaczewka, 2013), Ecuador appears to have been driven by ideational elements such as a shared identity, shared ideology and spontaneous initiative.

Some of the further elements of such shared identity which have been noted as influencing the behaviour of Ecuador are the features of collective identity formally embodied in the UNASUR treaty. These comprise: shared historical background, shared culture and languages spoken, and the symbiosis of a shared ethnic and immigrant background as the result of being ex-European colonies.
Regarding the links of small states to the whole region, Ecuador portrays itself as reflecting the whole of South America on a reduced scale, as it contains one of the world’s most diverse communities in a geographically small territory. A group of diverse provinces, nationalities, ethnicities, cultures and languages are embedded in the Ecuadorian national-state. The idea that Ecuador is the prototype of South American diversity has been constantly promoted by the Ecuadorian authorities in recent years.

This idea reflects the idea of a holistic South American region, in the sense that the South American region also contains a diversity of national-states with their distinct cultural and linguistic identities, different political systems, and localised social, political and economic issues -which despite the diversity have shared a historical background and a shared ideal.

Hence, there are various links between the South American national-states that explain the support of Uruguay and Ecuador to the construction and consolidation of the South American region as shown in figure 11. All three categorised identititarian elements exert a high level of influence on the decision-making of both small states as mentioned above.

In the case of Ecuador, the process of political re-foundation of the state coincided with the institutionalisation of UNASUR and the creation of various councils and further institutions. This has facilitated the incorporation of related norms at the domestic level and at the regional level. As a result, Ecuador has developed an
agenda for its foreign policy which includes the revival of regional integration as a strategy of its international politics.

As shown in the other case study, Uruguay has aimed to maintain its traditional region-engaging character by drawing on identititarian features that it has historically shared with Argentina and Brazil, as well as with the other Latin American states. The shared language, culture and history, among others, are highlighted by the arguments for the support given to UNASUR. Particularly these three elements are links that connect Uruguay to Ecuador and underpin the communitarian view of political cooperation in the region.

The set of South American values and beliefs also connect both states with the whole region as shown in figure 11. Both Ecuador and Uruguay demonstrate they have been highly influenced by shared values such as the protection of liberal democratic institutions, respect for human rights, social justice, and solidarity among others. As suggested by Wendt (1999), this self-consciousness and the intersubjective understanding of the existence of a culture and values shared between political actors within an international political environment are the basis for the formation of a collective identity which can be noted in the case of Uruguay and Ecuador during their involvement in the process of the consolidation of UNASUR.

Although the identification and self-assurance provided by shared elements of a collective or regional identity rarely evolve in a short period of time, the historical background of Ecuador and Uruguay in connection to most South American states is an example of the presence of such development.
To define what political action is in the interest of individual nations requires, as suggested by Finnemore (1996), a process of weighing up and comparing identities, one with another. In this case, the process would include from 2000, when the idea of IIRSA was introduced by Brazil, up to 2011 when the major challenges to UNASUR’s consolidation were finally overcome and the UNASUR treaty came into force.

Finally, I will turn to the identification of extra-regional identities or agents that can also influence the behaviour of small states. These can also influence the way in which the states involved in various regional projects enact their roles (Nabers, 2011; Harnisch et al., 2011). In this analysis there are various cases of the influence of identities, but only a few are highlighted.

One case is that of the constant and consistent portrayal of Great Britain as the ‘other’ in declarations complaining of its imperial behaviour in the South Atlantic, and the geopolitical issues raised by its claim concerning the Falkland Islands. These declarations made in the name of UNASUR bear the stamp of approval of all the South American states, and illustrate how a depiction of the ‘other’ counter-posed to the ‘us’, can act as a signal to influence the behaviour of states and the role played by them (Harnisch et al., 2011).

Another case is based on the idea that the USA with its military and economic imposing presence in South America could also culturally influence the behaviour of not only small states in the area but also other states. The rejection of the FTAA
project, and the protest of both Ecuador and Uruguay against the installations of US military bases in Colombia can both be understood as a reinforcement of the idea of the ‘other’ as an identity which does not belong to the region.

Again an identity conflict within the member states may arise when they play various roles as members of various regional integration processes, as suggested by Harnisch et al. (2011), Breuning (2011), and Nabers (2011). In the case of UNASUR’s members this possible identity conflict and its influence on their role as members or leaders has been resolved during the process of construction of UNASUR by drawing on past experience as a means of self-awareness of the existence of a South American region.

The inclusion of CAN and MERCOSUR within UNASUR as important sources of the South American identity reduces the possibility of such identity conflict. At the same time, the long-term project of merging CAN and MERCOSUR can enable small states to maintain their individual identities as well.

For example, Ecuador’s membership of CAN, and Uruguay’s membership of MERCOSUR are sources of experience which can be put to good use in the framework of UNASUR. This suggests that small states may be able to adapt to, adopt and adapt a regional building project driven by identitarian factors.

In addition, this constant interaction of states shows the other condition for the formation of a community, namely the many-sided and direct relations between states (Adler & Barnett, 1998). This interaction enables states to identify common
issues, collectively develop projects and resolve shared issues. Indeed, the shared identity promoted within UNASUR facilitates the solution of controversies, as already shown in the case of Argentina and Uruguay, and in the case including Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela.

In contrast to small states within the European Union which required further efforts regarding language and communication for negotiation, these South American small states share a culture and language, with most of UNASUR's members. This further facilitates the flow of communication in the planning and conduct of common projects.

In the case of Uruguay, the experiences and culture shared with Argentina and Brazil have facilitated the harmonisation of the norms of the national Uruguayan health system with the systems of other members of UNASUR. In the case of Ecuador, the use of the Spanish language in the majority of meetings and negotiation tables have facilitated the participation of Ecuador as well as the relative successful performance as President Pro Tempore.

To summarise, the examples I have given (the way in which the principles of equality is practiced and roles are played) signal that the South American states have pursued mechanisms that enable them to go through a process of trust-building by adopting political dialogue as the means for resolving disputes between states. From the Wendtian explanatory perspective, these phenomena can be characterised as the fourth master variable that explains the construction of a collective identity, namely, self-restraint (Wendt, 1999: 357) which will be further clarified in the following section.
5.5 The Role Enactment, Influence and Cooperation of Ecuador and Uruguay within UNASUR

The study of Ecuador and Uruguay has shown that beyond the theoretical explanations, the analysis of each states’ domestic phenomena also enables an understanding of the behaviour of small states in international relations. The fact that each member of UNASUR is entitled to the role of President Pro Tempore for a period of one year, and so is also responsible for coordinating the council’s meetings, setting the agenda and representing the region in international forums, enables small states to play a prominent role in the region, as well as worldwide.

Yet each state differs in its approach, and its ability to fulfil such demands. Moreover, each state has developed a particular kind of identity which is linked to regional as well as to extra-regional identities, as mentioned above. So the behaviour, the role enactment and the preference of the kind of policies and projects to be prioritised might be influenced by such links (Harnisch et al., 2011).

In the cases of Ecuador and Uruguay, links to the regional identity are high, as denoted in the previous section. However, a possible change of behaviour and consequently of role cannot be predicted as the tendency to support or reject a certain kind of integration appears to be related to the kind of government in power in a similar way to the fluctuation of foreign policy in the other Latin American states, as suggested by Gardini and Lambert (2010).

In the case of both Ecuador and Uruguay, the support given to the construction and consolidation of UNASUR is not only related to the ideology of the president and
party in government, but also shows a great affinity with the regional political tendencies, as shown in figure 11.

Moreover, the traditional region-engaging character of Uruguay, and its historical stable domestic and foreign policy offer a reduced space for role change. In contrast to Uruguay, the Ecuadorian historical background can frustrate any prediction of a role change owing to its unsettled politics and weak institutions as highlighted above.

However, the high level of identitarian ties which Ecuador has with the region has had considerable influence on its behaviour, to the extent that the old relationship with the USA has suffered and support for the South American regional integration process has increased.

Furthermore, the framework for cooperation within UNASUR offers many opportunities to small states, such as the role of President *Pro Tempore*. For many scholars of small states studies, the fact of being a small state and being a member of a regional international organisation already has value added in its favour (Goetschel, 1998; Hey, 2003; Wivel, 2010).

All the same, the membership does not guarantee that all small states will be able to coordinate, cooperate, influence and play the role of member and President *Pro Tempore* as expected by the other member states. But, the principle of complementarity and communitarian cooperation enables fellow states to support each other in fulfilling this role.
This kind of cooperation embodies the principle of communitarianism within UNASUR, as the existing asymmetries between states do not enable competition. Their asymmetries stimulate them to complement each other in order to define the common interest, agree on policies for all and find resolutions for collective issues. This kind of cooperation shows that the exercise of self-restraint as a condition for the construction of the collective identity.

These principles also enable weaker small states to coordinate common policies and projects without being concerned they will be overpowered by the responsibility of coordinating the projects and policies of UNASUR, as support of fellow member states can be requested in order to tackle issues affecting the international community.

The historical context within which UNASUR was created has also facilitated the construction of a unique regional international organisation that equips small states with the same constitutional roles as the larger states.

Historical factors at play here are firstly that this is a democratic region governed by a democratically elected government despite the differences in their approach to governance. Secondly, all the small states have actively participated in the design of the type of integration. The construction of the South American region has also obtained wider support from Ecuador than the FTAA project since 2006. As might be expected, there was also a new affinity within the new Ecuadorian political elite with the South American project. This civil support given to the new Ecuadorian political
elite has also enhanced the performance of Ecuador as a signatory, member and President *Pro Tempore* of UNASUR.

The region-engaging character of Ecuador was also reinforced by the maintenance of the principle of equal rights in the decision-making process of the policies and projects within UNASUR. Moreover, articles 7, 12, 13, and 14 of the UNASUR treaty further guaranteed Ecuador the opportunity to lead the South American region from 2009 to 2010.

These norms enable a small state to share responsibility with every state despite their respective material sizes. This kind of cooperation represents a new way of building trust.

The challenge for small states in this context lies in their ability to coordinate, cooperate, identify and propose policies and projects that contain common issues in order that the trust deposited in each member state can mature and develop into a (security) cohesive community.

The attempted *coup d'état* in Ecuador, in September 2010 and the institutional crisis in Paraguay, in June 2012, showed that the challenge to the small states in UNASUR is not the power differences between the fellow member states. The challenge for the small states is the weakness of their democratic institutions, which can also endanger the political stability of the whole region. This is due to the fact that half of the member states of UNASUR are small states.
In its six years of existence, UNASUR has had six Presidents *Pro Tempore*. Four small states have led the region, namely Ecuador from 2009 to 2010, Guyana from 2010 to 2011, Paraguay from 2011 to 2012, and Surinam 2013 to the present. However, in the cases of Ecuador and Paraguay not only the democracy of the state was endangered, but also the international institutions of the whole region.

It can be seen that the implications of the post of President *Pro Tempore* are that it enables a small state to play the role of leader of the region within UNASUR, and this role also offers small states the possibility of placing their issues on the agenda of projects and discussions.

**Figure 12. Coordination, cooperation and role enactment within UNASUR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Role of President <em>Pro Tempore</em></th>
<th>Member of UNASUR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case study</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECUADOR</td>
<td>● President <em>Pro Tempore</em> (H)</td>
<td>● Member of the CSD (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URUGUAY</td>
<td>● President <em>Pro Tempore</em> (·)</td>
<td>● Member of the CSD (M)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Interpreted levels = (H)=High  (M)=Medium  (L)=Low  (·)=Not assumed yet*

Figure 12 shows two possibilities in the region-engaging role of a small state: as President *Pro Tempore* and as a member of UNASUR. Ecuador as illustrated in figure 12 has already enacted the role of President Pro Tempore of UNASUR and as a member also shows a high input into the construction of the region. Hence, it can
be said that the role of President *Pro Tempore* enables small states to have a higher prominence in the construction and consolidation of the region.

Ecuador demonstrated a higher involvement in the issues of the region during its period as president of UNASUR despite the internal challenges such as the attempted *coup d’état* in 2010 and the diplomatic impasses with Colombia and the USA. Moreover, the role of President *Pro Tempore* enabled Ecuador to coordinate and lead the South American aid to Haiti in the name of UNASUR following the earthquake that destroyed the main physical structure of Port-au-Prince in January 2010.

The role of President *Pro Tempore* played by Ecuador has also shown that UNASUR as a community supports small states when they have to confront domestic and exterior challenges. The immediate reaction to and condemnation of the attempted *coup d’état* in Ecuador show that UNASUR as a regional actor was able to counter such events. The reaction of UNASUR during and after the *coup d’état* attempt on 30 September 2010 brought Ecuador back to conclude its mandate as President *Pro Tempore* of UNASUR as well as to strengthen the democratic institutions in Ecuador.

Comparing the Ecuadorian role to the Uruguayan one, it can be seen that Uruguay shows a medium level of engagement in the areas of cooperation within UNASUR following the signature of the UNASUR treaty. However, this disparity can be related to the fact that Uruguay has not yet played the role of President *Pro Tempore*, and its role is restricted to the quality of member state.
Nevertheless, Uruguay’s support given to the consolidation of UNASUR by ratifying the treaty is based on the actions of traditional region-engaging small states, and it can also be related to the discourse of collective identity expanded throughout the process of constructing UNASUR. These arguments support the general proposition that membership in international regional organisations can be particularly beneficial for small states.

However, as noted by Goetschel (1998), membership can also restrict the autonomy of the small state, forcing them to develop strategies to put forward their own most relevant issues as the priority of the region. Ecuador’s prioritised campaign for the ratification of the UNASUR treaty enabled it to obtain more support and reciprocity during its diplomatic impasse with Colombia. It would seem from this that small states need to focus on strategic areas of national and regional common interest in order to find direct support and expand their influence within the region, as well as beyond it.

Furthermore, as shown in the case of Ecuador, the reforms of the structure of the national state can also enable a small state to harmonise the national with the regional norms and interests in order to expand its areas of influence. This kind of strategy has been combined with hosting the headquarters of international organisations in the territory of the small state.

The installation of the permanent General Secretariat in Quito embodies a significant strategy of Ecuador, for the state as well as for the region. Firstly, it positions the
symbolical value of the newly created union in a country that was dominated by an extra-regional force until 2009, when the US army withdrew. Secondly, hosting the General Secretariat of UNASUR can impact on the national as well as on the international perception of Ecuador as an international actor. Thirdly, the presence of the headquarters of UNASUR, which includes larger states such as Brazil and Argentina, represents not only the increase in Ecuador’s geopolitical value, but it also motivates an urban regeneration of the area where the headquarters is placed.

Finally, the presence of the General Secretariat in Quito facilitates direct contact and involvement of the Ecuadorian people with one of the main institutions that represents the whole South American region, enabling them to be direct constructors of the South American identity. President Correa’s speech during the celebration of the beginning of the construction of the headquarters in 2011 refers to this as a signal that ‘reflects the emblematic longing for union and integration of our countries’ (Presidente Correa, 2011).

In this context, some of UNASUR’s particular objectives, such as consolidating the region as a zone of peace and supporting the consolidation of democratic institutions, have been perceived by Ecuadorian political actors as factors that are also of special interest for Ecuador due to its recent history of insecurity and instability.

In contrast, the case of Uruguay shows a lower performance than Ecuador. This strengthens the proposition that the nature of the international system’s structure can strengthen or constrain the region-engaging character of a small state. Uruguay, as
one of the states that has not obtained the role of President Pro Tempore, has not had the same opportunity as Ecuador in this process. Hence, its actions are limited to the role of UNASUR member as shown in figure 12.

Nevertheless, the region-engaging character of Uruguay and its role enactment as a member of UNASUR has been clarified by looking at its participation and input into the projects, regulations, norms and declarations that Uruguay has agreed to develop to fulfil UNASUR’s objectives.

According to Article 13 of the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR 2008, all the union’s regulations, the creation of new institutions and the execution of communitarian projects require discussion, coordination, and, under the consensus clause, the agreement of all parties. It is within this process of presenting, discussing and coordinating initiatives that the common collective interest is defined.

During the process of the creation and consolidation of UNASUR, Uruguayan behaviour has neither been driven by the force of an international system in which Uruguay, as a small state, was a prisoner (as was the case in its membership of MERCOSUR) (Fernández, 2012), nor was Uruguay merely opportunistic in its participation, as some would suggest. The fact that the foundation of UNASUR was revised and adapted within the Commission of High Representatives of all South American states, in which Uruguay was a major actor, shows the region-engaging role of Uruguay as an active UNASUR member.
In another way UNASUR presents further opportunities that can be utilised by the so
called ‘smart small states’ (Grøn & Rogaczewka, 2013), which would create
strategies to persuade their fellow member states to adhere to their initiative. This
strategy is available to all member states of UNASUR.

In the case of Uruguay, discussions about alternatives to amicably resolve the
commercial conflicts with Argentina were opportunities employed by Uruguay, as
UNASUR had already shown its potential for the pacific resolution of disputes in
previous cases, such as the diplomatic impasse of Ecuador and Colombia in 2008
and the internal destabilisation of the democratic system in Bolivia, also in 2008.

Ecuador, for example, was not able to plan and apply a foreign policy before 2007
due to its political instability, the lack of continuity of its governments, and the low
professionalisation of its civil servants. As a result, it can be argued that smart small
states may primarily be smart in their interior organisation in order to maintain a
higher level of stability, continuity and professionalisation of the civil service in order
to perform a smart international role.

A further important insight as a result of this study is that an international regional
organisation created on the basis of an equalitarian and communitarian cooperation
can enable small states to contribute more to the strengthening of the international
community.

The role played by Ecuador and Uruguay in the Creation of the South American
Defence Council (CSD) can support this argument. The Ecuadorian leading role in
the consolidation of the South American Defence Council and in the process of expanding international awareness of the idea of South America as a zone of peace while holding the Presidency Pro Tempore are examples of the contribution of a small state to the consolidation of the region. In this particular case, the idea of a South American identity in defence was utilised as one of their collective aims.

Despite the possible constraints that present historical principles such as self-determination and sovereignty, Ecuador and Uruguay appear to have flexibilised such traditional values and adapted themselves to the new idea of balancing autonomy and influence.

Ecuador's role as host of the General Secretariat of UNASUR has possibly opened up an opportunity to exert more influence. In contrast, Uruguay's role as member state has maintained its traditional region-engaging character in the form of an honest agent in order to maintain its international profile. This profile can be further strengthened during the enactment of its role as President Pro Tempore in the period 2014-2015.

During this whole process, the transformation of the character of Ecuador from pro-US American to pro-South American in the last seven years seems to have demonstrated that identity can be a main factor influencing the decision-making process of small states. This claim can be supported by the arguments presented by Uruguay about their own decision to confirm the UNASUR treaty.
This idea of a South American identity is manifest in all the councils created within UNASUR. In the cases studied here, the establishment of the CSD is a major mechanism which can help convert South America into a zone of peace on the basis of the idea of a South American identity.

At the same time, this process seems to have supported the transformation of a region of little wars (Sánchez, 2011) into a region that aims to consolidate the idea of a zone of peace. As shown in chapter 3, Ecuador has been an arena of coup d’états, military conflicts and constant civil unrest.

Hence, the will to change a culture of insecurity can also be considered as an influential factor on the behaviour of Ecuador in the construction of a more cohesive South American region through UNASUR on the basis that UNASUR promotes a zone of peace, respect for democratic institutions and political stability.

Ecuador used to lack these very elements, as shown in chapter 3. As examples of this permanent insecurity can be included the border conflicts with Peru, and the threat portrayed by the possibilities of the Colombian conflict with the FARC spilling over into Ecuadorian territory.

However, the new friendly relationship between Ecuador and Peru, following the signature of the peace treaty of 1998, shows the fourth and most important master variable for the construction of collective identity, the practice of self-restraint, that is, the abandonment of violence as means of the settlement of conflict (Wendt, 1999). This same idea has been promoted and formally accepted within the CSD, which
aims to promote the zone of peace and the South American identity in defence. In this way, the perspective of constructing a 'we-feeling' has been promoted in various forms by the Ecuadorian state and strengthened through its engagement in the creation of the CSD.

In contrast to the Ecuadorian case, Uruguay has had a low level of vulnerability in the area of security, despite its relative smallness and geopolitical position, in the period prior to the signature of the UNASUR treaty. This is related in the first place to its relatively stable relationship with its neighbours. Secondly, Uruguay does not appear to have been directly influenced by extra-regional forces, as in the case of Ecuador. At the same time, Uruguay’s membership in MERCOSUR, which was already considered as an emerging security community before the beginning of the twenty-first century (Hurrell, 1998), portrays Uruguay as less vulnerable to extra-regional influences.

Finally, the outcomes of the study of Ecuador and Uruguay have also helped to demonstrate why UNASUR cannot be considered as a security community in the terms considered by Adler and Barnett (1998). Firstly, Ecuador has about 11,000 soldiers on the border with Colombia occupied in constant patrol, due to the contact with the Colombian militia. These are repelled by the Colombian military forcing the conflict to spill over the borders. This phenomenon of insecurity also affecting neighbouring states has increased in violence since the beginning of the century, the mistrust between Ecuador and Colombia reaching its highest level in March 2008, while Brazil was promoting the creation of the South American Defence Council as mentioned in the previous chapter.
This use of violence by Colombian forces in Ecuadorian territory in March 2008 is one of many events that show that the South American region does not demonstrate the basic conditions for considering the region as a security community, as one of such requirements is the absence of military forces at the borders of states, and the abandonment of violence for the settlement of conflicts (Adler & Barnett, 1998).

All the same, there are at least three fundamental indications that the South American region can develop into a security community. First, the settlement of the historical border conflicts between Ecuador and Peru has developed into a successful project of peaceful transition from enmity into friendship, not only at the level of the states’ interrelationship but also between the two civil societies. The mutual civil projects on the Ecuadorian-Peruvian border concerning infrastructure, health and education can be considered as a success, following the signature of the Peace Treaty of Itamaraty in 1998.

Secondly, the creation of UNASUR has enabled all South American states to start projects of cooperation at various levels of the state as well as between the civil societies. The creation of twelve councils and various adjacent institutions in the period up to 2012 also shows an intensive and rapid development into a homogenous international community.

Thirdly, the creation of the South American Defence Council has enabled all South American states to hold dialogue and build trust, to make transparent their military assets and investments, and develop security projects between the military of all
states, cooperating at various levels of the field of security, and demonstrating willingness for the development of a zone of peace.

With all the above in mind, this investigation has considered UNASUR not as a security community at present, but as an international community based on a principle of communitarian cooperation, and which in future can develop into a security community.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter initially highlighted the argument that Ecuador and Uruguay could be characterised as region-engaging small states. The support they gave to the construction and consolidation of UNASUR is not the only way in which they fulfil the description of the region-engaging small state. Both Ecuador and Uruguay have also contributed in shaping the organisational structure of UNASUR.

In this context, Uruguay can also be considered as a smart small state, as a state that develops strategies to shape common policies and expand its own influence internationally. This characteristic is related firstly to the suggestion that politically stable small states are more able to influence international relations and project themselves regionally as well as globally. Uruguay has shown this characteristic by strategically supporting Venezuela in the efforts to change the original market-related integration, as envisaged by the Brazilian initiative, into a socio-politically oriented regional integration process based on communitarian cooperation.
Secondly, smart small states not only identify opportunities offered by the structure of the organisation but also develop strategies that would benefit the whole community. Uruguay’s timely approval of the UNASUR treaty enabled it to play the role of crucial actor (region-engaging actor) in the consolidation of UNASUR and, at the same time, enabled the whole region to possess a legally binding international regional organisation that represents all twelve South American states.

Ecuador also fits into the category of smart state, and therefore into the type of region-engaging small state, since it not only offered to host the General Secretariat of UNASUR, but also campaigned to obtain the ratification of the UNASUR treaty in order to consolidate the region. In relation to these actions, these cases confirmed the general proposition that regional international organisations can be sources of international influence for small states.

In addition, this study has shown that the kind of structure administering international organisations also influences the behaviour of the small state. An inclusive institutionalised regional organisation gives an incentive to small states to participate in, and to contribute more effort to the consolidation of the region. In this way, Ecuador has played a more prominent role than Uruguay, as Ecuador has already held the role of President Pro Tempore.

Two more important factors have also influenced both Ecuador and Uruguay in the process of consolidation of UNASUR. One is ideology; a left-oriented view of the national and regional policies has reinforced the region-engaging character of Uruguay, as many of its policies are included in the main objectives of UNASUR.
Ecuador joined this wave in 2007 when President Correa came to power and its position was strengthened following a constitutional change. This national political adjustment enabled the new Ecuadorian National Assembly to ratify the treaty of the UNASUR.

The final factor is identity. The various elements of identity are embedded in the whole UNASUR project. The formation of a South American identity is not only a historical concept employed in political debate in both Ecuador and Uruguay. It also reflects the circumstances of these South American small states which have a historically shared culture, language, as well as values and beliefs with most of the other South American states. From this it follows that identity is a major factor that helps to explain the support given by Ecuador and Uruguay to the creation and consolidation of UNASUR.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

6.1 Introduction

This study has had two aims. One is conveyed generally by the heuristic question, why have Ecuador and Uruguay supported the creation and consolidation of UNASUR? The second is related to the underpinning theoretical guide for this study, namely, has identity influenced the decision-making process of these small states in the process of creating and strengthening UNASUR?

The first section of this chapter summarises the result of the study and presents some answers to these questions obtained from this investigation. The second section evaluates the theoretical guide employed in this study as well as the methodology. The final section makes some suggestions for further investigations in the area of small state studies.

6.2 Reasons for Ecuadorian and Uruguayan Engagement in UNASUR: More than Shared Elements of a Collective Identity?

The study has helped to illustrate that Ecuador and Uruguay, as international political actors in the particular case and time-frame of creating and consolidating UNASUR from 2000 to 2012, can be considered as region-engaging small states.

Both Ecuador and Uruguay have fulfilled the criteria for the character of small states as region-engaging agents as suggested in figure 1 from chapter 2. These South American small states can be considered as region-engaging as they have
voluntarily cooperated with other South American states by signing and ratifying the UNASUR treaty, and have assumed the international role of general member. Ecuador has played the role of President *Pro Tempore* leading towards leadership and Uruguay is expecting to enact this role in the coming months.

Both states can be said to have voluntarily participated in and organised collective projects within the framework of UNASUR, in order to construct and strengthen this regional international organisation and strengthen South American identity, despite the fact that what constitutes a voluntary action by a state can be the object of subjective interpretation.

The use and the international expansion of the idea of a collective regional identity within the UNASUR framework has enabled Ecuador to link its regional politics to the domestic ones in order to overcome a period of increasing security threats to its national security, threats it expected to minimise by acting in conjunction with similar minded states. These issues include threats to political stability and democracy at a domestic level, and to the national sovereignty by international agents.

Here, the idea of a collective identity, and the idea of a new international forum that prioritises political dialogue for the resolution of conflicts, both driven by the UNASUR project, seem to have impacted on governments. It could be said, therefore, that Ecuador changed its preference for a pro-US policy in favour of a South American-oriented integration policy. In this respect the study has demonstrated that elements of the self-identity of Ecuador and the identity of the
South American region, conceived as identitarian factors, have played a fundamental role.

However, further reasons such as disenchantment with the old economic mechanisms of cooperation, the new perspectives offered by roles of President *Pro Tempore* of UNASUR and the new type of political communitarian cooperation have also influenced the change in political approach of Ecuador to the creation and consolidation of UNASUR.

The region-engaging character of Uruguay is based also on traditional principles of international cooperation and construction of international norms, and for institutionalisation in international organisations which are the lever for political international engagement. Shared elements of identity are not the only major influential factor in the Uruguayan decision-making process in order to support the consolidation of UNASUR. Its traditional professionalisation of the administration of the state seems to have swayed Uruguay into making strategic decisions based on a clear bargaining strategy.

Nevertheless, the links between identitarian elements in both case studies and the elements portraying the South American collective identity can be considered as strong factors that connect each to each other and to the whole region. Hence, identity has played a fundamental role in both cases in their support for the formation of UNASUR.
Another common factor between the cases is contained in the similar ideological tendency of the left-wing governments of both small states, and their prioritisation of social policies, and of common projects related to security and infrastructure instead of economic-commercially related integration.

The realisation of the danger of worsening their socio-economic situation through using lightly regulated international free trade as a vehicle for regional integration has influenced both states in favour of the creation and consolidation of UNASUR. This is connected with the poor satisfaction of both small states with the economic mechanism of cooperation and integration in CAN, ALADI and MERCOSUR respectively.

Small states’ economic cooperation on the basis of free trade and market competition with economically stronger states, can be either a risky, short-lived event that could lead to negative outcomes, or an egoistic, self-interested action by certain agents that aims for long term benefits, in which the South American small states, due to their comparatively underdeveloped and poor economies, are not able to compete.

This study has also further elucidated the differences between these two small states. Political stability and the protection of democratic institutions are some of the factors of comparison. Ecuador, being more vulnerable to political instability, sees UNASUR as a lever for positioning its national objectives regionally and beyond, and at the same time for constructing a state of peace. Uruguay views the signing and
ratifying of the UNASUR treaty as a way of avoiding isolation and of obtaining the right to act in regional politics.

Moreover, extra-regional forces have influenced both small states. Here, Ecuador showed more vulnerability to external factors due to its old ties to the USA, and to a variety of border conflicts with its neighbouring states. The role of leader of the region as President Pro Tempore of UNASUR offers small states the possibility to reduce such disparities.

In summary, the role of President Pro Tempore is a further important factor which has influenced the behaviour of Ecuador and Uruguay during the consolidation of UNASUR. There are various reasons for this. First, such a role enables small states to take a lead in the region. It also allows them to request support from large or medium states, or, conversely to offer support to them; in both cases, this reinforces the principle of complementary.

Secondly, the principle of equality through the consensus clause generates trust between large and small states. Third, these structural characteristics distinguish UNASUR’s practice from other methods of integration in the region, and make UNASUR unique in that it supports the equal participation of small states in the design and decision-making of regional politics.

In this study Ecuador demonstrates a higher level of involvement in the political construction of the region compared with Uruguay, as Ecuadorian security issues regarding the presence of US military bases in the region, and the diplomatic rupture
with Colombia became a major concern to digest while being the President Pro Tempore of UNASUR and consolidating the institutionalisation of the South American Defence Council.

For these reasons, Ecuador’s enactment of the role of President Pro Tempore enabled it to play a more prominent role in the process of consolidating the South American region, while Uruguay is soon to obtain this role and will have similar possibilities open as leader of the process for the period of a year.

This suggests that the principles of equality through the rotating enactment of roles and functions within a regional international organisation enable small states to contribute more for the benefit of the whole as well as to expand their influence regionally and beyond.

Finally, the introduction of the consensus clause in the decision-making process provides evidence of acceptance of the principle of equality and respect for the national sovereignty of all member states. It creates trust between the member states and empowers small states, as they have the potential to oppose policies and projects that could affect their national interest. Hence, a modification of the decision-making process that weakens the consensus clause would diminish the competence of small states to direct the destiny of UNASUR.

6.3 Reflections on the Theoretical Approach and Methodology

The theoretically related aim of this study was not to test a theory, but to employ theoretical elements as a guide to the understanding of the actions or inactions of
the subjects of the two case studies and their motivations in the process of region construction.

The combination of three constructivist theoretical views: Wendt’s (1999) social constructivism, Adler and Barnett’s (1998), security communities, complemented with elements of the role theory in international relations of Harnisch et al. (2011) and Nabers (2011) facilitated the interpretation of the empirical data in congruence with the theoretical explanations at a general, medium and specific level.

Furthermore, the combination of such elements enabled this study to maintain a coherent path of investigation, which is challenging to maintain when employing interpretative case study methodologies. The use of identity as the central focus of the investigation, with the flexibility of searching for further relevant factors that may have influenced the behaviour of the agents also allowed the development of a coherent set of ideas that facilitated an understanding of the region-engaging role of Ecuador and Uruguay.

The employment of an interpretative approach enabled me also to follow an investigative historical path and interpret the data in close relation to theory and find the story-line of the political events across the process, which is more difficult when using competing methodologies in the study of international politics. So, theory-related investigation not only guided the construction of the framework for this study, it also enabled a drawing of conclusions in connection with the theoretical precepts.
In the first place, the three main steps illustrated in the emerging constructivist framework facilitated the understanding of the historical political events antecedent to the creation of UNASUR. Secondly, the central focus on the links between national and regional identity enabled an understanding on the influence of agents to the structure, and vice versa, and also helped overcome the agent-structure dilemma of studying international relations.

The third step was related to the enactment of international roles, namely member and leader, by Ecuador and Uruguay in UNASUR. For an understanding of this, the combination of the theoretical explanations contained in Adler and Barnett's (1998) security communities with the theoretical explanations of role theory (Harnisch *et al.*, 2011; Nabers, 2011) facilitated a view of the role enactment and actions of Ecuador and Uruguay from a theoretical perspective which was intertwined with the main factor of explanation, namely identity.

The effects of identity on role change were only indirectly considered in this study, and this owes itself to the fact that the focus of this study was not necessarily on role change as Harnisch *et al.* (2011) and Nabers’ (2011) work aim to show. However, the direction of their thoughts has been important to understand both the material and ideational influences of larger and stronger states on smaller ones.

Regarding the case study methodology, there are further relevant aspects of the role played by Ecuador and Uruguay in UNASUR that are related to the application of a case study methodology. For instance, the categorisation of small states during the process of integration as region-engaging, region-constraining and region-adapting
has enabled this study to place Ecuador and Uruguay into the category of region-engaging South American small states.

The review of the literature has been a fundamental source from which to infer that small states could be classified in this way on the basis of their behaviour in a regional international organisation or integration project, despite the fact that international organisations as well as states possess their distinct histories, identities, issues, aims and motivations.

The classification into types of small states has been relevant for this study to the extent that it has facilitated the selection of the case studies according to established selection methodologies, which also enabled comparison (Gerry, 2007, 2008; George and Bennett, 2005), despite the fact that this study did not necessarily follow a positivist approach. Nevertheless, there are important tools in the positivist as well as in the interpretative approach to knowledge, that can be used alternately and as complementary tools, such as case selection methodologies supporting positivism and the historical description supported by interpretivism.

Despite this, mainly elements of the interpretative approach have been used in this study and they have enabled clearer inferences to be drawn from the single case analysis as well as from comparison. The complexity of a historical process appears to be less challenging to explain when using a theoretical explanation as a guide, and an in-depth study of each case supported by interpretative case studies facilitated the delving into the particulars of the historical process.
6.4 Final remarks

The field of small state studies is experiencing its come-back period as researchers began to consider that 'size matters' in international relations and 'it is now time for a true dialogic relationship between big and small' (Smith, 2005: iii). However, the distance small state studies will have to travel in order to catch up with the other main fields of IR is a long one, but the academic delay is what makes this prospect attractive, as most of the field has not yet been exploited.

For instance, a comprehensive edition that collates and reproduces the history and development of this area of studies, and complements Ingebritsen’s et al. (2006) work is required. Indeed, there is a need for cumulative academic work that also develops a cohesive and consistent academic agenda. The material for the conduct of more investigative work already exists, as most of the states of the globe could be characterised as small states, and each decade more small states are created.
Appendix 1. Primary data and project’s information

This appendix contains the list of interviewees and political speeches which have been organised according to case study, place and time of the recordings.

Case study Ecuador

Interviewees

4. Jacques Ramírez, Dean of the School of International Relations of the Instituto de Altos Estudios Nacionales (IAEN), Quito: 12 February 2012.

Political Speeches

4. President Rafael Correa, Ceremonia de Traspaso de la Presidencia Pro Tempore de la UNASUR. Quito: 10 de agosto de 2009.
5. President Rafael Correa, Sesión de Trabajo en Solidaridad con Hiati – UNASUR, Quito: 9 de febrero de 2010
6. President Rafael Correa, Discurso para la Cumbre de Parlamentos de UNASUR. Quito: 14 de junio de 2010.
7. President Rafael Correa, IV Cumbre de Poderes Judiciales de Países UNASUR. Cuenca: 23 de junio de 2010.
8. President Rafael Correa, Primera Piedra de la Sede Permanente UNASUR. Quito: 11 de marzo de 2011.
9. President Rafael Correa, VI Reunión del Consejo de Jefes y Jefas de Estado y de Gobierno de la UNASUR. Lima: 30 de noviembre de 2012.
11. Carlos Larrea, Main Officer of SENPLADES, La Visión y Misión del Ecuador Vista a la UNASUR como un nuevo Desafío en la Integración Suramericana. Quito: 19 de junio de 2012.

Case Study Uruguay

Interviewees

1. President Jorge Batlle, El rol de Uruguay en la UNASUR. Montevideo: 10 de mayo de 2012.
2. Luis Almagro, Foreign Minister, El rol de Uruguay en la UNASUR. Montevideo: 30 de abril de 2012.
3. Varela, N. Sub-director of Political Affairs at the Foreign Ministry, El rol de Uruguay en la UNASUR. Montevideo: 10 de mayo de 2012.
4. Ope Pasquet, Senator, El role de Uruguay en la UNASUR. Montevideo: 4 de mayo de 2012.

Political Speeches

2. President José Mujica, Nominación de Ex-Presidente Kirchner como Primer Secretario General de UNASUR. Los Cardales-Argentina: 04 de mayo de 2010.
Appendix 2. Data Collection Procedure and Development throughout the Investigation.

Initially, this investigation intended to be based mainly on data collected through personal semi-structured interviews of members of the elite from the sectors of economy and politics from both Ecuador and Uruguay. I had a personal contact with a civil servant who at that time, 2010-2011, was working at the Ecuadorian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and therefore I thought I would be able to have access to a considerable number of interviewees, as I also contacted various Ecuadorian universities which have close relations with politicians in the Ecuadorian government. In the case of Uruguay, I was put into contact with an Uruguayan ex-PhD student who had studied in the UK and who had personal contact with people in the Uruguayan parliament and with ex-members of the Uruguayan government.

Firstly, I contacted some of the Ecuadorian politicians by email to request a personal interview including the President of the Commission for Foreign Affairs of the
Ecuadorian National Assembly, the Ex-minister of Foreign Affairs who at that time was the Secretary of National Planning and the Sub-secretary for Foreign Affairs who was responsible for the area of integration. However, I did not obtain any positive responses until I started making telephone calls or visiting the offices following the advice of a sub-secretary who gave me an interview at the early stages of the fieldwork. During this process, I was offered and appointed the role of an Advisor to the Ecuadorian National Assembly for a few months. I had two reasons for accepting this appointment, one was the possibility to build up a network for obtaining interviewees and the other was the possibility to see the political dynamics of a country were I was born but had left 18 years previously.

This appointment enabled me to have a clear insight into the actual politics and the tensions within political classes and the different members of the elite, from the field of economy, and newly created political groups such as the Alianza País which had been governing in Ecuador for the last four years. This also helped me to understand that it was extremely difficulty to obtain interviews and information from Ecuadorian politicians. Firstly, the level of mistrust and secrecy was extremely high due to the fact that Ecuador was going through a very sensitive stage of recovery after political instability following an attempted coup d’état still under investigation. Dozens of injured people and seven deaths was the consequence of this attempted coup d’état. Hundreds of members of the police and various politicians were on trial. Hence, politicians preferred not to offer interviews.

At this time the National Assembly had a special military guard instead of the official National Police that is usually responsible, some of the members of the parliament were assigned special military guards, and the main institutions of the executive and legislative house had declared a period of special security measures. Hence, interviewing members of the political elite from the Ecuadorian government was extremely difficult despite the fact that my manager in the National Assembly belonged to the same political group that was governing the country. The interviews I obtained were more due to luck and persistence, and these were only possible later in the process of gathering other kinds of data, such as archived documents and political speeches.

The decision to collect this extra data was also based on the realisation that the interviews were largely not possible until half way through the field trip, and that there was little secondary literature written about the role of small states, Ecuador and Uruguay, in the formation and consolidation of the UNASUR. Hence, it was necessary to collect primary data which could provide me with information about what was agreed, and also about the arguments given by politicians in the political debates as well as to the public in the corresponding public speeches.

Moreover, some Ecuadorian politicians did not keep their word as many of them did not give me the interviews even after accepting my invitation. Nevertheless, the good relationship built with some civil servants and advisors from the government and academia directed me to the department of communication and media where most of the documents were in the process of being up-loaded due to a new legal mandate. Many documents were still in the digital archives of the institutions, but the majority were obtained from the websites mentioned in the second chapter of this study.
Similarly, the political speeches were downloaded from the website of the Ecuadorian presidency.

Finally, during the fieldwork, only three of the Ecuadorian interviewees were still working for the government, including the Ecuadorian Foreign Minister, who a year later agreed to an interview in the Ecuadorian Consulate in England. The other interviewees were ex-civil servants from the government, for example the Chief Executive Advisor of UNASUR. Many of the contacted politicians had left their roles during my field-work and various politicians who I had contacted offered me interviews but turned them down at the last minute.

This was different in the case of Uruguay and the politicians contacted there. Most of the politicians who I contacted through the Uruguayan student, and also through a contact of a colleague from my appointment at the Ecuadorian National Assembly, were able to give me an interview. They showed considerable interest in my research, with some of them asking for the list of questions to be sent in advance, and most of them giving me more time than requested for the interview. Moreover, they directed me to the websites were they archive their original documents of the debates in both chambers, the Senate and the House of Representatives. It was also clear that members of the Uruguayan political elite showed a sense of organisation, more political professionalism and experience than was evident with the Ecuadorian political elite.

Despite these differences between the members of the political elite of the two states, similar main questions were asked to both groups of interviewees. The following table shows the central guiding questions asked to the interviewees. These guiding questions were complemented with short and often spontaneous questions which arose according to the development of the interview.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of central questions</th>
<th>Time in minutes</th>
<th>Topic and Questions</th>
<th>Reference to Interview Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5-10</td>
<td></td>
<td>Presentación personal. Introducción, Síntesis y Propósito de la Investigación</td>
<td>This should be general and according to the interviewee. The level of language and purpose of the investigation are directed to the main elements of what the interviewer wants to find out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2-5</td>
<td>Preguntar al entrevistada/o si tiene preguntas/comentarios ¿Tiene alguna pregunta?</td>
<td>The reasons for this are that the interviewee might not be sure about the purpose of the interview or might have other questions that might be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>5-10</td>
<td>La integración, regionalización y la UNASUR. ¿Cuál es su concepción y cuáles son los avances más importantes?</td>
<td>Relevant aspects of this topics are the concepts, its understanding, views and definitions by the interviewee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>5-10</td>
<td>La función de estados pequeños en la regionalización/ El rol de Ecuador/Uruguay en la UNASUR ¿Ecuador &amp; Uruguay, que rol tienen estos estados en la formación de la UNASUR? ¿Es la UNASUR un proyecto realmente colectivo o se reflejan intereses superiores de algunos estados?</td>
<td>The political, economic and other strategies used by small states (Ecuador &amp; Uruguay) in the shaping of a regional international organisation are very important.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5-10</td>
<td>El rol de UNASUR y la influencia de los estados grandes en las políticas del Ecuador/Uruguay (diseño de políticas colectivas) 1. ¿Hay percepciones de algunas intenciones hegemónicas de</td>
<td>The influence of regional international organisations on the elaboration and design of political plans, and its applications and political decisions of small states are relevant for the analysis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Los estados de grandes poderes, tanto de las potencias militares y económicas globales tradicionales, como las emergentes?

2. Los estados grandes tienden a imponerse/influenciar el diseño de estas organizaciones: ¿Se siente esa influencia en la UNASUR y cómo se manejan?

3. Las organizaciones regionales internacionales tienen políticas colectivas para desarrollarse y consolidarse: ¿Cómo influyen éstas a las políticas del Ecuador/Uruguay?

| 5 | 5-10 | ALBA, CAN (Ecuador)/MERCOSUR (Uruguay) versus UNASUR | The choice of opportunities and the search for alternative strategies used by small states in a process that has different |
| 301 | Ecuador/Uruguay crear la UNASUR y en vez de consolidarse en las diferentes formas de integración en sus organizaciones subregionales: CAN / MERCOSUR? ¿Es ALBA una alternativa a la UNASUR o una amenaza/competencia? | tendencias. The form and reasons for looking for and choosing preferences by small states (Ecuador & Uruguay) is very important. |
| 6  | **5-10** | **Los actores políticos; Instituciones de estados pequeños y estrategias. (Elementos constitucionales..CRE Art. 416. #11; 423)** Desde diferentes puntos los estados tienen políticas entre ellas políticas de integración: ¿Desde su institución como se trabaja/ ha trabajado en el proceso de integración? ¿Cuál es la percepción personal sobre este proyecto, es beneficioso o no para el Ecuador/Uruguay, y por qué? | Institutions of the state and politicians as actors have the power to influence and direct politics and the plans/strategies of a state. It is important to find out the ways they act and how and why they prioritise strategies to confront political tendencies, decisions and strategies/interests of greater states. |
| 7  | **5-10 minutos** | **Conclusiones sobre el tema.** ¿De todo lo discutido, cuáles cree que son los elementos más relevantes para el Ecuador? | The interviewee (members of the elite) could see/find out that an interview could help investigators and them too by highlighting the most important/relevant elements |
¿Ha habido algo que ha aprendido/gustado/no gustado de la entrevista?

This will also help to improve the quality of the interview regarding content, strategies, flow, and interview techniques. It is important to let the interviewee evaluate the interview and perhaps ask for suggestions.

In the case that the interviewee remembers any aspect/elements regarding this topic at the last minute.

Appendix 3. Development of codes and themes during the data analysis process

The following tables outline both case study data coding procedures and the emergence of such codes and themes which appear to contain information relevant for answering the research question. This forms the basis for data classification and interpretation.

a. Mix-match method of Structural and Descriptive and pattern Coding Methodology (Spanish and English translations): Case study Ecuador

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coding Methods/Themes</th>
<th>Questions asked to the data in each factor</th>
<th>Structural Coding</th>
<th>Descriptive or Topic Coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Directed nodes</td>
<td>Directed nodes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Similar ideology of governments</td>
<td>How has the political ideology of the Ecuadorian government of Rafael Correa impacted on Ecuadorian regional politics?</td>
<td>Amigos = friends, confianza = trust, politicas sociales = social policies, politicas integracionistas = integration policies, diálogo amigable = Friendly dialogue, gobierno socialista = socialist government, reducción de la pobreza = reduction of poverty, asistencia social = social help to people, derechos</td>
<td>Equidad = equality, izquierdista = left, socialista = socialist, progresista = progressist, desarrollista = developmentalist, ecologista = ecologist, modernista = modernist, integracionista = integrationist, estado social = social state, estado incluyente = inclusive state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. <strong>Elements of collective or regional identity</strong></td>
<td>What is it that forms the South American and Ecuadorian identity? What is it that links them together?</td>
<td>Historia compartida = shared history, cultura compartida = shared culture, espacio compartido = shared space, región suramericana = South American region, diversidad = diversity, pluralismo = pluralism, pueblos hermanos = fraternal countries, identidad suramericana = South American identity, plurinacionalidad = many ethnic national groups, Miembro de UNASUR = member of UNASUR</td>
<td>Latinoamericano = Latin American, ciudadano sudamericano/a = South American citizen, ciudadanía sudamericana = South American citizenship, ciudadano ecuatoriano/a = Ecuadorian citizen, plurinacional = multi-national, multicultural = multicultural; culturas ancestrales = ancestral cultures, país amazónico = Amazonian country, país andino = Andean, país democrático = democratic state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. <strong>Interest in national and regional peace</strong></td>
<td>How has Ecuador contributed to establish and protect regional peace?</td>
<td>Amistad regional = regional friendship, Solucionar crisis = to solve crises, solución de problemas = to solve problems, mantener la paz = maintain peace, evitar conflicto = avoid conflict, construir confianza = construct trust, territorio de paz = territory of peace, solución de conflictos = conflict resolution, soberanía nacional = national sovereignty, manejo de crisis = crisis management</td>
<td>Inseguridad = insecurity, terrorismo = terrorism, crimen organizado = organized crime, CDS = SADC, conflicto militar = military conflict, seguridad nacional = national security, seguridad regional = regional security, estabilidad política = political stability, paz regional = region of peace, solución pacífica = peaceful problem solving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. <strong>Interest in internatioal communitarian cooperation</strong></td>
<td>Why do states look for communitarian cooperation? How does Ecuador support communitarian cooperation?</td>
<td>Coordinar proyectos conjuntos = joint projects, reducir la pobreza = to reduce poverty, coordinar proyectos de infraestructura física = to coordinate projects in physical infrastructure, políticas de educación = policies in education, la protección de fronteras = the border protection, lucha contra la</td>
<td>Bien común = common good, interés común = common interest, interés colectivo = collective interest, acción colectiva = collective action, comunidad suramericana = South American community, unión suramericana = South American union, multilateralismo = multilateralism, cooperación = cooperation, interdependencia y autonomía =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. <strong>Influence of external forces</strong></td>
<td>Principal mercado = fundamental market, fuente de tecnología = technological sources, supremacía diplomática = diplomatic supremacy, relación de dependencia = dependent relationship, posesión de bienes = possession of goods, coorporaciones financieras = financial corporation, compañias transancionales = transnational business, NGOs = NGOs, organizaciones internacionales = international organizations, estados hegemónicos = hegemonic states, estados grandes = bigger states.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What extra-regional forces are influential on Ecuadorian politics? What extra-regional factors have impacted on the engagement of Ecuador in UNASUR?</td>
<td>Amenaza = threat, deuda externa = foreign debt, dependencia económica = economic dependence, dependencia politica = political dependence, presencia militar = military presence, fuerza militar extranjera = military foreign force, compromiso comercial = commercial compromise, compromiso militar = military compromise, compromiso político = political compromise, injerencia = interference.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6. <strong>Disatisfaction with old regional integration projects</strong></th>
<th>Empobrecimiento de la sociedad = impoverishment of the society, crecimiento de la desigualdad = rise of inequality, violación de las regulaciones = violation of the norms, estancamiento del desarrollo = stagnation of the development, crecimiento de la deuda externa = increase of the foreign debt, aumento del desempleo = increase of unemployment, reducción del control del estado = deregulation of state’s control, pocos beneficios para la sociedad = low benefits for the sociedad.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Why has Ecuador supported the creation of UNASUR instead of improving/deepening the other regional organisations, such as ALADI or CAN?</td>
<td>OEA = OAS, CAN = CAN, MERCOSUR = MERCOSUR, proyecto ALCA = FTAA project, regionalismo abierto = open regionalism, competición abierta del mercado = open market competition, integración comercial = commercial integration, integración sub-regional = sub-regional integration, integración Latinoamericana = Latin American integration, estruturas internacionales = international structures.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| General questions posed to all the data based on the Research Topic and Research Question | -Why has E/U supported the UNASUR?  
-Why has E/U not tried to strengthen the CAN/MERCOSUR instead of supporting the UNASUR?  
-Why is she/he speaking?  
-How has Ecuador supported the construction of UNASUR? | -What is this a study about?  
-What is going on here?  
-What is the argument about?  
-What shows me this?  
-What is this?  
-How has Ecuador supported the construction of UNASUR? |

b. Mix-match method of Structural and Descriptive and pattern Coding Methodology (Spanish and English translations): Case study Uruguay

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coding Methods/Themes</th>
<th>Questions asked to the data in each factor</th>
<th>Descriptive/topic Coding</th>
<th>Structural/interpretative Coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Directed nodes</td>
<td>Directed nodes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Similar ideology of governments: ideología similar de los gobiernos</td>
<td>Why has the political ideology of the Uruguayan governments of Frente Amplio impacted on the Uruguayan regional politics?</td>
<td>Equidad = equality, izquierdistas = leftist, multilateralista = multilateralist, progresista = progressist, desarrollista = developmentalist, ecologista = ecologist, modernista = modernist, politca integracionista = integrationist, politicas sociales = social policies, estado social = social state, estado incluyente = inclusive state</td>
<td>Amigos = friends, confianza = trust, politicas sociales = social policies, tolerancia = tolerance, diálogo amigable = Friendly dialogue, gobierno socialista = socialist government, reducción de la pobreza = reduction of poverty, asistencia social = social help to people, derechos humanos = human rights, justicia social = social justice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Elements of collective or regional identity = elementos de identidad colectiva</td>
<td>What is it that links the South American and Uruguayan identity? Why does it influence to Uruguay to</td>
<td>Latinoamericano = Latin American, ciudadano sudamericano/a = South American citizen, ciudadanía sudamericana = South American citizenship, ciudadadano/a uruguayo/a = Uruguyan citizen, raíces similares = similar</td>
<td>Historia compartida = shared history, cultura compartida = shared culture, espacio compartido = shared space, región suramericana = South American region, diversidad = diversity, pluralismo = pluralism, pueblos hermanos = freternal countries, identidad surameircana = South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support the UNASUR?</td>
<td>Background, multicultural = multicultural; culturas migrantes = migrant cultures, país rioplatense = country of the Plata, país sureño = Southern country, país democrático = democratic state</td>
<td>American identity, plurinacionalidad = many ethnic national groups, Miembro de UNASUR = member of UNASUR</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Interest in national and regional peace= intereses en paz nacional y regional</td>
<td>Which actions explain that Uruguay has contributed to establish and protect national and regional peace, and why?</td>
<td>Amistad regional = regional friendship, solucionar crisis = to solve crises, solución de problemas = to solve problems, mantener la paz = maintain peace, evitar conflicto = avoid conflict, construir confianza = construct trust, territorio de paz = territory of peace, afianzamiento de paz = strengthening peace, soberanía nacional = national sovereignty, manejo de crisis = crisis management</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Interest in international communitarian cooperation = interes en cooperación comunitaria</td>
<td>Why do states look for communitarian cooperation? What actions show that Uruguay has supported communitarian cooperation?</td>
<td>Bien común = common good, interés común = common interest, interés colectivo = collective interest, acción colectiva = collective action, comunidad suramericana = South American community, unión suramericana = South American union, multilateralismo = multilateralism, cooperación = cooperation, interdependencia y autonomía = interdependence and autonomy, Interconectividad = interconnectivity. proyecitos conjuntos = joint projects, reducir la pobreza = to reduce poverty, mejoramiento de infraestructura física = improvement in physical infrastructure, políticas de educación = policies in education, protección de fronteras = the border protection, lucha contra la delincuencia = fight against crime, cooperación energética = energetic cooperation, protección de recursos naturales = protect natural resources, inserción internacional = International insertion, comunidad política = political community.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Influence of external forces=influeencias de fuerzas exteriores</td>
<td>What extra-regional forces have influenced the region-engaging character of the Uruguayan politics, and why?</td>
<td>Amenaza = threat, deuda externa = foreign debt, dependencia económica = economic dependence, dependencia política = political dependence, presencia militar = military presence, fuerza militar extranjera = military foreign force, compromiso comercial = commercial compromise, compromiso militar = military compromise, compromiso político = political compromise, compromiso financiero = financial compromise, Principal mercado = fundamental market, fuente de tecnología = technological sources, supremacía diplomática = diplomatic supremacy, relación de dependencia = dependent relationship, posesión de bienes = possession of goods, corporaciones financieras = financial corporation, compañías transaccionales = transnational business, NGOs = NGOs, Organizaciones internacionales = international organizations, Estados hegemónicos = Hegemonic states, estados</td>
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compromise, injerencia = interference. grandes = bigger states.

| 6. Disatisfaction with old regional integration projects=disatisfacción con la integración regional vieja | Why has Uruguay supported the creation of UNASUR instead of improving/deepening the other regional organisations, such as ALADI or MERCOSUR? | OEA = OAS, CAN = CAN, MERCOSUR = MERCOSUR, proyecto ALCA = FTAA project, regionalismo abierto = open regionalism, competición abierta del mercado = open market competition, integración comercial = commercial integration, integración sub-regional = sub-regional integration, integración Latinoamericana = Latin American integration, estructuras internacionales = international structures |
| | Empobrecimiento = impoverishment, desigualdad = inequality, inconsistencia = inconsistency, estancamiento del desarrollo = stagnation of the development, endeudamiento extranjero = foreign debt, desempleo = unemployment, deregularización = deregulation, autodestrucción = self-destruction, desatisfacción = dissatisfaction |

Appendix 4. Direct citations in Spanish and Portuguese and factors influencing the decision-making process

This appendix contains two fundamental elements of evidence for this study. The first part contains the direct citations in Spanish and Portuguese that were translated into English and inserted in the main text of this work. These direct citations are complemented with two pieces of information for clarification. The citations are firstly preceded by a page number which shows their place in this investigation.

The other piece of information is situated after the citation and shows the document, interview or speech which can be found in its full version in the Nvivo project in appendix 1. The second part of this appendix contains a matrix with themes which have been the basis for the development of the comparative part of this study.

a. Direct citations in Spanish and Portuguese which appear as English translations in the main body of this investigation

Introduction
‘...afirman su determinación de construir una identidad y ciudadanía suramericanas y desarrollar un espacio regional integrado en lo político, económico, social, cultural, energético y de infraestructura, para contribuir al fortalecimiento de la unidad de América Latina y el Caribe’ (UNASUR, 2008. Tratado Constitutivo de la Unión de Naciones Suramericanas: Preámbulo).

Chapter 3. Case study Ecuador

‘...9. Reconoce el derecho internacional como norma de conducta, y demanda la democratización de los organismos internacionales y la equitativa participación de los Estados al interior de estos. 10. Promueve la confromación de un orden global multipolar con la participación activa de bloques económicos y políticos regionales y el fortalecimiento de las relaciones horizontales para la construcción de un mundo justo, democrático, solidario, diverso e intercultural. 11. Impulsa prioritariamente la integración política, cultural y económica de la región andina, de América del Sur y de Latinoamérica...’. (Constitución Política del Ecuador, 2008: Título VII, Artículo 416; numeral: 9-10-11).

‘...la esperanza de un futuro, otro vivible desde lo humano, que es algo mucho más que solo una respuesta política a la crisis del capitalismo mundial. Que es lago mucho más que solo una respuesta política y cultural al imperialismo norteamericana’. (Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador, Acta 040, página 111).

‘... la unión de naciones del sur de América, se justifica por una vocación transcendente para unir y crear espacios de integración entre nuestros estados, entre nuestras culturas y lenguas, para unir pueblos en un destino universal que América del Sur es mucho más que una cultura, y nacionalidades y Estados, que es una unidad de destino en lo universal... ...que ya integrada tendrá que cumplir misiones universales’. (Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador, Acta 040, página 113).

‘...Defiende la presencia soberana de Ecuador en América Latina y en el mundo, sin tutelajes externos, ni servidumbres a potencias y proyectos extranjeros, ajenos a la realidad y al bienestar de nuestro pueblo. Lucha por la integración, solidaridad y cooperación entre los pueblos de América Latina y su compromiso con la creación de alianzas Sur-Sur’. (Manifiesto Ideológico, Programa de acción y Régimen Orgánico Alianza País. 35 PAIS. Versión escrita, sin fecha de publicación, página 11).

‘...la UNASUR genera otros espacios de integración que promueven los intereses latinoamericanos y cribeños. Es necesario fortalecer y dotarle de una institucionalidad, así como la construcción de su sede en la mitad del mundo’. (Manifiesto Ideológico, Programa de acción y Régimen Orgánico Alianza País. 35 PAIS. Versión escrita, sin fecha de publicación, página 48-49).

‘... queda atrás esa región que era insultada, humillada, mancillada por cualquiera, desde prepotentes diplomáticos extranjeros, hasta burócratas internacionales que nos venían a pedir cuentas, a revisar nuestros datos, a decir que hacer o no hacer; hoy si pretende venir una misión del Fondo Monetario con
esas intenciones, al estar bajando del avión, con las mismas tendrá que regresarse, porque ningún país lo va a permitir’. (Presidente Rafael Correa, Primera Piedra de la Sede Permanente UNASUR. Mitad del Mundo, 11 de marzo de 2011).


p. 140. ‘...Alianza PAIS busca el Socialismo del Buen Vivir. Se identifica en la consecución del bienestar común y la felicidad de cada uno, que no se logra mediante la acumulación de grandes riquezas, ni mediante una capacidad de consumo excesivo, sino a través de la maximización de los talentos y capacidades personales y colectivas...’ (Manifiesto Ideológico, Programa de acción y Régimen Orgánico Alianza País. 35 PAIS. Versión escrita, sin fecha de publicación, página 6).

p. 141. ‘...La integración latinoamericana, la cooperación y la solidaridad con las luchas de los oprimidos en todos los lugares del planeta es un objetivo estratégico de Alianza PAIS’. (Manifiesto Ideológico, Programa de acción y Régimen Orgánico Alianza País. 35 PAIS. Versión escrita, sin fecha de publicación, página 9).

p. 142-143. ‘...desarrollar un espacio sudamericano integrado en lo político, social, económico, ambiental y de infraestructura, que fortalezca la identidad propia de América del Sur y que contribuya, a partir de una perspectiva subregional y, en articulación con otras experiencias de integración regional, al fortalecimiento de América Latina y el Caribe y le otorgue una mayor gravitación y representación en los foros internacionales’. (IIRSA, 2004. III Cumbre Presidencial Sudamericana. Cusco 8 de diciembre d 2004. Declaración del Cusco sobre la Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones).

p. 143. ‘...i) la consolidación de una identidad suramericana a través del reconocimiento progresivo de derechos a los nacionales de un Estado Miembro residentes en cualquiera de los otros Estados Miembros, con el fin de alcanzar una ciudadanía suramericana’. (UNASUR, 2008. Tratado Constitutivo de la Unión de Naciones Suramericanas. Artículo 3, literal i.)


p. 146. ‘…Los actos normativos emanados de los órganos de UNASUR, serán obligatorios para los Estados miembros una vez que hayan sido incorporados en el ordenamiento jurídico de cada uno de ellos, de acuerdo a cada uno de sus procedimientos internos’ (Trado de UNASUR, 2008: Artículo 12).


p. 152. ‘…que tome en cuenta su diversidad y, consecuentemente, abandone el “pensamiento único” prevaleciente en las últimas décadas; que no se limite solamente a objetivos en la mejora en los resultados macroeconómicos, sino que tenga como ejes prioritarios la equidad y la justicia social, la preservación del medio ambiente para las generaciones venideras, los avances técnicos-organizativos en las estructuras económicas, la eliminación gradual de la dependencia externa, la reducción de las asimetrías a lo interno de la región y una inserción internacional que posibilite acortar la brecha que separa a las naciones pobres de las ricas.’ (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio e Integración, 2011. Agenda Estratégica de Política Exterior 2011-2013. p. 105).

p. 152-153. ‘Una nueva forma de convivencia ciudadana, en diversidad y armonía con la naturaleza, para alcanzar el buen vivir, el sumak kawsay. Una sociedad que respeta, en todas sus dimensiones, la dignidad de las personas y las colectividades; un país democrático comprometido con la integración Latinoamericana –sueño de Bolívar y Alfaro-, la paz y solidaridad con todos los pueblos de la tierra’. (Constitución de la República del Ecuador, 2008. Preámbulo).

p. 154. ‘…Que coincidencia, debo decirlo, los elementos que nosotros, que guiaron en definitiva, la cosntrucción de una Constitución libre en Ecuador, tiene mucho que ver con los elementos que sustancian los pueblos de América Latina, signatarios de este Tratado, los doce pueblos de más avanzada en nuestros países’ (Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador, Acta 040, página 115-116).

p. 158. ‘…Nosotros hoy somos los actores de esos gobiernos progresistas. Nosotros somos los artífices de este nuevo momento político y económico que no se somete al dogma ni a los organismos internacionales que prescriben la economía global. Nosotros hoy estamos marcando nuestra ruta regional y nacional… …Pero la integración no solo es un cúmulo de proclamas y buenos deseos. ¡No! La integración del siglo XXI está marcada por la ruptura de los viejos modelos… …Ahora la integración tiene el propósito fundamental de fortalecer la institucionalidad interna para fortalecer la institucionalidad externa’. (Canciller Ricardo Patiño, 2012. Presentación de la Revista Línea Sur 2).
p. 160. ‘Ecuador tiene mucho que decir al respecto de este debate por su enorme constitución a una nueva epistemología del desarrollo, una concepción del buen vivir plasmada en nuestra constitución y en el plan nacional de desarrollo con la propuesta de una nueva propuesta financiera para América del Sur y su consecuente política exterior que apuesta al multilateralismo y privilegia la integración latinoamericana y la diplomacia ciudadana para el desarrollo humano’ (Lorena Escudero, 2012. UNASUR y los derechos humanos. Construcción de una Ciudadanía suramericana. Quito, 20 de junio de 2012).


p. 162. ‘4. La Paz y el ambiente de amistad y cooperación entre los doce países suramericanos son características que distinguen favorablemente a la región en el ámbito internacional. La superación definitiva de diferendos territoriales, según ejemplo del acuerdo de 1998 entre Ecuador y Perú, cosntituye una demostración reciente del espíritu que prevalece en América del Sur, que ha hecho y hará de esta parte del mundo un área de paz y cooperación...’ (IIRSA, 2008a. Comunicado de Brasilia).

p. 167. ‘3. ...la presencia de fuerzas militares extranjeras no puede, con sus medios y recursos vinculados a objetivos propios, amenazar la soberanía e integridad de cualquier nación suramericana y en consecuencia la paz y la seguridad en la región’ (UNASUR, 2009a. Reunión extraordinaria de Jefes y Jefas de Estado y de Gobierno de la UNASUR).

Chapter 4. Case study Uruguay

p. 180. ‘Nosotros entendemos que Uruguay tiene que ser un partícipe activo en el proceso de integración sudamericano... Este espacio de integración que se pretende construir a través de la UNASUR involucra determinados temas para los cuales hay y ha habido reuniones especializadas; nos referimos a cuestiones relativas a lo cultural, social y económico, y a las políticas sociales, de educación, energía, infraestructura y medio ambiente. Según se establece, el Tratado apunta a generar los espacios de diálogo, y el intercambio de información con el fin de lograr la inclusión social y la participación ciudadana, fortalecer la democracia y reducir las asimetrías’ (Acta de Sesión de la Comisión de Asuntos Internacionales, Sesión del día 4 de noviembre de 2010. Ministro Luis Almagro, página 3).

181. ‘No voy a acampar esta iniciativa porque este es el octavo o noveno intento integracionista; todos han ido langediciendo lentamente, inclusive el MERCOSUR...’ (Acta de 54 Sesión Extraordinaria de la Cámara de Representantes, Sesión del día 25 de noviembre de 2010. Diputado Vázquez, página 122).
p.201. ‘La construcción de un nuevo modelo de integración no puede estar basada únicamente en las relaciones comerciales, sobre todo cuando es bien sabido que la región admite regímenes distintos: Mercosur, CAN, CARICOM y Chile. Con miras a la costrucción de una integración equilibrada y la consolidación de una Agenda de Integración Social y Productiva, los países de América del Sur, dando énfasis en la convergencia comercial, deben buscar una articulación económica y productiva más amplia, así como formas de cooperación política, social y cultural…’ (IIRSA, 2006a, Documento final de la Comisión Estratégica de Reflexión).

p. 203. ‘…cada uno de nosotros tiene algo para aportar …por.. … cada uno de los países lo tiene algo para aportar a la UNASUR. …. En temas de salud por ejemplo…. Atintabaquismo…’ (Entrevista personal con el Canciller Luis Almagro en Motevideo, Universidad de la República, 29 de abril de 2012).

p. 205. ‘…Hemos deicido priorizar América del Sur para que esta pueda darse una representación continental que sin comprometer la soberanía de cada uno de los países le pueda decir al mundo aquí estamos, somos, luchamos por intereses que son en común’ (Discurso del Presidente Mujica, 2010. Elección del Primer Secreatrio de UNASUR).

p. 206. ‘Este proceso… pretende la integración de los países sudamericanos y establece determinados objetivos que son claramente fijados en su Tratado Constitutivo, que es la cuestión central que debemos analizar. Dentro de estos objetivos está la promoción del diálogo político…, el impulso a las políticas sociales, el tratamiento de los temas de educación…, los asuntos relativos al medio ambiente, preservación de la democracia, la promoción de la inclusión social, el intento de reducir las asimetrías, los temas de energía e infraestructura, todos temas que cosnideramos importantes para el Uruguay…’ (Acta de 59 Sesión Extraordinaria de la Cámara del Senado, Sesión del día 30 de noviembre de 2010. Senador Da Rosa, página 52).

p. 207. ‘Artículo 6°.- En los tratados internacionales que celebre la República propenderá la cláusula de que todos las diferencias que surjan entre las partes, serán decididas… La República procurará la integración social y económica de los estados Latinoamericanos, especialmente en lo que se refiere a la defensa común de sus productos y materias primas. Asimismo, propenderá la efectiva complementación de sus servicios públicos.’ (Constitución de la República del Uruguay, 2004. Articulo 6).

p. 209. ‘…Los actos normativos emanados de los órganos de la UNASUR, serán obligatorios para los Estados Miembros una vez que hayan sido incorporados en el ordenamiento jurídico de cada uno de ellos, de acuerdo a sus respectivos procedimientos internos…’ (UNASUR, 2008. Tratado Cosnstitutivo de UNASUR, Artículo 12).

de defensa, que leve em conta as características sub-regionais e nacionais e que contribua para o fortalecimento da unidade da América Latina e do Caribe. c) Gerar consensos para fortalecer a cooperação regional em matéria de defesa’ (UNASUR, 2008a. Declaração do Conselho de Chefas e Chefes de Estado e de Governo. Costa do Sauipé, Bahía, 16 de Dezembro de 2008).

p. 228. ‘Creo que para logremos esa tierra de paz, esa tierra de salud, democrática, soberana que lucha contra distintas patologías, precisamente tiene que luchar muy duro y muy fuerte para eliminar las patologías que estamos padeciendo… … Para tener una tierra de paz, el Uruguay también piensa que la solución de las controversias que tenemos deben ser resueltas por la vía pacífica, por la vía del análisis, discusión, del respeto… …Por eso desde el inicio Uruguay rechazó abiertamente y rechazamos hoy las instalaciones de bases militares extranjeras británicas en las Islas Malvinas argentinas…’ (Presidente Vázquez, 2009. Discurso del Presidente Vázquez en Bariloche, Argentina, Agosto 2009).

p. 229. ‘Pero en cuanto a los golpes de Estado en la región, la ideologización que me parece grave es que solo los gobiernos de izquierda parecen ser afectados por esas rupturas institucionales…’ (Ministro Almagro, 2012a. Comparecencia ante el Senado de la República).

b. Information summarised from the case analysis for a comparative purpose

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### Political Instability
- Volatility of political clout:
- Respect for democratic institutions:
- Foreign Policy and Long term planning:
- Economic dependency:
- Issues Affecting the National Security

### Economic Dependency
- Geopolitical influences:

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Bibliography


Moncada, J. (2010b.) Integración y Globalización. Ecuador, la segunda mitad del siglo XX, Quito: La Tierra.


