“What about the locals?”
The politics of representation of the effects of the Colombian armed conflict on Ecuador.

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This paper is dedicated to the two people that have made this possible: my mom and my husband. My Mom, who has always believed in me, every accomplishment in my life is dedicated to you. To my husband: for joining me in this adventure, in this dream, that finally came true! Thanks for supporting me from the very beginning, with your infinite love.

I would also like to thank my supervisor, Dubravka, who I consider an incredible person, both at the academic and personal level. Thanks for guiding me in this process.

Finally, I dedicate this paper to all those people –Ecuadorean and Colombian- who are still suffering from non-sense violence. I hope that all the absurdity of this conflict comes to an end very soon.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELN</td>
<td>National Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INREDH</td>
<td>Regional Foundation of Human Rights Consultancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCA</td>
<td>Membership Categorization Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abstract

During the last decades Ecuador has been affected by the expansion of the Colombian armed conflict across its northern border. Particularly, with the implementation of Plan Colombia in 2000, the bordering populations have been facing the effects of the violence, such as: forced displacement, incursion of state and non-state armed groups, fumigations and different forms of violence. The interest of this research is to identify how such effects are represented in the discourses of three kinds of actors that write about them: Ecuadorean and Colombian governments, NGOs and academics. By using Framing and Categorization as analytical tools, hegemonic and dominant discourses around the effects of Plan Colombia in Ecuador can be identified, as well as what is left out of such discourses. To this end, this paper is framed under two interrelated theoretical perspectives: the politics of representation and the Foucauldian approach to power/knowledge, which are relevant for understanding the power relations embedded in those linguistic representations.

Relevance to Development Studies

Stuart Hall (1997) suggests that representation implies production of meaning, and producing meaning is important as it can define social realities and relations, such as who is included or who is excluded. In this regard, the analysis of texts/documents that write about the effects of the Colombian armed conflict on Ecuador provides an analytical perspective of what/who is considered important in terms of national policy, aid, development interventions and academic research. Thus, it may be possible to uncover how power relations operate and intentionally obscure certain peoples and livelihoods.

Keywords

Politics of representation, discourses, Ecuador, Colombian armed conflict, Plan Colombia, Categorization, Framing, NGO, policy, refugee, securitization.
Chapter 1: Introduction

Many Ecuadoreans have negative prejudices about foreigners, which lead to the rejection of refugee job applicants because of their nationality and/or race [...] according to the refugees interviewed, this discrimination is caused by negative images of Colombians within Ecuadorean society. In part, these images are fostered by the negative messages about violence and crime in Colombia in the media (Asylum Access 2011: 13).

The repetition of such statements in different documents/texts that report about the effects of the Colombian armed conflict in Ecuador caught my attention towards researching what are the representations that inform literature around this topic. Negative representations of Ecuadorean local population vis-à-vis Colombian asylum seekers and refugees are often repeated in policy and academic texts. As I read such statements they made me reflect on why I heard them so many times, whereas I hardly heard about the situation of the Ecuadorean population which is also affected by the armed conflict. While I do not intend to deny that refugees are a vulnerable population that has gone through much hardship, I am interested in understanding which representations and discourses become dominant, and what remains invisible.

In this research, I investigate the discourses about the effects of Colombian conflict on Ecuador, with specific attention to Plan Colombia and the ways its effects have been addressed by three kinds of sources: NGO, governmental and academic texts.

1.1. Contextual background

Ecuador is one of the Colombian southern neighbors that have been affected by the armed conflict and particularly by Plan Colombia. For decades the successive Ecuadorean governments have perceived the conflict in Colombia as internal, and non-interference has been the main strategy of Ecuador’s foreign policy. However, this apparent distant observation of the conflict changed since 2000, the year in which Plan Colombia was implemented.

In order to engage with the discourses on the effects of Colombian conflict on Ecuador, I will first engage in brief reflections on the conflict itself, and its actual effects on Colombian population, as well as on Ecuador. After that I will present the research questions and methodology. The main body of the study
that follows is organized around the three actors whose production of discourses on the effects is most prominent: the governments, NGOs and the academia.

Map 1

Ecuadorean and Colombian common border


1.1.1. The Colombian armed conflict and Plan Colombia

While being one of the oldest democracies in Latin America, Colombia has not been able to put an end to the violence derived from the internal armed conflict that has affected the country for several decades. Most analysts agree that the origins of the conflict can be situated between 1948 and 1958 when peasants and the working-class – supported by the liberals - confronted the conservative elite and landowners of Colombia. Soon, violence was widespread and as a reaction towards state repression the peasants’ movement and many liberal members began to organize themselves into armed groups. In the 1960s and 1970s, marginalization, social exclusion and social inequalities led to the formation of the

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1 In the post-colonial Latin America politics was characterized by the polarization of two parties: the liberals, who regularly opposed the state, the church and social inequalities. They aimed at modernizing the country by structural reforms. On the other side, the conservatives, who were composed of elites and landowners, reluctant to change the status quo.
guerrillas: Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and Movimiento 19 de abril (M-19). In addition to the state military and guerrillas, a third party has had an important role in the conflict: the right-wing paramilitary groups, which, by claiming the self-defense from the guerrillas, have committed numerous crimes against civilians. The largest paramilitary group was the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) (D’Arcier 2005: 216). Finally, drug cartels have organized their own armed bands and have fought each other, the state and other military forces, and used violence against civilians.

As all those armed forces perpetuated multiple forms of violence, it has become difficult to draw the line between guerrillas, paramilitaries and drug cartels. Particularly, drugs trafficking have become a main issue for both the national government and the international community. Through the decades, as the conflict with multiple armed forces went on, little attention has been given to the protection of civilians and their human rights, and civilians have often been seen by Colombian government as accomplices of either drug cartels or guerrillas. Due to the close ties between Colombian and USA governments through the 1990s, the former president of Colombia, Andres Pastrana, announced in 1999 the joint agreement between the two states, called Plan Colombia (Pardo 2000: 72).

Plan Colombia was initially aimed at addressing the widespread violence and drugs trafficking, and achieving peace and security: “As originally envisioned, this multiyear and multibillion dollar program was designed to address a variety of social, political, and economic stability issues” (Oehme 2010: 222). Under Clinton’s administration, Plan Colombia was presented as a plan of around $7.5 billion to contribute to the economy and development of the country. In 2000 the United States Congress approved the disbursement of the funds for the Plan Colombia and this marked the initiation of the joint actions in the context of the armed conflict (Crandall 2002: 165).

In practice, however, Plan Colombia mainly focused on military aid and anti-drugs operations. About 80% of resources for the Plan Colombia were military aid. For the United States this was an opportunity to expand its foreign policy against drugs trafficking in South America. The Plan included fumigations (i.e. aerial spraying of coca and other illegal crops plantations with powerful herbicides) and military actions against the guerrillas, particularly in southern Colombia. This immediately generated concern in the neighboring countries: Ecuador, Peru and Brazil, as they feared an increasing movement of armed groups and civilians across the frontiers (Crandall 2002).

Throughout the decades of conflict, and particularly since the Plan Colombia, violence has been part of life of many Colombians. Drugs trafficking, kidnappings, extortion, mass killings, forced displacement and ongoing instability
brought deterioration of social relations. According to the UNHCR, internal displacement and its consequences created the worst humanitarian crisis in the continent. Between 1997 and 2013 it is estimated that more than 5 million Colombians have been internally displaced, with an emphasis on afro-Colombian and indigenous population. In addition, around 327 000 Colombians have fled the country seeking refuge (UNHCR 2013).

1.1.2. The regionalization of the Colombian armed conflict: the case of Ecuador

Four effects of the Plan Colombia have been especially highlighted in literature. First, Ecuador has become the main receptor of refugees in Latin America, of whom almost 98% come from Colombia. According to the UNHCR the number of Colombians fleeing their country towards Ecuador increased particularly after Plan Colombia. Before 2000, only 390 Colombians were recognized with the status of refugee, but in the period 2001-2013, Ecuador has recognized 54 865 Colombians as refugees (UNHCR 2013). The reasons for leaving their country of origin are closely related to the violence of the armed conflict, among them: assaults, life threats, destruction of villages by armed groups, tax payment or “vacuna”\(^2\) to armed groups, forced recruitment and fumigations (Rivera 2007: 28). Once in Ecuador, the life experience of a Colombian asylum seeker could be very complicated, as it may imply the threat from armed groups, stigma and lack of opportunities in the receptor country, such as employment, housing, health and education (Women’s Commission for refugee women and children 2006; Santacruz 2012). The dynamics in the border provinces of Ecuador are very different from other regions in terms of obtaining refugee status, and it could take a few years from application to obtaining an answer, and the answer may still be negative. This is among the reasons why many asylum seekers live as undocumented, under illegal circumstances, as the option of returning to Colombia is not feasible (Santacruz 2012: 14-15).

Second, besides the increasing flows of asylum seekers, Plan Colombia has caused the displacement of Colombian armed and criminal groups across the Ecuadorean borders. The anti-drugs measures adopted by Colombia and the United States have motivated drug producers to cross the porous border in order to carry on with their illegal activities and settle in new places that are unknown to

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\(^2\) Tax payment or “vacuna”: (“shot” in English) refers to a sum of money that illegal armed groups require as payment in exchange of security. They usually apply to land owners or business owners, which takes the form of extortion, so their lives are respected, as well as their properties (Wikipedia, paramilitary).
the law enforcement agencies. Likewise, armed groups find Ecuador as a place for logistic support, where they can enter freely and get all the weapons and provisions they require, including medical services (D’Arcier 2005: 224). According to Vallejo (2010) the presence of leftists’ guerrillas, right-wing paramilitaries and criminal organizations increased significantly since 2002. There is evidence that both FARC and ELN are present in the provinces of Sucumbios and Carchi. Likewise, the paramilitary group AUC has established several bases in the border provinces Esmeraldas, Sucumbios and Carchi. Lastly, the criminal organization called Aguilas Negras (Black Eagles) which is known for drugs trafficking and smuggling weapons, and is a dissident group of AUC, is operating in the province Esmeraldas (Vallejo, 2010: 3).

Third, in order to counteract the presence of these groups, the Ecuadorean government has increased militarization of the border zone. But instead of reducing the illegal flows along the borderline, Ecuadorean army is engaged in a cycle of continuous dismantling of strongholds used by the militant groups, especially in the zones where the jungle offers space and protection for illegal operations, and has found coca refinery laboratories, training camps and medical facilities, among others (Vallejo, 2010: 3-4). It is estimated that between 30 and 40 % of the cocaine produced in Colombia is exported from Ecuadorean ports (D’Arcier 2005: 225). The country has not only become a shipping point for drugs cartels, but also a destination for money and assets laundering.

Fourth, while the main strategy adopted by the Ecuadorean government has been to allocate more military forces in the borderline, the local population has been given secondary place in terms of security and provision of basic subsistence. The Ecuadorean population is historically used to the dynamics of exchange and daily life with the Colombian population with whom they share the border zone. However, their traditional relations have been drastically transformed by change of power relations and military actions in their surroundings. The increasing presence of the Ecuadorean military, Colombian armed groups and different criminal organizations has forced local population to change their daily routines and even their economic life (Santacruz 2012: 6).

Even before the implementation of the Plan Colombia the three provinces - Esmeraldas, Carchi and Sucumbios - were characterized by poverty, unemployment, poor infrastructure and communication systems, and lack of basic services, testifying to the absence of the Ecuadorean state. When the violence in Colombia intensified, the consequences expanded across the border placing Ecuadorean local population between high militarization and increasing demand to share space with Colombian armed and criminal groups (Moreano 2010: 249). The practice of “tax payment” to the armed groups has forced many landowners to abandon their properties, out of fear and impossibility to pay the required
amounts of money. The indigenous populations, like the Awá, have abandoned their places and moved to the cities looking for security. Furthermore, as the border zone lacks income-earning and employment opportunities, local population created links with the guerrilla, the paramilitaries or the drugs traffickers, and got involved in illegal activities in order to subsist (Moreano 2010: 250-251).

While the issues noted above are not the only effects of the armed conflict in Colombia and the Plan Colombia, they illustrate well the diversity and complexity of the implications that violence in one country could have on another. This research is inspired by a wish to inquire whether such diversity and complexity also exist in the representations of those effects.

1.2. Research questions

The main research question is: how are the effects of the Colombian armed conflict and Plan Colombia in Ecuador represented by three different types of sources: those produced by the Ecuador’s and Colombian governments, the NGOs working in the area, and the academia?

The following sub-questions assist in answering the main questions:

a. What aspects of the violence are seen as relevant?

b. Who is seen as affected in Ecuador and what kinds of the effects are singled out?

c. Who is seen as bringing solutions to the problems?

d. What kinds of effects are not discussed? Who and what is absent from the representations?

1.3. Methodology and sources

1.3.1. The sources

The methodological approach is qualitative as this study examines the politics of representation embedded in the different types of written sources about the situation of Ecuador and the regionalization of the Colombian armed conflict. The data are generated from local, national and international documents and texts published since 2000, when Plan Colombia began to be implemented.
Three types of written sources are selected: Ecuador’s and Colombian government sources, NGOs’ documents and academic sources. These are selected due to my initial assumptions about their relevance for understanding of, and intervening into the effects of Colombian conflict and Plan Colombia on Ecuador, as well as due to my assumption that they would generate rather different discourses on the situation of the local population. As this research shows, my assumptions were only partially confirmed.

A government as a policy-maker is important in determining who and what issue should receive state attention, and how a particular problem should be addressed. At the same time, a government may intentionally exclude some groups of population or issues from its policy, in alignment with its various political, economic and other interests. In addition, policies create identities and give meanings to specific situations. They always articulate a Self and a series of Others which can be states, regions, peoples and institutions. In the case of security policies, they have traditionally created a Self that faces threatening Others, where their identities are radically distinct (Hansen 2006: 6).

Moreover, as Hansen (2006: 7) states, official policy documents are important because they are situated within a larger public and political sphere, which means that representations they engender are not only informed by the policymakers’, but, also by other individuals, institutions and media. Indeed, policymakers pay attention to what is present in the public sphere as a way to assure legitimacy from their constituencies. Accordingly, Hansen (2006) states that:

understanding official policy discourse as situated within a wider discursive field opens up a theoretical and empirical research agenda that examines how policy representations and representations articulated by oppositional political forces, the media, academia and popular culture reinforce or contest each other (Hansen 2006: 8).

However, some policies are less contested than others, in which case representations may be less diverse. This is also an interesting research inquiry. As the official policy representations become hegemonic, it is important to identify how are hegemonic discourses replicated and reproduced to other non-governmental realms (i.e. academia, media, etc., Hansen 2006: 8). Therefore, besides addressing the dominant representations in the national policies, my intention is to identify how the representations of Ecuador’s and Colombia governments are contrasted or replicated in other kind of sources.

The texts produced by academics and NGOs are similarly important to the extent of what Hansen (200: 63) calls “marginal political discourses”. These are worth analyzing as they might intersect with and influence dominant policy
discourses in subtle ways and hence become important for understanding past and future political contexts. Particularly, the documents produced by NGOs are relevant for the analysis as they currently play an increasing role in international governance. Work of NGOs has raised the concern of researchers, academics, journalists, states and other members of the civil society, because NGOs are considered any longer as powerless and charitable organizations – even if they do not hold the discursive power associated with other actors, such as media or political opposition– but as agents of power (Hansen 2006: 63). According to Steffek and Hahn (2010: 6), NGOs have gained the power of influence and agenda-setting, which allows them to access decision-making processes and realms that ordinary citizens cannot. Moreover, the importance of NGOs discourses is based in the possibility of shaping perceptions. Dempsey (2009: 328) suggests that “the images and discourses produced by advocacy NGOs have significant impacts on the communities who are the targets of their aid; images of people and their needs attract and repel funding and make political interventions more or less likely”. However, it is also argued that this representations have no direct relation with local interests or local actors, but instead are controlled by donors and professionals delinked from the local realities. NGOs advocate on the behalf of groups without direct access to the public sphere, while at the same time this process creates identities of such groups. Sometimes this is a counterproductive process that contributes to more marginalization of the people they intend to help, by reinforcing racism, imperialism and exclusion (Dempsey 2009: 330).

In the case of Ecuador, with the political and economic absence of the state from the border zones, this means that NGOs have often been the main service providers and supporters of the local population; they have been very familiar with the problems affecting locals and have not always seen the situation eye-to-eye with the state. Indeed, since 2007 the government of Ecuador has changed its policy towards international and local NGOs, especially those working in the Northern border zone, demanding that those organizations that do not work along the government policies cease their operations. As a result, circa 30 local and foreign NGOs have been forced to stop activities or leave the country (Human Rights Watch 2011; La Republica 2012). Thus, perspectives of many NGOs, supra-, and international agencies may be quite different from those of the government. With this presumption informing my research, I believed that research and policy reports of those organizations are valuable source for analyzing (alternative) representations of the effects of Plan Colombia on Ecuador and its population.

Based on Hansen’s (2006) assumption that academia is part of the “marginal political discourses”, the selection of academic texts is justified under the consideration that researchers are vital in the production of knowledge. Academia may reproduce or contrast policy discourses. In this research, I reflect on how different backgrounds, academic profiles and contexts result in different
representations and the reproduction of hegemonic meanings. But, academia can also become a source of reference – explicitly or implicitly – for policy discourse as a way to support their representations: to establish legitimacy and authority for their constructions of identity and politics (Hansen 2006: 12). Lastly, academia has become interested in the work and the representations produced by NGOs, in order to support or criticize them. According to Steffek and Hahn (2010: 1) “while early academic studies on the influence of NGOs in world politics saw them as being – at least on some issues – ‘the conscience of the world’, attitudes towards these organizations have become much more skeptical”. Thus, it is relevant to analyze the relations – if any – between academic and NGO discourses.

My assumptions about difference between the governmental, NGO and academic sources turned out to be only partly justified. As this research shows, the three actors shared a surprising number of discourses. Additionally, my analysis shows that the source category of international vs. national is important in shaping the dominant representations about the effects of the Colombian armed conflict in Ecuador.

The following table summarizes the number and type of texts selected for the analysis:

Table 1
Types and number of sources selected for the analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF SOURCE</th>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>NUMBER OF SOURCES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Ecuadorean National policies in relation to the armed conflict</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Colombian national policies in relation to armed conflict</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Ecuadorean NGOs</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International NGOs</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academia</td>
<td>Local academics</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International academics</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>TOTAL NUMBER OF SOURCES</strong></td>
<td><strong>42</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From the list above, some issues require further clarification. First, in relation to the type and number of sources, I included specific Colombian and Ecuadorean national policies that have addressed the armed conflict in Colombia and its implications for Ecuador, as the main governmental documents. The prevalence of sources from the international NGOs, over local, is due to the fact that activities of local NGOs are seldom recorded in the form of written reports or available on the web. This is balanced with more sources of local researchers. Academic sources outnumber the government and NGO sources because the existing material on the topic is very extensive, both from local and international academia. Secondly, it is important to note that not all the sources selected for analysis are focused exclusively or directly to the effects of the Colombian armed conflict on Ecuador. Their main concerns may lie elsewhere, and the effects of Colombian conflict on Ecuador may be addressed in only one or two sections in the document, or as a sideline to the main inquiry. I therefore regularly indicate in my analysis what the main focus of the document is.

1.3.2. Methods of analysis

The analysis of the different texts is made through the use two tools: categorization and framing. Membership Categorization Analysis (MCA) is applied in order to understand how issues and people are categorized in the selected documents and articles. As Leudar et al. (2004: 244) mention “MCA studies situated common-sense knowledge about people as it is locally invoked and reproduced; it stresses that categorizing is normally done to accomplish something other than just categorizing.” I will reflect on what this “something else” might be, whenever relevant.

Framing is used as a way to understand how a particular issue discussed in the texts is portrayed. As Entman (cited in Papacharissi 2008: 53) suggests, “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.” Papacharissi (2008: 53) states that frames have the power to influence how people understand, think and act about a particular problem.

My initial assumption – following the quotation with which this study begins - was that categories of vulnerability and security, and processes of Othering would be important. I also believed that I would find in the documents references to war on terror, security and war on drugs.
But, as one of the objectives of this research is to identify what is left out of the representations, the notion of opacity becomes particularly useful. This analytical category from the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is aimed at bringing into light inequalities, systematic omissions and distortions in the representations. What is absent from a text is as significant as what is “in” from a sociocultural and political perspective, but the problem is that the absences are more difficult to find out (Fairclough 1995: 133). The earlier brief reflection on the four effects of Plan Colombia on Ecuador serves as a sounding board and aids me in finding the missing pieces.

1.4. Paper structure

This paper is divided into five chapters. In chapter 1, I have outlined my main research problem and questions. In chapter 2, I provide the main concepts and theoretical approaches that inform my analysis and my research. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 comprise the analysis of the Ecuadorean and Colombian state documents, NGO sources and published academic texts on the armed conflict in Colombia and Plan Colombia and their consequences for Ecuador. Chapter 6 offers conclusions.
Chapter 2 : Theoretical framework

This research is informed by the notion that discourses are constructed under the exercise of power, which contributes to the structuring of the relations between different social agents (Howarth 2000: 9). I follow Foucauldian approach about power/knowledge regimes, indicating that “there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations” (Foucault cited in Howarth 2000: 77). This means that knowledge embedded in certain discourses is linked to particular power relations and social dynamics. It also means that ideas about, and representations of social realities are not politically innocent. Finally, it means that language and texts are also part and parcel of social relations of power. It is those power relations that I want to address when analyzing the written sources about the effects of Colombian conflict and *Plan Colombia* on Ecuador. To do so, I am aided theoretically by Stuart Hall’s ideas about politics of representation, which is directly informed by Foucault’s theorizing of power/knowledge regimes. Two specific representational strategies make those theoretical perspectives more concrete, and more pertinent for my research: Othering and Securitization. Finally, I am also informed by Critical Discourse Analysis as an important politically engaged analytical perspective, informed by Foucauldian understanding of power/knowledge and significance of the use of language in representation.

2.1. Theoretical perspectives: power/knowledge and the politics of the representation

According to Stuart Hall, “representation means using language to say something meaningful about, or to represent the world meaningfully, to other people” (1997: 15). This means that representation is social practice embedded in power relation, and that language and texts are crucial aspects of this practice. Fairclough argued that “Texts are social spaces in which two fundamental social processes simultaneously occur: cognition and representation of the world and social interaction” (1995: 6). I will use their insights to analyze production of meanings and social process related to representation of the Colombian armed conflict, *Plan Colombia*, and their effects on Ecuador.

Wenden (2005: 90) suggests that “reality is not perceived but rather constructed by linguistic representation”. This implies a competition over meaning, which is related to power. Power here needs to be understood not as
physical coercion, but in cultural and symbolic terms. Power to represent someone or something in certain way may have consequences in the real world, beyond the written or spoken language (Hall, 1997:10). The production of meanings is important as it is related to defining social realities and relations, such as for example, what is “normal” and who belongs, and as a consequence, what is abnormal and who is excluded.

Such understanding of the politics of representation will be used in this study to analyze the ways different actors are writing about the situation in Ecuador. Wenden (2005: 91) indicates that “a hierarchy is formed among the competing representations with the winner’s being given primacy as a way of framing a particular issue, and taking into account the acknowledged power of discourse as a principle of social action, in the selection of social actions taken to deal with it.”

Hall (1997: 6) identifies two ways of approaching production of meanings: the semiotic and the discursive. While the first one is concerned with the role of language, the second is interested in understanding the effects and consequences of the representation – its politics. The discursive approach is especially important for this research, as it is also concerned with “how the knowledge which a particular discourse produces connects with power, regulates conduct, makes up or construct identities and subjectivities, and defines the way certain things are represented, thought about, practiced and studied” (Hall 1997: 6). This political dimension of discourse will be discussed as an important aspect of the Critical Discourse Analysis. But first, I wish to address two specific representational strategies in which both language and politics are significant: Othering and Securitization.

2.2. Representational strategies

2.2.1. The construction of the Other

Edward Said’s conceptualization of the Self and the Other in his analysis of Orientalism highlights that the creation of knowledge about something or someone is vital in shaping power relations, while at the same time locates the Self’s Others in negative terms, such as exotic, alien, dangerous, unreliable or a threat. This means that the Other is represented in binary opposition to the Self, creating a hierarchy where one is privileged and the other is underprivileged (Moosavinia 2011: 105). Moreover, there seems to be an underlying violence in representing the Other, as it has become a normal usage to discuss about others with hostility and aggression. This may happen again as a result of the location of power in the discourses (Calia 2011: 62).
Othering also implies a contradictory process of constructing the Other as a passive object of representation, which needs to be studied, explored, classified and in many cases “saved” (Balibar 2006: 30). The result is that the Other is seen as lacking agency and as vulnerable, in need for salvation, which is also inscribed as a power relation due to dependency of the Other on the Self. The creation of the Other “projects the imaginary figure of an alien or external collective ‘other’, who at the same time becomes ‘reified’ as object of domination and knowledge, and becomes ‘fantastic’ as a threatening double, or an essential enemy” (Balibar 2006: 25).

Stuart Hall’s concepts of difference and stereotyping are useful here. Difference implies that in many ways the politics of representation is informed by binary oppositions (e.g. black/white, male/female, rich/poor, victim/perpetrator, good/bad) that make use of a reductionist and over-simplified ways of creation of meaning. Power relations determine the prevalence of one representation over the other. Stereotyping is important for the present analysis as it shows how textual and visual representations are used to reduce people to a few, fixed and simplified characteristics. In this way, it is possible to assign someone a membership to a determined group of people under the labels such as class, gender, age, nationality, refugee status, citizenship, or race, thus to create the Other. This representational strategy is investigated in this research by the use of categorization and framing as analytical tools.

In concordance with Hall (1997) and the notion of politics of difference, Murdick et al. (2004:312) point out that the creation of the Other is made by the surrounding society – be it government, NGOs or academia. In this way, the construction of the Other goes beyond the notion of a simple stranger, a victim or a perpetrator, to reach the level of an entirely different set of human values. Indeed, for societies it has been historically common to define all that is different from a perceived Self as the Other, which has been the cause of condemnation and exclusion.

### 2.2.2. Securitization and the “speech act”

The use of a “speech act” is, according to Van Leeuwen (1993: 195), the basic unit of the analysis of discourse as a practice. “Speech act” can integrate a diversity of language features and functions, such as to predict, to declare intention, to evaluate, to identify, to classify, etc.

Securitization as a concept represents an important way to understand the relation between politics and discourses in the realm of national security.
According to Waever (2011: 469) securitization occurs when a “securitizing actor” claims “an existential threat to a valued referent object in order to make the audience tolerate extraordinary measures that otherwise would not have been acceptable.” The “valued referent object” may be the state, the local or global community, the way of life, etc.

The notion of securitization assumes the enunciation of security as creating by itself a new social order, where the use of “normal politics” has shifted towards “extraordinary politics.” For the success of securitization, two rules must be observed: a) an internal rule, which refers to the “speech act” itself, its grammatical and linguistic composition and b) an external rule, which is related to the social and contextual position necessary to perform the “speech act”. Thus, for securitization to occur, an actor must convince an audience of the legitimacy of the stated necessary actions, but the actor is able to do so only when holding a position of power (Taureck 2006: 2).

As stated, the role of language within securitization is vital, as it positions specific actors or issues as existentially threatening to a particular political community. The articulation of the “speech act” is the mechanism through which language—spoken or written—constitutes security (McDonald 568). Therefore, when something or someone is labelled as a security issue, it then becomes one, such as “terrorism”, “drug cartels” or “refugees”.

Despite some criticisms that the theory of securitization has received (in terms of the narrowness of the notion of security and the limitedness of the “speech act”; Balzacq 2005; Stritzel 2007; McDonald 2008), it is helpful to my understanding why some issues around Plan Colombia receive more attention than others (e.g. asylum seekers over local population).

2.3. Analytical approach: Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)

Fairclough (1995: 23) describes the CDA as a process that integrates a) analysis of the text, b) analysis of the processes of text production, consumption and distribution, and c) sociocultural analysis of the discursive event as a whole. This approach is useful for the present analysis as it facilitates the integration of analysis of discourses as reflective of social power relations, and the language used in the analyzed written sources. Moreover, it allows making visible the existent “connections between properties of the texts and social processes and relations (ideologies, power relations) which are generally not obvious to people who
produce and interpret those texts” (Fairclough 1995: 97). Indeed, one important analytical category of the CDA is opacity, which refers to the linkages between power, ideology and language that may be unclear to those involved, indicating that social practice is bound up with causes and effects which may not be at all apparent (Bourdieu in Fairclough 1995: 133). In this sense, the CDA is concerned with both the presences and the absences in a text in order to contribute to “making visible” the “invisible”. This attention to invisible links CDA to Foucault’s and Hall’s insistence that what is absent from a discourse or a text is as important as what is present, and as indicative of the relations of power between the social actors.

Mumby and Strohl (1991: 318) quote Derrida’s concept of “metaphysics of presence” through which the boundaries between what is good, true or acceptable and what is not, are drawn in the form of binary oppositions. In such relational opposition, one of the meanings prevails over the other, as a direct consequence of power in social relations. Likewise, Derrida’s the notion of “signified absence” is considered, as it relates to hierarchical structural formations of meanings through a system of inclusion and exclusion (Mumby and Strohl 1991: 319). The construction process takes place through systematic absenting of individuals or groups: “the voice of certain interest groups is marginalized such that they are positioned as other within the system of organizational power relations” (Ibid). These concepts link well with the analytical tools of framing and categorization, used in this study to analyze the sources.
Chapter 3: Ecuadorean and Colombian government policies

In order to understand the context within which the policy documents regarding the effects of Plan Colombia have been produced by the government of Ecuador, it is vital to first explore the content of Plan Colombia and the Colombian Policy of Defense and Democratic Security. Both were produced by the Colombian government in relation to the armed conflict and the border security. In the second section of this chapter, the Ecuadorean national policies created in response to the expansion of the Colombian armed conflict in the Ecuadorean territory are analyzed: Plan Ecuador and the Refugee Policy.

3.1. Plan Colombia and the Policy of Defense and Democratic Security

The analysis of Plan Colombia provides an initial context for the understanding of the priorities and strategies set by the Colombian government at that time. In addition, I analyze a second official Colombian document, the Policy of Defense and Democratic Security published in 2003, where a shift from the discourse in Plan Colombia is identified. Both documents are relevant to understand the expansion of the conflict to Ecuador and other neighboring countries, and its representations.

Three main frames in those documents inform the representation of the conflict in Colombia: (i) war on drugs frame (ii) war on terror frame and (iii) securitization frame.

3.1.1. War on drugs frame

Plan Colombia was created by the Colombian government led by Andres Pastrana, in 1999. Andres Pastrana was the 30th President of Colombia from 1998 to 2002. His presidency is remembered for negotiations with the two guerrilla groups,

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There is a third Colombian national document, a policy called Patriotic Plan, which was implemented in 2003 specifically in the southern departments of Colombia – two of which border with Ecuador - in order to definitely eradicate the illegal drug crops and production. This is said to be the last phase of Plan Colombia, but with a different name (Leal 2006). However, this document is not available online, hence is not analyzed.
FARC and ELN, but also for breaking off such negotiations. *Plan Colombia* (1999) was introduced by Pastrana as a national plan for peace, security and prosperity. A strong commitment is set since the very beginning of the document in order to reflect the government as the main actor in providing solutions to the protracted conflict in the country. Five sections provide a general overview of the main concerns of the government in the context of armed violence. However, the solutions for victims of violence and forcefully displaced are barely mentioned.

Yanow (2000: 11) states that “frames direct attention toward some elements while simultaneously diverting attention from other elements.” In this case, drug trafficking is portrayed as the central problem, offering probably the most reiterative terms in *Plan Colombia*: “drugs”, “drug trafficking”, “illicit crops” or “fight against drug trafficking” are repeated in almost every paragraph. Drugs are defined as causing continuation of the armed conflict, and the main threat to the stability and consolidation of peace in the country. All the actions and strategies of the *Plan* suggest that there is a “war on drugs” and not an ideological, social and political conflict that has lasted for decades. Indeed, according to the government the improvement of the living conditions of the population requires economic and social alternatives to an “economy of drugs”.

My criticism of this frame is not that drug trafficking should not be addressed, but that all national resources and actions are directed towards this problem, while neglecting all others. According to Yanow (2000: 11) this happens because policy-makers, in this case the Colombian central government, value elements of the armed conflict differently, aiming at public recognition and validation, which in this case is closely related to the United States anti-drugs policies. The following extract shows the use of the war on drugs frame:

The government has established the fight against drugs production and trafficking as one of its priorities. Drug trafficking represents a threat to the internal security of Colombia and other nations […] the enormous revenues from drug trafficking and their destabilizing power have become a main cause for the violence in all the country (Government of Colombia 1999: 17) (translation GVVI)⁴.

Likewise, the peace process is constantly associated with the fight against drug trafficking, which requires strategic alliances with the international actors, the military and the civil society. *Plan Colombia* creates an inexorable nexus between peace and fight against drug trafficking, which allows Government to make any decision and justifies all actions under the label of “peace process”⁵. However, this

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⁴ I have translated to English all the quotations from the documents/ texts originally written in Spanish to be included in this paper.
kind of “peace” seems to neglect the root causes of the armed conflict and the humanitarian crisis that decades of violence have created in the country.

3.1.2. War on terror frame

In 2002, Álvaro Uribe was elected as the successor of Andres Pastrana and in 2003 he presented the Policy of Defense and Democratic Security (2003: 12) as “the framework under which the National Government draws the basic lines of the Democratic Security to protect the rights of Colombians and to enhance […] the democratic authority wherever it may be threatened” (translation GVVI). The new frame – war on terror - is used to describe all sort of activities carried out by the armed groups in the context of the armed conflict. It is important to remember that this Policy was released in the post-September 11 context. The international discourse of “war on terror” led by the United States was applied in the Policy of Defense and Democratic Security enabling a renewed and aggressive military approach to the problems of drug trafficking and irregular armed groups in Colombia (Cadena 2011: 125), as the following excerpt shows:

Now, the major threat to democracy in Colombia and the world is terrorism […] illegal armed organizations are targeting civilians through the use of non-conventional weapons and deliberate attacks. Acts such as kidnapping, murder of civilians and destruction of infrastructure have been recognized as acts of terrorism by the international community (Government of Colombia 2003: 20) (translation GVVI).

This statement evidences a shift in the discourse of the Colombian government, and words such as “terrorism”, “terrorist”, “terror”, “fight against terrorism” and “terrorists” are constantly repeated in the document. In this way, the categories of “us”, the Colombian and United States governments, versus “them”, terrorists, are created in order to pursue specific actions against the targeted group which is reflected not only in public policies, but also in the public discourse (Yanow 2000: 49). In this case, the policy is aimed at identifying the guerrillas, the paramilitaries and drugs cartels with terrorism. This categorization justifies the declared objective of the Colombian government: to eradicate all kind of groups and activities associated with terrorist activities. Indeed, terrorism is portrayed as the main threat to the nation, democracy and the lives of all Colombians, while drug trafficking is seen as an ally to terrorism.
3.1.3. Securitization frame

Both Colombian policies can be related to the securitization, as a number of measures are proclaimed necessary in the name of security, and justified through a “speech act” (Jensen 2013: 83). In Plan Colombia a justification of the need for increased presence of military and policing throughout the country is noted, not only to counteract drug cartels or armed groups involved in drug trafficking, but also to protect civilians and promote human rights. This is a mechanism that would allow the government to recover its presence and the monopoly of violence and justice. Indeed, one of the objectives implies the military control of the south of the country with the justification of eradicating every illegal crop or source of drugs production.

Plan Colombia also presents a contradictory standpoint regarding international “intervention”. On the one hand, the Colombian government rejects all forms of “intervention” from countries that could be affected by the expansion of the internal conflict, such as the neighboring countries. Even attempts of collective action in the peace process are discouraged. At the same time, the Plan requires the “intervention” from the United States and the European Union, and international organizations such as the IMF and World Bank, which are supposed to play a key role in economic development of Colombia. The United States and the European Union are seen as allies in the fight against drug trafficking – as the main consumers of drugs produced in Colombia. They are also required to create opportunities for trade and investment for the country, so at some point they are portrayed as “saviors” of Colombia.

The securitization frame is more explicit in the Policy of Defense and Democratic Security, where through the use of the term “democratic security”, everything becomes a valued referent object of security that needs protection (Waever 2011: 469). Accordingly, the actions carried out by the government were reflected in the states of emergency, increased militarization, and temporary suppression of citizen rights, very similar to the actions undertaken by the United States in the context of the Patriotic Act (Cadena 2011: 127).

It is interesting to find another contradiction in this policy. At the beginning of the document, it is stated that the framework that informs the actions to be carried out towards “democratic security” implies a series of coordinated strategies between government and civil society. However, in the section where the objectives of the policy are established, the civil society is absent. Except for one of the objectives, other four focus on the increasing militarization of the country, the recovery of the territory, the protection of sovereignty and the fight against
drug cartels and organizations. It would seem that the “democratic security” is again a state security and not a citizen security.

Finally, one of the strategies of the policy is to promote an increasing presence of the government in the border zones of the country. The cooperation with the neighboring countries is said to be vital to this end. Nonetheless, it has been clear during the review of the two policies that the Colombian government does not acknowledge that its actions and strategies may have repercussions on neighboring countries. There is a lack of consideration of possible humanitarian crisis, displacement of the population or expansion of violence to other countries, as no strategy contemplates these kinds of situations. These issues are absent from the document, and “what is not framed – that is, what is beyond the discursive horizon, can result in under-representation of critical issues with serious consequences for the non-labelled” (Moncrieffe 2007: 8).

3.2. Ecuadorean national policies

When Rafael Correa Delgado was elected as President of Ecuador in 2007, one of his main national policies was Plan Ecuador. He required the public institutions to jointly work towards the development and peace of the border population. On April 2007 Correa Delgado presented Plan Ecuador as a state policy aimed at counteracting the effects of Plan Colombia on the northern provinces of Ecuador. Due to the importance of Plan Ecuador as a comprehensive policy, I selected it as a key document for the analysis. In addition to Plan Ecuador, I analyzed the Plan Ecuador Agenda, released in 2011. Finally, because of the repercussions that the new Refuge Policy of 2008 had in the country, I also analyze this policy. It is a document that helps understand the ways in which refugee concerns are represented by the Ecuadorean government. Three main frames are identified in those documents: (i) the state as “container” frame, (ii) securitization frame and (iii) refugees as vulnerable population frame.

3.2.1. State as “container” frame

Cienki (2013: 303) explains that public policies are frequently informed by the frame of the state as the “container”, which applies to both foreign and internal

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5 Rafael Correa Delgado has been the president of Ecuador since 2007. He has been reelected for the third time in 2013 and his presidential period will last until 2017. He is known for his left-wing political orientation and his sympathy for similar government in the region, such as Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia.
actions of containment carried out by governments, as in the cases of immigration, anti-terrorism or border security. In this case, this metaphor is used to explain the frame through which Ecuadorean government represents itself as the main actor in providing solutions to the deteriorating situation in the border zone as a consequence of armed violence in Colombia, and the Plan Colombia.

One of the common statements found in all three Ecuadorean documents is that the three border provinces – Carchi, Esmeraldas and Sucumbios - have been traditionally neglected, excluded and isolated by former governments. The Plan Ecuador and the Refugee Policy clearly blame previous administrations for the precarious situation in the border provinces. So does the Plan Ecuador Agenda of 2011. This neglect is said to be the one of the main causes of extreme poverty of the population, as well as the lack of development, while the Colombian armed conflict is mentioned as an aggravating circumstance to the already difficult situation of the border communities.

In the Plan Ecuador Agenda (2011: 11) it is mentioned that the country requires an effective plan to counteract the negative effects of the Colombian armed conflict in the border zone, especially in relation to drug trafficking, “irregular” armed groups and smuggling. Again, the frame of the state as “container” of the spill-over effects of the violence from Colombia is evident in the policy. It is also mentioned that the development in the border provinces is weak, while the existent social inequalities are deepened by the Colombian armed conflict as a consequence of forced displacement, drugs production and all related illegal activities.

Despite the preoccupation of the Ecuadorean government to solve the situation in the border zone, there are some issues that remain invisible in the national policies. The existing problems in the three provinces are mainly portrayed as a legacy of neglect by previous governments, but less is said about the new social dynamics in the border towns. First, none of the documents seriously engages with the risks created by the Colombian armed conflict for the local population living in the border zone, such as forced displacement of Ecuadoreans. The possibilities of enrolment of the population in illegal activities or armed groups are also not considered as a priority to be addressed within the Plan Ecuador. Second, the ways in which militarization and policing of the villages may affect the living conditions of the population are not acknowledged. Finally, the different needs of different groups – indigenous, Afro-Ecuadorians, mestizos, youth, and women - living in the border provinces are not properly identified. These absences clearly contrast with the way Colombian refugees are represented in the official documents of the Ecuador’s Government (see below).
In addition, it is interesting to notice the absence of the Colombian government as a partner in the Ecuadorean national policies. This may be a sign of the lack of coordination or friendly relations between the two governments at the moment of the elaboration of the documents. Indeed, the 2008 and 2011 documents refer to a context of the diplomatic tensions after the military incident of Angostura in 2008.6

It is clear that the Ecuadorean government is constantly characterized as the main actor tasked with bringing solutions to the problem of the border zone, while the Colombian government, when present in the document, is mostly portrayed as unable to contain the armed conflict within its own borders. An intention of such portrayal may be to show the lack of commitment of the Colombian government towards its refugees in neighboring countries. Furthermore, the implementation of Plan Colombia has been publicly exposed by the Ecuadorean government as an intervention and expansion of the United States imperialism, while Colombian government was accused of lack of interest towards effects of its conflict on the neighbors.

### 3.2.2. Securitization frame

The overall objective of this Plan (Plan Ecuador) is to promote a process of peace, development and security in the northern border zone, which locates the human being at the center of a state policy aimed at building a culture of peace, human security and quality of life (Government of Ecuador 2007: 9) (translation GVVI). The northern border zone has received special attention from the government of Rafael Correa since the beginning of his mandate in 2007. The current Ecuador's National Constitution of 2008 clearly establishes in the article 249 that “the cantons with territories that are located totally or partially within the northern border zone of forty kilometers shall receive preferential attention” (National Constitution of Ecuador, 2008: 123) (translation GVVI). This may help to understand

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6 The 2008 Angostura incident was a diplomatic stand-off between the South American countries of Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela. It began with an incursion of Colombian military into Ecuadorean territory across the Putumayo River, on March 1, 2008, leading to the deaths of over twenty militants, including the leader Raul Reyes and sixteen other members of the FARC. This incursion led to increased tension between Colombia and Ecuador and the movement of Venezuelan and Ecuadorean troops to their borders with Colombia.
the importance that the national government has given to the situation in the border zone since the year 2007 as the valued referent object to be protected, which is constantly reflected in the public discourse (Waever 2011).

*Plan Ecuador* (2007) has been created – as it is stated in the document - in order to face the impacts of *Plan Colombia* on Ecuadorean territory, and enforce peace and development in a region that has been deeply affected by poverty, exclusion and violence. The Colombian armed conflict is mentioned in the context of increasing insecurity in the border zone, linked to the number of issues. The first issue is the penetration of illegal groups and organizations into Ecuadorean territory, causing damages to people and property. This is seen as destabilization of the bilateral relations between Ecuador and Colombia. The second issue is the huge number of displaced Colombians crossing the border. This is not mentioned as a humanitarian problem, but as a social, and implicitly, security problem. It is stated that the uncontrolled flow of people into Ecuador has created new forms of criminality and violence, thus defining all Colombians who cross into Ecuador as (potential) criminal and violent subjects. Another issue is the aerial sprays of glyphosate, noted as a cause for displacement of Ecuadorean peasants and an environmental damage.

### 3.2.3. Refugees and vulnerability frame

In all these documents the concerns of the Ecuadorean government are mainly focused on the increased flows of displaced population coming from Colombia, requiring adequate intervention from the state. The openness of the state policies towards the refugees is highlighted, while at the same time the need for joint work with UNHCR and other foreign organizations is recognized. It is interesting to notice that refugees are constantly associated with vulnerability and need for protection, even though they have also been associated with (potentials for) criminality and violence.

Throughout the three policies the state shows strong commitment to fight against xenophobia and discrimination towards Colombian refugees in Ecuador. There are concrete programs and strategies in order to promote the inclusion and acceptance of refugees into Ecuadorean society. For example, in *Plan Ecuador* it is mentioned that “it is important to adopt measures aimed at eradicating all forms of exclusion, xenophobia or discrimination. To this end there will be developed different activities with a high symbolic effect which allow consolidating favorable attitudes” (Government of Ecuador 2007: 3) (translation GVVI). The stress is, surprisingly, on symbolic, rather than social and economic actions.
It is also interesting to mention that according to the government, the source of negative attitudes can be found in the wrong-doings of media: “media do not always contribute for the population to have solidarity towards the refugees” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador 2008: 28) (translation GVVI).

At the same time, displaced Colombian population that has not acquired, and sometimes do not want, the legal status of refugee, are often depicted in the policies as “invisible”. According to the government, “invisibles” comprise almost the 60% of the Colombian population living in Ecuador, mostly located in the northern provinces of Ecuador. This particularly refers to youth, including girls, boys and teenagers who have been forcibly displaced due to the armed conflict (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador 2008).

Only in the initial document of Plan Ecuador (2007: 4) it is acknowledged that local Ecuadorian population is affected, some more than other, by the Colombian armed conflict. The indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian communities are portrayed as living in extreme poverty, having unsatisfied basic needs and being the ones who suffer more from the effects of armed conflict. The case of the Awá indigenous community is seen as the most complex as their territory extends in both Ecuador and Colombia. However, even as these communities are said to be more vulnerable, Plan Ecuador does not mention how they will be assisted.

3.3. Conclusions

Due to different overall objectives and political and social contexts in which each national policy was created, a comparison between Plan Colombia and Plan Ecuador may be problematic. Nevertheless, it is possible to mention some commonalities and differences. For instance, the similar notion of peace through military means is applied in both documents, which is why the two governments contribute to increased militarization and policing of the territories. This is also said to be the way to protect the population against human rights violations. Likewise, they portray themselves as the only actors capable of bringing solutions to the situation in each country. Finally, both governments subscribe to securitization as one of the main discourses in dealing with their respective problems. In relation to the main differences, Plan Colombia is designed as a military and anti-drugs strategy within a “peace-building” framework, while Plan Ecuador is focused on peace-building, security and development of the border provinces, with an emphasis on humanitarian concerns, but again with strong reliance on military means.
Chapter 4: Local and international NGOs, research institutions and supranational agencies

This section is aimed at analyzing the content of the documents produced by various NGOs, research institutions and supranational agencies in relation to the effects of the Colombian armed conflict and Plan Colombia in Ecuador. It is divided into two parts: the first reviews the representations made by Ecuadorean organizations, while the second focuses on the documents produced by different supra- and international non-governmental organizations and agencies.

4.1. Ecuadorean civic organizations and research institutions

Local civic organizations working in the northern border zone of Ecuador seldom produce written documents or publish information as an online resource. Consequently, I analyze here only four local documents related to the impact of the Colombian armed conflict in Ecuador. There is no unanimous trend of discussing such effects, and the fact that the organizations are local does not determine the topics they select to write about, nor reflects a preoccupation with the situation of Ecuadorean population. Two of the NGOs - Foundation Alejandro Labaka and the Observatory for Children and Youth - have studied the situation of Colombian refugees in Ecuador, while the Regional Foundation of Human Rights Consultancy –INREDH- and the Ecuadorean Scientific Commission emphasize the plight of local Ecuadorean population and the ways in which the conflict has affected them. INREDH (2008) acknowledges the need for research about how has local population been dealing with the expansion of the armed conflict, especially the indigenous communities living in the border zone.

The main frames used by Ecuadorean civic organizations and the research institutions are: (i) Colombian refugees and vulnerability frame and (ii) Ecuadorean population and vulnerability frame.

4.1.1. Colombian refugees and vulnerability frame

It is important to consider that the organizations using this frame (Observatory for Children and Youth and Foundation Alejandro Labaka) do not work specifically in the field of refugees or displacement, but in a broader context of human rights. Their decision to focus on refugees may be related to the fact that
both studies have been financed by international organizations, part of the United Nations system – UNICEF and UNHCR. This could mean that the themes of the researches are set by donors and not by the local organizations themselves. The main effect of the Colombian armed conflict, according to the two documents, is that Ecuador has become the number one refuge destination for Colombian forcefully displaced population. As such, there is lack of information about other effects of Plan Colombia, including the displacement of Ecuadoreans and other dynamics of the conflict faced by the bordering populations in Ecuador.

Colombian asylum seekers and refugees are said to face many difficulties in Ecuador, especially in terms of discrimination and xenophobia. There is a reiterative use of the word “discrimination” especially in relation to the lack of access to basic services like education and healthcare, or recognition. Moreover, both documents consistently use the category of “invisibility” to describe the living conditions of Colombian refugees in Ecuador and both argue that there is a lack of understanding of their real situation. It is said that some of the refugees actually prefer to be “invisibles”, so they cannot be traced or recognized, that their opportunities are limited and their rights are constantly denied and ignored by the society.

The terms “vulnerability” and “vulnerable” are used to emphasize the need of protection for refugees in the country. Particularly, girls and female adolescents are portrayed as “more vulnerable” than male, exposed to a “double risk” of age and gender: “one of the most vulnerable groups to abandonment and exploitation are the girls […] they are in risk of exploitation and sexual abuse, or forced labor as domestic servants” (Observatory for Children and Youth 2010: 48) (translation GVVI). Thus, vulnerability is chosen as a frame in correspondence to the common knowledge around refugees, meaning that the level of vulnerability is the measure to consider an individual “worthy of public or private charitable assistance” (Black 1994: 360). Moreover, this justifies the moral responsibility of the states and development aid agencies to protect them (Black 1994: 360).

In addition, the use of specific categories allows the creation of a dichotomy between “victim” and “victimizer”. According, to Moncrieffe (2007: 2) the way in which groups of people are labeled and categorized are used to sustain a particular frame, in this case the vulnerability attached to refugees. Ecuadorean population is mainly mentioned as an “adversary” who discriminates, rejects and mistreats. The negative attitudes against Colombian refugees are also linked to public actors, such as the militaries, the police or the authorities. Reflecting on a particular street march against the increasing violence in one of the Ecuadorean bordering towns, the report from Foundation Alejandro Labaka (2012: 19) notes that Colombians are blamed for the problems arising in the zone: “In a march, the authorities were the ones holding signs with phrases like ‘Go out, Colombians!”
[...] the rhetoric of discrimination came from them, the authorities, the institutions” (translation GVVI).

4.1.2. Ecuadorean population and vulnerability frame

The second frame identified in the work of local civic organizations is the emphasis on vulnerability attached to Ecuadorean population reflected in two documents elaborated by the Ecuadorean Scientific Commission and INREDH. Here, the shift in membership in categorization is evident, although the frame of vulnerability remains the same: local Ecuadoreans now become the main membership group filling in the category of vulnerable population. Furthermore, the two reports note a clear use of the “politics of vulnerability” among local civic organizations, where the consideration of vulnerability distinguishes between different groups that may receive, or not, assistance and assessment, closely related to the allocation of resources and funds (Black 1994: 362).

It is interesting to notice the difference in the content and language used by the Foundation and Observatory that wrote about Colombian refugees, on the one hand, and INREDH and the Ecuadorean Scientific Commission, that wrote about Ecuadorean local population, on the other. In the latter, the main preoccupation is with the situation of Ecuadoreans living in the border zone. Indeed, they acknowledge the presence of Colombian forcefully displaced population, but insist that their focus is on Ecuadorean population. Particularly INREDH (2008), as an institution working for the defense of human rights, stresses that there is a lack of understanding of the multiple ways in which the local population is being affected by the Colombian armed conflict. Even if a lot of research has been done about the topics of Colombians refuge and the effects of fumigations, this is described as the top of the iceberg of deeper problems faced by Ecuadoreans in the borderline, especially by indigenous communities. The document produced by the Ecuadorean Scientific Commission (2007: 16) states that the effects of fumigations on the Colombian population are not considered, as this is a competence of their own government. This, however, means negation of the fact that Ecuador’s government carries responsibility for the Colombians in Ecuador. The Commission stresses its use of a scientific method aimed at demonstrating the different impacts of the aerial fumigations while at the same time unveiling the environmental destruction produced by the chemicals, as well as the vulnerabilities created for the local population. The call upon scientific expertise acts here as an added layer of authority, and reflects the power of science as a knowledge producer, within the contemporary power/knowledge regimes.
Both INREDH and the Ecuadorean Scientific Commission use a discourse of denunciation against the actions of the Colombian government, particularly in relation the implementation of Plan Colombia and the involvement of the government of the United States, which is said to have negative effects not only for Colombians but also for Ecuadoreans living in the border zone. In the following extracts their discourses are evident:

This study is a microscopic analysis of the consequences of an international policy in our northern border, which we may also call the Micro-ethnography of a conflict. This means that in the daily spaces of the actors, one can understand the impact of Plan Colombia, as a massive violation of human rights (INREDH 2008: 22) (translation GVVI).

The establishment of a system of military logic for high impact in the control of illegal coca crops through aerial sprays of herbicide (Plan Colombia) has produced not only negative effects, fear and uneasiness of Ecuadorean communities living in the border zone, but also the criticism from the international scientific community (Ecuadorean Scientific Commission 2007: 15) (translation GVVI).

According to these sources, the effects of Colombian armed conflict and Plan Colombia are broader than the ones presented by the first two documents which focused on Colombian refugees. The first effect mentioned by the two latter texts is the aerial fumigations and its effects in the Ecuadorean border zone, which is said to impact negatively not only in the crops and the environment, but also in the physical and mental health of the population. A second effect closely related to the fumigations is the displacement of Ecuadoreans, especially of members of indigenous communities. Plan Colombia is said to cause “fragmentation” of these communities. The third effect is the militarization of the villages through the presence Colombian and Ecuadorean armies. Particularly, in the documents elaborated by INREDH, there is denunciation of arbitrary interventions and increasing presence of Ecuadorean soldiers in the communities with the excuse of searching for criminal or armed groups. Another effect is related to the presence of Colombian paramilitaries and guerrillas. It is acknowledged that they act differently, but have a widespread presence in towns and jungle zones (Ecuadorean Scientific Commission 2007; INREDH 2008).

### 4.2. International NGOs and supra national agencies

In this section I analyze documents of seven different foreign organizations in order to identify the categories and frames used in representation of the effects of the Colombian armed conflict in Ecuador. The criteria of selecting documents was
that they contain at least one section dedicated to the situation in Ecuador, as most of the sources tend to focus solely on the situation in Colombia.

These documents present a variety of missions, views, and objectives. In this section, the constant use of two main frames is identified: (i) refugees and vulnerability frame and (ii) “Spill-over” of the violence frame.

4.2.1. Refugees and vulnerability frame

Among the international organizations there is a predominance of those working in the field of forced migrations, displacement and refuge, which means that almost half of the documents deal with these topics. Even if the focus on the situation of the refugee population is coherent with their missions and objectives, the use of “vulnerability” to represent Colombian refugees indicate the shared framing strategies. As Etnman (1993: 52) mentions “a frame highlights certain events as problems, identifies their source, offers moral judgments and commends particular solutions”.

One of my main findings is that these organizations are concerned with the situation of refuge and displaced Colombian population in Ecuador fleecing violence, while paying much less attention to the situation of Ecuadorean populations living in “refugee-like status in their own countries for similar reasons” (Gupte and Mehta 2007: 64). The representation of Colombian refugees as “the most vulnerable” is related to the allocation of resources by the aid agencies and the states (Black 1994: 360).

A common pattern guides the way in which these organizations structure their reports, identified in five of the seven analyzed documents (WCRWC 2006; COALICO 2007; UNHCR 2007; UNFPA and ECLA 2010; JSR 2012). These reports usually start with legal framework for the protection of refugees; then offer quantitative data of the population in situation of refuge; and then give description of their living conditions and problems or challenges they face in the receptor country. This information is usually collected through direct interviews with the population, complemented with the data provided by experts and other agencies.

The findings are also structured in similar ways. First, the Ecuadorean government is characterized through an oppositional duality: constantly presented as a “traditionally open” government towards foreigners, but also criticized for becoming restrictive and unable to deal with the existing humanitarian crisis. As Cornwall and Fujita (2007: 56) state, international and supranational agencies tend to classify the states in terms of the global narrative of “good governance”, so any
evidence of “bad governance” promotes a narrative in which the state appears hostile to the “more vulnerable” –the poor, the refugees, the migrants – by active abuse or by neglect. In this case, the international organizations are critical of the Ecuadorean government, accusing it for inaction and disinterest in the situation of the displaced Colombian population.

In relation to categorization, labels like “corrupt”, “incapable”, “weak" and “intolerant” are attached to the Ecuadorean state, highlighting it as an important cause of the problems affecting Colombian refugees. Such “selective labelling” Moncrieffe (2007: 10) obscures other interpretations of the listed problems. Additionally, such categorization allows for the justification or rejection of past acts and, more importantly, entails new courses of action (Leudar et al. 2004: 263). In this case the action may imply the increasing need for international intervention in the country, following a moral judgment of the current precarious situation of Colombian refugees.

Discrimination and xenophobia against Colombian refugees by Ecuadoreans are a constant topic in the documents. Ecuadorean population is represented as adversary to Colombians refugees, those who discriminate and impede Colombians’ inclusion in the Ecuadorean society. It is said that the discrimination takes several forms, evidenced in difficult access to housing, education, health services and work. The Ecuadorean government and population are portrayed as those who discriminate and violate the rights of vulnerable Colombian population. The problem with such categories is their exclusivity and partiality. Yanow (2000: 50) clarifies that a set of labels implies two sorts of things about the issue represented: “first, the names or labels suggest that nothing has been left out: the categories are exhaustive. Second there is no overlap in category membership: the categories are discrete and no element fits into more than one category”.

As my earlier reflections indicate, however, both Colombian and Ecuadorean population in the border zones face similar vulnerabilities and abandonments by both respective governments. Furthermore, there are local Ecuadorean NGOs and population who are engaged in support of Colombian refugees. Thus, polarized and exclusive categorization of Colombian victims and Ecuadorean adversaries obscures this. Furthermore, without denying the difficult situation of Colombian refugees in Ecuador or excusing the discriminatory practices against them by local population, it is worth looking at some of the causes of local animosities. For example, Kelley (2007: 405) argues that refugees are often not well-received in host countries because international assistance provided to them is seen by local communities as improving others’ lives, while they still struggle against poverty and marginalization.
Finally, it is valid to re-consider the category of “vulnerability”. Moncrieffe (2007:3) states that, even where the goal of labeling is supposed to be positive, labels “can misrepresent whole categories of people; they can stigmatize and incite and/or sustain social and political discord”. The “vulnerability” label strips the labeled group of agency, creating a symbolic need of a “savior”. This is particularly so when the labels are gendered, as I will discuss later.

4.2.2. “Spill-over” of the Colombian armed conflict frame

Two of the international organizations - Assessment Mission to Ecuador’s Northern Border and Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre - produced documents with a partial focus on the situation of local population. The frame identified in these two documents is that the Plan Colombia and the violence of the conflict “spilled over” to Ecuadorean territory in a multiplicity of ways, which are mentioned but not analyzed in depth.

The report by the Assessment Mission to Ecuador’s Northern Border (2005) presents an overview of the situation of the local communities living in the three Northern provinces of the country. It is important to highlight that the report was also informed by the work done by local civic organizations operating in the border zone, which collaborated with the research carried out by the Mission. The second document is produced by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC, 2009), aimed at analyzing the humanitarian impact of the Colombian armed conflict in Ecuadorean territory. It is produced at the time when the expansion of the Colombian armed conflict in Ecuador was calling the attention of the different governments, organizations and media, as a consequence of the earlier mentioned 2008 incident in the Ecuadorean province of Sucumbios, where the Colombian army entered and attacked a FARC campsite and killed one of the main leaders of the guerrilla. This event became a reason for an increasing interest in the situation of the Ecuadorean communities living in the border zone. IDMC (2009: 1) acknowledges that the expansion of violence from the neighboring country has been affecting the border towns since 2000 and the implementation of Plan Colombia.

According to these sources, the border provinces suffer from the abandonment of the government, which is why the living conditions of the local Ecuadorean population are precarious, ridden with poverty and lack of basic services. Ecuadorean government is categorized in negative terms, as neglecting the population and failing to contain the “spill-over” violence from Colombia’s armed conflict.
The impact of the Colombian armed conflict is said to affect the normal life in the towns and villages of the border zone. Four main effects are mentioned by these organizations: first, the forced displacement of Ecuadorean communities as a consequence of the aerial fumigations by the Colombian government. Second, the increasing militarization of towns impedes free circulation and normal life of the population. It seems that instead of providing security, the military consider everyone as a suspect or collaborator of the FARC, so arbitrary detentions and interrogations are carried out. Third, the presence of illegal armed groups in the country resulted in violence, blackmailing and threats to the locals, situation that is underestimated and unregistered by the Ecuadorean government or the organizations working in the border zone. Finally, the forceful displacement of Colombians into Ecuadorean territory is mentioned, while similar situation of the Ecuadorean population in the border zone is absent from the reports.

4.3. Conclusions

Representations of Plan Colombia effects on Ecuador by non-governmental agencies and organizations are informed by very similar, rather fixed frames and categories. The most common frame in both local and international reports is the vulnerability associated with the forced displacement of Colombians in Ecuador. The aim of this paper is not to deny that exclusion, discrimination and marginalization are affecting Colombian refugees, but instead to question the simplification and stereotyping in the representations. The “voices” of refugees are represented and categorized according to the vulnerability frame; meanwhile the “voices” of Ecuadoreans are scarcely heard. With exception of two local civic organizations –INREDH and Ecuadorean Scientific Mission- the majority of these agencies have decided to make visible only one of the multiple aspects of the Colombian violence in Ecuador, and then, only from one perspective.
Chapter 5: Local and international academic sources

This chapter is focused on the work of Ecuadorean and foreign scholars. The importance of the representations made by academics lies in the ways their frames become a research paradigm, and contribute to “general theory that informs most scholarship on the operation and outcomes of any particular system of thought and action” (Entman, 1993: 54). Moreover, this is a process that allows the creation of “dominant meanings” which through framing receive “the highest probability of being noticed, processed and accepted by most people” (Entman, 1993: 54). The analysis is divided into two subsections; the first is related to the Ecuadorean academic sources, the second to international academia.

5.1. Ecuadorean academia

Thirteen academic texts by Ecuadorean authors, published in national and international journals and sponsored by national and international universities, were selected for analysis. Despite of dealing with different subject matters, at some point each of the thirteen studies make references to the broader implications of the expansion of the Colombian armed conflict in Ecuadorean territory. These studies are analyzed, as in the previous sections, following their dominant frames: (i) national security and bilateral relations frame and (ii) refugees and vulnerability frame.

5.1.1. National Security and Bilateral Relations frame

The first group of academic studies comprises the majority of all selected texts (Andrade-Garzon 2008; Alvaro 2011; Andrade 2004; Bonilla 2003; Gomez 2013; Moreano 2009; Moreano 2010; Rivera 2004; Sanchez de la Vega 2003; Vallejo 2010) and is dedicated to the theme of national security and bilateral relations. Most of the texts are informed by International Relations theories and concepts, which may explain why they are mainly concerned with national security policies, securitization, militarization, anti-drugs strategies and armed groups.

However, not all Ecuadorean scholars write in the same way about situation in Ecuador. There seems to be a difference between scholars sponsored by the local universities – especially Latin American School of Social Sciences
Ecuadorean scholars are interested in contextualizing Ecuador within international politics, in order to explain local concerns around the Colombian conflict. One of the common themes is the pressure by the governments of Colombia and United States to involve Ecuador in the armed conflict through different mechanisms. In fact, anti-drugs strategies and fight against terrorism are seen as “threats” that both the United States and Colombia have created in Ecuador. As Bonilla explains:

the increasing involvement of Ecuador in the Colombian conflict presents itself as undesirable from the perspective of security of the country. However, the external pressure – Colombian and American - is consistent and continuous (Bonilla 2003: 7) (translation GVVI).

There is also recognition that after 9/11 the war on terror discourse of the United States spread around the world, including to Colombia and the neighboring countries. The authors note that new anti-terrorist policies meant that the interpretation of the situation in Colombia needed to be adjusted to new terms. As a result, the armed groups in Colombia became “terrorists” and all their actions “acts of terrorism”. Consequently, the fight against terrorism in Colombia and its neighboring countries needed adequate anti-drugs strategies, as drugs trafficking was said to be the consequence of terrorism. According to Gomez (2013: 99), after 9/11 the national policies of Colombia and Ecuador adapted to United States policies of security: “in this way, Plan Colombia ceased to be an anti-drugs strategy to become a plan against insurgency, and in practice a plan against terrorism” (translation GVVI).

It is important to identify terminology by which Ecuadorean scholars represent effects of Colombian conflict on Ecuador. Andrade-Garzon (2008) uses

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7 Latin American School of Social Sciences (FLACSO) “is an inter-governmental autonomous organization for Latin America and the Caribbean dedicated to research, teaching and spreading of social sciences. It was created on April 17, 1957, following a UNESCO initiative at the Latin American Conference on Social Sciences in Rio de Janeiro” (Wikipedia, FLACSO). In this paper, when referring to FLACSO it is about the institution based on Quito, Ecuador
the word “spill-over” which points to the key responsibility of the Colombian government and its inability to contain the internal conflict. This discourse to some extent exonerates Ecuador from responsibility. Other authors (Andrade 2004; Gomez 2013; Sanchez de la Vega 2003) use the word “impact”, which connotes force or violence, but implies a need for an action on Ecuador’s side to address this impact. The words “repercussion”, “effect” and “consequence” (Bonilla 2003; Moreano 2009; Vallejo 2010) are more commonly used by Ecuadorean scholars, pointing to a logical result of determined actions (by Colombia) and may be considered as more neutral terms regarding actions of Ecuador’s government. Finally, the word “problem” is also used (Alvaro 2011; Moreano 2010; Rivera 2004), such as “the problem of refugees”, “the problem of drugs”, etc., bringing associations with something to be eradicated or solved, presumably by Ecuador.

Still, there is a lack of in-depth explanation or detailed information about the effects of Colombian conflict on Ecuador. It would seem that scholars are more interested in exploring the reactions of the Ecuadorean government and its policies of counteracting the effects of Colombian armed conflict, than the effects themselves. Besides, the IR and security approach are predominant. The following table summarizes the recurrent effects that local scholars mention (and not necessarily study in-depth) in their publications. Once again, it is interesting to note the absence of references to the displacement of Ecuadorean population:

**Table 2**

**Effects of Plan Colombia in Ecuador according to local academic sources**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Security</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Environmental</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drugs trafficking</td>
<td>Forced displacement of Colombians</td>
<td>Money laundering</td>
<td>Fumigations (land and crops destruction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(production and distribution)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Colombian illegal armed groups</td>
<td>Increase of criminality and insecurity</td>
<td>Goods smuggling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incursions of the Colombian army</td>
<td>Increase in the rate of homicides</td>
<td>Increase in military expenses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarization of the border zone</td>
<td>Widespread violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms trafficking</td>
<td>Social fragmentation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Andrade-Garzon 2008; Alvaro 2011; Andrade 2004; Bonilla 2003; Gomez 2013; Moreano 2009; Moreano 2010; Rivera 2004; Sanchez de la Vega 2003; Vallejo 2010.
Lastly, the authors reject the idea of a “serious risk” supposedly created by external – foreign governments - and internal actors – local government and media. Rather, as they are concerned with issues around national security, they tend to assess the “seriousness” of different risks differently. Rivera (2004: 19) for example notes that “drug problems” have been assumed to pose security threat to Ecuador without actually doing proper research to see if this is so.

5.1.2. Refugees and vulnerability frame

The second group of academic texts (Jimenez 2007; Ospina and Santacruz 2011; Ortega and Ospina 2012) is focused on the situation of Colombian refugees and forced displaced population in Ecuador. It is valid to note that three of the texts have been elaborated under the sponsorship of FLACSO, which may indicate the increasing interest of the graduate university in the topic of refugee and displacement of Colombians. The studies state their intention to “make visible” the situation of Colombians in Ecuador, and identify their living conditions and the challenges they face. Unlike other studies of refugees, these three chose to analyze the situation in urban areas and not in the northern border zone (which is a predominant topic in the case of the NGO sources). The structure of the texts present the same pattern: reasons for leaving Colombia, places of origin of the population, places of current residence, and description of their living conditions in terms of work, housing, education, health and social integration. The studies seem to use the same methodological approach as the studies conducted by NGOs: they combine quantitative data – statistics and figures - with qualitative data – interviews and testimonies - in order to give a broader context of the situation of Colombian refugees in Ecuador.

I note again the lack of references to other effects of Plan Colombia and the Colombian armed conflict, such as changed socio-political and economic dynamics and the effects on the local population.

In analyzing the situation of refugees, the scholars stress that the “problem” of refugees in Ecuador is not visible and that there is a lack of adequate definition of the Colombian population in the Ecuador's border zones. Sometimes they may be considered migrants, sometimes displaced, or refugees. Second, the category of vulnerability is again attached to Colombian refugees and their living conditions, with no mentioning of the vulnerabilities of the local Ecuadorian population. According to Gupte and Mehta (2007: 69) people who are displaced in their own countries are usually misrepresented in the debates or suffer from exclusionist labels. This seems to be the situation with Ecuadorians from the border zones displaced within Ecuador. Third, the issue of discrimination of the refugees and xenophobia of local Ecuadorians is one of the recurrent topics and
the use of direct testimonies of Colombian refugees produces moral categories of population. For example:

For me, there is nothing worse than Ecuadoreans […] We Colombians do not discriminate or are racist. And, if an Ecuadorean comes to Colombia we receive him with open arms, even if we know they are going to say bad thing about us (Focus Group Discussion extract cited in Ortega and Ospina 2012: 83) (translation GVVI).

The same study also includes testimonies of Ecuadorean population obtained from Focus Group Discussions, using quite similar negative, exclusionist terms:

We do not know what kind of people they [Colombians] are. They bring new forms of criminality, which we hear in the news. They bring lots of drugs and they make their own business here. They do whatever they want! (Focus Group Discussion extract cited in Ortega and Ospina 2012: 85) (translation GVVI).

The authors fail to reflect on similarities between the views expressed, but stress xenophobia among Ecuadoreans.

5.2. International academic sources

The Colombian armed conflict is a topic that has received much attention from scholars all around the world, making it one of the most studied internal armed conflicts. A total of thirteen academic texts have been selected for the analysis, grouped according to the dominant frames shared by the academics: (i) national security and bilateral relations, (ii) United States and “responsibility role” frame and (iii) refugees and vulnerability frame.

5.2.3. National security and bilateral relations frame

Most of the international academic texts are widely informed by notions of state security under the framework of International Relations. Again, the main concerns for the international scholars, quite like the Ecuadorean, are the national security policies adopted by Colombian and Ecuadorean governments in relation to the situation at the common border. This is particularly so for a large group of Colombian authors who write on the topic (Ahumada and Moreno 2003;
Gonzalez 2011; Velez 2011; Ortiz 2012; Aranguren 2013). Many of these authors have a background in Political Science and International Relations and belong to well-recognized Colombian universities, contributing to the production of dominant discourses on the conflict.

The common border and the dynamics related to the armed conflict and Plan Colombia seems to be a predominant topic for Colombian scholars. In the case of Velez (2011), Ortiz (2012) and Aranguren (2013) the role of the border zone in politics and relations between the two countries is central. Even if their studies do not solely focus on the effects of the armed conflict in the border zone, they acknowledge the need to include them in their analysis, especially in terms of the expansion of drugs trafficking, incursion of illegal armed groups and other criminal activities that have repercussions for the bilateral relations.

Ahumada and Moreno (2003) and Gonzalez (2011) write about the border zone, but they focus on the situation of forced displacement of Colombians in Ecuador. Interestingly, the issues of Colombian refugees and the impact that such flow of people has on the security policies adopted by Ecuadorian government are analyzed here under the frame of national security rather than vulnerability. Additionally, the issues of securitization and militarization are among the main interests of the Colombian scholars, where the Ecuadorian context exists only as the “opponent” to Colombia’s actions, policies and plans.

The following table sums up the main common topics of Colombian scholars:
Table 3

Effects of Colombian armed conflict in Ecuador according to Colombian scholars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security and military threats</th>
<th>Environmental threats</th>
<th>Economic threats</th>
<th>Societal threats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drugs trafficking</td>
<td>Fumigations and derived health problems</td>
<td>Limited bilateral commerce</td>
<td>Forced displacement of Colombians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of illegal armed groups</td>
<td>Fumigations and derived environmental degradation</td>
<td>Illegal economic revenues</td>
<td>Association of local population with illegal activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms trafficking</td>
<td>Payment of “vacunas”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Ahumada and Moreno 2003; Gonzalez 2011; Velez 2011; Ortiz 2012; Aranguren 2013.

Not all of these effects are considered by all authors. Ahumada and Moreno (2003) and Gonzalez (2013) see the forced displacement of Colombians towards Ecuadorean territory as the main implication of Colombian conflict for Ecuador. Ortiz (2012) directly links the increasing flows of Colombian refugees in Ecuador to Plan Colombia and acknowledges the expansion of violence, but place them alongside other problems, such as drugs trafficking, presence of armed groups and the increase of insecurity and violence in the border towns and villages in Ecuador. Lastly, Velez (2011) considers violence derived from drugs and arms trafficking as the main consequences of Colombian conflict for Ecuador.

Few authors analyze in depth the situation of Ecuadorean villagers affected by these or other “threats”. The exception is Aranguren (2013), who mentions that the presence of illegal armed groups in the border zone leads to increasing involvement of local Ecuadoreans with such activities.

In addition to Colombian scholars, two other authors (Schilling 2010; D’Arcier 2005) elaborate on the theme of security and IR. Schilling, a Brazilian scholar, develops a critical study of the Ecuadorean political responses to the security and defense challenges that exist in the region. Again, the topic of security is prevalent, particularly in terms of the effects of the Colombian armed conflict in the northern border zone of Ecuador. According to Schilling (2010: 44) there are diverse ways in which Ecuador is affected, particularly in the province of
Sucumbios: environmental damages as a consequence of the aerial fumigations, the humanitarian crisis of the Colombian forcefully displaced population, drugs trafficking and the presence of the illegal armed groups.

D’Arcier (2005) elaborates on the future repercussions of the Patriotic Plan in Ecuador. It is interesting to note that this author does not focus on Plan Colombia as the majority of other cited scholars do, but on the Colombian policies that were the latest to be implemented at the time of her study. The interest of this scholar in the security national policies of the affected countries is associated with her work in one of the most well-known military academies of France. D’Arcier (2005: 223-224) mentions several forms of the “displacement of violence”: 1) forced displacement of population; 2) displacement of violence associated with drugs and terrorism; and 3) displacement of insecurity, through the increase of crime, number of criminal groups and delinquency (translation GVVI).

5.2.2. United States and “responsibility role” frame

The frame of “responsibility role” mostly informs the work of academics from the United States (Millett 2002; Stanton 2005; Jaskoski 2012). The topic of national security is also predominant, but in this case the departure point of the authors is the role of the United States in addressing Colombian conflict as a regional – even international - threat to security and peace. Particularly, two out of three of the authors - Millett and Jaskoski, who are part of the Army and Naval schools in the US - are heavily influenced by the military perspective of the United States. The language and representations used by these two authors are informed by idea that the United States is “required” to end the crimes carried out by the “terrorist groups” in Colombia.

The three US scholars acknowledge that the “spill-over” effect or “regionalization” of the Colombian armed conflict represent more insecurity and violence for the Ecuadorian border zone, which includes the presence of “terrorist” groups and related activities such as drugs trafficking and the forced displacement of civilians alongside the border. The military concerns, in which the United States funds have been largely invested, are addressed throughout the texts while at the same time other considerations are ignored. There is a clear absence of interest in the situation of both the local Ecuadorian and the Colombian displaced population in those studies. By framing the United States as the country that can “resolve” the conflict, these scholars are using hegemonic framing and categorizing, which not only sustains dominant representations of geo-political relationships, but also focuses on only one of the aspects of the problem and one
way of solving it, while at the same time excluding other salient issues (Moncrieffe 2007: 11).

It is interesting to note that the language these scholars use attempts at delegitimizing both the Colombian and Ecuadorean governments by categorizing them as incapable and weak. For instance, Colombia is portrayed as “exporter of insecurity”, “prospective danger” or “factor of regional instability” (Millett 2002; Stanton 2005; Jaskoski 2012), which, as stated before, may be part of justificatory rhetoric for international intervention or actions that informs the frame of United States as “responsible” and “savior”. The Ecuadorean government is said to be “weak”, “instable” and “failed”. These scholars also insinuate that Ecuador has accepted the presence of the Colombian illegal armed groups in its territory as a way of avoiding direct military confrontation with them. The insinuation is linked to the fact that, unlike Colombia and the US, Ecuador’s government has refused to categorize the FARC and ELN as “terrorists” (which would then force it to act against them).

This is a clear example of how categories are used in binary terms, where the division between “good” (US government) and “bad” (Colombian and Ecuadorean governments) is present. As such, these labels sustain existing geopolitical power relations because they are linked with social, political and economic power in order to secure hegemonic values and meanings (Moncrieffe 2007: 2).

Stanton (2005) is using more neutral language when presenting a general overview of the ways in which the Colombian armed conflict has affected neighboring countries, including Ecuador. Such effects are only mentioned, without in-depth analysis, and this author also focuses on the role of the United States government as a central actor in the Colombian armed conflict, especially through funding for military and the direct participation in the promotion of peace and security in the region.

One of the topics that was not addressed by Ecuadorean scholars but was important for international authors is the economic effects of the Colombian armed conflict on the Ecuadorean border zone, with the use of concepts such as “war economy” or “illegal economy”. For instance, Stanton (2005: 7) notes that the Ecuadorean border “is characterized by an expanding war economy”, which comprises all the activities associated with illegal armed actors such as drugs trafficking, kidnappings and extortion. She particularly notes that there is “the cultivation and sale of illicit crops and the sale of precursor chemicals, […] trafficking of arms and explosives, contraband gasoline, money laundering, prostitution, and the proliferation of businesses set up to provision the illegal armed groups” (Stanton 2005: 7).
5.2.3. Refugees and vulnerability frame

The work by European scholars (Gottwald 2004; Korovkin 2008) is heavily informed by the dynamics of forced displacement and refugee situation of Colombians in Ecuador, while other effects of the violence are not considered. Categories such as “fragility”, “invisibility” and “vulnerability” are used to describe the living conditions of Colombians in Ecuador, especially when referring to the lack of protection from the Ecuadorean government and the exclusion forged by the receptor communities. Indeed, “the unwillingness of the Ecuadorean government to acknowledge the problem and grant international protection” (Gottwald 2004: 518) is said to be the main manner by which Colombian refugees are excluded. Once again, the reiterative use of the vulnerability frame to represent the situation of Colombian refugees is what Gupte and Mehta (2007: 65) identify as an unexpected outcome of categories that sustain dominant frames. In this case, while categorizing refugees as vulnerable allows understanding of their dire living conditions, there is also a danger of homogenizing both the refugee experience and the attitude of local population, and justifying top-down interventions.

The study jointly written by Colombian and Dutch scholars (Barajas and Barten 2011) is aimed at exploring the specific situation of displaced Colombian women living in Ecuador, in terms of access to their basic rights, and discussing the context in which Ecuador became a destination for forced displaced population. They address the situation of female refugees living in Ecuador as a “grey zone of knowledge”, because these women live in invisibility and denial of basic human rights. The authors suggest that academia has ignored the situation of female refuge in Ecuador, arguing that “Colombian displaced migrants in Ecuador have been object of persecution, abuse, and stereotypes, especially women” (Barajas and Barten 2011: 164).

The categories attached to Ecuadoreans in most of these studies are negative, even if explained by the context. For example, the collaboration of the Ecuadorean villagers with the illegal groups is mentioned by some scholars, arguing that the local population is forced to get involved in illegal activities because of the lack of other income or opportunities, as the Colombian conflict has reshaped the dynamics in the border towns of Ecuador. The Ecuadorean government is labelled as restrictive in terms of the migration policies against Colombians and unable to face the rampant flows of forcibly displaced population. These categories become inherently exclusionist and are aimed at simplifying complex realities, which according to Gupte and Mehta (2007: 68) provide “clear ideological constructions of us versus them or even them versus another them”.
5.3. Conclusions

The analysis of publications by Ecuadorean and international scholars provides an interesting variety of the representations. My analysis shows that national background, academic affiliation and specific political context may be related to the dominant political and disciplinary discourses that the authors adhere to. While all authors give importance to national security and the situation of Colombian refugees, making those two issues the most prominent academic topics, the situation of Ecuadorean population affected by the Colombian armed conflict remains invisible for most scholars, even for Ecuadoreans. Most of the authors, contribute to the hegemonic notions of security, and take securitization as their major perspective, ignoring many other possible perspectives. The scholars from the United States seem to be most heavily influenced by the security and military perspectives of their country, portray both Ecuadorean and Colombian states in similar, negative terms, and define the US as a capable provider of solutions. This chapter thus shows how hegemonic discourses in the political and security realms are replicated in, and sustained through the academia.
Chapter 6 : Concluding remarks

The main objective of this research has been to analyze how the effects of the Colombian armed conflict and Plan Colombia on Ecuador are represented in written sources produced by three different kinds of actors: Ecuadorean and Colombian governments, NGOs and supranational agencies and academia. In this regard, my initial assumptions were that each set of actors had different representations and discourses. Moreover, I assumed that the dominant discourses present in state policies were contested by the other actors, especially by academics. Nonetheless, my findings show a surprisingly number of similar discourses, which means that at some point hegemonic discourses are being replicated by both NGOs and academia.

In order to answer the central question: how are the effects of the Colombian armed conflict and Plan Colombia in Ecuador represented by three different types of sources: those produced by the Ecuador’s and Colombian governments, the NGOs working in the area, and the academia? I used three main analytical tools from the discourse analysis: framing, categorization and opacity, which allowed me to identify what is present, excluded and dominant in the different sources. I also set four sub-questions, around which I will draw my conclusions in this chapter.

In relation to my first sub-question: what aspects of the violence are seen as relevant? I found that, despite of the diversity and complexity of the situation faced by Ecuadoreans, particularly in the border zone with Colombia, the sources deliberately select to report only about one or two aspects of the whole context. As such, it was identified that the issues around state security are the most relevant aspect addressed by the different sources. Likewise, the majority of the sources – with the exception of Colombian policies Plan Colombia and Policy of Defense and Democratic Security – place the situation of forced displacement of Colombians as the main effect of violence in Ecuador. This is evident in NGO reports, as well as in academic texts.

In terms of the second sub-question: who is seen as affected in Ecuador and what kinds of effects are singled out? I discovered that in concordance to the previous question, the “affected” in Ecuador are labelled under a general category of vulnerability. Under this category, Colombian forced displaced population is represented as the main affected, but also in risk of being exposed to discrimination and violence by Ecuadoreans. It is important to note, that only, two out of 42 sources selected –INREDH and the Ecuadorean Scientific Commission- analyze in-depth the vulnerabilities faced by Ecuadorean local population, which interestingly are Ecuadorean civic organizations.
Regarding my third sub-question: who is seen as bringing solutions to the problems? Using Cienki’s (2013: 303) metaphor of “state as container”, both Colombian and Ecuadorean governments portray themselves as the ones to provide security, relief and protection to the population. However, it is also interesting to note that the role of the US is also seen as determinant, even in a contradictory way. For the Colombian government, the US is an ally, a “savior”, whose participation is important for bringing peace to the country. This is echoed by the academic texts produced by US scholars, in which the “responsibility role” of that country is clearly stated. On the other hand, the Ecuadorean government presents the US as an “interventionist-imperialist” force, whose participation in Pan Colombia has deeply affected the country and the whole region.

Lastly, my fourth sub-question: what kinds of effects are not discussed? Who and what is absent from the representations? Here, I point out again the lack of references to the situation of the Ecuadorean local population, especially the one living in the border zone. Their situation of forced displacement as a consequence of aerial fumigations, presence of non-state and state armed groups and increasing criminality are barely recognized by international NGOs, state policies and academics. Moreover, not only the “vulnerabilities” of the local population are absent from the discourses, but also the creation of new dynamics of livelihoods of the border towns are not acknowledged, such as the relations with armed groups or criminal groups, the involvement in illicit activities such as drugs cultivation or production, which are also part of the regionalization of the violence.

As a result, my analysis pinpointed the most salient similarities and differences between the representations made by three kinds of actors. In relation to the similarities, it was first noticed that government and academic discourses are similar to the extent that their primary concern is security. Even if they may address it from different standpoints (i.e. human security, national security), it is clear that state hegemonic discourses –securitization- are replicated by academia, not only from Ecuador, but at international level. Second, the way in which the situation of forced displacement and refuge in Ecuador is addressed is very similar in the three groups of sources. Even the Ecuadorean government policies are informed by the same context and terminology to describe the phenomenon of Colombian refugees (i.e. vulnerability, invisibility, discrimination) that NGOs, international aid agencies and academia use to frame their reports and texts. This may explain why the Colombian refugees and vulnerability frame is repeated by the three sources. Third, “otherizing” as a representational practice is present in all the documents herein analyzed. A binary construction of the Self and the Other is evident, where the Other –state, government, neighbor, refugee, local, etc. - is commonly portrayed as dangerous, threatening or unreliable. Again, as Hall (1997) states this is a representation of difference embedded in power relations.
With regard to the differences, I found out that other effects, besides threats to national security and forced displacement of Colombians, are at least acknowledged by Ecuadorean and Colombian academics and NGOs, even if they are not analyzed in-depth. Government policies, international academia and international NGOs ascribe to dominant discourses, while at the same time obscuring some “voices” and contexts.

Therefore, to answer my research question, I refer to Hall (1997) when he states that there is power behind knowledge production and the creation of meaning, what he calls the politics of representation. Even if there are many forms in which the Colombian armed conflict and Plan Colombia have affected Ecuador and its population, the discourses about this topic are depicted around only one or two aspects of the whole situation. Hansen (2006) defines this as less diverse representations where powerful actors, such as the states are able to impose their dominant meanings, in other “marginal political discourses” – i.e. academia and NGOs-. Concerns around security and the resulting securitization and the forced displacement of Colombians are here identified as hegemonic discourses replicated by both NGOs and academia, with a minimum level of contestation by these actors.

Finally, as the analysis has shown, power determines who and what is included or excluded from the representations, as the case of an absent Ecuadorean population demonstrates. But, even if something is included in a text, the representations may still be negative and sustain dominant power relations. This is the case of the vulnerability attached to Colombian refugees, who are constantly portrayed as the Others, which Balibar (2006) points out to be a contradictory process of constructing the Other as passive, lacking agency. Such representation may contribute to more marginalization and dependency.
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